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ABSTRACT 
.A model termed the Focusing Hypothesis is presented. It is propo- 
sed that language processing is shared by an analytic and a holistic 
system, according to a task specific balance of demand and efficiency. 
The analytic system could function alone, but it is more economical, in 
normal communication, for holistic processing to operate up to clausal 
level and analysis to deal with the evaluation of propositions. The 
severe limitations on the abilities of the holistic system originate 
from its use of formulae to recognise familiar words in familiar struc- 
tures. Where problems arise, the analytic system 'trouble-shoots', by 
focusing attention onto the language, at the expense of propositional 
focus. The relative involvement of the two systems is variable, accor- 
ding to the strategy selected from a task specific strategy option 
range; the strategy option range and preferences within it are built up 
as a response to the environmental requirements placed on the individu- 
al. Apparent evidence for left hemisphere lateralised language is re- 
examined in the light of this hypothesis, which proposes that the test 
environment of most psycholinguistic and clinical assessments induces a 
language-focusing strategy and thus deactivates the right hemisphere 
(holistic) mechanisms. It is predicted that careful modifications to 
the methods of test administration could reveal right hemisphere acti- 
vity by permitting it to occur. Support for the hypothesis is drawn 
from the literature relating to neurophysiological (dynamic) studies 
and from the reported symptoms of left and right hemisphere damaged pa- 
tients. Accounts of polyglot (bilingual) acquisition and storage and 
of differential language loss in polyglot aphasia are also examined. 
Output processing is examined with reference to one specific hypothesis 
(Pawley & Syder 1983) which closely aligns with the one for input pre- 
sented by the Focusing Hypothesis. Two experiments attempt to examine 
contrasts in strategy as a function of age (Experiment I) and stimulus 
type" (Experiment II). Neither displays strong patterns of the kind 
predicted to be associated with contrasts in hemispheric superiority 
according to strategy choice, and it is suggested that, despite the at- 
tempt, the experimental designs failed to enable consistent access to 
the proposition-focused strategies held to be operational in normal 
communication, that is, those involving holistic processing. 
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NOTES ON TERMINOLOGY 
1. ANALYTIC AND HOLISTIC 
Analytic processing is contrasted here with holistic processing. Holi- 
stic is used in preference to synthetic even though the terms are lar- 
gely interchangeable in the literature. This distinction is made be- 
cause, according to its etymology, synthesis means 'the construction of 
a whole out of parts', which is at odds with the holistic approach to 
processing described here. 
2. LEFT AND RIGHT HEMISPHERE 
References to the left and right hemispheres are made in lieu of 
the terms dominant and nondominant, which are considered inappropriate 
in the context of the hypothesis presented here. Dominant is widely 
used by others to refer to the left hemisphere, with the dominance re- 
lating to language (as opposed to any other) functions, but the terms 
are problematic in any case (Buffery 1974: 229). Not all individuals 
are left hemisphere dominant for language, but it is generally consi- 
dered that some 96-98% of right handers and 70% of left handers are 
(O'Leary 1982: 55) and, in keeping with current practice, it is this 
majority which is referred to in the discussion. There is an advantage 
in the use of the terms left and right in this way, as it avoids the 
assumption that the remaining 27. of right handers and 30% of left hand- 
ers simply have reversed dominance. Some evidence indicates a bilater- 
ality in some of these individuals (O'Leary 1982: 55). The question of 
how such apparent bilaterality could be accommodated in terms of the 
Focusing Hypothesis is not addressed. 
3. BILINGUAL AND POLYGLOT 
With the exception of chapter 4: 3-4, where the term bilingual is 
used in the context of discussing the theories of others, a single term 
is used to refer to the "condition of all those who are not unilingual" 
(L'Hermitte et al 1966, referring to a definition by Haugen), but that 
term is polyglot and not, as Haugen specified, bilingual. L'Hermitte 
et al's (1966) exploration of the usage of these terms points up some 
(mis) applications such as bilingual for multilingual, and also notes 
that polyglot is primarily used in the medical literature (p. 727). 
They consider that all references to bilingualism should be accompanied 
by details of age, circumstances and mode of acquisition, usage and af- 
fective value for each language (p. 728), which is a practical conces- 
sion to the looseness with which the terminology is generally employed. 
Nevertheless, confusion inevitably pervades the continuing equation of 
bilingual and polyglot, encompassing indiscriminately individuals with 
a range of skills and linguistic experiences, from no more than a lit- 
tle formally acquired knowledge (e. g. Carroll 1980, Chernigovskaya et 
al 1983. Galloway 1981), to simultaneous childhood acquisition (e. g. 
Pichon, cited in L'Hermitte et al 1966). Kotik (1984: 236) and Obler 
(1984: 200) are careful to avoid the too liberal usage of bilingual. 
For attempts to quantify bilingualism see Cooper & Greenfield (1968). 
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Doyle et al (1978) and Lipsky (1978). Ascertaining the standard of an 
L2 is, of course, most problematic in clinical studies, as even the 
patient himself may have little idea whether a language has recovered 
to the pre-aphasic level of competence: 
Some non-native speakers without cerebral trauma might speak like 
Broca's aphasics. (Galloway 1981: 36). 
The term polyglot has been less abused and is preferred for that 
reason. It is deliberately used to refer to all non-monolinguals be- 
cause the Focusing Hypothesis draws its own, separate, distinctions be- 
tween types, by invoking the effect of different preferred acquisition- 
al and processing strategies. The terminology within quotations has, 
of course, not been altered. 
4. MASCULINE PRONOUN AS THE UNMARKED FORM 
In referring to individuals of unspecified gender it is now common 
practice to systematically interchange he and she. to use forms like 
(s)he or he/she or to extend the use of the plural pronoun to the sin- 
gular (though, in this case. the reflexive forms leave the writer lit- 
tle scope to defend themself). In the hope that the important state- 
ments about equality have now been firmly made by others, and in keep- 
ing with the general contention of this thesis, that it is detrimental 
to the evaluation of the propositions to draw the reader's attention to 
the language in which they are expressed (which-these bisexual forms 
probably do), the (hopefully relatively) innocuous masculine pronoun is 
used throughout where an unmarked form is required. This is not inten- 
ded to imply that males are superior, nor that they are sexless. 
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INTRODUCTION 
. The question of hemispheric lateralisation for language has now 
been under examination for more than 150 years. Models of function 
have been closely related to observations made in the aphasia clinic 
and, more recently, in the psycholinguistic laboratory and the neuro- 
surgical unit. The results are both sophisticated and detailed and 
they adhere in general to the Occam's Razor Principle by relating what 
can be observed to anatomical structures in the most straightforward 
way. 
It is the contention of this thesis that certain observations which 
do not easily fit the commonly-accepted models, and which have been as- 
signed secondary importance by invoking random-or. systematic external 
influences on a system, actually form a pattern. This pattern acts as 
a pointer to a new account, 
Previous models have- envisaged linguistic processing as a single 
analytic system, with a peripheral holistic involvement in what is 
termed automatic speech and in certain paralinguistic levels of commun- 
ication. The account presented here proposes that there is a dual sy- 
stem of processing, operating across the gamut of language functions. 
That is. there is the option for either the holistic or analytic hand- 
ling of most levels of language processing. Where accounts so far have 
tentatively mentioned strategy as a confounding factor in a simple ac- 
count, here strategy is considered to be of primary importance, and the 
preference for one strategy over another is seen as one determining 
factor in an individual's range of potential performances in the psy- 
cholinguistic laboratory. the speech pathology clinic and the class- 
room. 
1 
The model itself relates to input processing only, though some re- 
ferences will be made to output too, particularly with regard to the 
aphasic literature. A more formal examination of input and output is 
made in chapter 5: 6. This is done with reference to work by Pawley & 
Syder (1983), whose stronger hypothesis, pertaining to output only, 
both complements the Focusing Hypothesis and is, to a considerable 
extent, rationalised by it. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE FOCUSING HYPOTHESIS 
1: 1 DEFINING TERMS 
1: 1.1 THE DUAL SYSTEM 
The account which follows will be referred to as the Focusing Hypo- 
thesis. This is because, within it, the selection of language process- 
ing strategies' seen to be determined by the FOCUS of the individual's 
attention. 
The dual system to which the account will refer is one which is 
well recognised in the field of psychology. This is the opposition of 
analytic and holistic processing (see, for instance, O'Leary 1982: 64; 
Bogen 1969 and Bogen & Bogen 1969, cited in Van Lancker 1987: 65). Some 
types of information which the brain routinely deals with appear to re- 
quire a specifically analytic approach (e. g. calculation, temporal or- 
der processing (Van Lancker 1987: 64)). We may define analytic in terms 
of the breaking down of large units into smaller ones and/or the build- 
ing up of large units from smaller ones'. This leads to an understand- 
ing and/or identification of a large unit in terms of the relationships 
between its constituent units. 
An analogy of analytic processing might be the construction of a 
mechanical device. The pieces of the machinery must fit together in a 
specific way in order for the machine to work. And it can be dismantl- 
ed, too, by removing the pieces in reverse order. The whole machine is 
complex, but it can be 'understood' in terms of the presence and func- 
1. This is termed in some contexts 'synthesis'. This term, however, is 
avoided here as it is also widely applied to the holistic approach to' 
processing by the right hemisphere (see Notes on Terminology). 
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tion of its components. 
For various reasons which will be described and in some cases chal- 
lenged later, it has been widely assumed that language is and must be 
analytically processed. Language has been described in terms of com- 
plex wholes which consist of combinations of simple constituents. The 
approach to language both of traditional grammars and, more recently. 
of syntactic theory, has been to divide sentences up into smaller units 
and/or to build them up from smaller units. Recent psycholinguistic 
accounts recognise some language-related processing which is not analy- 
tic. This concerns prosodic aspects of language including intonation 
and emotional colour (Van Lancker 1987: 53-4). Making the customary as- 
sociations between analytic processing and the left hemisphere and bet- 
ween holistic processing and the right (see section 1: 10). Van Lancker 
(1987) thus states that, roughly speaking: 
the unit-and-rule kinds of phenomena described by generative gram- 
mars are lateralised to the left hemisphere whereas complex pat- 
terns, not reducible to component parts, are specialised to the 
right hemisphere. (p. 50) 
The left hemisphere knows what is being said while the right hemi- 
sphere knows how it is being said (with what kind of affect, mood, 
or attitude) and who is saying it (what sex, age, and in some 
cases, which person). (p. 54) 
In addition, some now consider certain units of language. especial- 
ly empty phrases and idioms. to be non-analytically processed. Indeed. 
as Van Lancker observes. "the idiom.. . must not be analysed in those 
[i. e. analytic] terms" (p. 67), because this will lead to an inappropri- 
ate, literal interpretation. 
The account presented in the Focusing Hypothesis will not attempt 
to deny that language is ordered according to a constituent structure. 
Neither will it deny that language can be and often is processed accor- 
L 
ding to analytic strategies. But it will be argued that the analytic 
processing of language does not usually occur. 
Holistic processing involves a very different approach to informa- 
a 
tion. Because there is no analysis. it is inevitably difficult to de- 
scribe its operation in analytic terms: 
The only 'explanation' of how you recognize something as a Gestalt 
is that you recognize it as a Gestalt. (Marshall 1981: 72) 
One type of information which appears to be processed holistically is 
visuo-spatial input (e. g. Harris 1978). The appreciation of a three- 
dimensional form, of a route or a location is not achieved by a dissec- 
tion of the input information into constituent units. Similarly, the 
recognition of a face (e. g. Levy 1974: 155-6) does not appear to proceed 
via the separate recognition of the individual features2. 
Although the existence of parallel analytic and holistic systems is 
4 
not generally disputed, no in depth consideration appears to have been 
given to the possibility of their both being involved in linguistic 
processing. O'Leary (1982) summarises the general viewpoint extant in 
the psychological literature as follows: 
It seems reasonable to conceptualize the human brain as a dual 
channel information-processing device. One channel (the left 
hemisphere) processes information in a sequential and linear man- 
ner, while the other channel (the right hemisphere) processes in- 
formation in a wholistic and parallel fashion. The interaction 
between the two channels has not yet been studied in detail. It 
is not known, for example, whether both channels simultaneously 
process all incoming information, or whether some executive mech- 
anism selectively activates the two channels. (p. 65) 
2. In section 1: 10 a connection is made between holistic processing and 
the right hemisphere. One of the shortcomings of such a simplistic 
association is that it tends to imply that one hemisphere is responsi- 
ble for a particular kind of processing. The recognition of faces is 
not achieved by the right hemisphere alone, it seems, but by the com- 
bined action of the two hemispheres, specifically the underside of the 
temporal and occipital lobes of both (Geschwind 1979: 164). See also 
Concluding Remarks. 
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1: 1,2 FOCUS AND INFORMATION PROCESSING 
Focus can, with one exception (described in section 1: 9), be taken 
as an abbreviation for focus of attention. This is in keeping with 
others' definitions, such as Brown (1983): 
to cognise an object in an analytic mode requires a discrete or 
selective type of attention. The perception is built up around 
object features. Conversely, holistic or global perception accom- 
panies a more diffuse attention which is distributed over the ob- 
ject field... The attentional state of the left hemisphere can be 
characterized as focused, and that of the right as diffuse.... 
(p. 48) 
Thus references to focus directly relate to what the analytic mechan- 
isms are occupied with. The conscious individual is probably always 
focusing on something or other. Thus his analytic mechanisms are al- 
ways operating. If one-opts to view analysis in this way. i. e. as an 
exclusive operation, then it becomes clear that the way the world is 
viewed will be highly dependent on what attracts focus; other aspects 
of the input than the focal one must either be processed in some non- 
r 
focal, non-analytic way, or ignored. 
One axiom of the Focusing Hypothesis is that focus on language in- 
hibits focus on anything else. Yet. quite apart from the numerous at- 
her things that are competing for our attention at any given moment, 
language itself consists of many 'layers' of information, from the ba- 
sic acoustic or visual signals right up to the complex ideas which it 
is employed to express. It is proposed that there is a considerable 
limitation on the capacity for more than one of these levels to be fo- 
cal at any one time. 
In what will be termed propositional focus. a process of evaluation 
compares one idea with another in the same discourse sequence (e. g. to 
see if an argument follows logically) or with ideas from elsewhere 
6 
(e. g. our knowledge of the real or some other relevant world). As 
ideas require such evaluation in order to make any contextual sense, 
they can only be handled analytically. If some other level of the in- 
put is focused upon (e. g. the linguistic form) or if focus is upon some 
other unrelated input (e. g. a co-occurring event), then the analysis 
(and therefore appreciation) of the ideas cannot occur. In the terms 
of the Focusing Hypothesis, ideas cannot be assessed in relation to 
each other by means of the holistic mechanisms. Therefore, those to 
which attention is not paid (i. e. upon which there is no focus) will 
not be evaluated at all. 
In the process of dealing with ideas conveyed in language, our at- 
tention is focused upon the nature and interrelationship of the ideas, 
not the form and sequence of the language itself. Thus, an assessment 
of the validity of ideas is most effective when the form of the langu- 
age used to convey them is not permitted to intrude into our conscious- 
ness, because any such intrusion will cause a temporary hiatus in the 
evaluation of the ideas. 
What. then, is happening to the language when the ideas it conveys 
are focal? It is somehow being decoded into large semantic units 
(Ideas or propositions) without drawing any attention to itself. It 
would be fallacious to claim that it follows from this observation that 
the language processing is not analytic but holistic. Any number of 
other accounts could be submitted. These might invoke a semi- or un- 
conscious analytic mechanism3 or a system of parallel analyses in terms 
of which focus was a misleading term. 
3. Unconscious analysis does, in fact, feature in the Focusing Hypothesis 
(see section 1: 9). 
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However, it is not the purpose of this discussion to explore and e= 
valuate these possibilities. Rather, this one specific line of reason- 
ing has been selected for exploration. 
1: 1.3 FORMULAE 
Formulae, according to which the holistic system is considered to 
operate, are not to be equated with clauses. They are templates for 
clauses, which specify the syntactic and semantic relationships between 
constituents. How many of them there are available to an individual 
will depend upon the productivity of the analytic mechanisms in con- 
structing them (see the discussion of acquisition in section 1: 8). The 
selection of a formula is effected by the use of a scanning procedure 
(see section 1: 2) which recognises but does not decode constituents. 
Specifically, it assigns a formula to the clause, usJng word order and 
lexical clues, particularly so-called function words like grammatical 
particles, some morphological patterns and, probably, the verb. It is 
not new to suggest that verbs might be marked in the lexicon for de- 
tails such as transitivity etc. Thus, a formula might look something 
like (1), recognising many essentially 'novel' (i. e. spontaneous) 
strings including (2)-(5): 
1) NP - speak-TENSE - to-NP - about-NP 
2) I've spoken to Henry about the new carpet. 
3) Have you spoken to the gasboard about the leak? 
4) She's going to speak to the committee about Dr. Peterson's conduct. 
5) The Prime Minister will speak to the nation about the state of the 
economy. 
Clearly, much more needs to be said about the mechanisms of formula se- 
lection and decoding (see, for instance, section 1: 6.1 below). At pre- 
sent, however, the precise nature of the formulae is of secondary im- 
portance. Formulae of this kind also figure in Pawley & Syder's (1983) 
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account of processing. described in chapter 5: 6. 
The value of clausal size formulae is that they permit the use of 
semantic information from later in the clause to contribute to the in- 
terpretation of earlier constituents. This means that (in holistic 
processing) ambiguity will not surface if any information in the clause 
specifies the interpretation intended (see the discussion in 5: 2.4). 
Not all formulae will be clause-sized. The scanning procedure (see 
section 1: 2) which enables the recognition of constituents is also en- 
visaged as using formulae and these too could be decoded. But that 
would mark the end of the holistic processing because the output of 
that decoding could not be dealt with further except by the analytic 
mechanisms. To recognise rather than decode constituents, therefore, 
enables the bypassing of costly analytic decoding in early stages. If 
a recipe states "add the flour, eggs and sugar" this is takers to mean 
that all three may be added at once and then stirred in. It is less 
time consuming to do this than to add each ingredient separately and 
stir it in before adding the next. But if the recipe stipulates that 
they must be added and stirred in separately, then this must be done, 
despite the extra effort. In the same way, the Focusing Hypothesis 
proposes that it is less expensive in processing effort to gather a 
number of constituents and decode them all at once than to decode each 
separately and incorporate it into the accumulating clause before the 
next one is decoded. This is because that 'incorporation' is achieved 
by means of evaluating each constituent's value in relation to that of 
others, which requires juxtaposition (see below). Juxtaposition is an 
analytic process, and analysis is more costly than holistic processing. 
The larger the constituent which is finally evaluated, the better, as- 
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suming that the ultimate aim of the processing is to evaluate, * in one 
way or another, those largest constituents (i. e. propositions). If, on 
the other hand, the very focus of interest is the relationship between 
some phonological or syntactic constituent and the others around it, 
then the processing must proceed via a lower-level analysis, even if it 
is costly. 
1: 1.4 ANALYTIC AND HOLISTIC PROCESSING 
The difference between the systems lies in the use or else over- 
sight, for processing purposes, of information about the autonomous se- 
mantic and syntactic function of constituents when they themselves form 
only a part of the unit being decoded. Returning to the analogy of a 
mechanical device, a skilled mechanic could identify the function and 
value of every piece and justify its inclusion within the whole. An 
unskilled worker on an assembly line could also construct the device 
but he would not have the understanding of w the pieces were there 
and how they functionally interrelated. Instead, he would construct it 
in accordance with a formula, that is, a set of instructions which was 
the same every time. In both cases a working machine would result. A 
factory might employ both skilled and unskilled workers but it would be 
a waste of the skilled one's talents if he were employed only to con- 
struct machines which conformed to the formula, as an unskilled worker 
could do this. However, the skilled worker would be invaluable for 
'trouble-shooting' when, for instance, a component was the wrong shape 
or missing, or when a new or less familiar design of machine was being 
constructed. He could locate malfunctions and irregularities in a way 
which the unskilled worker could not. The latter could only identify 
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that the formula was not being adhered to and relinquish his responsi- 
blities to the skilled worker. If the irregularity related to a stage 
which was late on in the construction of the machine, it would be most 
economical of resources for the unskilled worker to construct the ma- 
chine to that point and then pass it over to the skilled worker so that 
the latter was not involved until the specifically problematic stage. 
The more efficient and plentiful the formulae used by the unskilled 
worker, the less often the skilled one would be called upon to inter- 
vene. This would leave him free to deal with other tasks which only he 
could do. 
In holistic linguistic processing as defined in this chapter, se- 
mantic decoding occurs at the level required by the analytic mechan- 
isms, as determined by the focus of attention. In normal communication 
the focus is upon the propositions (see 1: 4). Therefore the holistic 
mechanisms decode up to such a level that propositions are the unit 
which is transferred; this level is the clause. For discussion of why 
the clause is associated with the single proposition, see chapter 
2: 2.3. 
1: 2 THE DYNAMIC RELATIONSHIP OF THE TWO SYSTEMS 
Both types of processing observe constituent boundaries. That is. 
both recognise phonemes, morphemes, words, phrases and clauses. But 
they do so in different ways and they also use in different ways the 
information they compile about an utterance. The holistic mechanisms 
use formulae to recognise constituents but it is only recognition, not 
identification. It is not a process of assigning syntactic or semantic 
status to them, but of assuring that such an assignment. when it does 
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occur, will be trouble-free. They locate the area of the lexicon in 
which searches will occur and they delimit the selectional range of 
structures. Again, an analogy is helpful. 
In a hardware store the customer tells the assistant what he re- 
quires to complete a D. I. Y. job. The assistant makes a list of the i- 
tems, checking each, as it is named, against his stocklist. When he is 
sure that all the items are in stock, he takes the whole list into the 
stockroom and fetches them all together. If an item is not on the 
stocklist, he knows he will not be able to find it in the stockroom. 
In this case he stops the proceedings and tells the customer that the 
item is not available. This is important because without that. item the 
whole job which the customer is preparing to do is jeopardised. The 
checking off of the items against the stocklist is the parallel to re- 
cognition; recognition is not the same as retrieval, but it assures 
that the retrieval procedure will be problem-free. 
So it is that the holistic mechanisms scan the input to assure that 
all the items and structures are recognisable. That such a scanning 
occurs independently of comprehension has been suggested by Garnham 
(1985) and is discussed in chapter 5: 1.6. Some sort of scanning device 
is required in any-case in any processing system which recognises con- 
stituent boundaries, because to be sure that a clausal (or any other) 
boundary has been reached some examination of at least the immediately 
succeeding information must have been carried out. 
Of considerable assistance in the scanning of input in this way 
would be intonation cues. which would help to identify constituent 
boundaries and the relationships of words along an independent parame- 
ter to the as yet unavailable semantic one. This means that the inton- 
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ational information would be used before the semantic. 'and would there- 
fore have more power in the delimitation of the range of*possible'in- 
terpretations. Semantic decoding, when it finally occurred, would be 
effected against a backdrop of the intonational pattern. This predicts 
that where intonational and lexical information contradicted each ot- 
her, precedence would be given, in the interpretation of the utterance, 
to the former. This appears to be what happens in normal communica- 
tion. 
The decoding itself would be postponed until the size of constitu- 
ent was reached which formed the basic unit of focus. Thus, if focus 
were on the propositional level (as in most communication), the holist- 
ic mechanisms would gather the constituents, recognised but not decod- 
ed, up to the level of the clause, and then apply the relevant clausal 
formula to enable the semantic decoding of the whole clause to occur. 
If the focus was on the meaning of the individual words, on the other 
hand, 'then the words would be decoded separately-and-passed to the ana- 
lytic mechanisms for evaluation. If the focus were on the phonological 
or phonetic form, then the words or sounds as required would be sent 
over as single units without any semantic decoding at all. This dynam- 
is relationship is-represented in Figure 1: I As described above, the 
most economical use of the analytic mechanisms is in the juxtaposition 
of propositions as expressed by single clauses. This is effected by 
the passing of each proposition to the analytic mechanisms after it has 
been holistically extracted in a process of clausal level semantic 
decoding. This use of the mechanisms is depicted in Figure 1: I by the 
unbroken line. It is this route which could be referred to as the 
optimal processing route, because it accesses the highest possible 
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level of information for juxtaposition, the proposition, at the least 
cost to the analytic (attentional, focusing) mechanisms. 
However, it has been stated that the analytic mechanisms can become 
involved at lower levels too. Possible alternative processing routes 
incorporating this lower level focus are depicted in Figure 1: I by the 
broken lines. Essentially, the analytic mechanisms 'decide' what is to 
be focal (e. g. the proposition, the syntactic structure, the phonology. 
I 
A N A L Y T I C Ar 
analyser and 
_f _phoneme_ -_- juxtaposer 
_f_ word- ___ 
_f_phrase_ 
--etc_ ----I 
proposition 
FIGURE 1.: I 
input accumulator 
clausal processor 
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of the lexical item, etc. ) and the holistic mechanisms feed in that le- 
vel of ready-processed information. Thus. when there is attention to 
the semantic content of a lexical item, semantic decoding of that item 
will have already occurred holistically; for phonological attention, 
the information will be passed on in phonological form, but already 
cleared of irrelevant phonetic detail. In this way, the analytic me- 
chanisms are never concerned with detail below the level of the focal 
interest and, crucially, that information is not available to them 
without some backtracking and reconstruction. 
As the holistic mechanisms operate by recognising formulae. they 
can equally well recognise when a structure is not familiar, or not 
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manageable. This triggers the intervention of the analytic mechanisms, 
either for -metalinguistic attention, or to juxtapose any items or se- 
quences (in phonological or semantic form as required) up to the size 
of a clause. This process is described in more detail in section 
1: 6.2. 
The conversion of a sequence of phonemes into a word entails the 
sacrifice of the individual phonetic detail; the word adopts a standard 
phonological identity. This predicts that the phonetic detail of, say, 
the regional accent with which words may be spoken is discarded once 
the word has been identified. Any analysis of that accent must, there- 
fore, occur at phonemic level and not lexical level. Similarly, in the 
process of conversion to idea (proposition), the phonological informa- 
tion relating to individual words is lost. This predicts that once se- 
mantic decoding has occurred, the potential to recreate verbatim the. 
exact lexical sequence will depend upon how uniquely the idea can be' 
expressed: synonyms and semantically inconsequential constituent reor- 
derings may routinely occur. Sachs' (1974) work, which indicated that 
information about the form of input is lost after semantic decoding, 
may support this. 
1: 3 'JUXTAPOSITION' 
To recap, the Focusing Hypothesis proposes that there are two sys- 
tems for linguistic processing. the analytic and the holistic. How 
they share between them the decoding of a given sequence of input de- 
pends on what attracts the focus. Focus is an analytic process. and 
holistic processing can operate only on levels below the focal level. 
It is proposed that the evaluation of whatever is focal in relation 
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to other items of the same kind (e. g. proposition with propositions, 
word with words, sound with sounds) occurs by means of the juxtaposi- 
tion of those items. Juxtaposition is not possible for the holistic 
mechanisms as they can deal with only one unit (albeit a complex one) 
at a time. 
The units juxtaposed may be of any type, from sounds, through pho- 
nemes to phonological or semantic representations of words, phrases or 
clauses. The Focusing Hypothesis submits that it is the juxtaposition 
of semantic representations of clauses, containing a single proposition 
(idea) that usually occurs in communicational interaction. However, in 
rhyming poetry the focus might be upon the phonological form of the 
words, with a juxtaposition of words to appreciate rhymes and of larger 
units to appreciate scansion. Similarly, the juxtaposition of semantic 
units smaller than the whole proposition might occur in attempts to de- 
cide on the appropriateness of a word or phrase and to detect parody. 
Where phonetic or phonological information is required, 
juxtaposition of . 
the specific units involved must take place, because 
this information is lost at the time of conversion. Semantic informa- 
tion, however, may be collected either at word level or at any subse- 
quent stage. If the specific requirement is the semantic comparison of 
two words, then word-level juxtaposition must occur. However, if the 
ultimate aim is an accumulation of semantic information to extract pro- 
positions, then it would be inefficient to juxtapose single words, and 
the most- efficient use of the resources would be for juxtaposition at 
the - idea stage. To state it another way, it is considered a poor use 
of the analytic mechanisms to decode individual words semantically and 
then . fit them together, as is suggested 
in some accounts of on-line 
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processing (e. g. Tyler & Marslen-Wilson '1977). In the case of a word 
note being routinely semantically decodable in its clausal context, a 
backtracking procedure could be adopted, whereby lexical-level analysis 
would take place after all. The juxtaposition of ideas may perhaps on- 
ly occur successfully when that word has been clarified and then placed 
in the clausal context. Backtracking in at least the case of phonolo- 
gical (as opposed to written) input must involve, for reconstruction 
purposes. access to a phonological trace. The Focusing Hypothesis 
holds that an abstract phonological representation is normally carried 
to clausal level before semantic decoding takes place. 
If, in circumstances of holistic processing, language is dealt with 
phonologically until whole clauses are semantically decoded, then it 
follows that there has been no point at which a discrete lexical seman- 
tic representation existed. Rather, a word will be inextricably bound 
to its clausal semantic context. This predicts that all ambiguities 
which are clarified within the clause will go unnoticed. However, they 
may, in other circumstances, be identified by either of two means: 
firstly, after semantic decoding, via a phonological reconstruction 
using echos or visual traces from short term memory; secondly, when se- 
mantic decoding occurs, by juxtaposing semantic information at lexical 
rather than clausal level. In the latter case this will be at the ex- 
pense of the juxtaposition of ideas. Thus lexical ambiguities would be 
easily identified if they are being looked for, but would be overlooked 
(if the clausal context disambiguated them) where attention was focused 
on the ideas conveyed in the language. Ambiguity is discussed in depth 
in chapter 5: 2.4. 
The nature of juxtaposition is then, essentially simple. It invol- 
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ves the evaluation of relationships between items, whether they be syn- 
tactic constituents or semantic units. When'the focus is on language 
itself (see section 1: 4 below) juxtaposition will be the means of eval- 
uating syntactic structure in much the same way as any other processing 
account proposes. But when focus in on propositions, then language is 
not decoded by means of juxtaposition but via the application of formu- 
lae (templates) which specify the relationships between the constitu- 
ents in a non-dynamic, rigid way. determined by precedent. That is, a 
clause is attributed syntactic and semantic interrelationships for its 
constituents according to the formula it is mapped onto. 
1: 4 PROPOSITION-FOCUSED LANGUAGE (PFL) AND LANGUAGE-FOCUSED LANGUAGE 
LFL 
Proposition-focused refers to language which is produced and/or in- 
terpreted for its communicational intent, which normally means for the 
ideas which it carries. In PFL, the language itself is a tool, a means 
to an end, and is only of interest insofar as it conveys ideas. It is 
the ideas which are the focus of attention. Via juxtaposition, these 
ideas are analysed at a level which establishes their relationship to 
other ideas and to the individual's knowledge of the real or some other 
relevant world. 
Language-focused refers to 'non-communicational' applications of 
language. This includes listening to speech sounds for their own sake 
(e. g. accent identification), some types of reading aloud (see Conclud- 
ing Remarks), of dictation writing, text-copying, repetition and reci- 
tal, and some instances of the detailed monitoring of one's own output 
(e. g. in L2 production). 
One type of LFL is metalinguistic attention, such as Strawson 
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(1963) employs in order to illustrate the limits of the notion of in- 
consistency: 
Suppose I write on the blackboard the following two pairs of 
sentences: 
i) 'I am under six foot tall' and 'I am over six foot tall' 
ii) 'The conductor is a bachelor' and 'The conductor is married'. 
In writing the sentences on the board I have, of course, not con- 
tradicted myself, for I may have written them there with a purely 
illustrative intention, in giving an English lesson. (p. 3) 
As Strawson illustrates, metalinguistic reference renders the message 
contained within the object of that reference irrelevant to the real 
world. The syntactic form of that language is also firmly contained 
within the quotation marks which surround it and the whole referent is 
embedded into the metalinguistic context as if it were an NP: 
6) Why did you use an 'if' if you were certain? 
7) It is tiresome to write the lengthy 'and so forth'. so we usually 
use an 'etc'. 
Wray (1982) has examined the demarcation of metalinguistic referents in 
some detail. 
1: 5 THEORETICAL OBJECTIONS TO THE HOLISTIC PROCESSING OF LANGUAGE 
[The] creative aspect of language is quite incompatible with the 
idea that language is a habit-structure. Whatever a habit-struct- 
ure is, it's clear that you can't innovate by habit, and the char- 
acteristic use of language, both by a speaker and by a hearer, is 
innovation. You're constantly producing new sentences in your 
lifetime - that's the normal use of language. When you read the 
newspapers or walk down the street you are constantly coming a- 
cross new linguistic structures which you immediately understand, 
which have no feeling of lack of familiarity, but which are never- 
theless not in any definable way similar to others that you've ex- 
perienced before. So much for the notion of habit-structure. 
(Chomsky 1968: 687) 
At first glance, this dismissal on Chomsky's part of 'habit-struc- 
ture' appears to present probably the most obvious and potentially ser- 
sous 'threat to the notion of formulaic processing. However, this is 
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not the case. 
%Chomsky does not draw a distinction between the individual's acqui- 
sition and knowledge of the language on the one hand and his subsequent 
use of it on the other. The Focusing Hypothesis recognises the comple- 
xities of analysis which go into the process of acquisition (see secti- 
on 1: 8 below). Thus there is no quarrel with Chomsky's observation 
that: 
it is quite impossible to formulate as a system of habits or as a 
network of associations the processes which will account for the 
sound-meaning relation that all of us know intuitively when we've 
mastered English. (p. 687) 
But it is proposed that it is wasteful of the analytic mechanisms for 
them to continue to operate on the routine structures of language once 
they have been identified and a linguistic system has been compiled to 
deal with them. 
The Focusing Hypothesis does not deny that units as small as single 
words can be broken down and analysed. Neither does it deny that this 
can and does occur in some circumstances. However, it designates such 
analysis wasteful of the analytic resource, except where that specific 
information is desired or there is no formula to deal with that struc- 
ture. 
The objection which has always been posed to accounts of clausal 
level language processing is that an infinite inventory of sentences 
would be required. If there were not such an inventory, novel senten- 
ces could not be recognised; for sentences which have never been produ- 
ced or heard by a given individual before are quite likely to occur 
(Chomsky 1968: 687). However. it is not being suggested in the Focusing 
Hypothesis that each individual carries around in his head an infinite 
inventory of sentences. The strength of the dual system account is 
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that the non-analytic system. 'justifiably seen to be limited in its ca- 
pabilities, works in tandem with. an analytic system. The old sentence 
inventory account fell foul of the observation that, as a complete list 
of potential sentences is not feasible, there would be no way of deal- 
ing with the unexpected, that is, with any sentence that was not on the 
list (e. g. colorless green ideas sleep furiously). But the holistic 
processing mechanism proposed in the Focusing Hypothesis does have a 
way of dealing with the syntactically unexpected or the semantically 
irregular. It passes the processing over to the analytic mechanisms. 
1: 6 THE OPERATION OF THE HOLISTIC MECHANISMS 
1: 6.1 HOW FORMULAE WORK IN HOLISTIC PROCESSING 
The formulae used by the holistic mechanisms are seen as having a 
constituent structure of the type familiar in phrase structure theory. 
But, to recap, what makes holistic processing different is that, in 
PFL, the constituents are only recognised and are not decoded until the 
clausal boundary. Then the whole clause is taken into account at once. 
It is easier to imagine that language might possess a finite set of 
clausal formulae than that there might be a finite set of possible sen- 
tences. But even so, the existence of recursion in language means that 
the formulae can, in theory, multiply in number without limit. 
Radford (1981) exemplifies five types of recursive agent: the clausal 
complement (8). the relative clause (9), the coordinate (10). the ad- 
jective (11) and the adjective modifier (12). 
8) Fred said that John said that Mary was ill. 
9) I chased the dog that chased the cat that chased the rat. 
10) I met Debbie, Noam, the Dustman and Harry. 
11) John is a sensitive, tall, dark, handsome man. 
12) Debbie Harry is very, very, very, very attractive. 
(Radford 1981: 19f) 
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Of these, (8), (9) and (10) link clauses and so fall outside of the 
proposed abilities of the holistic mechanisms. (11) and (12) are not 
problematic because only short strings of this kind occur in normal 
communication4 
The strength of the formulaic processing account is that it does 
not have to deal within that one framework with all existing linguistic 
structures. Holistic processing as envisaged in the Focusing Hypothe- 
sis relies not on the potential for the unexpected in a given utterance 
but upon the statistical likelihood of the expected. 
This account. then. states that any aspect of an utterance (in in- 
put) which does not strictly adhere to the formulae employed by the ho- 
listic mechanisms will be passed over to the analytic ones for closer 
examination. As the analytic mechanisms are far from standing idly by 
waiting for such a thing to turn up, this new task actually distracts 
them from their other analytic tasks, most specifically the assessment 
of propositions in relation to each other and the real world. 'Thus the 
prediction is made that the appreciation of the underlying propositions 
in an utterance will be hindered by the use of an unexpected word or 
structure. This will occur not only where that word or structure is 
essential to the understanding of the clause, but also where its röle 
is peripheral or even irrelevant. 
It follows that the more efficiently the holistic mechanisms can 
4. That is, longer strings can occur. but do not usually; when they do, 
they draw attention to themselves and thus initiate language focus. 
For example, the person who produces a sentence like (12) is not in- 
crementing the emphasis on the adjective so much as indicating a par- 
ticular (emotional) reaction to the NP. He effects this by using the 
linguistic package as a pointer and 'very' is, in a sense, therefore 
being used 'nonliterally''. 
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deal with input, i. e. "the more words and structures they can routinely 
process, the more efficiently the analytic structures will be able to 
manage the complex sequences of propositions. 
1: 6.2 TRIGGERS TO ANALYSIS 
This section describes how the analytic mechanisms are alerted by 
the holistic mechanisms to operate. As has already been stated, the 
clause, as the unit which contains the proposition, marks the upper li- 
mit of the capabilities of the holistic mechanisms. If the analytic 
mechanisms intervene at a lower level than the propositional one, this 
is because attention was focused there in order to-examine some aspect 
of the language, or because, conversely, some aspect of the language 
was irregular or too complex to be dealt with by the formulae in the 
holistic system. Clausal boundaries are detected by the scanning. of 
the input, so that as items are recognised, landmarks for the formulhic 
structure are pinpointed. These landmarks include some lexical items 
with a specific syntactic röle, e. g. relative pronouns and complementi- 
sers. Intonational cues in speech and punctuation marks in written in- 
put contribute to the definition of structure which enables the selec- 
tion of the correct formula5. 
The analytic mechanisms will be used for linguistic purposes where 
some item or structure surfaces which disrupts the holistic operation. 
This could occur when there was incoherence, lack of fluency or an ex- 
treme complexity of structures. The hearer/reader would be aware of 
taking more notice of the language itself, as a prerequisite for ex- 
5. Cooper & Paccia-Cooper (1980) discuss the role of phonetic information 
in the demarcation of syntactic boundaries. 
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tracting the propositions it conveyed. Other language-focused exer- 
. 
vises might-include appreciating poetry for its rhyme, rhythm, onomato- 
poeia or alliteration; attention to any of these would, once again, be 
expected to make the job of comprehending and juxtaposing the proposi- 
tions more difficult. 
The use of formulae to recognise and decode structures means that 
passive sentences would be dealt with independently of their active 
counterparts. But while the holistic mechanisms could not make any di- 
rect connection between active and passive, the analytic mechanisms 
certainly could, particularly (but not only) if the acquisition of pas- 
sive formulae had involved a procedure which identified the syntactic 
and semantic relationship between them. 
In most multi-clause sentences the clauses are joined together in 
such a way that one or more could not stand alone in its 'surface stru- 
cture' form. There is no problem for the Focusing Hypothesis in accom- 
modating such incomplete clauses in its clausal processing account. 
They can simply be considered to possess their own formula, which car- 
ries minimal syntactic information about the missing constituent. Ex- 
ample (13) is-taken from Radford (1981: 184). 
13) John seems to me to have perjured himself. 
To deal with a sentence like (13) holistically, there would need to be 
two (independent) formulae which contained 'traces'. The occurrence of 
the first clause (John seems to me... ) could instigate an expectation 
for the second, or for a set containing the second. The holistic pro- 
cessing of each clause would occur independently of the other to the 
extent that the semantic link between them would be unspecified. The 
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information passed from the holistic mechanisms for propositional jux- 
taposition would. contain semantic gaps no more specific (even in the 
second clause (... to have perjured himself)) than 'some act, which 
you'll find in place x in the next clause' and 'someone, which you'll 
find in place y in the previous clause'. The holistic mechanisms could 
have, so to speak, no memory of the identity of the subject of the pre- 
vious clause as they processed the subjectless succeeding clause. 
The same approach can be taken in dealing with embedded clauses: 
14) The long list of instructions that you left me got eaten by the 
cats. 
At each clausal boundary a formula would be identified which included 
something rather like a trace or at least some recognition of the 'pa- 
rasitic' environment: 
15) The long list of instructions t 
16) (that) you left me t 
17) t got eaten by the cats 
Juxtaposition would relate the three semantically. In constrast, the 
holistic semantic decoding of each individual part-clause would not in- 
volve any direct identification of t (or the antecedent of 'that') in 
relation to anything that had already been processed (because the holi- 
stic mechanisms cannot juxtapose semantic units). There would only be 
non-specific pointers saying, for instance: 
17') t (to be restituted from the initial part-clause) got eaten by 
the cats 
1: 7 FORMULAE IN LANGUAGE PROCESSING 
As already stated, the principle of operation for the holistic pro- 
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cessing of language is that although language has the potential for un- 
predictability, it is, the majority of the time, predictable within 
certain definable bounds. Therefore, while no specific or formulaic 
inventory could deal with every aspect of grammatical (and, of course, 
ungrammatical) language use, such an inventory could perform a valuable 
function in coping with what we might term routine processing. 
Routine processing is not intended to refer only to the handling of 
those empty phrases and idioms which are commonly termed automatic Ian- 
guage. One of the characteristics of automatic language is that it is 
low in semantic content and not 'propositional' in the sense of convey- 
ing novel ideas in a custom-built linguistic package (Van Lancker 1972: 
24). Rather, we are speaking here of novel as well as idiomatic ex- 
pression, so long as the constructions involved are recognisable as 
conforming to one of the formulae. A more detailed examination of the 
term automatic language can be found in chapter 2: 2.2. 
1: 8 THE ACQUISITION OF FORMULAE 
Where do these formulae originate? Not from a simple process of 
observation, that is clear. Even in the light of observations like 
Moskowitz's (1985) that, in fact, nothing like as many of the utter- 
ances directed at the child as often claimed are ungrammatical or even 
unduly complex, it is clear that any account of formulae acquisition 
must not attribute too large a röle to raw observation, even cumulative 
raw observation. 
It is proposed here that a formula is constructed as the result of 
observation and rule-building by the analytic mechanisms. This means 
that there is a system underlying the construction of formulae, which 
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successfully prevents an ungrammatical string being judged grammatical 
and incorporated into the processing inventory simply by virtue of 
something as perverse as the Bellman's rule of three. 
6,7 
Where the Focusing Hypothesis parts company with the more tradi- 
tional views of language acquisition is in what it considers is done 
with the information amassed. Implicit in most accounts of language 
learning is that routes to the decoding of input and encoding of output 
are forged and then adhered to for the rest of the individual's commu- 
nicatory life. The sole exception to this is that idioms are somehow 
immune to the original breaking down procedure and are reproduced as a 
package when required for output. Idioms are considered to be excep- 
tions because they are "transformationally defective" (Weinreich 1969, 
quoted in Van Lancker 1972: 28), often have an idiosyncratic and/or ana- 
chronistic structure and, most particularly, are "low in semantic con- 
tent" (Van Lancker 1972: 28). 
The analytic system constructs hypotheses about language, simple at 
first, and then increasingly complex, until one is found which can deal 
with the adult language8. 
The other, holistic, system is not equipped to deduce rules from 
data, to deal with new information or to perform according to analyti- 
6. "What I tell you three times is true" (Lewis Carroll, 'The Hunting 
of the Snark, Fit the First, stanza 2; also Fit the Fifth, stanza 8-9. 
7. As the child continues to focus on propositions while it analyses 
language in an unconscious manner, it is proposed that there is an 
'unconscious analysis' which complements language focused conscious 
analysis. This is described in section 1: 9. 
8. In fact, as discussed presently, it could be that some aspects of 
syntax and some items of vocabulary never become integrated into the 
final set of formulae, and require specific recall; it could be tenta- 
-"tively suggested that this 'shortfall' of holistic 'knowledge' in re- 
lation to analytic 'knowledge' forms the basis of the performance- 
competence dichotomy. 
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cal procedures. However, it is highly efficient at applying sets of 
immutable formulae, even ones which are internally highly complex. 
Thus, these two systems are functionally complementary. Once the 
analytic operations have produced a hypothesis containing a finite num- 
ber of patterns for the cooccurrence of constituents, these can be most 
effectively applied holistically. This frees the analytic system to 
home in on other input features, including occurrences of new vocabul- 
ary and any so far unanalysed structures. In addition. it can take 
note of input constructions (including the corrections of adults (see 
below) which the current hypothesis does not generate and, in time, use 
that information to form a new hypothesis. Crucially. however, this 
new information cannot be used in spontaneous output until it has been 
incorporated into a new hypothesis. Until the analytic system has con- 
structed new rules to generate the new structure and has passed these 
on, in the form of a closed set hypothesis, to the holistic system, 
production (except in the case of deliberate repetition or of attempts, 
on the part of the analytic system, to use a half analysed structure 
for particular effect) continues to proceed according to the old hypo- 
thesis. An analogy might be the continued application of a law as laid 
down in the Statute Books. while parliamentary debate takes place re- 
garding its substantial alteration or abolition. 
The acquisition of formulae is considered, then. to proceed in the 
following manner. In much the same way as is proposed in other ac- 
counts of acquisition, the child observes input and constructs rules. 
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The' first rules are simple and enable only the production of one-9 or 
(later) two-word utterances. However, the signs of production compe- 
tence eclipse the importance of the considerably greater comprehension 
ability of the young child. This advanced comprehension forms the ba- 
sis for the development of the dual system. 
.. ---The- very- first communicational elements which the baby appears to 
respond to and to reproduce versions of in its own output are the fa- 
cial expressions and intonational contours in the speech of the mother 
and/or other caretakers. Both of these are considered to be processed 
in adulthood by the holistic mechanisms of the right hemisphere (Code 
1987: 99ff, Geschwind 1979: 165, Heny 1985: 171). It seems, then, that 
the backdrop against which the first verbal elements are decoded. is one 
of holistically processed information. In accordance with Piaget's10 
principle of using old, familiar information to contextualise the new 
(Moskowitz 1985: 57). the first hints of what the mother's words may 
mean comes from understanding the general emotion being expressed. 
The Focusing Hypothesis utilises the principle of focus on the 
new, an analytic procedure, in the context of holistically processing 
the old, and considers that this principle applies not only to that 
prevocal stage but throughout language acquisition. 
The observations which form the basis of the child's first utter- 
ances must clearly be in some way independent of the processes of com- 
9. The question of whether one-word utterances have an underlying syn- 
tax is not settled. See, for instance, Bloom (1973) who argues that 
they-do not: "There is simply no evidence that children have knowledge 
of linguistic structure before they use structure in their speech" 
(p. 131); Greenfield & Smith (1976) challenge the assumption that one- 
word utterances are as simple as they look. 
10. Greenfield & Smith (1976: 221) attribute this maxim to Werner & Kaplan 
(1963, e. g. p. 175). 
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prehension. Evidently, not all of the information available to the 
child as he hears and decodes an utterance is" available to-him"when he 
attempts to construct one. The child's ability to analyse the language 
around him and therefore to identify those lexical items which convey 
the ideas which he wishes to express, appears to be restricted to iso- 
lated words taken from within a context of given information. That is 
to say, from understanding the general drift of an utterance, which the 
Focusing Hypothesis proposes he does holistically, he is at liberty to 
'home in' (or focus) on a particular element for analysis, to study its 
sounds and more exact meaning. It is submitted that it would not be 
possible 'for such analysis to succeed if it were not for that backdrop 
of comprehension. And, furthermore, if that backdrop were produced by 
means of analysis at the time, this would make the job of isolating 
target items for potential production considerably more difficult. 
Much as any other account of acquisition, it is proposed that hypo- 
theses are constructed and that production proceeds according to them. 
In the initial stages these will be hypotheses about the applicability 
of words, later about possible combinations of words. However, the Fo- 
cusing Hypothesis adds the following: 
When a hypothesis has been formulated, it is transferred, as a set 
formula, to the holistic mechanisms, which operate it without any 'ap- 
preciation' of how it came to be constructed. To use an analogy not 
quite identical to the one presented earlier, it is like the process of 
constructing a complex machine which, once made, can be managed by an 
unskilled operator with no comprehension of how it works, only a know- 
ledge of how to switch it on and what the end product will look like. 
The value of transferring hypotheses would lie in the freeing of 
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the analytic mechanisms for the next stage of analysis. There would be 
no conflict, then, between the comprehension and production of utter- 
ances according to the transferred hypothesis and the focusing upon new 
items or more complex structures that would be required for the con- 
struction of the next hypothesis. One important prediction of this ac- 
count is that recently acquired information about shortfalls in the 
current production hypothesis, whether inferred or taught to the child 
by an adult, would not be immediately incorporated into the production 
of the child. This is because the old hypothesis would continue to op- 
erate, independently and without regard to the new information or its 
relevance, until a new hypothesis had been formed (on the basis of suf- 
ficient data and a logical system) and transferred. At this point the 
old hypothesis would be over-ridden and the differences between the old 
and the new become evident in the production of the child. In the 
terms of the analogy, the machine operator would continue to perform 
his tasks on the old machine, quite oblivious of new breakthroughs in 
engineering and machine design. until one day there was a new machine. 
ready-designed and operational, to replace the old. This would result 
in a gap between the learning of a new word or structure and its ap- 
pearance in performance. Moskowitz (1985) reviews reports of the appa- 
rent failure on the part of children to take account of linguistic cor- 
rection by their parents (see also Brown 1973a). But, as they do pre- 
sumably ultimately develop the adult usage, it is equally plausible to 
suggest that the information is shelved rather than ignored. The dual 
systems account proposes that new information has no direct way of en- 
tering the normal holistic processing system. which uses immutable for- 
mulae. Instead, it must be stored up until it is surrounded by a large 
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enough corpus of systematic supportive evidence to enable a new hypo- 
thesis to be formed. When that is adopted by the holistic mechanisms. 
new structures will begin to appear quite naturally, being either adult 
forms or forms laid down by a new temporary working hypothesis. 
This proposed scenario of hypothesis construction, transferal and 
the accumulation of new information to create a new hypothesis, pre- 
dicts that language development will occur in a pattern of punctuated 
equilibrium rather than entirely smoothly. However, this may be ob- 
scured by simultaneous progress being made in several hypotheses and 
also by the necessity for several different hypotheses to be construc- 
ted and superceded before the adult rule is finally approximated. 
To invoke a process of punctuated equilibrium in the acquisition of 
formulae entails the following pattern. At any moment there is a set 
of formulae already constructed and a remainder, i. e. a body of infor- 
mation not yet incorporated into a formula. In time, enough of the 
same type of information may be in the remainder for a new formula to 
be constructed to replace the one already in operation. This will re- 
move all the relevant 'loose data' from the remainder but leave other 
items and structures which have not yet been rationalised in terms of 
the system. As more and more formulae equate with adult norms. the ac- 
quisitional process will slow down and very few new items will become 
added to the remainder. But it may also be that not all items ever get 
incorporated into formulae at all, because they have occurred too rare- 
ly to be adequately supported by additional observations, or because 
they were part of an alien system which was never fully rationalised. 
These structures or items would be understood, if and when they occur- 
red, only by the analytic mechanisms, which could probably make a fair 
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attempt at working out their function in the context, but only, of 
course, by focusing upon them. As there would not be-any-formula to 
deal with them, the holistic mechanisms would not recognise them in the 
initial scan and this would be the trigger to focus. Furthermore, if 
it were to be the case that the same hypotheses operated for output as 
well as input processing (and Pawley & Syder's 1983 work suggests that 
this may be largely so, see chapter 5: 6), then remainder items and 
structures would not be available for use in the production of proposi- 
tion-focused language, only for language-focused language. In other 
words, they could be produced. but only if the primary focus was meta- 
linguistic. This is reminiscent of Krashen &. Pons' (1975) observations 
regarding an. L2 monitor user, as cited by Krashen (1978). Krashen 
(1978) quotes and expands on Krashen & Pons' (1975) comments as 
follows: 
The fact that the vast majority of [the subject's] errors were 
self-correctable suggested that 'she had a conscious knowledge of 
the rules' but did not choose to apply that knowledge. '... In wri- 
ting, and in careful speech, she utilizes the conscious linguistic 
knowledge of English, while in casual speech she may be too rushed 
or preoccupied with the message to adjust her output'[Krashen & 
Pons 1975: 1261. (Krashen 1978: 178) 
It is proposed in the Focusing Hypothesis that the mechanisms which 
effect acquisition are not lost or dismantled but rather remain 
throughout the individual's life. However, certain external factors 
may tend to prevent their operation. Some of these could be associated 
with general cognitive development and change and, it cannot be certain 
that these latter play absolutely no part in, for instance, the alleged 
tendency for adults to be bad at foreign language learning. One major 
factor possibly responsible for a change in the way language is proces- 
sed is literacy. By the time the child begins to read and write in 
33 
earnest, he has mastered his language to quite a complex level and can 
express. himself via hypotheses which largely-resemble-those of the ad- 
ults around him. In one sense we could say that literacy teaches him 
nothing new except graphemes. It shows him how to write down what he 
already knows about, that is, sounds, words and combinations of words, 
all of which have manifested themselves as distinct entities during his 
linguistic development. But literacy is, of course, more than that. 
It involves the abstraction of what was, before, fully contextualised. 
At the very least, it bridges the gap between what was unconscious 
knowledge. the domain of the language faculty. and conscious knowledge. 
It adds, alongside linguistic knowledge, metalinguistic knowledge. 
This is perhaps most acutely observable where the school teaches a 
standard language which does not entirely coincide with the vernacular 
spoken by the child. The child's school success depends upon his abi- 
litt' (in the classroom at least) either to monitor his output and to 
alter it to fit the new standard (cf. the discussion of Krashen in 
chapters 4 and 5), or to alter his own production hypotheses, i. e. to 
adopt the standard as his own (though not necessarily his only) norm. 
The latter will only be possible in the presence of the conditions 
which have previously. enabled the creation of a new hypothesis, i. e. 
enough information to establish a system and enough motivation to do 
so. It is suggested that in the former case the analytic mechanisms 
will remain involved in monitoring language, to the detriment of the 
other activities it could be embarking on. e. g. the acquisition of new 
words and structures and the development and analysis of ideas. 
However, all individuals in the education system, whether they ex- 
perience the vernacular-standard conflict or not, will be required, to 
r 
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some extent, to monitor and analyse linguistic material which might 
otherwise have been dealt with entirely holistically. For output, this 
would make the task of expressing ideas more difficult, because both 
the processing and the manipulation of propositions would be competing 
for the same functional mechanisms. The tactic of monitoring tends to 
be adopted in this environment because of the constant correction and 
improvement which the child receives in the classroom in relation to 
the form of his expression on paper, including the numerous unwritten 
'rules' which characterise written as distinct from spoken language 
(cf. Perera 1986). This increased (conscious) awareness of the struc- 
ture of the language may, when L2 classes begin, contribute to a ten- 
dency to analyse and to compare L1 and L2, even in an immersion situa- 
tion. Formal L2 tuition positively encourages this (see chapter 5). 
4 
1: 9 STRATEGIES 
The Focusing Hypothesis places great significance on the brain be- 
ing multi-systemic and programmable. The blue print for language, to 
use a Chomskian term, is seen as non-specific, determining approaches 
to learning which enable certain types of sense to be made of the 
world, but not determining what is learnt. What is learnt and which 
approach to learning is selected is decided by the environment in which 
the individual is placed. Those'things perceived as important will be 
singled out for learning. Some things may be most successfully ap- 
proached holistically. Others may require, or be presented as if they 
require, analysis, and then analytic processing will be preferred. 
There is more than one way of learning and/or processing a piece of in- 
formation and the brain has the capability to use all those ways. But 
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in any given circumstance it selects one as the most economical; in 
consideration of the kinds of responses which need to be made. As one 
example, returned to later, the child manifests a high profile for ho- 
listic processing during L1 acquisition because this makes the most e- 
conomical use of the holistic and analytic mechanisms in spoken commu- 
nication. When it is faced with learning literacy skills, however, 
that precise sharing of functions is no longer as uniformly valid and 
the child has to learn to focus onto language at specific points in 
order to meet the new demands of the environment. 
Strategies, which will be often referred to in subsequent chapters. 
are combinations of holistic and analytic involvement. That is. the 
term strategy is not used here to refer to an analytic or holistic op- 
eration per se, but to a combination of the two, selected as most 
appropriate for the specific task in hand. For example, a young child 
learning to write may employ holistic processing with propositional fo- 
cus for formulating the sentence to be written, analytic processing 
with language focus for writing it and checking it, and holistic pro- 
cessing with propositional focus coupled with a lexical focus (thus 
placing a high load on the analytic mechanisms) for reading it through. 
This entire pattern would be termed a strategy. 
The range of strategies available for coping with a task will be 
determined by the precise results which the individual has learnt to 
access from that task. When tired, or writing a difficult passage, an 
adult might use the same strategy as has been described above with re- 
ference to the child. But he will also be capable of writing a sen- 
tence down without language focus, because he has learnt to automatise 
the transcription of lexical representations in the brain onto the 
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page. If he is prone to bad spelling, he may have taught himself to 
check every word as he writes it. But if he is not a bad speller, he 
will not have had to learn to do this. If he is writing in a foreign 
language he may have taught himself to focus at the syntactic or mor- 
phological level etc. Although such habits might become engrained, 
they would be avoidable too, as other strategies remained available. 
But the more automatically one was selected in preference to the rest, 
the more economical the whole operation to achieve the goal. If the 
goal changed, the individual would have to retrain himself to select a 
different strategy, one that perhaps felt unnatural for a while, but 
which would soon become the preferred one, leading with least effort to 
the new goal. 
In many cases, several strategies could be retained as-preferred 
options, because a selection of different goals remained desirable. 
This can be exemplified with reference to learning music. 
Both the conceptual and motor operations that every person is cap- 
able of learning will be mastered only by those who 'teach' their brain 
to handle them. One such motor skill is playing the piano, which re- 
quires the translation of a written code into unique sequences of pre- 
cise motor activity. But the recognition of harmonies is a conceptual 
skill, which is not simply a matter of hearing differences between tun- 
ed chords, but of being able to categorise them according to their com- 
ponents. For the trained musician, listening to harmony componentially 
is an option amongst a range of potential strategies when he hears mu- 
sic. The other options include ignoring it, listening to the melody, 
listening to the tuning, enjoying its emotional impact etc. The last 
of these options has been associated with right hemisphere holistic 
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processing, while those which involve a specific level of attention and 
evaluation are associated with the left hemisphere (Bever & Chiarello 
1974). Untrained musicians will not have that range of options - they 
may enjoy music for its emotional impact but have little facility for 
paying attention to specific aspects of the tune or harmony because 
they have never learnt to do this. What variables operate to lead to 
one strategy choice over another could differ greatly from musician to 
musician. Those who are highly critical, or who spend all their work- 
ing lives being analytical, (e. g. instrumental teachers who do not per- 
form), might have an automatic tendency to discard the option of holi- 
stic processing for access to the emotions and impressions conveyed by 
a piece of music, and may never listen to music simply for enjoyment. 
Others may have retained that option and be able to bypass the analysis 
and enjoy music even if it is not technically perfect. For brief gen- 
eral reviews of research into hemispheric activity in music processing 
see Harris (1978: 421-5) and Code (1987: 92f). 
It is contended that in language processing in adults the optimal 
strategy would be the one which kept analytic focus on the proposition- 
al level while the holistic processing dealt with the language up to 
the clausal stage. But other strategies would be available and would 
be preferred where the desired outcome of the task was different (see 
section 1: 3). Crucially, however. the range of strategies would depend 
on how many the individual had needed to develop to meet specific de- 
mands; the monitoring strategies of the literate individual would not 
have been developed by an illiterate. The preference amongst the stra- 
tegies would depend on the individual's priorities when faced with a 
task which could be processed to produce different results relating to 
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its various levels. The most preferred strategy in the range would be 
selected by default. In addition, selection within the range might be 
restricted by the virtual exclusion of some options, because a single 
preferred option was exclusively employed for some reason. For exam- 
ple. someone who was very self-conscious might always select a self- 
monitoring option, even if one involving a. less-self-conscious approach 
was actually more conducive to the desired results (cf. in this respect 
also Krashen 1976,1978, Krashen & Terrell 1983 on Monitor use in L2). 
It is clear that in L1 acquisition the analysis which occurs in 
making sense of input and the construction of hypotheses is not consci- 
ous and does not require attention to be paid in some metalinguistic 
manner. Unconsious analysis is considered here to be a left hemisphere 
function and to compete for processing space with other levels of ana- 
lysis, so that it will be easier for a child to understand the proposi-. 
tional content of an utterance in a familiar structure (holistically' 
decoded) than in one which is still being dealt with by the mechanisms 
of unconsious analysis. 
Clearly, the acquisition strategy utilising unconscious analysis 
would be used less for learning after childhood, but would still be 
available for the occasional encounter with an. unknown word (to extract 
the meaning from the context) or, more rarely, structure. However, it 
might be frequently useful for identifying words which were obliterated 
by extraneous noise etc. (and it would be valuable in L2 'acquisi- 
tion'll). In, say, a noisy room, then, a strategy involving unconsious 
11. This is a technical term used with reference to L2, which contrasts 
with 'learning', as defined by Krashen (e. g. 1976). Where 'acquisi- 
tion' is written without inverted commas, it is intended in a neutral 
sense. 
7 
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analysis might be operational just to enable some kind of comprehen- 
sion. This would, like L1 acquisition, not involve conscious attention 
to the form of the utterance, but a certain approach to the information 
that was heard, to create hypotheses about the likely propositions and 
try to assign identities to the unheard items. Once identified, the 
proposition could be confirmed and added to the contextual information 
being used to assist in the predictions. This association of an every- 
day adult processing strategy with the one used for acquiring L1 and L2 
seems plausible; the process of acquiring a language does require pro- 
positional projection of this kind, using given information to access 
12 the values of new items (Moskowitz 1985: 57). 
Other strategies may develop less naturally. If we must be taught 
to recognise and identify harmonies, perhaps we must also be taught to 
focus on specific levels of language which will be useful to us in a 
certain environment. Many aspects of western style education may pro- 
vide such a training, which encourages the development of and prefer- 
ence for certain strategies, beginning with literacy itself. A child 
must be taught to read and write and in the process learns to formally 
identify words and. if his language is alphabetic, to break words up 
into sounds. What has until then been achieved by a proposition-focus- 
ed unconscious analysis and, subsequently, a holistic execution, is now 
brought into the domain of conscious analyis and metalinguistic aware- 
ness. The literate individual's formal knowledge of his language in 
this respect is. inevitably. greater than the illiterate person's. His 
knowledge of a formally taught L2 may be even greater. 
12. Is this perhaps why we (allegedly) tend to shout at foreigners. as if 
they failed to understand because they missed hearing some key words? 
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The tuition which the child receives in school to help him express 
himself better on paper involves, as one example. the-highlighting, in 
the form of corrections, of certain phrases and spellings which are not 
'acceptable'. Thus he must learn, if he is to be successful at school, 
to recognise and avoid those items and to use the ones which have been 
pinpointed as 'good'. This requires a certain kind of monitoring of 
his own production, so that certain phrases which he formulates. and 
which may be perfectly acceptable in speech, do not find their way onto 
paper. Later, he may be taught to rephrase and precis and also to id- 
entify rhyme. onomatopoeia, alliteration and metaphor. All of these 
will contribute to an awareness of different levels of language; and an 
awareness that they exist is, perhaps. a prerequisite to focusing upon 
them. 
The above discussion suggests that education may be one of the fac- 
tors operating to produce cross-subject differences in performance on 
certain tasks which require strategies not necessarily within some peo- 
pie's strategy range. Where these tasks have been devised by individu- 
als who have themselves been successful in the educational environment 
(e. g. psycholinguistic tasks and I. Q. tests) they may. mostly give an 
advantage to-those using the same strategies, learned in that same en- 
vironment. In other tasks, an analytic strategy may be a disadvantage 
if attention to the operation itself is detrimental to its completion. 
Many things. (e. g. driving etc. ) may come under this heading, charac- 
terised often by the remark that the only way to do well in them is to 
relax. Those who 'think too much' may. by adopting an analytic strate- 
gy, prevent the operation of the very mechanisms required to do the 
task well. 
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It is a natural extension of this general discussion that attention 
to language would involve a strategy which'altered the whole approach 
to the task of communication. One potential expression of this could 
be the effect that linguistic focus would have on the subject of a psy- 
cholinguistic experiment or on the aphasic patient during systematic 
tests of linguistic ability, as discussed in chapter 5: 3. 
1: 10 THE RIGHT AND LEFT HEMISPHERES 
Up to now. no firm association has been made between the analytic 
and holistic systems and the left and right hemispheres respectively, 
even though it is customary to do so (see below). There are some good 
reasons why it would be preferable not to do so at all, as Gazzaniga 
(1977) points out: 
[The] popular psychological interpretations of mind left and mind 
right are not only erroneous: they are also inhibitory and blind- 
ing to the new students of behavior who believe classic styles of 
mental activity break down along simple hemispheric lines. (p. 416) 
Gazzaniga makes this remark in the context of attempting to redress the 
balance regarding the current profile which the notion of differential 
hemispheric function tends to enjoy. He refers to the "overpopulariza- 
tion of much of the basic data that Roger Sperry and I first reported 
some sixteen years ago" (p. 415) and the failure of "those not directly 
involved in split brain research" to take adequate notice of later fin- 
dings, whose variance from the previous ones he attributes to "improved 
methods of lateralizing stimuli" (p. 417) and which indicate not simply 
that the right hemisphere can perform a considerable range of linguist- 
ic and logical functions after all (p. 417,419) (see chapters 3: 5.3 and 
5), but that the most major confounding factor in the supposedly sup- 
portive data of lateralisation studies emanates from a tremendous mea- 
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sure of individual variation. In keeping with Gazzaniga's view, then, 
it would be overly simplistic to associate analytic functions with the 
left hemisphere and holistic ones with the right in such a straightfor- 
ward way. But unless some association is made between them. there ex- 
ists no basis for addressing the clinical and psycholinguistic data 
which operates in terms of relative hemispheric participation under 
different conditions and/or in the face of different stimuli. It is 
because of this and, in particular, the mileage which can be obtained 
in support of the Hypothesis from an examination of its relationship to 
the findings of these research areas (see chapter 5). that, that associ- 
ation is now to be made. However. it still remains fundamentally a se- 
condary one. In what follows. one or two issues raised by the bridging 
of the great divide between abstract concepts and physiologically per- 
tinent empirical evidence are discussed. 
The association between the left hemisphere and analytic processing 
modes and the right and holistic modes appears in more than one guise 
and is, in an indirect sense, traceable back to the observations of 
Hughlings Jackson in the 1860's (see chapter 2: 2.2). who proposed, in 
the light of clinical observations, that the left hemisphere was capa- 
ble of all linguistic functions, and the right hemisphere able to deal 
with "the automatic use of words" (Hughlings Jackson 1874: 130). The 
association was indirect only, for he did not make the final link of 
characterising the production of automatic language as holistic. Since 
then, however, research appears to have justified a more direct associ- 
ation, at least with regard to input processing. For example, with re- 
ference to Japanese, Code (1987) says: 
... findings... strongly suggest that the right hemisphere is super- 
ior in its abilities to deal with holistic kanji script while the 
left hemisphere is better able to deal with segmental kana script 
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.... (p"55) 
The work of Bogen in the late 1960s (Bogen 1969, Bogen & Bogen 
1969, cited in Code 1987) and the early clinical observations of Gaz- 
zaniga & Sperry amongst others (Gazzaniga 1977: 415) promoted the notion 
of separate hemispheric functions characterised by propositional (left) 
versus appositional (right) processing modes. Research of various 
kinds supported this, with subsequent reports like the following: 
While the left hemisphere seemed to analyse the stimulus proper- 
ties, the right hemisphere seemed immediately to abstract the sti- 
mulus Gestalt - that is, as an integrated whole. (Levy 1969: 614) 
Associated with this was the proposal that the left hemisphere had a 
preferential relationship with consciousness and self-awareness (Popper 
& Eccles 1977: 304; see also Bever 1983: 34), but this, like other as- 
pects of the old mind left - mind right idea (Gazzaniga . 1977: 
416) has 
been rejected in favour of more integrated accounts such as Brown's 
(1983) and Sperry's (1984): 
the conscious mind is normally single and unified. mediated by 
brain activity that spans and involves both hemispheres.... In the 
normal state the two hemispheres function together as a very 
closely integrated whole, not as a double, divided, or bicameral 
system. (Sperry 1984: 669, quoted in Code 1987: 4) 
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2: 1 INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER TWO 
THEORETICAL ISSUES 
Two major theoretical issues will be dealt with in this chapter. 
The first is terminology and will concern the similarities and differ- 
ences between the usages of terms in the Focusing Hypothesis and else- 
where. 
11- 
The second issue involves the contribution which the Focusing Hypo- 
thesis offers to some specific aspects of semantic and syntactic the- 
ory. 
2: 2 TERMINOLOGY 
2: 2.1 VOCAL ISATI ON -FOCUSED LANGUAGE 
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Proposition-focused language (PFL) and language-focused language 
(LFL) were defined in chapter 1: 4. Vocalisation-focused language (VFL) 
r 
lies, in one sense, between the other two. It covers language use 
which is neither language-focal per se nor used directly for the commu- 
nication of ideas. In VFL the purpose of the utterance is to vocalise 
for some self-fulfilling reason, that is, to 'speak for the sake of 
speaking'. In VFL the semantic content of the utterance is irrelevant. 
Examples of VFL include the vocalisations associated with testing a mi- 
crophone, exclamations of the kind which are just as likely to be ut- 
tered when the speaker is alone as when someone else is present, and, 
possibly, some utterances produced by the young child. Moskowitz 
(1985) cites the example of a two and a half year old who repeatedly 
asked the question "why? ' and was as satisfied with irrelevant replies 
such as "Because the moon is made of green cheese" as with relevant 
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ones. She contends that this type of exchange was a crucial part of 
t 
the acquisitional process for that child, during which he "practise[d] 
the form of social conversation before dealing with its function" 
(p"53). It is proposed here, however, that this may be an example of 
VFL, that is, a device for gaining the security of hearing an adult 
voice and knowing that the adult had not forgotten him. If so, then 
there was no linguistic or propositional aim, on the child's part, to 
the interaction. 'Speaking for the sake of speaking may also cover va- 
rious other types of utterance, such as some greetings etc. (see sec- 
tion 2: 2.2). 
The terms PFL. LFL and VFL have been carefully chosen to avoid as 
far as possible potential confusions when the proposed account is comp- 
ared with the ideas of others. In the following discussion, an attempt 
will be made to clarify the relationships between PFL, LFL and VFL and 
two terms used by other writers, viz. propositional and proposition. 
2: 2.2 PROPOSITIONAL 
Drawing on his own clinical cases, Hughlings Jackson (1866,1874) 
made the straightforward assumption that, in the event of considerable 
damage to Broca's area, residual linguistic ability must be emanating 
from the intact right hemisphere. The retention by patients of a small 
inventory of greetings, oaths and other standard or idiosyncratic short 
strings of words, while all novel utterances were impossible, therefore 
indicated to him that the right hemisphere was instrumental in the pro- 
duction of such automatic phrases. 
As right hemisphere damage did not appear to affect the production 
and comprehension of automatic phrases, it was not possible to say that 
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the right hemisphere had sole control over automatic language. Rather, 
it appeared that: 
the right is the half of the brain for the automatic use of words, 
the left the half for both the automatic and the voluntary use. 
(Hughlings Jackson 1874: 130) 
He distinguished utterance (verbalisation) from speaking (active "pro- 
positionising", p. 130, fn. 2) and restricted the latter to the expression 
of ideas through language. The automatic phrases of the aphasic fell 
into the former category, being, as he saw it, propositionally empty. 
Many of his 'speechless' patients retained good comprehension, be- 
ing able to extract more or less normally the ideas conveyed in lingui- 
stic input. This he attributed to the 'automatic' manner in which com- 
prehension occurs: 
[When someone speaks] I am, so to speak, his victim, and the words 
he utters rouse similar ones in me; there is no effort on my part; 
the revival occurs in spite of me if my ears be healthy. (p. 132) 
In his view it was equally clear from his öbservations that "the 
man who has no internal speech.. . can think" (pr. 131). However. Hugh- 
lings Jackson considered the patient to be limited to only those propo- 
sitional expressions of thought which he received from others. That 
is, he did not see 'speechlessness' as a result of a failure to find 
the words for propositions already formulated. Rather: 
the speechless patient has lost speech, not only in the popular 
sense that he cannot speak aloud, but in the fullest sense; he 
cannot propositionalise in any fashion. (p. 131) 
Associating the residual abilities of the aphasic with the usage of va- 
rious emotion- and convention-motivated interjections in the speech of 
normals. Hughlings Jackson identified four types of language, on a con- 
tinuum from most automatic to most voluntary: 
(1) Receiving a proposition. (2) Simple and compound interjections 
as 'oh! ' and 'God bless my life'. (3) Well-organised conventional 
phrases as 'goodbye', 'Not at all', 'very well'. (4) Statements 
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requiring careful, and, metaphorically speaking, personal supervi- 
sion of the relation each word of a proposition bears to the rest. 
(p"133) 
Items in category (2) were to be viewed as semantically empty. Thus: 
The communist orator did not really make a blunder when he began 
his oration, 'Thank God. I am an Atheist', for the expression 
'Thank God' is used by careless. vulgar people simply as an inter- 
jection, there being no thought at all about its primative mean- 
ing. (p. 135) 
The term propositional, therefore, contrasts in the writings of 
Hughlings Jackson with the term automatic. Along the continuum between 
the two extremes could be found, for instance, contextually appropriate 
automatic phrases such as 'That's a lie'. which was "used rather as an 
offensive missile than as a proposition" but was "a little less automa- 
tic than an oath -... a shade nearer to speech" (p. 135). 
Van Lancker (1972,1987) uses propositional in a similar way. She 
sees propositional utterances as those which have been expressly con- 
structed for the communicational event. Automatic ones are ready-con- 
structed strings which are fetched as whole, unanalysed entities from 
the lexicon (Van Lancker 1972: 25). She considers the former to be the 
product of the analytic mechanisms, the latter a product of the holi- 
stic1 ones. Like Hughlings Jackson, she both attributes analytic func- 
tioning to the left hemisphere and holistic functioning to the right, 
and envisages a continuum from 'most propositional' to 'most extreme' 
(p. 22): 
the same phrase 'good morning' can occur in different modes: As 
the automatic greeting; in perhaps '-semi-propositional' use as in 
'she didn't say "good morning" to me'; or propositionally, as in 
'it's a good morning to play tennis'. The reality of these vari- 
ous modes is reflected in puns, word games, and the shock effect 
1. The use of 'holistic' has been generalised here in accordance with the 
observations made in the Notes on Terminology. However, it is not in- 
tended to imply that Van Lancker or any other writer necessarily makes 
the same distinction between 'holistic' and 'synthetic' as is made in 
respect of the Focusing Hypothesis. 
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of minor substitutions in overlearned phrases. such as 'A rolling 
stone gathers momentum'. (1972: 28) 
She suggests that idioms and automatic phrases may be processed like 
single lexical items. Evidently not constructed on the spot, they are 
presumably retrieved whole from the lexicon and possess, like any other 
lexical entry, a specific semantic value. Van Lancker (1987) cites ex- 
perimental support for this view and notes several assertions by other 
writers which agree with it. In one unnamed study to which she refers, 
normal subjects were tested on their processing powers with idioms and 
non-idiomatic phrases of similar length. They were able to retain four 
or five familiar phrases, each five to seven words long, with the same 
ease as they could retain six or seven words in a non-idiomatic context 
(p"9°). 
The Focusing Hypothesis divides language into three types. Van 
Lancker sees only two basic types but on a continuum, with a possible 
third type (semi propositional) between them. Figure 2: 1 below indi- 
cates the relationship between the terms. It is not entirely clear 
what status is afforded in Van Lancker's model to metalinguistically 
oriented input and output. The only clue is her example of "She didn't 
say 'good morning' to me" (1972: 28) which she assigns the status 'semi- 
propositional'. She presumably does this because the 'good morning' 
itself is not novel but is being used as one element in a novel (propo- 
sitional) sentence. However, this deals only with the type of metalin- 
guistic reference that we might term quotation and does not in any ob- 
vious way relate to the other types of VFL as described above. This o- 
versight is unfortunate, considering the role which self-monitoring 
must be playing both in the speech of the aphasic and in the perform- 
ance of the psycholinguistic subject (see chapter 5). 
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A. , Distinction between propositional and non-propositional as defined 
by Hughlings Jackson, Van Lancker etc.: 
PROPOSITIONAL 
(= Novel) 
<-> 
SEMI-PROPOSITIONAL 
(= metalinguistic? ) 
<-> 
NON-PROPOSITIONAL 
(= Automatic) 
B. Distinction as defined in the Focusing Hypothesis: 
PROPOSITION-FOCUSED 
COMMUNICATION OF 
IDEAS 
(=novel) 
FORMULAIC IDIOMS 
& GREETINGS COM- 
MUNICATING IDEAS 
(='automatic') 
FIGURE 2: 1 
VOCALISATION-FOCUSED 
SPEECH FOR THE 
SAKE OF VOCALISING 
(self-fulfilling) 
FORMULAIC SEQUENCES 
NOT COMMUNICATING 
IDEAS 
(='automatic') 
LANGUAGE-FOCUSED 
IMETALINGUISTIC I 
I SELF-MONITORING I 
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In comparing and contrasting the two models in Figure 2: 1, one 
major and crucial difference emerges. This is that in model B, automa- 
tic language can be proposition-focused as well as vocalisation-focus- 
ed. In the latter case, an idiom would be uttered for the sake of say- 
ing something, as for instance in non-turn-winning utterences like 
'well I never' and 'did you really? '. The association of automatic and 
novel language under the umbrella of PFP is not in any sense an eleva-. 
tion of automatic language to equate it in novelty or propositional in- 
tention with original, situation-tailored utterances. The Focusing Hy- 
pothesis is drawing different distinctions between utterance types. 
The feature which is considered to unite novel and automatic language 
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is that both are proposition-focused. And, as such. it is not automa- 
tic language which has been attributed new characteristics - for that 
is still considered to be holistically processed. Rather, it is the 
production of novel utterances which has been, so to speak. 'moved in' 
with it, to also be considered a holistic, not an analytic, process. 
In the Focusing Hypothesis, a novel utterance and a cliched or id- 
iomatic one are considered to be equally propositionally-focused provi- 
ded that there is some kind of communicational intent which distracts 
the speaker and/or hearer from the linguistic form of the utterance. 
Van Lancker (1987) does acknowledge that even apparently 'meaningless' 
phrases like 'it's a small world' may actually convey a quite complex 
proposition (p. 51), but she does not seem to see this as important. 
The reason why Van Lancker's definition does not place primary im- 
portance on the communicatory intention of the automatic phrase, de- 
spite her acknowledgement that the same phrase can be used novelly as 
well as automatically (p. 28) is that she still defines it essentially 
in terms of its form. Code's (1987) definition, on the other hand. 
centres on its function: 
A propositional utterance... expresses a unique predicate or state- 
ment, itself the product of a voluntary, intentional cognitive 
act. (Code 1987: 59) 
Such an approach enables a clearer relationship to be seen between no- 
vel utterances, idioms used with a specific semantic intent and idioms 
used for what would be termed in the Focusing Hypothesis a VFL type 
purpose. Rather than 'demoting' automatic phrases by seeing them as 
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lacking functional novelty as well as novelty of formt, a function 
based definition can more directly recognise the deliberate intent of 
all three types of utterance. To use Grice's terminology (see. for in- 
stance. Levinson 1983) the difference between them lies in the flouting 
of maxims (Levinson 1983: 102,109). An idiom used to express a novel i- 
dea may flout the Maxims of Relevance and/or Manner if it involves the 
use of metaphor. An idiom used for the sake of speaking (i. e. as VFL) 
flouts the Maxim of Quantity (p. 101) by proffering semantic information 
which is not required. 
Not only may one person use a phrase for different purposes (see a- 
bove) but also different individuals may use phrases in different ways: 
in scientific literature such phrases as 'theoretical underpin- 
ning', 'the more or less consistent finding' and 'recent studies 
have shown that' are probably used regularly, automatically and 
maybe relatively non-propositionally by some individuals. For ot- 
hers, however, such phrases would be novel and unusual. (Code 
1987: 59) 
In cases such as this, however, the occurrence of the phrase needs to 
be constrained to only those contexts where, even if automatically pro- 
duced and/or holistically processed by the speaker/writer, it will not 
be misleading for the hearer/reader to take it literally. That is, the 
non-universality of the nonliteral meaning could lead one hearer to 
consider the phrase as it stands to be flouting the Maxim of Relevance 
(Levinson 1983: 102) while another hearer took it at face value. To a- 
void potential confusions, the speaker is obliged to used it only where 
2. This is an important distinction. Code (1987) states that "uniqueness 
is an important hallmark of propositional language" (p. 59). It is 
contended here that the salient uniqueness resides in the idea being 
conveyed. not in whether or not it happens to be an entirely, or rela- 
tively, novel string. Discussion in chapter 5: 6 explores this distin- 
ction further, with reference to Pawley & Syder's (1983) 'lexicalised 
sentences' and 'lexicalised sentence stems'. 
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either interpretation is legitimate. 
Code then goes on to associate automatic and emotional (p. 60). In 
this way he, justifiably, designates non-propositional status to utter- 
ances whose sole intent is to create a social effect rather than impart 
an idea. This highlights the fact that within the confines of the pro- 
positional-automatic opposition which he is dealing with, there is no 
way of formally recognising the purpose behind 'emotional' utterances. 
In contrast, as we have seen above, the Focusing Hypothesis assigns 
these utterances a special status (VFL) because the very fact of their 
utterance constitutes their purpose, (e. g. 'Owl' as an expression of 
pain and/or to draw attention to oneself; 'How are you? ' as a conven- 
tional acknowledgement of another individual). 
4 2: 2.3 'PROPOSITION' 
Code (1987) provides the following definition of the proposition: 
A proposition always says something about something. As Luria 
(1970) puts it, it is a thought 'embodied in a sentence'(p. 188), 
and, he suggests, the fundamental unit of speech. (p. 59) 
This last aspect is attractive to the Focusing Hypothesis, which makes 
the proposition so central to its portrayal of the use and processing 
of language. Hughlings Jackson's (1874) definition formalises the lin- 
guistic structure of the proposition: 
when we apprehend a proposition, a relation between two things is 
given to us - is for the moment, indeed, forced upon us by the 
conventional tricks which put the two names in the respective re- 
lations of subject and predicate. We receive in a two-fold man- 
ner, not the words only, but the order of the words also. (p. 130, 
fn. 2) 
In the context of the Focusing Hypothesis, proposition refers, es- 
sentially, to a single idea. It is the semantic equivalent of the syn- 
tactic unit clause. It would be equally possible to attempt to define 
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the proposition in terms of what a clause may contain and to define the 
clause in terms of what syntactic units can express a proposition. 
Neither would necessarily permit a one hundred percent adherence to 
standard usages of both terms. It is clearly of some importance that 
the Focusing Hypothesis should not turn out to be built on terminologi- 
cal air. However, the in depth examination of what proposition and 
clause mean would be a lengthy digression and so it is not attempted 
here. Nevertheless, some brief observations will be made, in the hope 
of anchoring the terms to some sort of terminological terra firma. 
Propositions, as the term is used here, are what might elsewhere be 
termed simple propositions (e. g. Purtill 1972: 82), that is, expressions 
relating a subject and a predicate (or, more precisely, predicates of 
the exact number specified for that syntactic construction). There are 
two exceptions to this, Firstly. a clause which requires as a predi- 
cate another clause becomes a proposition with a semantic trace where 
that clause would go (see chapter 1: 6.2). Secondly, the semantic con- 
tent of a unit smaller than the clause may be treated as if it were a 
proposition when it is for some reason (e. g. during language focus or 
when it occurs alone) isolated (see chapter 1: 3). The following exam- 
ples illustrate what is meant at the simplest level by the association 
of the syntactic unit clause and the semantic unit proposition. 
1) York is an ancient city. (1 proposition) 
2) York is an ancient city but the University is new. (2 propositions). 
Where gapping occurs, as in (3) and (4), it is generally assumed that 
there is an ungapped structure underlying it as in (3') and (4'). 
3) York and London are ancient cities. 
4) She ate a hamburger and went to the cinema. 
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3') York is an ancient city... 
... and London is an ancient city. 4') She ate a hamburger... 
... and she went to the cinema. 
The Focusing Hypothesis differentiates the two types of coordination 
illustrated in (3) and (4) by assigning them a one- and a two-clause 
status respectively in their surface structure form. This is done 
within the context of an account referred to as the reduction of juxta- 
positional complexity. 
2: 3 ISSUES IN SEMANTICS AND SYNTAX 
2: 3.1 THE REDUCTION OF JUXTAPOSITIONAL COMPLEXITY 
One feature of language which has often proved problematic for syn- 
tactic theory and which has retained a high profile in explorations of 
semantic theory is . presupposition (see Levinson 1983 chapter 4 for a 
review). In its non-technical sense (cf. Levinson 1983: 168), presuppo- 
sition is the essential element underlying Grice's co-operative prlncl- 
pie because conversation is conducted, according to Grice. on an under- 
standing that there is co-operation of a particular kind, viz. that 
speakers express the truth as they perceive it (the Maxim of Quality) 
and that they express ideas which are relevant (the Maxim of Relevance) 
etc. (Levinson 1983: 101f). Examples (5)-(7) below illustrate the way 
in which presupposition may operate within a discourse context. (5) is 
referentially meaningless out of such a context, even though it could 
easily occur within a discourse where the references were already esta- 
blished. (6) presupposes less referential information, but still car- 
ries the implications of truth and relevance and therefore a number of 
presuppositions, f7). 
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5) Well, he doesn't. 
6) That man you chatted to yesterday doesn't sell ice creams after 
all. 
7) a) There is a man. 
b) You chatted to that man yesterday. 
c) That man does not sell ice creams. 
d) We thought that that man did sell ice creams. 
As the theories of presupposition and implicature indicate, it appears 
to be advantageous to hearers to make certain assumptions about utter- 
ances, so that they can more easily fit them into their picture of the 
world. In other words, although evaluating the truth or relevance of 
an utterance is possible, it appears to be an option which is usefully 
bypassed in situations where the hearer is assured, or chooses to be- 
have as if he is assured, of the speaker's co-operation. The flouting 
of the maxims defined by Grice is a deliberate act on the part of the 
speaker, who recognises the risk that the hearer will not notice that 
flouting. In the case of irony, metaphor, the flouting is intended to 
be detected. In the case of lying and loaded questions (e. g. (8)) it 
is not. 
i 
8) A: What time did you see Margaret leave the cinema? 
B: About ten-thirty. 
A: I though you said you didn't see Margaret all day. 
The value of the co-operative principle is presumably that it re- 
moves one vital level of propositional evaluation which would otherwise 
detract from the evaluation of the internal relationships between the 
propositions presented by a single speaker and from the assimilation of 
. knowledge. A clear example of the co-operative principle at work is 
the teaching of school children. Their task is to receive ideas and 
make sense of them in relation to one another. That task would be far 
more complex if they had to enclose every idea within the questions "Is 
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this true? " and "Is this relevant? ". This is presumably one reason why 
the issue of school teachers imparting partisan political views to 
children is considered so important. Similarly, it is mentally exhaus- 
ting to read a newspaper while applying the questions "Is this true? " 
and "Do I agree with this? " and it is an attractive option to choose a 
single publication whose biases are the same as one's own and, by ap- 
plying the co-operative principle, to allow the former to reinforce the 
latter. 
The Focusing Hypothesis enters this arena with an account for why 
such a dangerous set of assumptions as truth and relevance should be 
continually made by hearers and readers. The analytic mechanisms, 
which it considers to have only a very limited capacity for juxtaposi- 
tion at any one time, are pressurised not only 'from below' by the re- 
quirements of language decoding, a pressure which is alleviated by the 
passing of these 'lower' processes to the holistic mechanisms, but'also 
'from above' by pragmatic considerations. A number of possiblities are 
theoretically open for dealing with this 'top end' pressure: 
a) Pragmatic and propositional evaluations could be simultaneously 
dealt with. This could overload the system. so that that one or other 
pursuit would be unsuccessful. 
b) They could be successively dealt with, by evaluating the proposi- 
tions, relating them to the hearer's picture of the 'real world' and 
then attempting to evaluate their truth. This is more plausible, but 
would increase the overall processing time required, with the speaker 
able to present propositions faster than the hearer could evaluate 
them, given his need to deal with each proposition at both these levels 
of evaluation in succession, before the next proposition could be con- 
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sidered. The result might be either the loss of the thread of the ar- 
gument or the loss of a sense of which parts were true or relevant and 
which not. This could be 'relieved' however. if the hearer, having 
once established that one proposition was invalid in his own terms, 
made the assumption that they all were. This would not help him pre- 
pare a counter-argument, because for this he would still need to esta- 
blish precisely which ideas were false and why. But, as radio inter- 
views in current affairs illustrate, in most cases disagreement between 
speakers does not lead to a point by point dissection of the argument 
but to a general dismissal of the whole speech. 
c) The pragmatic aspects could be processed holistically. 
d) The pragmatic aspects could be assigned a default value. 
(c) and (d) perhaps amount to the same thing, as holistic mechan- 
isms, if they could contribute anything at all, certainly could not op- 
erate juxtaposition and so the evaluation of connected ideas for truth 
and relevance could not occur there. In that case a default value 
would have to operate; such a default value would have to be along the 
lines of Grice's maxims. to include the assumption that utterances were 
true. relevant, gave enough but not too much information and so on, ot- 
herwise communication would be highly problematic. Offsetting the de- 
fault value would occur only by invoking the analytic mechanisms, so 
that (a) or (b) would apply. 
One thing that the holistic mechanisms could do. which perhaps 
gives (c) the edge over (d), is to contribute interpretational cues a- 
bout the speaker's emotional state and personality; this is an ability 
which is closely associated with the right hemisphere (see chapter 
3: 5.2). If these 'higher level' operations were mediated by the holi- 
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stic mechanisms in conjunction with a default favouring the co-opera- 
tive principle, then it might be expected that a hearer would tend to 
make judgements about the truth and relevance of a speech according to 
impressionistic criteria such as whether the speaker's voice sounded 
sincere, whether his eyes looked shifty etc., and perhaps also some 
less reliable cues, such as the general timbre of the voice, the speak- 
er's manner, his dress, posture and even race etc. 
So far, the contribution of the Focusing Hypothesis to the question 
of implicature has been examined, but presupposition has only been ad- 
dressed within the context of pragmatics. There is also something to 
say about presupposition within the immediate sentence. In examples 
(5) and (6) above, different amounts of information are explicit within 
the sentence. Specifically, (6) provides considerably more explicit 
context within which the central piece of information, the same as that 
in (5), is framed. To put it another way, in a situation where (6) was 
adhering to Grice's Maxim of Quality, which requires that an utterance 
contain as much information as necessary but no more (Levinson 1983: 
101), then clearly in that same situation (5) would not be adequate and 
might prompt questions such as "Who are you talking about? ' or "He 
doesn't do what? '. The ways in which (5) and (6) anchor themselves to 
the real world to enable the evaluation of their meaning are different. 
I (6) anchors to the general co-operative principle and general concommi- 
tant assumptions about common knowledge between the speaker and the 
hearer. All other information is explicit. (5) anchors on two addi- 
tional facts which have been considered to be true up until that mo- 
ment: (i) there is a man to whom the hearer was chatting yesterday and 
(ii) the man sells ice creams. These facts, as knowns, are marked by 
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the pronoun 'he' and by a' trace' of ter 'doesn't' respectively. For 
one discussion of the contextual relevance of pronouns see Isard (1975: 
288ff). The juxtaposition of propositions which are unknown requires 
contextualisation. The juxtaposition of ones that are known does not. 
Therefore it seems logical that a contextualised utterance bypasses 
certain stages of evaluation by 'plunging' into the middle of the part 
of the world already established as most relevant. Indeed, the success 
of flouting the Maxim of Relevance as in (9) (where. let us suppose, B 
is late because he set out late, and the roadworks - which must, of 
course exist, if B is not to be a liar - were on the opposite carriage- 
way) 'depends, if it is intended to mislead, upon the A's failure to see 
that the comment has detached itself from the context which has been 
previously specified: 
9) A: You're two hours late. 
B: There are major roadworks on the Al. 
Speaker B intends speaker A to receive his reply in accordance with the 
co-operative principle and A is likely to do so unless the information 
is impossible to assimilate into the assumed context. In (10) this 
might well be the case (unless B happens to work for the media or an 
international charity). 
10) A: You're two hours late. 
B: There was an earthquake in Bangladesh. 
If it is the case that precontextualised utterances are more eco- 
nomical of processing space - and this seems plausible given the pre- 
ference for exchanges like (11) over (6), by which the sudden introduc- 
tion of context and new information all at once is avoided - then, once 
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again, the Focusing Hypothesis proffers a processing model which ad- 
dresses this limitation. 
11) A: You know that man you were chatting to yesterday. 
B: Yes. 
A: You know we thought he sold ice creams. 
B: Yes. 
A: Well, he doesn't. 
It also provides an account for how the overload is avoided, viz. that 
a holistic contextual background to the new information is created. A 
parallel to this type of assimilation of new material is found in Pia- 
get's suggestion that in language acquisition old, familiar structures 
and forms are used to contextualise the new (Moskowitz 1985: 57). Those 
familiar structures are considered in the Focusing Hypothesis to be 
formulae operated by the holistic mechanisms. And indeed this holistic 
4 backdrop can be traced right back to the first steps of a baby's langu- 
age learning process, where the mother's facial expressions and tone of 
4 voice provide 
the context for interpreting utterances as unanalysed 
wholes, these wholes then themselves contextualising the interpretation 
of specific elements within them. 
Finally, it was noted above that co-ordination might in some cases 
be party to the reduction of juxtapositional complexity and in other 
cases not. This is one aspect of syntactic manipulation to the end of 
reducing the analytic load. Another is the internalisation of clauses. 
Both will be briefly explored. 
2: 3.1.1 CO-ORDINATION 
In generative syntax there is a constraint on co-ordination which 
permits only identical constituents to be conjoined (cf. for example, 
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Radford 1981: 59ff). This satisfactorily treats both (3) and (4) (re- 
peated below) in the same way. 
3) York and London are ancient cities. (NP + NP) 
4) She ate a hamburger and went to the cinema. (VP + VP) 
3') York is an ancient city... 
... and London is an ancient city. 
The Focusing Hypothesis is required to distinguish, however, between 
(3) and (4) because the holistic mechanisms use formulae which are spe- 
cified by the verb. Therefore, in (4). two formulae will be required, 
but in (3) only one. This is not problematic. It simply means that 
sentences with two verbs3 are treated as two clause constructions. The 
second clause of (4) would contain a trace in subject position (see 
chapter 1: 6.2) which the holistic mechanisms could not fill but which, 
in the course of juxtaposition, would be cross-referenced with the NP 
in the first clause. (3), on the other hand, contains only one verb. 
There is no reason why the two clauses in (3') could not be separately 
decoded and then juxtaposed. However, as the formula would be the same 
in both clauses (as specified not only by the verb but by the con- 
straint preventing the co-ordination of non-identical constituents), it 
clearly would be advantageous to avoid such juxtaposition and to treat 
. the sentence as one clause and not 
two. This, again, is not problema- 
tic but it does require the existence, amongst the formulae, of both an 
NP-VP structure (or equivalent) and an NP-conj-NP-VP structure (or e- 
quivalent). As discussed in chapter 1: 6.1. the question of recursivity 
------------ 
3. Terms like 'main verb', 'auxiliary' etc. are deliberately being a- 
voided here, not because they are not important to the ultimate as- 
sessment of the plausiblity of the whole Hypothesis, but rather. pre- 
cisely because they are. A detailed exploration of which verbs deter- 
mine the selection of formulae and how would be a vast undertaking and 
so must, unfortunately. be set aside in the present work. 
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is not as difficult for the Focusing Hypothesis to deal with as it is 
for other accounts based on formulaic decoding. This is because formu- 
lae do not have to exist for all possible expressions of a recursivity 
rule, only for those where it is useful. Other cases will be dealt 
with analytically. 
2: 3.1.2 INTERNALISATION 
The basic argument presented here is simple: that speakers are in a 
position to choose whether to express their ideas via syntactic or se- 
mantic complexity. It is in particular ways advantageous to the list- 
ener (at least) for the complexity to be semantic. This is because the 
holistic mechanisms are able to deal, within a single clause, with in- 
formation of any semantic complexity, but are strictly limited with re- 
gard to the syntactic complexity they have to deal with, because claus- 
al boundaries sooner or later intervene. or else the sheer syntactic 
complexity or unfamiliarity of the clause triggers analysis (see chap- 
ter 1: 6.2). Provided there is a formula to cope with it, then, a sin- 
gle clause of high semantic complexity will be more economical of pro- 
cessing space than two semantically simpler ones. One example in Eng- 
lish is illustrated in (13). which expresses in one clause what (12) 
expresses in two. 
12) [I hope that][Margaret will sing well tonight] 
13) [Margaret will hopefully sing well tonight] 
Somehow a specific complexity which was syntactically expressed in (12) 
has been moved inside the single clause which constitutes (13). But 
this has been achieved at a price: whereas the construction in (12) may 
take any member of the verb paradigm (i. e. 'You hope', 'Marmaduke 
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hopes'), (13) is constrained to apply only to the speaker, such that 
(14) cannot be restated as (13). 
14) Marmaduke hopes that Margaret will sing well tonight. 
However, in a third person narrative, a restatement of (15) is possi- 
ble, rendering (16): 
15) Marmaduke hoped that Margaret would sing well that night. 
16) Margaret would hopefully sing well that night. 
The interpretational restrictions on 'hopefully' as compared with 
'x hopes that' relate to one aspect of what Lyons (1982) terms subjec- 
tivity. Lyons explores the idea that: 
one cannot reduce the speaker's expression of himself in his 
utterance to the assertion of a set of propositions. (p. 104) 
Subjectivity relates to the expression of the (psychological) state of 
the speaker, which feature of language is one of the three specified by 
Russell (1940). the other two being the indication of facts and the mo- 
dification of the (psychological) state of the addressee (Lyons 1982: 
106). With cases like 'hopefully' the Focusing Hypothesis links sub- 
jectivity. as the expression of the speaker's emotional state, with the 
reduction of the amount of propositional juxtaposition required in pro- 
cessing. In line with the preceding discussion, it is proposed that 
'hopefully' does not receive juxtaposition like 'x hopes that' does in 
order for it to be related to the rest of the clause. This means that 
it must be entirely predictable in meaning and truth value from the wi- 
der context, provided that the co-operative principle is in operation. 
This is precisely the feature of 'hopefully': it is is permitted to re- 
fer only to the speaker or. in narrative, the possessor of the context- 
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ualising thoughts (as-in (14)-(16) above); and it is, practically spea- 
king, immune from truth evaluation by anyone but the speaker or thinker 
to whom it refers, for no-one else can know what that person thinks or 
feels. (17) and (18) illustrate this. It is possible for (17) to be 
truth-evaluated by an outsider, but not (18): 
17) I have a swollen finger. 
18) 1 have a pain in my finger. 
The price paid, then, for this reduction in juxtapositional complexity 
is a restriction on the reduced clause (if it is so termed) to refer 
only to the speaker/thinker and to have to be true. These two con- 
straints remove the need to evaluate it for relevance or for truth, so 
it does not need to appear in its own clause. 
Another type of internalisation used to reduce the complexity of 
propositions could be the preposing of relative clauses as in (19)-(22) 
below: 
19) Don't miss this 'never-to-be-repeated' weekend. 
(British Rail publicity leaflet, September 1987) 
20) A made-for-television feature length film... 
(Times, 18th September 1987) 
21) A hefty increase in rates in North Yorkshire is still on the cards 
despite a better-than-expected cash handout from the Government. 
(Yorkshire Evening Press, 28th October 1987) 
22) Inflation has gone up because of much worse than expected share 
price increases. 
(BBC news, 17th August 1987) 
Sentences such as (19)-(22) are still not common in English and may be 
judged as clumsy, but they undoubtedly occur. In discussions of lan- 
guage typology. the gradual adoption by a language of such a feature is 
considered potentially indicative of a shifting in fundamental language 
type as defined by the position of the verb relative to the subject and 
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object; the preposed relative clause is primarily a feature of SOV lan- 
guages (Downing 1978: 391ff). There is a far-reaching implication in 
drawing parallels across language types in this way when dealing with 
the possible advantages of preposed relative clauses in reducing juxta- 
positional complexity. This is that some languages would be using this 
to advantage while others did not. However, this is a welcome justifi- 
cation of the Focusing Hypothesis' proposal that the motivation for 
finding optimal strategies for dealing with information is processing 
limitations, and that the strategies most advantageous to an individual 
(or speech community) will depend upon what he or it already has in the 
system and what he (it) specifically requires. The whole question of 
universal types as a rationalisation of language change hinges on equi- 
librium and, where equilibria are upset, a chain of reactions reflect- 
ing instability, until a new balance is established. The limitations. 
on analytic capacity, as proposed by the Focusing Hypothesis, seem as' 
good a motivator as any for such low tolerance to an unbalance in the 
arrangement of syntactic structures. The existence of devices to re- 
duce the juxtapositional complexity of sentences, such as the internal- 
isation of clauses as discussed here, could be a valuable catalyst, 
creating opportunities for a new equilibrium to become established, by 
vacating (or, if the device is, conversely, abandoned, then occupying) 
processing space so that other features of the language are forced to 
compensate. 
If the question of equilibrium is at the centre of this phenomenon. 
then it should be the case that languages in a stable condition which 
do use, say, preposed relative clauses (i. e. SOV languages) possess ot- 
her structures which are not reduced in respect of their juxtaposition- 
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al complexity. 'Unstable languages might possess a larger number of re- 
duced structures pending the establishment of equilibrium. Languages 
which could be examined in this respect include Hindi (23) which ap- 
pears to be relatively stable4 and German (24) which is generally con- 
sidered to be halfway between SVO and SOV5. 
23) hamlog makaan ke saamne khelne - vaale bacchö ko 
we house in-front-of playing being children (+erg) to 
aam denge 
mangoes give(+future) 
We '11 give mangoes to the children who are playing in front of the 
house. 
24) Der von mir bis gestern noch nicht kennen gelernte Mann war 
The by me till yesterday yet not known made man was 
heute den ganzen Tag hier. 
today the whole day here 
The man who I didn't meet until yesterday was here all day today. 
It is inevitably beyond the scope of the present work to pursue such an 
examination or to discuss the phenomenon in greater detail. 
The above discussion cannot be said to say anything particularly 
new about the possible problems inherent in trying to evaluate too many 
things at once. or about the involvement of the right hemisphere in em- 
otional and other holistic aspects of interpretation. But it does pre- 
4. "Hindi is almost the paradigm of an SOV language" (Pullum 1974: 3). 
Nevertheless, Ross (1970) has argued that Hindi has an underlying SVO 
structure, on the basis of its allowing forward and backward gapping 
in contrast to, say, Japanese (p. 256). McCawley (1970), who questions 
the primacy of SVO at all, argues for a VSO status for Hindi; see also 
Subbarao's (1974) discussion. 
5. There has been much discussion, about the underlying word order of Ger- 
man. Ross (1970) believes that German "cannot be derived from deep 
structures manifesting SOV order" (p. 258). Lehmann (1971) argues for 
a current return towards SOV in New High German after a brief sojourn 
(in Middle High German) in SVO. Bierwisch (1967) also argues for SOV. 
67 
sent an account which directly links these issues in with a number of 
other aspects of language processing: the dual system, the very notion 
of which is fundamentally associated with the idea that the analytic 
mechanisms have a very low threshold to overload, provides a straight- 
forward and principled scenario for the sharing of functions in speci- 
fic ways (strategies) to meet the demands of individual tasks as they 
arise and become established as routine. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
EVIDENCE FOR LEFT LATERALISED LANGUAGE 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The Focusing Hypothesis makes a controversial claim: that novel 
language (see chapter 2: 2.2) can be and usually is processed holisti- 
cally, in clausal chunks. Furthermore, it recognises the logical pos- 
sibility that this processing could be taking place in the right hemi- 
sphere. 
The purpose of this chapter is to present some of the evidence av- 
ailable in the field of neuropsychology and neurolinguistics which is 
generally considered to speak strongly against accounts which propose a 
more than secondary right hemisphere involvement in language production 
rand comprehension. 
3.2 ANATOMY 
3.2.1 POST-MORTEM EXAMINATIONS 
Anatomical measurements of normal adult, infant and foetal brains 
have been carried out by a number of researchers (e. g. Geschwind & Le- 
vitsky 1968, Teszner. Tzavaras, Gruner & Hecaen 1972, Wada 1974, Wada. 
Clarke & Hamm 1975, Witelson & Pallie 1973). All of them found that in 
a majority of brains the left hemisphere was larger than the right in 
those areas traditionally associated with language. Wernicke's area 
(in the left temporal lobe) was usually larger than the equivalent re- 
gion in the right hemisphere, and the shape of the whole lobe was also 
different (Geschwind & Levitsky 1968, Teszner et al 1972). 
Foetal brains also had this asymmetry (Teszner et al 1972, Wada 
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1974, Wada et al 1975), indicating: 
that the enlargement of the left planum cannot be a response to 
the development of linguistic competence in childhood. (Geschwind 
1979: 166) 
Wada et al (1975) note, however, that there was greater asymmetry in 
adults than in infants, which implies an increase in asymmetrical deve- 
lopment with age. 
The frontal operculum was found to be half as large again in top 
surface area on the right as on the left in most of the brains examined 
(Wada et al 1975). However, the convoluted surface was much more 
densely packed on the left, leading to the suspicion that: 
the total cortical surface area of the operculum could be larger 
on the left in most brains. (Wada et al 1975: 245) 
Sex was found to be a relevant variable; of the 10% of brains found 
to have a larger right temporal lobe. significantly more were from fe- 
males than males (Wada 1974; Wada et al 1975). 
i 
3.2.2 IN VIVO EXAMINATIONS 
3: 2.2.1 GREY & WHITE MATTER 
A search for the neurophysiological substrate of functional asym- 
metry should begin with an examination of the amount and distribu- 
tion of various types of neural tissue in the two hemispheres. 
(Gur, Packer, Hungerbuhler, Amarnek, Obrist & Reivich 1979: 24) 
Grey and white matter constitute different kinds of fibrous connec- 
tions in the brain. To find different proportions and arrangements of 
them in the two hemispheres might be considered relevant to the general 
differences associated with the handling of information by left and 
right. 
White matter consists mainly of fibres surrounded by the white fat- 
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ty substance myelin. These fibres link both the peripheral and central 
4 
brain areas and the various areas of the cortex, besides making the 
crucial interhemispheric connections. Grey matter. of which the outer 
surface (cerebral cortex) of the brain is composed, is made up of non- 
myelinated fibres and closely-packed nerve cells. Grey matter forms 
the internal connection of individual regions (Gur, Packer, Hungerbuh- 
1er et al 1979). 
Cur, Packer, Hungerbuhler et al (1979) used a method of bloodflow 
tracing (in which the radioactive isotope Xenon-133 is injected into 
the main arteries to the brain, providing a means of tracing the amount 
of bloodflow to various areas) to establish the relative distribution 
of grey and white matter in each hemisphere. They found a higher ratio 
of grey to white fibres in the left hemisphere. This was most marked 
in those areas associated with abstract thought and with speech, i. e. 
the frontal and pre-central regions. 
V 
3: 2.2.2 X-RADIOLOGY 
3: 2.2.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Two methods of measuring the static-state differences between the 
hemispheres will be described here. Similar methods which deal with 
cross-function comparisons are described in chapter 5: 4. 
3: 2.2.2.2 TRANSMISSION COMPUTERISED AXIAL TOMOGRAPHY (TCAT) 
The principle of X-radiology is the monitoring of the passage of 
X-rays through an organ; these are differentially impeded by the vari- 
ous tissue structures. TCAT is able to provide accurate tissue density 
readings (to 0.5%) through the focusing of the X-ray detectors onto a 
71 
specific layer of tissue, so that a number of images can be assembled 
by computer into a 3-dimensional representation (McAlister 1979). Re- 
porting the work of LeMay, Geschwind (1979) describes the findings of 
this research: 
a peculiar, skewed departure from bilateral asymmetry is observed. 
In right-handed people the right frontal lobe is usually wider 
than the left, but the left parietal and occipital lobes are wider 
than the right. The inner surface of the skull itself bulges at 
the right front and the left rear to accommodate the protuberan- 
ces. (p. 168) 
3: 2.2.2.3 CEREBRAL ARTERIOGRAPHY 
By injecting into the bloodstream a substance opaque to X-rays. 
X-ray photographs will highlight the vascular system. This method is 
used for general diagnostic purposes, but it has proved useful with 
regard to linguistic research, in establishing the size and angle of 
the Sylvian fissure, which is the upper boundary of the temporal lobe 
and passes through the middle of Wernicke's area; the middle cerebral 
artery follows the Sylvian groove (Geschwind 1979: 168). Again report- 
ing the work of LeMay. Geschwind states: 
She found that in most people the middle cerebral artery on the 
right side of the head is inclined more steeply and ultimately as- 
cends higher than the corresponding artery on the left. (p. 168) 
3: 2.2.3 ELECTRICAL STIMULATION 
Penfield and Roberts (1959) describe in detail their method of map- 
ping areas of brain function by means of the direct electrical stimula- 
tion of exposed brain tissue in conscious patients. They found that 
although meaningless vocalisation could be inhibited or initiated by 
the stimulation of either hemisphere's motor cortex, aphasic symptoms 
in speech were produced only in conjunction with stimulation of the 
speech areas of the left hemisphere, though the boundaries of these ar- 
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eas and the density of linguistically sensitive sites within them vari- 
ed from person to person. Fedio & Van Buren (1974) report similar fin- 
dings. For some brief discussion of more recent work see Code (1987: 
23f). 
3: 2.2.4 THE WADA TEST 
The Wada test is considered the most reliable gauge of hemispheric 
dominance for language. It is on the basis of data from this test that 
the accuracy of the dichotic listening test (see section 3: 4.2 below) 
has been established (Weinstein 1978: 19) and challenged (Kinsbourne & 
Hiscock 1977: 183. Bryden & Allard 1978: 396). Developed as a means of 
studying epileptic discharge between the hemispheres (Harris 1978: 493). 
the procedure involves the injection of the barbiturate sodium amytal 
into one of the intracarotid arteries; this causes the temporary anaes- 
thesia of the ipsilateral brain hemisphere (Wada & Rasmussen 1960; see 
also Harris 1978: 493 for a description of the procedure). A patient's 
ability to react to commands while one hemisphere is inactive is consi- 
dered an indication of what the unaffected hemisphere can and cannot 
do. Tasks that are exclusively the domain of the anaesthetised hemi- 
sphere will be beyond the patient's capability. It has been found 
that: 
during the period of left hemisphere anesthetization subjects, al- 
though totally incapable of speech, can understand and carry out 
simple verbal commands. (Hebes 1978: 109) 
On the other hand, 
injection of sodium amytal to anesthetize the right hemisphere of 
. right-handers only rarely produces any 
deficit in verbal skills. 
Usually. as far as can be tested. comprehension and expression are 
unaffected. outside of some slurring resulting from left-sided fa- 
cial weakness. (ibid: 102) 
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Right hemisphere anaesthesia does. however, produce some other 
effects, such as the loss of the ability to sing a tune (Nebes 1978: 
121, Harris 1978: 422). The response to commands during left hemisphere 
anaesthesia, though limited, is an indication that the patient: 
is co-operating and that his lack of speech is not due to distur- 
bances of consciousness or co-operation. (Harris 1978: 493) 
The Wada test has been used to establish that in some stutterers 
(15%) there is bilateral representation of speech (for a brief descrip- 
tion of this and other research on stuttering see Nebes 1978: 108). 
By far the most important and widely quoted of the finding of Wada 
test investigations is that an estimated 96-98% of right-handers have 
left hemisphere dominance for language (e. g. Rasmussen & Milner 1975, 
cited in O'Leary 1982). The same researchers estimate left dominance 
for 70% of left-handers, with the remaining 30% divided equally between 
right dominance and bilaterality. However, not all researchers agree: 
Satz (1979) estimates bilateral representation to occur in 70% of left-r 
handers (see O'Leary 1982: 55). 
Some caveats apply to the use of data from the Wada test to draw 
conclusions about the lateralisation of brain functions. Firstly, they 
are administered almost exclusively to patients with a history of epi- 
lepsy or, at the very least, with some suspected brain abnormality (Le- 
vy 1974). Levy is cautious about drawing conclusions from studies of 
brain-damaged patients and applying them to theories about the normal 
population. 
Secondly, the period of hemispheric inactivity is very short: 5-10 
minutes (Nebes 1978: 101). As some of this time is required "for the 
conscious hemisphere to readjust to the situation" (ibid: 101), task 
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complexity is severely' limited by the time constraint. For instance. 
Nebes describes the test of right hemisphere language competence (dur- 
ing left hemisphere anaesthesia) as being: 
fairly superficial... and [consisting] mainly of commands to per- 
form gross left-sided body movements. (p. 109) 
It is possible that in the period during which the barbiturate is ac- 
tive. the conscious hemisphere does not reflect its full range of abi- 
lities. This, and another possibility. that the left hemisphere's in- 
activity does not prevent its operating an inhibitory mechanism on the 
right. will be discussed in chapter 4: 1.1.4. 
Thirdly, it is not possible to get a complete picture of hemispher- 
is activity by introducing substances only into the carotid artery. 
This artery supplies the middle cerebral artery (and through this the 
speech and auditory regions) and the anterior cerebral artery (to the 
frontal and midline regions). But the primary visual area is supplied 
by the vertebral artery via the posterior cerebral artery and therefore 
is one of the regions not affected in these experiments (Lassen, Ingvar 
& Skinhmj 1978: 53). 
3: 3 CLINICAL 
3: 3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Marc Dax in 1836 was apparently the first to publicly speak of a 
connection between acquired right hemiplegia and language loss, but it 
appears that Paul Broca's own observations in the 1860's were made 
without any knowledge of this earlier work (Penfield & Roberts 1959: 
56). In 1874. Hughlings Jackson observed that: 
The two halves (of the brain] are not double in function in the 
sense that both are required for speech, since a patient can speak 
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perfectly well when the right half of his brain is damaged... Nor 
are they double in the sense that the two halves are such exact 
duplicates that either of them will do for speech, since extensive 
damage to a certain region of the left hemisphere will destroy 
speech altogether. (p. 129) 
Broca in 1861 and Wernicke in 1874 were able to identify specific 
regions of the left hemisphere which could be associated each with 
their own characteristic language deficit (see below). A detailed ac- 
count of the history of aphasic research can be found in Penfield & Ro- 
berts (1959. chapter 4). Since then, research has furnished the field 
with a substantial corpus of data, from patients who have incurred 
brain damage through strokes, bullet or shrapnel wounds or motor acci- 
dents. In addition, neurolinguistic research has reaped benefits from 
the advances in neurosurgery and it has been possible to study patients 
who have undergone hemispherectomy or hemidecortication and others with 
a split-brain, i. e. a surgically severed central commissure. which 
leaves them with two isolated hemispheres. For reviews of the findings 
of aphasic research see, for example, Benton & Joynt (1960), Hecaen 
(1976). For examples of detailed case histories see Basser (1962), 
Hecaen (1976). There is no doubt that this data has confirmed the very 
first observations of 150 years ago, which associated language loss 
with left hemisphere damage: 
Everyone must admit that there is at least a statistically signi- 
ficant concentration of language defects due to lesions in given 
areas of the left cerebral cortex. (Lenneberg 1974: 518) 
=Just. what the relationship is between the findings of clinical 
research and the distribution of functions in the normal brain during 
conversation, however, can. necessarily, only be inferred. It is the 
comnon assumption that "nearly all human beings have their language 
functions 'lateralized' to the left" (Bolinger 1975: 293; see Ten Houten 
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1982: 32 for a similar assertion) which is being challenged by the Fo- 
cusing Hypothesis. 
3: 3.2 LEFT HEMISPHERE LESION 
3: 3.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Drawing from his clinical research, Basser (1962) said that: 
the dominance of one cerebral hemisphere, usually the left, in 
relation to speech... [is]... one of the most constant and remark- 
able phenomena of human cerebral physiology. (p. 427) 
In his examination of case reports relating to children with brain da- 
mage, he found 86% of left hemisphere damaged patients to have a langu- 
age deficit, and 46% of right hemisphere damaged patients. Children 
have been considered by many to have less strongly lateralised language 
than adults (see chapter 4: 1.2.4.4). Hecaen (1976) challenges Gasser's 
figures (See chapter 4: 2.2) and presents his own, also for child pati- 
ents (up to 14 years of age): language handicap in 88% of left hemi- 
4 sphere 
lesions and 33% of right hemisphere lesions. Hecaen considers 
even his own latter figure to be unrepresentatively high and notes that 
it is based on only six cases, as opposed to 16 left hemisphere cases. 
so that: 
one suspects an artifact: certain children with right sided le- 
sions without language disorder may not have been referred to us. 
(p"199) 
The symptoms of aphasia after a left hemisphere lesion range from 
virtually complete loss of comprehension and production ability to mi- 
nimal word-finding difficulties. Indeed. some problems are so specific 
and limited that they might go unnoticed in some circumstances. For 
example, brain damage which was only associated with a loss of literacy 
skills would presumably not be considered to have had a language-rela- 
77 
ted effect if the patient happened to be illiterate. Veyrac (1931) re- 
fers to a case of differential aphasic recovery in a polyglot (see 
chapter 4: 5) in which: 
if she had never spoken any other language but French, it could 
have been concluded that the aphasia had completely regressed. 
(p"326) 
No two left hemisphere damaged patients will have identical post- 
lesion aphasic symptoms, for each brain injury is unique. Furthermore, 
there may be individual variation in the location and density of cells 
associated with linguistic function. The classic symptoms of Broca's, 
Wernicke's and conduction aphasia, to name but three, function as 
points of reference in the diagnosis of essentially idiosyncratic com- 
binations of linguistic deficits found in any individual patient. The 
descriptions below are brief; a more detailed account of the different 
types of speech. reading and writing disorders associated with left he- 
misphere lesions can be found in Hecaen & Albert (1978: 36ff) and Lesser 
(1978). Some discussion of the precise type and area of brain damage 
associated with the aphasias can be found in Code (1987: 65ff). 
3: 3.2.2 BROCA'S APHASIA 
The characteristics of Broca's aphasia are a lack of grammatical 
function words and morphological suffixes, and speech which is "slow, 
effortful and distorted in pronunciation" (Slobin 1979: 127). There are 
severe naming difficulties. While novel expression is severely distur- 
bed. memorised formulae such as prayers, poems, lists and paradigms can 
often be successfully produced (Veyrac 1931: 336, Denes 1914: 109). 
While novel production is non-fluent and 'telegraphic' (for examples 
see Geschwind 1979: 209, Heny 1985: 162), comprehension problems are not 
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considered to be a symptom of pure Broca's aphasia. 
Broca made a connection between this particular type of agrammatic 
speech and damage to the third frontal convolution in the left hemi- 
sphere, specifically the posterior end of that convolution (Scoresby- 
Jackson 1867: 704). Broca's area is thus adjacent to the motor cortex, 
which is partially responsible for linguistic production. in that it 
controls the articulatory apparatus (Heny 1985: 163). Slobin (1979) at- 
tributes the continued motor control of articulatory muscles for non- 
linguistic purposes to right hemisphere activity (p. 127). If this is 
the case, then the failure of the right hemisphere to take over motor 
control for linguistic functions as well as non-linguistic ones may be 
considered indicative of the absence of any linguistic processing ap- 
paratus in the right hemisphere. However, there is an alternative ex- 
planation. The right hemisphere could have linguistic processing me- 
chanisms which remain inactive because inhibitory mechanisms prevent it 
from adopting the motor control of the articulators from the damaged r 
left. In this case, speech would fail not because the right has no 
linguistic instructions to give to the articulators. but because. since 
the damage. the left has not. 
3: 3.2.3 WERNICKE'S APHASIA 
Wernicke's area is situated in the temporal lobe, between the pri- 
. mart' auditory cortex and the angular gyrus. 
The latter is thought to 
, connect 
the auditory and visual centres (Geschwind 1979: 161). The area 
: consists of the temporal portion of a region variously referred 
to as 
the general interpretative area, the gnostic area, the knowing area and 
, the tertiary association area (Guyton 1981: 195). all of which names in- 
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dicate the importance of the functional attributes with which Wernic- 
ke's area is directly or indirectly linked. The linguistic disorders 
associated with damage to this area are consistent with its proximity 
to the auditory cortex and the angular gyrus. The angular gyrus marks 
the meeting place of the auditory, visual and somesthetic sensory areas 
(Hecaen & Albert 1976: 29f). Thus these disorders include difficulties 
in dealing with auditory and visual input leading to comprehension pro- 
blems: 
A person might hear perfectly well and even recognize different 
words but still might be unable to arrange these words into a co- 
herent thought. Likewise, the person may be able to read words 
from the printed page but be unable to recognize the thought that 
is conveyed. (Guyton 1981: 195) 
In addition, the production of speech will feature lexical fluency wi- 
thout normal semantic cohesion (see Geschwind 1979: 161, Heny 1985: 162): 
Words are often strung together with considerable facility and 
with the proper inflections, so that the utterance has the recog- 
nizable structure of a sentence. The words chosen, however. are 
often inappropriate, and they sometimes include nonsensical sylla- 
bles or words. (Geschwind 1979: 161) 
Utterances characteristically lack content words, are nonspecific in 
reference and contain "a preponderance of pronouns" (Slobin 1979: 128). 
3: 3.2.4 CONDUCTION APHASIA 
Broca's and Wernicke's areas are connected by fibres referred to as 
the arcuate fasciculus. Conduction aphasia is associated with damage 
to -these fibres. so that the exchange of information between the two 
functioning speech areas is impaired. Speech is fluent because Broca's 
area is intact. Comprehension is normal because Wernicke's area is 
processing input normally. But the semantic content of speech is miss- 
ing because Wernicke's area is unable to-provide Broca's area with the 
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necessary information (Geschwind 1979: 161, Slobin 1979: 129). Slobin 
also refers to an inability on the part of conduction aphasics to re- 
peat speech they hear. because the auditory information entering Werni- 
cke's area cannot be passed on to Broca's area for production (p. 129). 
3: 3.2.5 OTHER TYPES OF LANGUAGE DISORDER 
As already stated. many other types of aphasic disorder have been 
identified. Some of these are described in detail by Hecaen & Albert 
(1978: 36ff). One of them, transcortical motor aphasia (p. 52f) is dis- 
cussed at length by Luria & Tsvetkova (1970) under its alternative 
name. dynamic aphasia. This disorder is apparently caused by a lesion 
to the anterior part of the border zone immediately surrounding the 
language zone (Hecaen & Albert 1978: 52f), this latter consisting of 
Wernicke's and Broca's areas and the angular gyrus (ibid: 27). Motor 
speech and comprehension are preserved. but the patient is apparently 
unable to verbalise ideas, to 'propositionalize' (Luria & Tsvetkova 
1970: 187). 
In some patients, secondary linguistic functions are affected, of- 
ten alongside speech and comprehension handicaps, but also sometimes 
where there are no primary linguistic deficits. As one example. damage 
to the angular gyrus appears to affect the comprehension of written 
language. This implies a failure in communication between the visual 
cortex and Wernicke's area (Geschwind 1979: 161f). Two other well-docu- 
mented secondary linguistic impairments are deep dyslexia and surface 
dyslexia. Marcel (1980) describes their main contrastive characteris- 
tics as being, in the former, errors based on the syntactic and seman- 
tic characteristics of the words. and in the latter, errors based on 
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spelling-to-sound correspondences. The dyslexias and their causes are 
discussed from a variety of angles by a number of authors, e. g. Marsh- 
all & Newcombe 1966,1981, Newcombe & Marshall 1981, Patterson & Marcel 
1977, Patterson 1978,1979, Richardson 1975, Saffran, Schwartz & Marin 
1976, Saffran & Marin 1977, Shallice & Coughlan 1980 and the contribu- 
tors to Coltheart, Patterson & Marshall 1980). 
3: 4 PSYCHOLINGUISTIC EXPERIMENTS 
3: 4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Inevitably, the types of test which can be conducted without spe- 
cialist medical equipment and without risk to the subject, and which 
can be administered quickly and effectively to large numbers, render 
the psycholinguistic experiments different in content and object to the 
investigations carried out in clinics and hospitals. 
Measurements are indirect and usually relate to induced processing 
difficulties, in the expectation that the two hemispheres may perform 
differently in adverse circumstances. The difficulty of the task may 
lie in requiring the response to be given as quickly as possible. or in 
having to deal with competing stimuli. As with all behavioural experi- 
ments, there is an inherent problem in distinguishing relevant and ir- 
relevant variation in within-subject and across-subject performance. 
Furthermore, the overall interpretation of results inevitably involves 
inference, which leaves the way permanently open for alternative inter- 
pretations. Even the most consistent evidence for right ear superiori- 
ty in a dichotic listening test cannot therefore be considered to prove 
the left lateralisation -hypothesis. It is certainly consistent with 
the predictions of that hypothesis, but no direct connection can be 
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drawn between the behavioural trends of individuals listening to compe- 
ting auditory stimuli and actual activity in a specific area of the 
brain. On the other hand, behavioural data is currently the best we 
can gather in the circumstances (but see chapter 6: 4). A brief review 
of haptic processing experiments, which are not discussed here, can be 
found in Code (1987: 30ff). 
3: 4.2 DICHOTIC LISTENING TESTS 
In the dichotic listening test (d. 1. t. ) the subject is played two 
stimuli or sets of stimuli. one into each ear. He is required to re- 
port what he has heard, usually in a free recall condition. i. e. where 
items may be reported in any order. The pioneering work in this field 
was done by Broadbent (1954) and Kimura (e. g. 1963.1967; Knox & Kimura 
1970). Kimura used as linguistic stimuli randomly"ordered and paired 
monosyllabic single digit names (i. e. one to nine, excluding seven). 
In the d. l. t. the stimuli are heard through headphones and the onset of 
each word in a set is in exact alignment with that of the corresponding 
word in the set presented to the other ear. 
Ear advantage is determined on the basis of accuracy in recall. 
1ý 
This is not wholly satisfactory, however, as the order of recall tends 
to be different according to the speed of presentation, favouring the 
report of all stimuli to one ear and then all those to the other in 
fast presentation, and, in slow presentation, alternate ears, in order 
of the stimulus pairs as they appeared (Bryden & Allard 1978: 393). 
Bryden & Allard also note that free recall permits the choice of which 
ear- to report first. A general preference for the right would lead to 
that ear being reported first and thus most accurately, giving the ap- 
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pearance that information to that ear is subject to superior perception 
and/or decoding efficiency. However, there is evidence that even when 
the order of report is specified and therefore controlled, a right ear 
advantage (REA) is still to be found (Bryden & Allard 1978: 394). There 
is further discussion of procedures in dichotic listening tests in 
chapter 4: 1.2.5.1. 
Results have been consistent in showing a right ear (left hemi- 
sphere) advantage, almost always statistically significant, for lingui- 
stic stimuli (Bryden & Allard 1978: 393)" This advantage is manifested 
in the. more`. accurate reporting of right ear stimuli. It applies to ad- 
ults and to children as young as four (Kimura 1963). In appropriately 
modified tests, Entus (1975) and Best & Glanville (1976, cited in Ten 
Houten 1978: 25) found that babies responded more to an alteration in 
the right- than the left-ear item of dichotic pairs of. speech sounds. 
indicating an REA for language at an age when there are not yet any 
signs of systematic language acquisition. 
In contrast, non-linguistic stimuli such as clicks, melodies, sonar 
signals and musical chords elicit a left ear (right hemisphere) superi- 
ority (see H2caen & Albert 1978: 271). For a general review of d. l. t. 
results see Ten Houten (1982: 25ff). 
The cut-off point between what appears to be treated as 'language' 
and what does not is an interesting one. An REA has been reported not 
just for digits but also for words played backwards (Kimura & Folb 
1968, cited in Dimond 1972: 157). Some subjects have been found to have 
an REA for minimal pairs differing in one consonant but not one vowel 
(Studdert-Kennedy & Shankweiler 1969). It has been suggested (Tsunoda 
1975: 169) that the perception of isolated vowels and consonants as lin- 
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guistic as opposed to non-linguistic-input depends on the functional 
load of the items in the particular language of the subject. Fluent 
users of morse code have been found to have an REA for morse signals, 
while naive subjects have an LEA for sequences over seven segments long 
(Papcun, Krashen, Terbeek, Remington & Harshman 1974; see also Tsunoda 
1969, cited in Tsunoda 1975). 
On the other hand, speech which has been chopped into segments of 
200 milliseconds or less elicits not a right, but a left ear superiori- 
ty (Kimura 1970. cited in Dimond 1972: 157). 
The interpretation of results for the dichotic listening test re- 
lies on the assumption that the connection between a hemisphere and its 
contralateral ear is more direct and more efficient than that with its 
ipsilateral ear (Hecaen & Albert 1978: 271). However, Shadden & Peter- 
son (1981) suggest on the basis of their monaural experiments that at- 
tention may play an important röle alongside any more general laterali- 
sation of functions (see also Hecaen & Albert 1978: 413). Soares & 
Grosjean (1981) removed a difference in dichotic listening test scores 
between mono- and bilinguals by presenting the stimuli in blocks of a 
single language. 
Kinsbourne & Hiscock (1977) question the validity of comparing the 
size of REAs to determine extents of lateralisation in different 
groups. because attentional factors appear to play a decisive röle in 
the ear advantage patterns (p. 176,182). 
Bryden & Allard (1978) survey and assess the results of the dicho- 
tic listening test and highlight some inconsistencies. These will be 
discussed in chapter 4: 1.2.5.1. 
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3: 4.3 TACHISTOSCOPIC TESTS 
'In 
some important ways tachistoscopic investigations can be consi- 
dered the visual parallel to dichotic listening tests. They compare 
the efficiency with which stimuli are dealt with when presented to the 
left and right visual half-fields. This may be by requiring the subse- 
quent reporting of the stimuli after the simulaneous presentation of i- 
tems to both fields. or by measuring the speed of responses made to a 
single stimulus. In the latter case, the subject does not know which 
field will host the stimulus. so his only way of scoring above chance 
level is to affix his gaze centrally. This, and the minimal exposure 
time - too short to enable the eyes to move and focus on the stimulus - 
assure that a stimulus presented to a part of space only within one vi- 
sual half-field, remains completely outside of the other. Thus, the 
information passes, in the first instance, to only one (the contrala- 
teral) hemisphere. For a more detailed account of the motivation be- 
hind the design of tachistoscopic test procedures, see Kimura & Durn- 
ford (1974: 25). 
As with dichotic listening tests, it has been established that the 
majority of subjects respond faster and/or more accurately to lingui- 
stic stimuli presented to the right visual half-field (e. g. Levine & 
Banich 1982). For a review of findings see Witelson (1977). The dif- 
ferences in response time between left and right presentation are con- 
sidered to be : 
of the order to be expected for interhemispheric transfer via the 
corpus callosum on the pathway from the visual cortex to the hemi- 
sphere concerned with the discriminative processing of the inform- 
ation. (Popper & Eccles 1977: 351) 
Moscovitch (1983) is more exact: 
It is-assumed that a consistent advantage of some 30msec in laten- 
cy or 10% in accuracy for one visual field or ear over the other 
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in recognition indicates that the hemisphere contralateral to the 
favored field is dominant for the task at hand. (p. 62) 
In tasks of pattern recognition it is the left visual half-field that 
displays an advantage (see Harris 1978). 
One issue raised in relation to the findings of particular tachi- 
stoscopic studies has been the röle of the direction of scan in reading 
that the subjects are accustomed to (see chapter 4: 4.2.2.1). 
3: 4.4 VERBAL-MANUAL INTERFERENCE TASKS 
The premise upon which verbal-manual tasks have been administered 
and interpreted is that: 
people generally cannot simultaneously perform two tasks as well 
as each one by itself. [Efficiency] depends on which parts of the 
brain are involved in the two tasks. If both activities are pro- 
grammed in the same cerebral hemisphere, the time-shared perfor- 
mances will be inferior to those found when one activity is pro- 
grammed on one side of the brain and one on the other side. (Kins- 
bourne & McMurray 1975: 240; see also Kinsbourne 1978: 558) 
It has been demonstrated experimentally that subjects' performance 
on digit naming and tapping with the right hand decreases when both are 
required simultaneously, in comparison to when either task is done by 
itself (Kantowitz & Knight 1974)1. 
In addition, performance drops more where the tapping task is more 
complex: 
Thus, not only does the tapping task itself require processing ca- 
pacity, but even more importantly, an increase in tapping diffi- 
culty also requires greater processing capacity. (Kantowitz & 
Knight 1974: 334) 
The advantage of such tasks over the dichotic listening test is 
1. The general principle of reduced efficiency on simultaneous tasks 
has been demonstrated elsewhere too, as, for instance, in Foss (1970), 
where subjects detecting ambiguity and also reacting to the occurrence 
of a target phoneme were slower in both respects than groups doing on- 
ly one of the two tasks. 
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that attentional variations are not a confounding factor. In the for- 
mer, subjects may shift their attention from one ear to the other just 
to relieve boredom or out of curiosity. In the verbal-manual tasks, 
any shift in attention can only be between the two concurrent tasks, so 
it has no effect of any kind that could be mistaken for a pattern along 
the parameter of brain organisation (Kinsbourne & Hiscock 1977: 184). 
Verbal-manual interference has only been found in children: adults 
seem to be able to over-ride the difficulties (Briggs 1973, cited in 
Kinsbourne & McMurray 1978). According to Kinsbourne & McMurray, 
Briggs (1973) found adults well able to sustain tapping with either 
hand during speech, though at a speed proportionately lower than when 
there was no concurrent speech task. In other words, assuming left he- 
misphere speech, right-hand tapping did not appear to be in competition 
with it any more than left-hand tapping did. Kinsbourne & McMurray at- 
tribute this both to an increase in discrete motor control in maturity 
(p. 240) and to a greater automatisation of repetitious motor tasks such 
as tapping (p. 241). 
Kinsbourne & McMurray (1975) tested preschool children in a task of 
simultaneous tapping with one hand and speech (reciting a nursery rhyme 
and repeating four familiar animal names). They reasoned that a ten- 
dency to interference masked by the adults' maturity in motor control 
would show in children: 
The immature organism has a limited repertoire of synergisms which 
with increasing maturation can be better differentiated into pre- 
cise, discrete, and isolated movement. If overflow from one motor 
program to another within a hemisphere is a special case of this 
synergistic tendency, then it should be relatively more in evi- 
dence in the immature organism. (p. 240) 
Their results indicated a general reduction in tapping efficiency 
when it was concurrent with speech and an asymmetry was observed with 
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regard to which finger was tapping. Right-handed tapping was dispro- 
portionately disrupted in relation to left-hand tapping. This was con- 
sidered to indicate that the mechanisms involved in speech and right- 
hand tapping were in greater competition than those of speech and left- 
hand tapping, implying left lateralisation for language. Kinsbourne & 
McMurray note that the task requiring the repetition of animal names 
disrupted tapping more than the recitation of the nursery rhyme. 
Tsunoda (1975) conducted a whole series of experiments on normal 
Japanese and Western subjects and also on unilaterally lesioned Japan- 
ese patients. His method required a constant tapping pattern (right 
and left hands were not compared), with stimulus sounds (pure tone and 
the vowels /a/ & /u/) played synchronously into one ear and with Delay- 
ed Auditory Feedback of approximately 0.2 seconds into the other. He 
assessed cerebral dominance for stimulus sounds according to the rela- 
tive intensity with which the delayed sounds had to be played into the 
two ears to create a threshold of disruption to the tapping pattern. 
By this method Tsunoda was able to collect the following results: 
1. Told to pay attention to the synchronous sounds, 71.7% of normal 
Japanese subjects showed a right ear advantage for vowels and a left 
ear advantage for pure tones, white noise, buzzer etc. 7.6% showed the 
reverse pattern, 18.5% showed no difference (p. 156). 
In the condition of not being asked to pay attention to the syn- 
chronous sound, 83.9% showed normal or normal reversed dominance, 6.4% 
no difference. 
2. With brain-damaged patients, in the 'no attention' condition both 
aphasics with right hemiplegia and those without any motor paralysis 
showed a left ear advantage for both verbal and non-verbal sounds; dys- 
arthrics with right hemiplegia but no language handicap had normal pat- 
terns; left hemiplegics without speech disorders had (8 out of 9 cases) 
right ear advantage for vowels and non-verbal sounds. 
In those cases where verbal and non-verbal functions were in dif- 
ferent hemispheres, Tsunoda's test accuratedly matched the results of 
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Wada tests (Sodium amytal, see section 3: 2.2.4). 
By attaching a bone conduction receiver to the forehead during the 
test, an 'interfering' linguistic stimulus, either a verbal sound (/a/) 
or a continuous interesting text, could be played to the subject while 
he continued to tap against the background of dichotic sounds as de- 
scribed above. Tsunoda found that the superimposition of the linguist- 
is stimulus shifted the cerebral dominance for the pure vowel sound 
from right to left (left to right in reversed dominance subjects). 
The following stimuli were treated as 'verbal' by subjects: spoken 
isolated filtered vowels consisting of only first and second formants 
(F1 and F2), isolated vowels. CV and CVC patterns accelerated four 
times (unnatural in sound, four times higher in formant frequencies, 
but still with the same F1: F2 ratios), whispered vowels, CV and CVC se- 
quences accelerated four times and unnaturally segmented. Complex FM 
and AM sounds and harmonic sounds produced left ear (right hemisphere) 
dominance; inharmonic sounds produced right ear (left hemisphere) domi- 
nance. 
Other verbal-manual interference experiments have used motor tasks 
other than finger tapping. Kinsbourne & Cook (1971) and Hicks (1973. 
cited in Kinsbourne & McMurray 1975) investigated subjects' ability to 
balance a dowel rod on their index finger, and found that balancing was 
less well maintained by the right hand during speech-but left-hand ba- 
lancing was not affected. 
3: 4.5 LATERAL EYE MOVEMENT 
The use of involuntary eye and head movements during linguistic and 
spatial tasks has been used by Kinsbourne (1972) to establish dominance 
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for language and visuo-spatial skills. This is in accordance with ot- 
her experimentation which has suggested that: 
the direction of eye movements indicates contralateral hemispheric 
activation. (Gur, Packer, Reivich, Hungerbuhler, Goldberg & Obrist 
1979: 4) 
He found than right-handers moved the eyes most often to the right dur- 
ing the linguistic task and to the left in the spatial one. The same 
applied to horizontal head movements. Some left-handers looked to the 
right and most others to the left, both in verbal and spatial tasks. 
The relative patterns lead Kinsbourne (1972) to conclude that: 
functions that are widely distributed across the cerebrum in 
right-handers are more closely packed into one hemisphere (some- 
times . the right and sometimes the 
left) in left-handers, or at 
least are performed by the same hemisphere during the period of 
the experiment. (p. 540) 
For further discussion of lateral eye movement experiments see Code 
(1987:. 32ff). 41 
3: 5 THE LINGUISTIC ROLE OF THE RIGHT HEMISPHERE 
3: 5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Two lines of thought can be found in the psycholinguistic and cli- 
nical literature regarding the röle of the right hemisphere in language 
processing. The first is a logical extension to the general, and only 
relatively recently challenged, assumption that it is the left hemi- 
sphere that is, more or less exclusively. the language hemisphere, a 
view which has sprung naturally out of the consistent observation that 
language loss often occurs after left hemisphere damage and rarely af- 
ter right hemisphere damage (see section 3: 3 above). In this view, the 
right hemisphere's contribution to language processing relates to the 
non-linguistic aspects of the total communication process, such as in- 
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tonation. gesture etc. In addition. automatic speech (see chapter 2: 
2.2) is 'relegated' to the right hemisphere. All these components of 
communication are easily linked to the right hemisphere's observed su- 
periority in holistic perception and visuo-spatial tasks. 
The other view of the right hemisphere in language attributes to it 
a direct linguistic role of sorts, or at least the capability for such 
a role. Most proponents of this draw on recent observations from the 
clinic, and attempt to demonstrate that particular aspects of language 
(e. g. phonetic perception, syntax or semantics) require a cognitive ap- 
proach consistent with that of the right hemisphere. Thus they argue 
for a model which has a particular distribution of language functions 
between the hemispheres. The ways in which these accounts differ from 
the one proposed in the Focusing Hypothesis is examined in chapter 5. 
Most strikingly, the Focusing Hypothesis envisages a variable interface 
in the interhemispheric transfer of operations, which requires a dupli- 
cation of abilities, though not methods, for processing. In contrast, 
the theories to be discussed here appear to work towards the identifi- 
cation of a static divider between the capabilities of each hemisphere, 
implying that a given aspect of language processing is always and must 
always be dealt with in the same analytic or holistic way. 
3: 5.2 THE NON-LINGUISTIC RIGHT HEMISPHERE 
Until very recently, it has been generally considered that language 
processing in the right hemisphere is restricted to "the noise of peo- 
ple talking at a party... [and] common greetings and overlearned phra- 
ses" (Rupp 1980) and to the paralinguistic features of verbal communi- 
cation, such as gesture and intonation (e. g. Blumstein & Cooper 1974). 
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These are- aspects which it is supposed. are most effectively processed 
in a holistic, non-analytical way, and therefore most effectively by 
the hemisphere associated with that approach (Rupp 1980: 20, Krashen & 
Galloway 1978: 2). Some work by Jaffe (1976, cited in Seliger 1982) in- 
volved the selective removal of just the high or just the low frequen- 
cies from recordings of normal utterances. Where there were only low 
frequencies the emotional force of the utterance remained but it was 
lexically incomprehensible. Where only high frequencies remained there 
was a clear but unemotive message. According to Seliger (1982: 313) 
Jaffe proposes that the right hemisphere is equipped to deal with the 
processing of the low frequencies, which carry information about the 
speaker (e. g. age, sex, emotional state), while the left hemisphere 
deals with the high frequencies. With regard to hand gestures. Seliger 
observes that these are usually performed with the right hand and'so 
fall into the left visual field of the hearer, to which field the right 
hemisphere is most efficiently linked. This raises the question, how- 
ever, of why, if the production of gestures is also holistic, as we 
would assume it to be. and therefore also controlled by the right hemi- 
sphere. it is not the left hand which preferentially expresses them; 
Moscovitch & Olds (1982), cited in Code (1987: 103) found a right-hand 
dominance in gestures during speech, though only when there was no co- 
occurring facial gesture (Code 1987: 76). 
An investigation of hemispheric specialisation in normal and con- 
gentially deaf signing and non-signing children (Neville 1977) has in- 
dicated that gesture can be left hemisphere mediated where it plays a 
directly , linguistic röle as in deaf sign language. Non-signing deaf 
children- did not show hemispheric differences for the perception of 
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line drawings. Normal. hearing children showed the predicted left vis- 
ualfield superiority. But signing deaf children showed a reverse pat- 
tern, which Neville attributes to either the adoption by the left hemi- 
sphere of all visuo-spatial skills, including signing, or to a total 
reversal of the normal organisation, with language (signs) in the right 
hemisphere and other, nonlinguistic skills, in the left hemisphere 
(p. 129; cf. also McKeever, Hoemann, Florian & Van Deventer 1976). The 
question of right hemisphere superiority for visuo-spatial skills 
briefly discussed in the Concluding Remarks. 
Numerous reports from aphasic studies note that after the loss of 
normal linguistic communicational ability in the wake of left hemi- 
sphere damage. some automatic phrases (e. g. swearwords and greetings) 
and parrot-learned sequences and paradigms (e. g. nursery rhymes and 
days of 'the week) remain intact. This again has led to the supposition 
that these aspects of language are holistically stored and accessed by 
the right hemisphere. Benton & Joynt's (1960) review of reports of a- 
phasia provides many such accounts. For example: 
At the same time she lost all speech with the exception of the 
words 'yes' and 'and'. She could say no other word, not even a 
syllable, with these exceptions: the Lord's Prayer, the Apostles' 
Creed, some Biblical verses and other prayers, which she could re- 
cite verbatim and without hesitation, but somewhat precipitously. 
But it is to be noted that they were said in the order in which 
she was accustomed to saying them for many years, and, if this re- 
gular sequence were interrupted and she were asked to recite a 
" prayer or Biblical verse not in its accustomed place, she could 
not do it at all, or only after a long interval and with great 
difficulty.... Then we tried to determine whether she could repeat 
very short sentences consisting of the same words found in her 
prayers. However, she was also unsuccessful in this. (Peter Rom- 
mel 1683 in Gans 1914, quoted here from Benton & Joynt 1960) 
3.5.3 THE LINGUISTIC RIGHT HEMISPHERE 
It is only relatively recently that more interest has once again 
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been taken in the potential role of the right hemisphere in the main- 
stream of linguistic processing. However, caution is still the order 
of the day: 
There is no evidence to date which would clearly indicate that the 
mature right hemisphere surpasses the left in any aspect of langu- 
age performance. At best, an aspect of language may be processed 
by both hemispheres to an equal extent (but not necessarily in the 
same way). Galloway & Krashen 1980: 74) 
This is fair comment, but even in the light of that observation, most 
now consider that the old view of left hemisphere language is no longer 
valid: 
language consists of an aggregate of perceptual and mnemonic pro- 
cesses. some of which may be better subserved by the left hemi- 
sphere and others by the right. Both hemispheres would, then, 
contribute to language processing. (Vaid & Genesee 1980: 423) 
But just which processes are considered to be best subserved by 
each hemisphere differs from author to author. Chernigovskaya, Balanov 
& Deglin (1983) suggest that in L1 (but not L2) the right hemisphere 
deals with deep semantic structure (p. 195,212). Experimental evidence 
(e. g. Liberman et al 1967, Tsunoda 1975, and Tsunoda 1978, reviewed in 
Sibatani 1980), suggests that vowels may be processed by one hemisphere 
and consonants by the other within the same language, perhaps dependent 
upon the semantic load which isolated vowels carry (Tsunoda 1975). 
Clinical evidence, on the other hand, appears to indicate that: 
phonological and syntactic judgements are primarily mediated by 
the left hemisphere... semantic judgements may call on either of 
the two hemispheres, depending on whether the input is processed 
by recourse to a phonological coding (see Zaidel 1978). (Vaid 
1984: 177) 
Gazzaniga (1977) reports a split brain patient who "within a month af- 
ter surgery was able to show an incredible range of language skills in 
the right hemisphere" (p. 418). This leads him to observe that: 
the variation in the amount and kind of language in the right he- 
misphere is far greater than the consistency, and it is most like- 
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ly a-function of-the degree and place'of early brain damage to the 
left hemisphere. (p. 418) 
Zaidel (1973) found the right hemisphere of a commissurotomised patient 
to have the vocabulary level of a 10-16 year old and to be significant- 
ly better than chance on syntax, including passives. The major con- 
straints on success seemed to be the length of the construction and the 
word order (Nebes 1978: 111-2). More detailed discussion of the lingui- 
stic ability of the right hemisphere in split brain patients can be 
found in Perecman (1983) and Code (1987). There is some indication, 
too, that the right hemisphere can cope better with concrete and image- 
able words than with abstract and non-imageable ones (Code 1987: 50ff). 
Coltheart (1980) proposes that the symptoms of deep dyslexia may be 
a direct indication of the reading ability of the right hemisphere. 
Galloway (1981) chooses to hold both views of the right hemisphere's 
functional ability alongside each other. She believes that the right 
hemisphere's capacity for processing the non-linguistic aspects of lan- 
guage operates alongside its "purely linguistic (grammatical) contribu- 
tion to language" (p. 2; see also Rupp 1980). Bakker, Smink & Reitsman 
(1973) have suggested that the right hemisphere is involved in the ini- 
tial stages of L1 reading acquisition. In Levy's (1969) opinion, part 
of the right hemisphere's linguistic ability is masked by: 
competition from the major hemisphere for control of the motor me- 
chanisms for the production of language. (p. 615) 
The competition question is discussed further in chapter 4: 2.1. 
The issue of right hemisphere involvement gains even more promin- 
ence in discussions of polyglots and bilinguals (see chapter 4: 3-6). 
where it is impossible to ignore the many variations in the side and 
extent of ear advantage which appear for different groups in the dif- 
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ferent experiments and their apparent relationship to factors like the 
age, stage and manner of L2 acquisition. From this L2 perspective. 
Galloway (1981) looks back at L1 processing to observe that: 
It remains to be determined to what extent this [right hemisphere] 
ability might be used also in first language comprehension. Logi- 
cally it could be employed to the same extent in L1 as in L2 per- 
formance. (p. 19) 
An important additional consideration is that the right hemisphere 
may have linguistic capabilities which are not always directly mani- 
fest. This is one of the predictions of the Focusing Hypothesis (see 
chapter 5) but is also suggested as a possibility by others, including 
Gazzaniga (1977): 
[our studies] suggest that the right hemisphere, no matter what 
its potential for linguistic analysis might be, does not, when 
normal English words are being read. contribute much to the read- 
ing process. The studies do not rule out the possiblity that the 
right hemisphere m be capable of performing simple linguistic 
functions, but they do strongly imply that the right hemisphere 
linguistic abilities are not heavily relied upon by callosum-in- 
tact persons when they are reading ordinary prose. (p. 419) 
One of the physiological observations which (indirectly) reinforces 
such a view is the apparent capability of the anterior commissure to 
transmit visual, auditory and olfactory information (in split brain pa- 
tients), but its failure to do so in every case (Gazzaniga 1977: 416). 
If such differences can occur and if, as Gazzaniga also suggests. de- 
tails of the clinical history can be invoked to account for consider- 
able interpatient variation in right hemisphere linguistic abilities 
(p. 418), then the potential for making useful generalisations about the 
precise nature of hemispheric functions is drastically reduced. De- 
tailed discussion of the ability of the right hemisphere to deal with 
language can be found in Code (1987, chapters 3& 4). 
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3: 6 commENr 
In this chapter it has been demonstrated that there is a consider- 
able force of evidence from different sources to support the contention 
that language is primarily associated with the left hemisphere. The 
right hemisphere may play a peripheral role, dealing with some paralin- 
guistic features of communication, or it may possess greater capabili- 
ties, though whether these are operational in normals or only come into 
force after brain damage or surgery is not clear. There is further 
discussion of these points in chapter 4. 
The brief description of some recent accounts of possible right 
hemisphere involvement in language processing in section 3: 5.3 acts as 
an introduction to the contradictions and inconsistencies which form 
the centre of the examination given to data in the next chapter. The 
psycholinguistic evidence is considered by many to be highly convinc- 
ing. However, it is characteristic of the experimentation in this 
field that, once 
.a 
basic method has been established. investigations 
take the expectation of patterns congruous with left lateralisation for 
language as read. Thus, though many such experiments have been conduc- 
ted and, as will be seen in chapter 4. many have produced results puz- 
zlingly inconsistent with those expected, this has always been attribu- 
ted to variables pertinent to the specific experiment (e. g. sex, age, 
class, language) rather than being seen as any challenge to the under- 
lying premises. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
t 
INCONSISTENCIES IN THE DATA 
4: 1 INCONSISTENCIES IN THE MONOLINGUAL DATA 
The last chapter presented an overview of experimental and clinical 
evidence supporting the belief that language is a left lateralised 
function. However, the data contains many inconsistencies. These have 
been interpreted as complications induced by external factors. rather 
than being considered to challenge the basic premise of left hemisphere 
language. As a prelude to a closer, thematic examination of the evi- 
dence in chapter 5. this chapter highlights the nature of the inconsis- 
tency which the data creates and presents some of the accounts which 
have been offered in the face of that inconsistency. 
4 
4: 1.1 CLINICAL DATA 
One of the most problematic issues for clinical research into the 
localisation of language functions must be the extent to which general- 
isations can usefully be made across individuals, each with their own 
unique brain damage and previous history. Code (1987) raises this que- 
stion with reference to the differences between groups of CVA and mis- 
sile-wound patients, which include the size of the lesion and age of 
onset; characteristic contrasts in the nature and severity of the lan- 
guage problem and the recovery pattern seem likely to be related to 
these (p. 8f). 
Where the left hemisphere is damaged and the right hemisphere in- 
, tact it can not be clear whether the remaining linguistic ability is 
due to the part-functioning of the former or the new, or continuing, 
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functioning of the latter. Furthermore. not only may an improvement in 
language skills be due to some recovery in the damaged (or an adjacent) 
area, but also, perhaps, to the gradual adoption of more and more func- 
tions by the previously 'dormant' right hemisphere; see Code (1987. 
chapter 6) for an exploration of this. 
If one hemisphere has been completely removed, all functions possi- 
ble for that individual must emanate from the remaining half of the 
brain. Thus it might seem obvious that a study of such individuals can 
tell us everything we need to know about the abilities of a single he- 
misphere. Furthermore, if the two halves of the brain remain but have 
been disconnected from each other. then it ought to be possible to es- 
tablish exactly what each hemisphere is responsible for across the 
whole range of brain functions. 
In many respects, however, clinical studies of hemispherectomised 
and commissurotomised (split-brain) patients have confused rather than 
clarified these matters. On the other hand. there are some legitimate 
reasons for caution in interpreting the data, reasons which do not 
challenge the underlying theory of lateralisation (see below). It 
seems wise, in any case, to note Code's (1987) cautionary observation, 
that: 
an isolated right hemisphere is not the same as a right hemisphere 
separated from its neighbour. which, in turn, is not the same as a 
right hemisphere with a damaged neighbour. None of these is the 
same as a normal brain.... (p. 34) 
4: 1.1.1 HEMISPHERECTOMY 
It may not be possible to tell to what extent a remaining hemi- 
sphere is still performing all and only those functions with which it 
was concerned before the removal of the other hemisphere. That is, as 
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a result of its becoming solely responsible for everything, it may have 
adopted certain functions previously achieved (or attempted) by the ot- 
her hemisphere. This might be at the expense of some functions it was 
previously able to initiate. In addition, it is possible that certain 
functions may be performed by the intact hemisphere as a result of the 
loss of inhibitory mechanisms emanating from the hemisphere which has 
been removed (cf. Popper & Eccles 1977: 331). Furthermore, the functi- 
ons performed by the remaining hemisphere which were its reponsibility 
before the hemispherectomy as well, may only have been so because of a 
previous transfer of function necessitated by the bad state of the dam- 
aged hemisphere (cf. Heny 1985: 169). This is less likely to be the 
case where the damage is recent and acute, but in many cases hemispher- 
ectomy follows a long history of hemispheric abnormality. Thus, while 
we may receive a view of what the intact hemisphere is able to do, this 
is not necessarily indicative of the normal functions of that hemi- 
sphere. 
Thirdly, it would be mistaken to view the human's range of abili- 
ties as simply the sum of the abilities of individual areas of the 
brain. Some higher functions undoubtedly emanate from simultaneous op- 
erations, much as three dimensional vision results from the combination 
of two simultaneous two-dimensional images (cf. Zangwill 1974: 275). 
The data regarding hemispherectomy is compromised by a tendency to 
underplay in discussion the difference between hemisphere c tomy, that 
is, the removal of an entire hemisphere, and hemidecortication, the re- 
moval of the lobes of the neocortex only (Code 1987: 11). 
Despite the belief of some (e. g. Basser 1962) that bilateral func- 
tioning in infancy makes it possible for a single hemisphere to assume 
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the complete range of linguistic abilities normally accomplished by the 
two hemispheres if hemispherectomy occurs early enough in life, there 
is evidence that this does not happen. Dennis (1980b) describes how 
left hemispherectomised patients of five months old or less did not de- 
velop entirely normal language, despite the right hemisphere having 
what might be considered to be maximum opportunity to take on the func- 
tions normally associated with the left. 
Popper & Eccles (1977) speak of a ten year old female left hemi- 
spherectomy patient who improved her linguistic capabilities between 
the ages of ten and twelve but did not achieve normal language. She 
retained the ability to sing, however, and usually used the correct 
words when doing so. Of particular interest to Popper & Eccles was her 
retention of "a self-conscious mind" (p. 331f; cf. also Zangwill 1974: 
270), despite the consensus that it is the dominant hemisphere which 
houses self-awareness (cf. indications that the minor hemisphere is not 
self-conscious in split-brain patients, (e. g. Popper & Eccles 1977: 
332f). Popper & Eccles account for the retention of self-consciousness 
in terms of a previous transferal of functions necessitated by the his- 
tory of cerebral abnormality (p. 332f). 
Popper & Eccles also explain residual right hemisphere linguistic 
functions in the same way. They quote from Hillier (1954) a descrip- 
tion of one 14 year old patient's linguistic ability after left hemi- 
spherectomy: 
Comprehension of the spoken word is quite accurate. The motor a- 
_ phasia shows a constant improvement. He is capable of reading in- 
dividual letters, but cannot formulate words. He is at times un- 
able to name an article in an advertisement, but yet can tell the 
radio programme and describe the artists who advertise the parti- 
cular product. (quoted in Popper & Eccles 1977: 331) 
To attribute to previous transferal the post-left-hemispherectomy 
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linguistic ability of adult patients, as Popper & Eccles do in discus- 
sion of Smith's (1966) patient, however, implies a continuing recepti- 
vity throughout adulthood on the part of the right hemisphere which ot- 
her researchers deny (e. g. Krashen 1974). 
Examinations of hemispherectomy in adulthood in fact reveal that 
the right hemisphere has linguistic abilities over and above those pre- 
dicted by the traditional left lateralisation model. Reports indicate 
that although there are certainly considerable differences between the 
two hemispheres, they are hardly consistent with the notion that the 
right hemisphere is "word blind and word deaf' (Geschwind 1965, quoted 
in Coltheart 1980: 328). Dennis' (1980a, b) work indicates that there is 
linguistic competence in the right hemisphere (which may, however, have 
been abnormally transferred as described above), tempered by a somewhat 
different method of dealing with not just linguistic but all input: 
The two hemispheres, using different encoding operations, both 
succeed in establishing the deep structure, conceptual or logical 
meaning.... The theme and focus relations of the passive... are 
available to the left hemisphere but not to the right... just as 
the surface feature of entailment is established only by the left 
hemisphere. (Dennis 1980a: 315) 
The right hemisphere appears to be more proficient with auditory 
input, than other types of linguistic material. Interestingly it ap- 
pears to be the lone left hemisphere that is more restricted than the 
right in its ability to ascertain the focus or topic of sentences with 
stylistically based different orderings of constituents (e. g. topicali- 
sation); it appears to rely solely on surface structure clues. Gallo- 
way, (1981) has summarised Dennis' findings as follows: 
1) Both isolated hemispheres could identify surface structure lex- 
ical information when required to identify the premises of impli- 
", cative verbs 
(e. g. that someone (didn't) remember to do something 
in the sentence 'Jane (didn't) remember to close the window')... 
1 2) Both hemispheres seemed able to determine the lexical rules of 
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interpretive elements when the'task required identification of the 
presuppositions of factive verbs (e. g. that dinner is ready in the 
sentence 'Mary (doesn't) know that dinner is ready'). 
[3] However, only the isolated left hemisphere performed at better 
than chance level in using interpretive rules (e. g. negation) 
which operated on surface structures, when the task required judg- 
ing entailments of implicative verbs (e. g. that the window is 
(not) closed in the sentence 'Jane (didn't) remember to close the 
window'). (Galloway 1981: 45-6). 
To summarise, it seems clear that the right hemisphere possesses 
more than a negligible linguistic capability in hemispherectomised pa- 
tients. Discussion largely concerns the nature and limits of that ca- 
pability. Such observations provide an important contextualisation for 
the evaluation of the Focusing Hypothesis which proposes a permanent 
potential role for the right hemisphere in normal language processing. 
However, it is still clear that whatever the right hemisphere's capabi- 
lities may be, they contrast with the superior performance of the left. 
It is this difference which must be adequately accounted for in the 
terms of any hypothesis attributing normal linguistic processing to the 
right hemisphere. 
4: 1.1.2 SPLIT BRAIN 
Commissurotomy, the severing of one or more of the interhemispheric 
connections, is usually effected as a means of restricting the severity 
of epileptic attacks, by preventing their transmission across into the 
hemisphere in which they have not originated (Ten Houten 1982: 31, Gaz- 
zaniga 1967: 24). Because the majority of split brain patients have a 
history of severe epilepsy, care must be taken in drawing conclusions 
about' the normal population from observations of this kind (Levy 1974: 
124). ' (For a general description of the symptoms of epilepsy see Guy- 
, ton. ': 
1981: 185ff). In addition, some brain damage may be caused in the 
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course of the operation itself (see Millar & Whitaker 1983, cited in 
I 
Code 197: 10f). Further reservations in the interpretation of the data 
from split brain patients are necessary because of the possibility of 
alternative internal connections or of external cueing. With regard to 
the former, while, until recently (cf. Code 1987: 40), epileptic pati- 
ents will presumably have had the corpus callosum, the anterior commis- 
sures and the hippocampal commissures severed (Zaidel 1977: 2). non-epi- 
leptic patients, who may have had a tumour in one of those areas, or 
who may have a congenital disconnection may have retained, or indeed 
developed (Gazzaniga 1967: 27) some interhemispheric connections. 
Gazzaniga (1977) reports a transferal of visual, auditory and ol- 
factory information in some split brain patients whose anterior commis- 
sure was intact, but not in others. But Brown (1983) refers to person- 
al communication with Zaidel to the effect that the same phenomenon of 
transfer has been observed in patients without that pathway (p. 50), 
which challenges Gazzaniga's inference about precisely what it is that 
he, has observed. 
External cueing is a potential aid to all split brain patients. 
; Gazzaniga 
(1967) describes the strategy of one patient who was required 
to name a coloured light as red or green with his disconnected right 
hemisphere. Although the right hemisphere 'knew' what colour the light 
was, it was , 
enable to verbalise its response, whereas the left hemi- 
sphere, which could speak, did not know which colour to say: 
the right hemisphere saw the red light and heard the left hemi- 
tsphere make 
the guess 'green'. Knowing the answer was wrong, the 
right hemisphere precipitated a frown and a shake of the head, 
which in turn cued in the left hemisphere to the fact that the an- 
swer was wrong and that it had better correct itself. (p. 27; see 
,. also 
Slobin 1979: 130) 
It" is- interesting to note that the success of this strategy entails 
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some linguistic comprehension on the part of the right hemisphere. 
Experimentation on split brain patients has indicated certain ge- 
neral features about the capabilities of the two hemispheres: 
learning and memory continue separately in the two hemispheres 
such that both can sense, perceive and conceptualize independent- 
ly. The left hemisphere is shown to be proficient in speech, wri- 
ting and mathematical calculations, but limited in spatial tasks. 
The right hemisphere in these same patients has limited verbal 
skills, but is capable of complex spatial tasks and nonverbal ide- 
ation. (Ten Houten 1982: 32) 
Gazzaniga (1967) discusses the possibility of two separate conscious- 
nesses in the split brain, and the potential for an increase in mental 
capacity to above normal levels (p. 29). For descriptions of other, 
nonlinguistic, effects of commissurotomy see Gazzaniga's (1967) account 
(p. 24f). 
The right hemisphere can act on written and auditory commands. but 
syntactically complex input is not so easily dealt with and its vocabu- 
lary is relatively small (Slobin 1979: 123). 
Gazzaniga & Hillyard (1971) tested two split-brain patients with a 
high measure of linguistic ability. A single hemisphere was shown a 
picture and two sentences were read out, one of which matched the pic- 
ture. The patient had to nod in response to the appropriate sentence. 
The results indicated that: 
the right hemisphere is capable of recognising noun objects, but 
cannot comprehend verbs or respond to printed commands. In the 
more complex semantic sphere, there is no ability to recognise ei 
ther the relations between subject, verb and object, the future 
versus the present tense, or the singular versus the plural case. 
It has a remarkable ability, however, to discern whether an action 
sequence is properly represented by an affirmative or negative 
sentence (p. 275) 
Nevertheless, as Galloway (1981: 8f) points out, various tests appear to 
have' relied on the right hemisphere's ability to understand the test 
instructions to perform at all. 
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As far as production is concerned, the right hemisphere of split- 
brain patients seems to be more restricted in its ability. While the 
left hemisphere can read words presented to the right visual field 
(RVF). name objects held in the right hand, read whole messages and do 
calculations (Gazzaniga 1967: 25f), the right hemisphere. dealing with 
stimuli presented to the left visual half-field or left hand. seems on- 
ly able to guess when it comes to spoken or written reponses: 
a pencil placed in the left hand (behind a screen that cut off vi- 
sion) might be called a can opener or a cigarette lighter, or the 
patient might not even attempt to describe it. The verbal guesses 
presumably came not from the right hemisphere but from the left, 
which had no perception of the object but might attempt to identi- 
fy it from indirect cues. (Gazzaniga 1967: 25f) 
Other evidence indicates that it is not a failure on the part of the 
right hemisphere to perceive or identify the stimulus objects, only to 
find the appropriate verbal expression (Gazzaniga 1967: 26ff). 
Slobin attributes the right hemisphere's failure in speech produc- 
tion to the left hemisphere's having control of the speech apparatus 
, 
(p. 123). This implies that the impasse could be as late as the motor 
`stage and therefore admits of the possibility that the right hemisphere 
, might have access to linguistic encoding mechanisms as well as decoding 
ones. 
4: 1.1.3 TOKEN TEST 
One of the most revealing tests administered to brain damaged and 
post-operative patients is the Token Test (e. g. Zaidel 1977). In this 
test, sentences of five types are presented to the patient and require 
'a motor response using large and/or small plastic shapes in five co- 
-; lours. The test 
is administered to aphasics, to hemispherectomised and 
to I. split brain patients to assess their comprehension ability. There 
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are five parts to the test, containing stimuli of the following types 
(cf. Zaidel 1977): 
.. 
I:, Touch the red circle. 
II: Touch the small yellow circle. 
III: Touch the yellow circle and the red rectangle. 
IV: " Touch the small yellow circle and the large green rectangle. 
-V: 
i) Put the red circle on the green triangle. 
ii) When I touch the green circle you take the white rectangle. 
' 
Zaidel (1977) reports the performance of four-year-old children, 
aphasics and the right hemispheres of split-brain and hemispherectomi- 
sed patients (these last two performed similarly enough for him to pool 
the data on them). Results revealed an ability on the part of the 
right hemispheres to perform parts I, II and V of the test, which indi- 
cates some measure of basic competence in linguistic comprehension and 
implies some more complex capabilities too. However: 
the right hemisphere is selectively unable to remember all the el- 
ements of the auditory message in the correct sequential order. 
.. That is, the right hemisphere 
is more likely to decode correctly 
-; some parts of the instruction than to get it all, relative to a- 
. ., phasics. 
(p. 6) 
Zaidel observing that the items which the "right hemisphere finds most 
difficult are substantially different from those on which most children 
-or aphasics fail" (p. 9), and it characteristically displays: 
a failure to decode linguistic messages with multiple references 
-which are semantically nonredundant and refer 
to context-free in- 
formation. (p. 11) 
4: 1.1.4 INHIBITION 
, -,,,,,, Although all clinical reports confirm that the right hemisphere's 
linguistic capability is very limited (see chapter 3: 5), it has been 
1. Part V contains a range of constructions and at least three verbs, 
: 'as opposed to only 'touch' in parts I-IV. A full list of the part V 
stimuli used by Zaidel (1977) is given in the Appendix. A5: 4. The 
'Token Test is discussed with reference to the Focusing Hypothesis in 
chapter' 5: 3.., 
.. 
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noted that- the left hemispherectomised'patient displays a greater com- 
municative ability than does the commissurotomised patient using his 
right hemisphere (Zangwill 1974: 272fn). It seems as if: 
the verbal capacity of the right hemisphere. however small, is not 
evident until the left hemisphere is put out of action. (Hdcaen & 
Marcie 1974: 346; see also Popper & Eccles 1977: 331, Levy 1974) 
This may indicate that the left hemisphere's very presence causes 
some kind of inhibition upon the capacity of the right hemisphere. 
Such inhibition. perhaps the result of hemispheric competition (see 
section 4: 2.1 below), would cease to function when the left hemisphere 
was removed, if it emanated from there. Why it should, however, con- 
tinue to operate after commissurotomy is not clear. Zaidel & Schweiger 
(1984), cited in Code (1987: 119) suggest that those left hemisphere le- 
sions causing aphasia involve a failure to disinhibit the right hemi- 
sphere to take over the language dominant role. If so. the same could 
perhaps be argued for commissurotomy. 
It is also possible that such an inhibitory mechanism could be bas- 
ed in the right hemisphere itself. If so, it is necessary to assume 
that the right hemisphere is aware of the left hemisphere's absence af- 
ter hemispherectomy and its presence after commissurotomy. The action 
of. - inhibitory mechanisms 
in the right hemisphere during language pro- 
cessing in normals could explain the symmetrical activity of the two 
hemispheres which has been detected in measurements of metabolic ex- 
change in brain tissue (chapter 5: 4)2. This would mean that it was not 
differences in test procedures which were responsible for the different 
. 'findings 
across research methods (as proposed in chapter 5) but that 
only . the 
direct measurements of brain activity were able to register 
-------------- 
2. John Marshall (personal communication) has suggested this. 
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the constantly operating inhibitory activity of the right hemisphere. 
But this account is self-defeating. Its purpose is to explain the 
findings of symmetrical activity without invoking right hemisphere in- 
volvement in the language task itself. However. if the inhibitory me- 
chanism functions to prevent the right hemisphere taking part in lin- 
guistic processing, then this implies that it is in fact able to do so. 
Indeed, any hypothesis which allows for such inhibitory mechanisms pre- 
sumably does so on the basis of an assumption that, were they not to be 
active, the right 'hemisphere would become involved in language. The 
invocation of an inhibitory mechanism is therefore not very useful to 
general linguistic accounts which do not envisage some direct or indir- 
ect involvement (or at least potential involvement) in linguistic pro- 
cessing on the part of the right hemisphere. A similar point is made 
by Marshall himself (Marshall & Patterson 1983): 
How plausible'is it that one part of the normal... brain should in- 
hibit the performance of another part which is committed (albeit 
less effectively perhaps) to the same functions? What principle 
of biological engineering could demand such organization? (p. 426) 
4: 1.1.5 SUMMARY AND COMMENT 
.. Clinical 
data drawn from studies of aphasic. hemispherectomised and 
split-brain patients indicates that there is a clear and systematic di- 
fference between the abilities of the left and right hemisphere to per- 
form in linguistic tests. Differences between the performance of these 
three groups, however, suggest that the presence of the left hemi- 
sphere, whether intact or damaged, may inhibit the linguistic capabili- 
ties of the right hemisphere. But as already noted, caution is requir- 
ed here, as patients often have a lengthy history of localised brain 
abnormality and it may be that there has already been a transfer of 
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linguistic functions to the right hemisphere (Levy 1974: 124, Gazzaniga 
1977: 418-9). 
4: 1.2 PSYCHOLINGUISTIC DATA 
4: 1.2.1 NATURE & PARAMETERS OF THE INCONSISTENCIES 
While there can be no doubt that the right ear and right visual 
half-field superiorities for language tasks found in psycholinguistic 
experiments are largely replicable. nevertheless some interesting devi- 
ations from the predicted norm have also come to light. Tables A4: 
i-iii in the Appendix provide some indication of this. There is no 
shortage of explanations for why one group should behave differently to 
another in this respect, and some of these are described in the follow- 
ing sections. The kinds of contrasts invoked in the accounts presented 
here can be divided into four general categories, relating to variation 
within one subject. within a group. across groups and across studies. 
4: 1.2.2 WITHIN SUBJECT VARIATION 
0 
Most of the potential within-subject variables are adequately 
controlled for within a standard experimental design. For instance, by 
varying the order of presentation of stimuli for different subjects, 
practice and fatigue effects will not become falsely associated with 
specific stimuli. Such procedure assumes that individual variation in 
the strength and duration of the effects will cancel out over a group. 
However, other perhaps more influential difficulties may remain unnoti- 
ced or unmonitored, to the general confounding of the results of a stu- 
dy. Heny (1985) observes that: 
A single subject tested twice by one of these [psycholinguistic] 
;, measures may show different lateralization for the same task with 
only one week intervening between the first and second test. 
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(p. 169f)3 
Her account of this phenomenon is one which appears repeatedly in 
different guises throughout the accounts of variation in psycholingui- 
stic results, and which forms the core of the Focusing Hypothesis: 
It seems that hemispheric choice is fickle enough to be disrupted 
by seemingly minor factors. In a phenomenon called priming, sub- 
jects are asked to memorize a list of words, thus presumably turn- 
ing on the left hemisphere's circuits. If they are immediately 
asked to perform some spatial task that normally yields right he- 
misphere dominance, they will often fail to show the expected re- 
sult. They will perform the task with the left hemisphere.... ob- 
viously, the reliability of tests like these depends on the abili- 
ty to control such outside factors on choice of processing strate- 
gy, and that is no simple matter. (Heny 1985: 170) 
Shadden & Peterson (1981) demonstrated experimentally a contrast in ear 
advantage according to whether or not the subject knew in advance of 
presentation which ear the stimulus would be presented to. 
4.1.2.3 WITHIN GROUP VARIATION 
4 
Even if the subject performs consistently, there may be important 
differences between the performance of different individuals. Krashen 
(1978) highlights one important factor affecting the performance of in- 
dividuals in situations of L2 learning, namely their personal propen- 
sity to use the Monitor (see also Krashen & Terrell 1983 and section 4: 
3.1.2 below). Other factors identified in the field of second language 
testing of various sorts, but equally relevant to psycholinguistic stu- 
dies are affective factors (see section 4: 3.2.5). Basically, these re- 
late to the individual's attitude towards the task and his motivation 
to perform well. It is difficult to control for these factors across a 
group. Similarly, the attentional span of individuals may vary and on- 
3: Kinsbourne & Hiscock (1977: 182), however, doubt the relevance of the 
extent of ear effect as a measure at all (see 3: 4.2). 
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ly the fatigue-based aspect of this can be controlled for by varying 
the order of presentation across the group. That one individual may be 
in general more distractable than another is a potential confounding 
factor. 
4: 1.2.4 CROSS GROUP VARIATION 
4: 1.2.4.1 CULTURE 
Variation across groups within one study is expected and indeed 
many experiments have been set up expressly to test predictions regard- 
ing such variability. Some studies have looked for culturally-based 
differences. Geffner & Hochberg (1971) administered a dichotic listen- 
ing test to 4-7 year old children from two different socioeconomic 
classes (SECs). All the children from the higher SEC showed a signifi- 
cant right ear advantage (REA) for linguistic stimuli (two pairs of d$- 
gits). But amongst the children from the lower SEC all but the oldest 
age group showed only a nonsignificant trend towards REA. Geffner & 
Hochberg speak of a possible delay in the development of language la- 
teralisation in the lower SEC children, caused by a relative lack of 
intellectual stimulation at home (p. 200). This is only one of several 
potential explanations, however, as they themselves note. The higher 
SEC children could simply be brighter (p. 201), or, as the higher SEC 
children in their sample were predominantly white and the lower SEC 
ones predominantly black, there could be some racial difference, per- 
haps linked to affective factors. 
In another contrast of cultures, Scott, Hynd, Hunt & Weed (1979) 
found significant differences between d. l. t. ear preferences in Navajo 
and Anglo Americans (male right-handers). The Navajos displayed a left 
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ear preference, the 'Arglos the usual right ear preference, and both 
groups performed significantly better with the preferred than non-pre- 
ferred ear. This appears to indicate that: 
Native American Navajo subjects do, in fact process language in 
what would normally be considered the minor cerebral hemisphere. 
(Scott et al 1979: 91) 
However, Scott et al are unsure whether this is attributable to differ- 
ences in their predisposition to the development of neuropsychological 
asymmetries or to language specific factors (p. 91). 
Hynd, Teeter & Stewart (1980) administered d. 1. t and time sharing 
tests to Navajos and Anglos and found a significant REA in both. How- 
ever, they did find an initial left ear advantage in the Navajos, which 
was lost after 15 trails. They attribute the contrast between their 
findings and Scott et al's to the fact that in the latter study the 
subjects were college freshmen: 
It seems that these oppositional preferences are still evident in 
Navajo college freshmen... but in successful college students. only 
a trace of this tendency is still evident. (p. 6) 
This begs the question: what is it about college success that asso- 
ciates it in some way with signs of strong left lateralisation for lan- 
guage? There are two possible answers. Firstly, that only left later- 
alised individuals are suited to academic success. Secondly, that aca- 
demic. success involves the adoption of some strategies in dealing with 
information which are manifested in psycholinguistic tests as a left 
hemisphere dominance. The initial trend to LEA in Hynd et al's sub- 
jects suggests the latter because it indicates that the individuals may 
'have. had some measure of indirect control over which ear displayed the 
dominance. 
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4: 1.2.4.2 FIELD DEPENDENCE 
Other related issues come to the fore in this respect too. The Am- 
erindians are attributed an "appositional mode of thought" (Hynd, Tee- 
ter & Stewart 1980: 6), which is reflected in, or else caused by, the 
nature of their languages. This apparently predisposes them to right 
hemisphere dominance for language. Ten Houten (1982) explores the re- 
lationship between culture, IQ test performance, cerebral lateralisa- 
tion and field dependence/independence. The last of these involves the 
ability to mentally separate a stimulus from its context (Ten Houten 
1982: 29). Amongst the groups found typically field dependent (i. e. un- 
able to decontextualise the object of focus), are women and left-hand- 
ers (p. 30). Field dependence is associated with bilaterality for lan- 
guage functions, but, more specifically, with a failure to always use 
the hemisphere most appropriate for the task (p. 30). McGlone & Kertesz 
(1973) note, in their discussion of visuo-spatial accomplishment, Kimu- 
ra's (1969) proposal. that: 
when a task can be performed by either left or right hemisphere 
mechanisms, males tend to employ right hemisphere, non-verbal sy- 
stems, whereas females, perhaps because of their generally more 
developed language skills... may tend to employ left hemisphere, 
verbal ones. (p. 313) 
Conversely. Harris (1978) suggests that males may appear less field 
dependent because most dependency tests are visuo-spatial, which gives 
them an advantage (p. 491). Ten Houten (1982) quotes Ramirez & Castahe- 
da (1974: 74-5) as follows: 
characteristics of the field-sensitive cognitive style are analog- 
ous to those identified with the functioning of the right cerebral 
hemisphere, whereas characteristics of the field-dependent cogni- 
tive style are similar to those identified as functions of the 
left hemisphere. (p. 48) 
If field dependency is reflected in differences in appropriate he- 
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mispheric use, *then many cross-group differences will appear, between 
the sexes and between left- and right-handers, as well' as between dif- 
ferent social and cultural groups. Furthermore, sex differences will 
presumably be subject to the same 'acculturation' processes, so that 
women successful in the field-independent educational system will per- 
form essentially like men. 
4.1.2.4.3 SEX 
It is not clear how important the sex of subjects should be consi- 
dered to be as a factor in data interpretation. Harris (1978) reviews 
findings of sex differences in anatomical structure and the effects 
that comparable brain damage in a man and a woman may have on their 
brain functions. She associates implicitly the anatomical dimension 
with the sex differences found in some psycholinguistic experiments 
, 
(p. 468-72). Some experimenters have checked or even directly tested 
, 
for sex differences and found none (e. g. Kinsbourne & Hiscock 1977, 
Scott et al 1979, Geffner & Hochberg 1971, Berlin, Lowe-Bell, Hughes & 
Berlin 1973). But others have found sex differences in language stimu- 
lus test performance (e. g. Rupp 1980, Molfese 1977: 204, and Harshman & 
Remington 1975 and Bryden 1966, both cited in Harris 1978: 471). Kimura 
(1963) found that the girls in her study scored all in all higher than 
the boys at ages 4,5 and 6. And in several studies, girls demonstrated 
signs of strong lateral preferences (left hemisphere for language. 
right for visual stimuli) earlier than boys (e. g. Buffery 1971, Pizza- 
miglio & Cecchini 1971, Bryden et al 1973, see Harris 1978: 458). Buf- 
fery & Gray 1972 point out that this phenomenon may not relate to sex- 
determined laterality differences per se but simply to the more advanc- 
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ed developmental stage of girls relative to boys at a given age (Harris 
1978: 460). The findings of these experiments contrast with those sug- 
gesting that adult females are less strongly lateralised than adult 
males (see above) and that right hemispheric lateralisation for visuo- 
spatial skills may occur earlier in males. Harris (1978) addresses 
this discrepancy (p. 458ff) and explores, amongst other accounts, the 
following explanation: 
the male eventually equals and then surpasses the female in degree 
of left hemisphere lateralization, so that in adulthood, language 
in females is bilaterally represented. (p. 46o) 
Evidence in support of this hypothesis comes from McGlone & Kertesz's 
(1973) examination of visuo-spatial abilities in lesioned patients, 
where "visuo-spatial deficits associated with right-side damage were 
most clearly evident in men" (p. 317). 
Harris (1978) cites support from d. 1. t. experiments by Bryden 
(1966) and Harshman & Remington (1975). Bryden found an REA for spoken 
digits in 67% of left-handed and 74% of right-handed males, and in 50% 
and'57% respectively of females (normal subjects). Another d. l. t. stu- 
dy by Bryden, using free recall digit pairs, found an REA for 73.6% of 
males (11 left-handers, 42 right-handers) and 62.2% of females (3 left- 
handers, 42 right-handers). In another experiment Lake & Bryden (1976) 
produced similar figures using 144 undergraduates listening to CV dich- 
otic pairs. 
Harris later (p. 476f), in the context of discussion about visuo- 
spatial skills, suggests that sex differences in performance may revol- 
ve around preferred strategies: 
It is conceivable that in addition to sex differences in hemi- 
sphere lateralization in adulthood, the different developmental 
histories of males and females therefore predispose them to the 
use of different methods of analysis of spatial problems, with 
females relying more on the less efficient left hemisphere modes. 
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(p. 476) 
6 
In summary, it may be seen that the importance of sex as a deter- 
miner of performance in psycholinguistic (and visuo-spatial) tests is 
unclear. Some accounts go some way to exploring the variation in re- 
suits, particularly given that even a genetic determiner would not pro- 
duce a clearcut situation in which all men were better than all women 
or vice versa in a given task (Stafford 1961, Carron 1970; see section 
4: 2.1 below). Furthermore, the recognition of general cognitive modes 
and possible sex differences in task strategies is an important pivot 
in attempting to account for the considerable variation in findings a- 
cross different studies. 
4: 1.2.4.4 AGE 
As with the sex variable, age seems to prove a significant factor 
in some studies and not in others. In an experiment using 1-4 month 
old infants, Eimas. Siqueland, Jusczyk & Vigorito (1971) monitored the 
non-nutritive sucking rate during exposure to synthesised syllables be- 
ginning with bilabial stop consonants. The rate of sucking rose mark- 
edly in the group exposed to a change in stimulus sound which crossed 
the acoustic divide between what adults perceive as /p/ and /b/ (Voice 
Onset Time changing from +20 msec to +40 msec). The subject groups 
whose two stimuli were equally different but fell within one phonemic 
category (VOT -20 msec -> 0 msec and +60 msec to +80 msec) displayed a 
much less marked reaction. These results are taken to indicate that: 
the means by which the categorical perception of speech, that is, 
perception in a linguistic mode. is accomplished may well be part 
of the biological makeup of the organism and. moreover, that these 
means must be operative at an unexpectedly early age. (p. 306) 
Entus (1977) sought to measure hemispheric specialisation in in- 
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fants by presenting stimuli dichotically and monitoring sucking rate as 
a measure of speed of recovery from the novelty of a new sound to one 
or other ear: 
If a novel stimulus in one ear leads to greater recovery of suck- 
ing than does a novel stimulus in the other. we may assume that 
the hemisphere contralateral to the ear associated with a greater 
recovery rate is more proficient in dealing with the stimulus in 
question. Thus, a significant difference between ears in the rate 
of recovery may be taken to reflect differences in hemispheric 
processing of the stimulus material. (p. 65) 
Her results indicated a laterality pattern just like the typical adult 
one, with an REA for speech sounds (CV) and an LEA for musical sounds 
(A (=440Hz) played on the piano, viola, bassoon and cello (plucked har- 
monic)). This suggests that hemispheric functional asymmetries are 
present from birth or very soon after (Entus 1977: 71). Molfese (1977) 
achieved similar results by measuring Auditory Evoked Potentials in in- 
fants. 
. However, Bryden, Allard & Scarpino (1973) failed to find any later- 
ality effect in young children listening to dichotically presented CV 
syllables contrasting in initial (stop) consonants, which, in the cir- 
cumstances, is "a very curious finding" (Bryden & Allard 1978: 399). 
Bryden & Allard speculate that the d. l. t. is not an appropriate test 
for the very young. In particular, the ability to "disentangle the si- 
multaneously occurring sounds" (p. 400) may be absent. Bryden et al's 
results may indicate that the children were largely unaware of having 
heard two sounds at all. Kinsbourne & Hiscock (1977) concur, suggest- 
ing'-that young children find d. l. t. tasks very difficult because they 
involve: 
an unknown mixture of perceptual, attentional, memory, response 
set and perhaps other factors. (p. 179) 
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Using a modified procedure in which the subjects were told to listen 
for a particular item and then asked whether they had heard it, after 
it had been played in dichotic competition with another item, they 
found a right ear advantage in subjects as- young as three years old. 
Two possible confounding factors may interact with age. Firstly, 
the tendency of subjects to prefer to report first the stimuli present- 
ed to one ear and then those presented to the other. which puts the 
greatest burden of memory on the stimuli. of the second ear reported 
(Bryden & Allard 1978: 393). This is discussed in section 4: 1.2.5.1.1. 
Secondly, strategy preferences. Kinsbourne (1970) cited in Bryden & 
Allard (1978: 400) suggested that older children may tend towards verbal 
thinking. O'Leary (1982) tested for this in his picture comparison 
task. considering it a possible explanation for the changeover he found 
from LVFA to RVFA by age 8. By presenting visually dissimilar but lin- 
guistically similar (rhyming) pairs in some trials, he built in a dis- 
tractor element operational only if,. the pictures were verbally labelled 
for, memorising. However, he failed to find any significant effect in 
this regard (p. 71). For a fuller discussion of this experiment see 
chapter 6: 2. 
4: 1.2.4.5 LANGUAGE 
Language as a within-subject variable is discussed in sections 4: 
3-5. A small number of studies, however. have compared speakers of 
different languages and found laterality contrasts which, unlike the 
Amerindian studies described above, appear to relate to the structure 
of the languages themselves, as opposed to a language or culture rela- 
ted approach to the world. 
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Tsunoda (1975) found a left hemisphere superiority for both vowels 
and, - consonants in Japanese native speakers. This contrasted with a 
left hemisphere superiority for consonants and a right hemisphere su- 
periority for vowels in native speakers of other languages, including 
non-Japanese speaking second generation Japanese. Studdert-Kennedy & 
Shankweiler (1969) found a similar vowel-consonant based difference in 
their English speaking subjects. Tsunoda attributes the pattern of la- 
teralisation in his Japanese speakers to "peculiarities of the Japanese 
language", including the fact that: 
Japanese vowels form meaningful monosyllabic words... These may be 
processed in the dominant hemisphere as are the consonants and 
full syllables of some other languages. (p. 169) 
Another area of interest has been the comparison of lateralisation 
patterns of individuals whose native language is written right to left 
as, ", opposed to left to right. Experiments conducted in Israel have in- 
_, dicated, at any rate, that: 
-;.. Something about the Hebrew language results in its being more bi- 
laterally represented than English. (Gaziel, Obler & Albert 1978: 
196) 
4: 1.2.5 CROSS STUDY VARIATION 
The one most central contributor to the lack of consistency inher- 
ent: in psycholinguistic studies investigating lateralisation patterns 
. is-the variation across studies. Besides the obvious dangers of incom- 
, 
patibility across techniques, a number of factors are not controlled 
for <even within one general procedural brief. Not least among the po- 
tential confounding factors are the general limitations of the dichotic 
listening test itself. 
4: 1.2.5.1 LIMITATIONS OF THE DICHOTIC LISTENING TEST 
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The development of the finger-tapping task as an alternative mea- 
sure of hemispheric preference in tasks (e. g. Kinsbourne & McMurray 
1975) was motivated in part by the recognition that the reliability of 
the dichotic listening test may have been over-estimated. Kinsbourne & 
Hiscock (1977) observe that something like 20% of subjects are misclas- 
sified by the test; the baseline for assessments of the accuracy of the 
d. l. t. is the result of the Wada test performed on the same individuals 
(see chapter 3: 2.2.4). They assert that: 
clearly a method that so grossly misclassifies a substantial mino- 
rity of the normal population cannot be a valid index of laterali- 
sation with individuals when used in the usual manner. (p. 183) 
They continue by stating that to be more sure of a correct classifica- 
tion of an individual the asymmetry pertaining to their performance 
should be reflected in statistically significant differences in scores, 
should be repeatable and should not be subject to attention factors. 
Heny's (1985) observation regarding replicability in the individual has 
already been mentioned (section 4: 1.2.2). 
Bryden & Allard (1978) also express reservations in this respect: 
dichotic listening procedure is not a perfect measure of speech 
lateralisation - in adults some 80% to 85% show a right-ear super- 
" iority, not the much higher figure that would be expected from a 
direct assessment of speech lateralization. (p. 396) 
Indeed it is open to question whether the principle of comparing re- 
sponse times and drawing conclusions about contralateral processing ef- 
ficiency is valid at all. Code (1983) cites work by Cohen (1977) which 
1 suggests that "interhemispheric transfer time ranges from 4msec to 60 
msec and that the size of the differences probably varies between tasks 
and between subjects" (Code 1983: 58). 
'4: 1.2.5.1.1 FREE RECALL 
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A large number of the dichotic listening tests that have been con- 
ducted request the free recall of stimulus words dichotically presented 
(Bryden & Allard 1978: 393). In this condition, the subject is not con- 
strained to list the words in any particular order. The problem with 
this is clear: should the subject adopt a certain order for his report- 
ing, the limitations of his memory, which might tend to reduce his ac- 
curacy on the items he reports last, could be misconstrued as indica- 
tive of perceptual and speech inaccuracy. Work by Bryden (1962,1967, 
cited in Bryden & Allard 1978: 393) has indicated that: 
When the successive pairs of items are presented fairly rapidly, 
most subjects report the items presented to one ear followed by 
the items presented to the other ear. This has been termed the 
'ear of report'.... At slower rates, it becomes more common to 
find the subject reporting first one pair of items and then the 
next, in a 'temporal order of report'. (Bryden & Allard 1978: 393) 
Their own observations, however, indicate that adults who are required 
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to report the left ear stimuli first as often as the right still dis- 
play a right ear advantage (Bryden 1967). When the right-ear start bi- 
as was taken into account in some data relating to second, fourth and 
sixth grade children, although an REA was obtained at each age, a clear 
developmental trend was observable, with a greater proportion of older 
children displaying an REA; this trend had been masked by the consider- 
ably greater tendency of the youngest children to report the right ear 
stimuli first (p. 395). Inglis & Sykes (1967) comment, on the basis of 
their own findings, that: 
order-effect and. by hypothesis, short-term memory storage, is a 
powerful source of variation in [dichotic listening performance], 
as also is age. Ear-asymmetry, on the other hand, would appear to 
be a much weaker source of variation; its apparent effect may have 
been exaggerated by those studies in which care has not been taken 
to ensure that the influences of laterality and order be separate- 
ly analyzed. (p. 485) 
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4: 1.2.5.1.2 MEMORY CAPACITY 
, 
Inglis- & Sykes' (1967) results (see above) indicate that given a 
reporting order preference. a misleading superiority in accuracy will 
be found for the ear whose stimuli are reported first. simply because 
of the limitations of short-term memory. They in fact found no prefer- 
ence overall in their subjects to report the right ear before the left. 
But Bryden & Allard (1978) suspect that there may be one, and ask, as a 
, result, whether perhaps: 
items presented to the left ear are not harder to perceive. but 
are more difficult to remember, than items presented to the right 
ear. (p. 394) 
If this is the case, then it seems obvious to ask what it might be a- 
bout the way that the left hemisphere processes its input that makes it 
more memorable. Papcun. Krashen, Terbeek, Remington & Harshman's (1974) 
experiment using morse code dichotic stimuli may shed some light on 
this. Code sequences representing a single letter (not words or sen- 
tences) were presented to code users and instructors, who displayed an 
REA for these. Naive subjects, however, showed an REA only for codes 
sequences with seven or fewer units and an LEA for longer sequences. 
(A 'dot' counted as one unit, a 'dash' as three units). Papgun et al 
hypothesise that: 
the naive subjects were able to deal with stimuli of seven or few- 
er elements by noting the individual elements which comprised the 
signal and therefore lateralized the shorter stimuli to the left 
hemisphere. But with the list which included longer stimuli... 
they were forced to adopt strategies which took account of the ho- 
listic qualities of the stimuli and therefore lateralized the lon- 
ger stimuli to the right hemisphere.... The Morse code operators, 
on the other hand .... could deal with all the stimuli without los- 
ing the details of their temporal structure. They were not forced 
to switch strategies as were the naive subjects. (p. 326) 
Input to the left hemisphere was only more memorable where it con- 
sisted of a short sequence of seven or fewer items. This is in line 
124 
with Miller's (1956) observations regarding the capacity of the short- 
term memory. However. an 'item' may be a complex construct; in other 
words, one obvious interpretation of Paprun et al's findings, is that 
the Morse code operators could translate dot-dash sequences into alpha- 
betic items and store the latter in short term memory, whereas the 
naive subjects had to remember the dot-dash forms themselves. As Pap- 
Sun et al state, sequences which exceed the limitations of short term 
memory are more successfully remembered via holistic strategies. 
4: 1.2.5.1.3 STIMULI 
A criticism that can be levelled at psycholinguistic tests as a 
whole, and at the dichotic listening test in particular, is the limited 
range of stimuli used. According to O'Leary (1982), Porter & Berlin 
(1975) postulated that: 
different dichotic tests may tap different levels of language pro- 
cessing. The levels of processing tapped by different dichotic 
tasks may be lateralized to a different degree or may develop at a 
different rate. (p. 59) 
While Berlin et al (1973) did at least admit that nonsense CV syl- 
lables as experimental stimuli are hardly representative of real langu- 
age (O'Leary 1982), Bryden & Allard's (1978) list of "all types of lan- 
guage material" is indicative of a general failure to appreciate this. 
They mean to illustrate the width of range of stimulus types which have 
displayed a left hemisphere superiority: 
lists of words (Bryden 1967) or numbers (Kimura 1961), sound sha- 
dowing connected prose (Treisman & Geffen 1968), portions of back- 
ward speech (Kimura & Folb 1968), single phonemes (Studdert-Kenne- 
-dy & Shankweiler 1970) and even Morse code for experienced opera- 
tors (Papcun et al 1974) - in fact, virtually any type of acoustic 
material with a linguistic referent. (p. 399) 
Whet is most strikingly absent from this list is any proposition-orien- 
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ted continuous speech requiring a non-metalinguistic response (but see 
chapter 5: 2 for discussion of some experiments making less explicitly 
metalinguistic demands). 
4: 1.2.5.1.4 DATA ANALYSIS 
Bryden & Allard (1978) consider it important in analysing data col- 
lected from children to examine individual as well as group patterns 
(P"398)" Many studies which found an overall REA across a group may 
actually contain a considerable number of individual LEA performances. 
Arguing that ear difference scores are confounded by alterations in 
accuracy through increases in the subjects' tendency to guess at some 
points of the test, Harshman & Krashen (1972) developed an 'unbiased' 
procedure for analysing results. In this, the percent of errors is 
calculated individually for each ear and variations in accuracy can 
thereby be taken into account. Krashen & Harshman (1972) reanalyse 
some data on this basis and find that the revised figures support the 
theory that lateralisation for language is complete by age five. 
4: 1.2.5.2 STIMULI 
There is no question but that the stimulus presented to the subject 
plays some part in determining the observed hemispheric advantage. A- 
mongst auditory stimuli which have been linked with right hemisphere 
dominance are emotional parameters of language (Haggard & Parkinson 
1971), environmental sounds, pure tones and white noise (Tsunoda 1975) 
and : music (Knox & Kimura 1970). Visual stimuli creating the same ef- 
fect include geometric designs (Bryden 1960, cited in Ten Houten 1982: 
26), patterns of dots (McGlone & Davidson 1973. McGlone & Kertesz 1973. 
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Kimura (1966); in . addition, Levine & Banich 
(1982) found no visual 
field advantage for naming line drawings, in contrast to a right visual 
field advantage for reading words. 
What is of most interest is exactly what it is in the nature of a 
stimulus that makes it favourable to the processing procedures of one 
hemisphere rather than the other. The evidence from the Morse code 
study (Papgun et al 1974) suggests that the ability to construct larger 
units, or else to make corporate sense of sequences of individual items 
may be linked to left hemisphere superiority. Additional support is 
found in studies of hemispheric preferences in the processing of music 
by musicians and non-musicians. A number of experiments have found a 
right ear advantage for melody recognition in musicians and a left ear 
advantage for non-musicians (for discussion and references see Bever 
1983: 23). Bever interprets this phenomenon as indicating that: 
musicians have learned to listen to music in an analytic way, 
which stimulates the kind of processing natural to the left hemi- 
sphere. (p. 23) 
With regard to speech sounds. Studdert-Kennedy (1975) claims that 
the left hemisphere's superiority relates to its possession of a device 
which enables componential analysis specifically relating to linguistic 
features (O'Leary 1982: 58). 
Just what constitutes language or at least an analysable sequence, 
appears to be different for auditory and visual presentation. Whilst 
nonsense syllables (e. g. Studdert-Kennedy & Shankweiler 1969), and 
backwards speech (e. g. Kimura & Folb 1968) appear to evoke a right ear 
advantage, visually presented nonsense sequences of letters, including 
anagrams, do not produce the right visual field advantage obtained with 
meaningful words of the same length (for a brief review -of these exper- 
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iments see Harcum 1978: 164). 
, 
The same point has been made about tachistoscopic test stimuli: 
Whether or not our brains process a given input as verbal-concep- 
tual or as visuo-spatial is determined largely by the relative 
ease and utility of such strategies. This is influenced by the 
methods of stimulus presentation and the constraints imposed by 
these methods upon initial perception. With limited tachistosco- 
pic exposure, words may have to be processed as fragmentary 
shapes, whereas, given more time, even doodles can be christened. 
Such constraints upon perception help to determine the degree of 
verbal or non-verbal bias of the cognitive strategy employed. 
(Buffery 1974: 228) 
4: 1.2.5.3 PROCEDURES 
Shadden & Peterson (1981) have illustrated that the procedure rela- 
ting to the presentation of stimuli can have an important effect on the 
patterns of hemispheric superiority. They presented monotic CV sylla- 
bles and measured reaction times. The left ear presentation stimuli e- 
yoked significantly faster reaction times when the side. of presentation 
was known as opposed to random: in the former condition a block of sti- 
muli were presented to the same ear in succession. This leads them to 
suggest that alongside a general left hemisphere superiority for lingu- 
istic stimuli. attentional factors may differ according to expectations 
of the side of presentation. 
4.1.2.5.4 SUMMARY 
It is extremely clear from the psycholinguistic data that laterali- 
" sation patterns are subject to a considerable number of wide-ranging 
influences. Not only are some of the methods of measuring for lateral- 
ity unreliable but also it seems possible that data gathered from dif- 
ferent procedures is not compatible. But, most of all. the consider- 
able variation in performance across different sections of the popula- 
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tion brings to light the dangers potentially inherent in restricting 
the majority of investigations to subjects of a particular type, viz. 
university students. usually reading psychology or linguistics (see 
chapter 5: 2.1.4). Similarly, caution should be taken in assuming that 
the strategies adopted by subjects in response to the stimuli commonly 
used in experiments are representative of their strategies when pro- 
cessing language in a communicative context. 
4: 2 THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS FOR THE INCONSISTENCIES 
Two accounts addressing the variation in data have been selected 
for discussion here. These accounts need not stand in opposition to 
each other. 
4: 2.1 HEMISPHERIC COMPETITION AND THE GENETIC AND HORMONAL ACCOUNTS 
FOR LATERALISATION 
The characteristics of a competing stimulus, including its own 
perceptual lateralization, exert unknown influence on the magni- 
tude of anobtained asymmetry. (Haggard & Parkinson 1971: 176) 
One aspect of hemispheric interference has already been mentioned 
in the context of clinical findings. This is the possiblity that there 
exist inhibitory mechanisms (section 4: 1.1.4 above). which would pre- 
vent the right hemisphere from operating to its full capacity in the 
course of normal linguistic processing. 
Other areas in the competition discussion, however, relate to the 
simultaneous operation of linguistic and non-linguistic functions. An- 
nett (1964), in a discussion of a possible di-allelic basis for handed- 
ness (where dominant homozygotes (i. e. R-R) and most heterozygotes (R-1 
or 1-R) are right-handed and recessive homozygotes (1-1) are left-hand- 
ed) examines the hypothesis that in the case of early unilateral brain 
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damage (heterozygotes only) there may be the alternative to use the in- 
tact hemisphere for either visuo-spatial skills or for language. She 
suggests that in such instances language remains in or is transferred 
to the damaged hemisphere (p. 60), so that: 
more primary skills of orientation in space can be developed in 
the opposite normal hemisphere. (p. 59f) 
She cites supportive evidence for this from McFie (1961) who observed 
greater verbal than non-verbal impairment in children with early uni- 
lateral damage followed by hemispherectomy. She also refers to the ex- 
istence of evidence showing that: 
apparently healthy children of mixed handedness were significantly 
inferior to matched consistent handers, both right and left, on 
tests of verbal intelligence. There are strong grounds for belie- 
." wing therefore 
that in some circumstances heterozygotes may shift 
cerebral functions at the expense of speech. (p. 60) 
A report by Levy (1969) is not easy to reconcile with the study de- 
scribed by Annett. Levy tested right- and left-handers on verbal and 
performance IQ skills (the latter test the minor hemisphere functions). 
She found no difference in verbal scores, but a highly significant dif- 
ference in the discrepancies between verbal and performance scores: 
dextrals 8 points, sinistrals 25 points. As Levy did not take homo- 
and heterozygocity into account as a possible determinant of handedness 
types, she presumably included within her sample a substantial number 
of 'what Annett would term mixed handers. that is, heterozygotes with a 
preferences for the right or left hand only just strong enough for them 
to identify themselves as one or the other. According to Annett, cul- 
tural pressures would encourage most mixed handers to prefer the right 
hand. Thus, a greater proportion of the left-handers than of the 
right-handers in Levy's study ought to have had a strong hand prefer- 
ence; in that case, Annett's predictions would include the following: 
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the right-handers should show a lower mean verbal score than the left- 
handers, because a greater proportion of the former group are actually 
mixed-handers by genetic determination. No such verbal difference was 
obtained. Levy does not specify the method by which she determined 
handedness; it is possible that a stringent screening enabled her to 
exclude all but those with a strong hand preference. 
Levy's ideas regarding competition relate to the incompatibility of 
analytic and gestalt skills. Lateralisation is proposed to be: 
an adaptation permitting control of the unique vocal apparatus, 
uncomplicated by competitive antagonism between the hemispheres. 
(p. 615) 
In other words, the lateralisation of language to the left hemisphere 
and of visuo-spatial skills to the right is seen as a compromise solu- 
tion (in evolutionary terms) to minimize contradictory processing eman- 
ating from two different strategical approaches to the same task (see 
also Harris*1978: 463). 
Gazzaniga (1977) proposes something rather similar. The succession 
of the right hemisphere to dominance in visuo-spatial skills is by de- 
fault, after the preferential assumption for language processing of the 
left hemisphere neurological space which would otherwise have dealt in 
perceptual wholes: 
we feel that the emergence of right dominance is not indicative of 
the unique perceptual specialization of the right hemisphere, but 
instead represents a settlement between the hemispheres whereby it 
is discovered that less conflict is encountered if each half-brain 
controls performance for different classes of activities. (p. 420) 
" Thus, the ability of the right hemisphere to perform well in visuo-spa- 
tial` tasks is not at all remarkable; rather, it is a surprise that the 
left-hemisphere is less good at them (p. 421). 
Geschwind (1983) has suggested that bilaterality of linguistic 
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skills will lead to superior visuo-spatial skills. Included within the 
group whom he predicts will display such an advantage are left-handers. 
His theory, however. relates not to interhemispheric or inter-function- 
al competition, but to the relative speed of development of the two he- 
mispheres. Briefly, he suggests that a foetus which is exposed to an 
excessive amount of testosterone during the gestational period will ex- 
perience a slowing of left hemispheric development relative to the 
right, allowing the latter to catch up or even overtake it (p. 37). 
This, he proposes, can lead to right hemisphere preference in motor 
control (left-handedness), superiority in visuo-spatial skills and, in 
some cases, bilaterality or even right hemisphere dominance for langu- 
age. He associates the 'abnormal' language representation with stut- 
tering and dyslexia. Other, non-linguistic effects of the increased 
right hemisphere development which he proposes include a failure of the 
immune system to fully develop, leading to various allergies such as 
hayfever, eczema and asthma. All of the characteristics which he asso- 
ciates with a high level of testosterone in the womb are more common in 
males than females. He accounts for this by noting that the male foe- 
tus produces a considerable amount of testosterone during that period 
(p. 36). in addition to the quantity produced by the mother herself. 
Geschwind is therefore able to draw support for his account from the 
observation that left-handedness is most common in male twins, who have 
developed in a doubly concentrated environment of testosterone (Ge- 
schwind 1985; see also Bestic 1985 and Netley 1977). 
Stafford (1961) and Garron (1970) also provide a plausible account 
for lateralisation. suggesting that it is genetically determined. Evi- 
dence from patients with Turner's Syndrome (phenotypical females with 
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only one X chromosome (X0)) support their case. Netley (1977) de- 
scribes how individuals with the abnormal- sex chromosome formation XXY 
are handicapped on verbal tests, while those with Turner's Syndrome 
(XO) have normal verbal skills but impaired visuo-spatial ability. 
This, he believes, indicates that: 
the absence of one X chromosome in phenotypic females is associa- 
ted with some tendency toward right hemisphere processing of ver- 
bal material. (p. 139) 
The genetic explanation proposed for this is that superior spatial abi- 
lity is carried on a recessive gene on the X chromosome (p. 139)ß so 
that normal males (XY) display it if they inherit a single recessive 
gene, but women (XX) require two recessive genes to display the trait. 
This account predicts that: 
the proportion of females showing the trait will be the square of 
the proportion of males showing the trait. (Garron 1970: 148) 
This is strongly supported by Stafford's (1961) work. He found the 
predicted zero correlation in visuo-spatial ability between fathers and 
sons (Y chromosome inherited), a significant correlation between both 
fathers and daughters and mothers and sons (X chromosome inherited) and 
a smaller positive correlation between mothers and daughters (one of 
two X chromosomes inherited as one of two). 
Garron (1970) discusses Bock's (1967) findings. which also general- 
ly support this genetic account, except in one detail. Although Bock 
found, as predicted, the proportion of females that excelled in the vi- 
suo-spatial task was the square of the proportion of excelling males 
(males = 50%, females = 25%), of those females who did excel (and who 
would- therefore be predicted to carry two recessive genes for superior 
visuo-spatial skills), six did not have a father who also excelled. 
This is problematic, because they must have received a recessive gene 
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from the father, who would therefore also express the trait. Bock at- 
tributed this phenomenon to a lack of motivation on the part of the 
fathers who therefore performed badly. 
To account for Turner's Syndrome in these terms it is necessary to 
explain why a recessive gene on the single X chromosome does not lead 
to visuo-spatial abilities equal to those in normal males. One possi- 
blity proposed by Garron (1970) is that the Turner's Syndrome data is 
confounded by the failure to distinguish between individuals with no 
second chromosome at all and those with a defective second X chromo- 
some. In the latter case. there may be a block to the realisation of 
the superior spatial ability. Another account invokes positive action 
on the part of the Y chromosome. Ounsted & Taylor (1972) have suggest- 
ed that the Y chromosome functions to slow the general developmental 
rate so that there is opportunity for the full potential of the ability 
to be expressed. This means that males would have an advantage over 
Turner's Syndrome women with respect to the extent of expression which 
the sole recessive gene enjoys (Netley 1977: 140). Linking the possi- 
bility of a röle for the Y chromosome with Levy's (1969) hypothesis re- 
garding hemispheric competition, Netley suggests that perhaps: 
the Y chomosome acts in such a way that hemispheric specialization 
starts more slowly and terminates at a higher level for males. 
(p. 140) 
4: 2.2 AGE OF LATERALISATION 
A considerable amount has been written about the age at which one 
or all of the component skills relating to language processing lateral- 
ise to the left hemisphere. Central to the discussion is the question 
of whether the left hemisphere is already set up for language at birth 
or whether it becomes so in the course of post-natal development. 
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4: 2.2.1 LATERALISATION AT BIRTH 
Although no direct inference regarding functional asymmetry may be 
drawn from purely anatomical structures, it is nevertheless considered 
indicative of hemispheric differences in potential to function. that 
the speech areas of the left hemisphere are more highly developed than 
the equivalent areas of the right hemisphere in the foetus and neonate 
(Teszner et al 1972, Wada 1974, Wada et al 1975, Witelson & Pallie 
1973; see chapter 3: 2). The ability of babies to differentiate speech 
sounds (as determined by sucking rate (Eimas et al 1971. Entus 1975 and 
section 4: 1.2.4.4 above), and the association of AEP asymmetries with 
speech input in babies (Molfese 1977) further supports the belief that 
some kind of left hemisphere superiority and/or preference exists from 
birth. 
Clinical support for lateralisation at birth comes from the observ- 
ation that even very early unilateral lesions to the left hemisphere 
have a greater tendency to lead to handicaps than those to the right 
(see Krashen 1974 and Kinsbourne & Hiscock 1977 for reviews of support- 
ive data). Moscovitch (1977) presents a critical re-examination of 
Basser's (1962) case studies, which led to a claim that early damage to 
either hemisphere was equally likely to lead to linguistic handicap. 
By challenging this data, he considerably undermines the premises upon 
which Lenneberg (e. g. 1967) based his support of hemispheric equipoten- 
tiality for language at birth. Apparent evidence supporting equipoten- 
tiality at birth. particularly that relating to aphasias after right 
hemisphere lesions in children, is treated with scepticism by Kins- 
bourne & Hiscock (1977). Amongst the points they raise are the fol- 
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lowing: 
t 
a) Basser's (1962) data is unrepresentative of the clinical population 
because it consists of information gathered from other researchers, 
each reporting their own selection of interesting cases. 
b) Children with brain damage may, in many cases, have additional, un- 
detected anormalities of long standing, which may have led- to the 
transfer of linguistic functions to the minor (undamaged) hemisphere 
(but cf. Annett's 1964 hypothesis described in section 4: 2.1 above). 
c) the definition of aphasia differs across studies. Of cases at the 
Toronto Hospital for Sick Children they say: 
the evidence for aphasia in clinical charts often is no better 
founded than "the child would not talk to the doctor'. There are 
many reasons why that might happen. (p. 175) 
d) The occasional case of language loss associated with right hemi- 
sphere damage does not prove that young children have bilateral langu- 
age representation: it is known that a small proportion of the popula- 
tion have language lateralised to the right. 
With regard to the behavioural support for a development of later- 
alisation (e. g. the studies discussed in Bryden & Allard 1978: 397). 
Kinsbourne & Hiscock draw attention to uncontrolled variables such as 
attention, motivation and cognitive and situational factors. 
Left hemisphere superiority at birth could be associated with the 
faster maturation of the left hemisphere than the right (Marie 1922; 
see also Geschwind 1983), which would afford the left hemisphere an ad- 
vantage at every turn in the assimilation of information and the analy- 
sis of increasingly complex input. 
4 
4: 2.2.2 STAGGERED LANGUAGE LATERALISATION 
Lenneberg (1967) and others (e. g. Krashen 1974) supporting the be- 
I.: lief. that there is equipotentiality for language functions at birth be- 
lieved that lateralisation occurred by the age of five. As described 
; above. there is now considered to be little support for this. 
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However, more plausible to many writers has been the possiblity 
that different elements of language lateralise at different times. 
Despite Bryden et al's (1973) finding that children did not display a 
right ear effect for the phonetic discrimination of CV syllables (see 
section 4: 1.2.4.4), many believe that if language does not lateralise 
all at once, it is phonetic discrimination which is first to lateralise 
(Scovel 1969, Seliger 1978). Witelson & Pallie (1973) take note of the 
fact that, in the case of babies and young children, it is not possible 
to measure anything other than phonetic discrimination anyway, and this 
leads them to restrict their claim regarding biological preprogramming 
for left hemisphere language to speech sounds only (p. 645). 
O'Leary (1982) takes a similar view, noting that the experiments on 
neonates have found laterality for "only the most_primitive stages of 
speech perception". leaving open the possibility that: 
the more complex aspects of language use (e. g. syntax and seman- 
tics) lateralize only gradually. (p. 52; see also Moscovitch 1977 
and Molfese 1977: 198). 
Drawing on evidence from childhood aphasia, Hecaen (1976) expresses 
the same idea, noting indications that: 
the different language zones do not achieve their full maturation 
at the same time, allowing a reorganization even in the same hemi- 
sphere of verbal function, a reorganization which, moreover, oc- 
curs at the expense of other functions. (p. 130) 
McKeever et al (1976) suggest that certain linguistic milestones 
(in this case the lateralisation of phonetic discrimination rather than 
just lateralisation in general as Krashen (1974) suggests) have to be 
passed at the appropriate time in order to enable further normal devel- 
, opment. They 
found a lack of hemispheric asymmetry for language in 
non-signing deaf people and only a low level of perceptual asymmetry on 
tachistoscopic tests in signing ones. They conclude that the normal 
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development of lateralisation for linguistic and non-linguistic func- 
tions may be affected by the absence of phonetic input. However, the 
fact that laterality for language is found in the signing deaf (Neville 
1977) indicates that phonetic input is certainly not the only catalyst, 
if it is one at all, to normal lateralisation. Furthermore, we may 
note that in the deaf, two things are failing to occur: phonetic input 
and the brain functions which would deal with it. It is difficult to 
see how one could determine whether it is the missing input (an envir- 
onmental type of factor) or the missing brain activity (a biological 
factor) which upsets the normal development of functions. The case of 
Genie (e. g. Fromkin, Krashen, Curtiss, Rigler & Rigler 1974) could also 
be taken as evidence of the inability of language to lateralise without 
phonetic input, but the röle of this environmental deficiency can be 
extracted neither from the effect of an overall absence of linguistic 
stimulation, nor, once again, from the biological consequences of fail- 
, 
ing to initiate linguistic development when the brain is primed to ac- 
cept it. 
4: 3 THEORIES FOR BILINGUAL4 AND POLYGLOT STORAGE AND ACQUISITION 
The involvement of the hemispheres in language has also been ad- 
dressed in relation to second language acquisition and storage. In the 
following section theories will be described which have been proposed 
in this context. Then section 4: 4 will examine the inconsistencies in 
the"data which has emanated from testing these accounts. 
------------ 
-: =4. ' Despite the general use of 
'polyglot' to apply to all non-monolinguals 
'(see Notes on Terminology), 'bilingual' is retained where it is a cen- 
-, tral'term in a theory under discussion (e. g. 'compound & coordinate 
, 
bilingualism', below). 
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4: 3.1 STORAGE 
4: 3.1.1' COMPOUND & COORDINATE BILINGUALISM 
When, after becoming a practical expert in his own, first langu- 
age, a person starts learning a second language, new sets of deco- 
ding and encoding habits are being formed in competition with the 
old. When the bilingual shifts from language to language, simi- 
larly, two systems of decoding and encoding habits come into con- 
flict to a greater or lesser degree. (Ervin & Osgood 1954: 139) 
Ervin & Osgood (1954) appear to be the first to have used the terms 
compound and coordinate in the context of bilingualism. However. Wein- 
reich (1953) explores the same ideas in a slightly less formal way and 
traces the concepts back as far as the end of the last century (see be- 
low). 
COMPOUND 
rm....... sm 
/ / \ \ 
SA / \ RA 
/ \ 
SB RB 
COORDINATE 
rml........ sml 
SA RA 
rm2........ sm2 
SB RB 
KEY 
S= set of linguistic signs A= language A 
R= set of responses B= language B 
rm = representational mediation 
sm = self-stimulation 
FIGURE 4: I (reproduced from Ervin & Osgood 1954: 140) 
Figure 4: 1 depicts the model of compound and coordinate bilingual- 
ism used by Ervin & Osgood. The difference between them lies in whe- 
ther there is (compound) or is not (coordinate) a shared "set of repre- 
sentational mediation processes or meaning" (p. 140). The compound 
structure, they suggest, is typically formed as a result of foreign 
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language learning in school, where, in particular, vocabulary lists en- 
courage the association of an L2 item with its L1 equivalent rather 
than directly with the concept. In addition, however, a compound re- 
presentation may result from an entirely different acquisitional set- 
ting: 
where interlocutors use both languages interchangeably to refer to 
the same environmental events. (Lambert & Rawlings 1969: 604) 
The association of such different methods of language learning/acquisi- 
tion within one storage category is considered by some to be an avoid- 
able generalisation (see below). 
The coordinate bilingual operates two independent systems, each of 
which may contain some conceptual material not within the other, so 
that some subjects may be substantially more difficult to discuss in 
one language than the other: 
The total situations, both external and emotional, and the total 
behaviors occurring when one language is being used will differ 
from those occurring with the other. (Ervin & Osgood 1954: 140) 
According to Ervin & Osgood, both types of bilingual will be subject to 
some problems of cross-language interference. but the difficulties will 
be more acute for the individual with compound storage. This is be- 
cause in this case both languages share the same conceptual framework; 
interference will occur in proportion to the amount of cultural simil- 
arity between the two language communities because this will determine 
the measure of equivalence between a concept-label in one-language and 
its nearest translation in the other. 
Weinreich (1953). whose examination of bilingualism resembles and 
predates that of Ervin & Osgood, attributes the concepts of compounded 
versus separate systems of storage to earlier writers, such as 96erba 
14o 
(1945) and even Loewe (1888). Weinreich's model involves three types 
of storage, by which means he affords separate status to the two types 
of compound bilingual treated together by Ervin & Osgood. Weinreich 
(1953) represents the model as follows (Figure 4: 11): 
MODEL A MODEL B MODEL C 
_{ 
'book' } 
'book' 'kniga' 'book' _ 'kniga' { /bwk/ } 
II/ 
/bwk/ /kniga/ /bwk/ /kniga/ /kniga/ 
FIGURE 4: 11 (from Weinreich 1953; see also Paradis 1978) 
Model A is equivalent to Ervin & Osgood's coordinate category, 
where each phonological realisation (/ /) is associated-with its own 
concept (' '). whatever resemblance there may be between any of those 
concepts. Model B applies to those individuals termed compound by Er- 
vin & Osgood who have acquired two languages within one environment; 
here the concepts are considered identical (where applicable) and are 
each directly connected to both words. In Model C, where L2 has been 
learnt (formally) via the L1 medium, access from a single L1 appropri- 
ate concept is mediated by the L1 word, so that L2 production proceeds 
via some level of translation. With reference to the theories of Ro- 
berts (1934). Weinreich associates Model C with subordinative bilingu- 
alism because of this L1 mediation. Further detailed discussion of the 
compound-coordinate model of linguistic storage can be found in Albert 
& Obler (1978: 227ff). 
Whitaker (1978) draws on the evidence from polyglot aphasia (dis- 
cussed in section 4: 5) to challenge the compound-coordinate distinc- 
tion. Although parallel recovery of languages appears to be indicative 
4 
i 
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of compound storage, he says, both parallel and differential recovery 
can be accounted for in terms of coordinate storage: 
for the simple reason that it is almost certain that all languages 
are represented and organized similarly in the same anatomical 
structures. Therefore, a lesion in one of these structures would 
affect all languages similarly, regardless of whether there was a 
single set of linguistic rules or not.... From the evidence at 
hand, it is not clear that a case can be made for these two types 
of bilingualism. let alone the third type postulated by Weinreich, 
the subordinate. (p. 28) 
The compound-coordinate distinction has proved a useful baseline 
for research. However. despite the observation that most bilinguals 
probably fall somewhere on a continuum between totally compounded or 
totally coordinated storage (Albert & Obler 1978: 227; Lambert 1969: 301; 
Kotik 1984: 237), much research has failed to really take this into ac- 
count, relying rather on the assumption that subjects can be considered 
polarised (Lambert & Rawlings 1969: 605). According to Vaid (1984), 
Lambert's major criterion for the classification of bilinguals as com- 
pound or coordinate was the age of onset of the bilingualism (Vaid 
1984: 176). Some authors employ misleadingly simplified definitions, 
e. g. Rupp (1980): 
A compound bilingual is one who acquired both languages at the 
same time.... The coordinate bilingual is one who acquired each 
language in different settings and usually at different times. 
(p"5) 
Rupp's definition is particularly problematic because it predicts a 
coordinate storage for formal classroom L2 learners. 
5 
Despite the implications of modifying a clear two-way distinction 
into a continuum, Lambert & Rawlings (1969) consider that the studies 
investigating the "construct validity of compound-coordinate differ- 
5. Elsewhere, (e. g. p. 23) Rupp (1980) expands on Ervin & Osgood's model 
in a more representative way. 
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ences": 
promote a good deal of confidence in the psychological signifi- 
cance of the phenomenon. (p. 605) 
They describe an experiment which required the naming by bilinguals of 
key words linking a group of semantically associated stimulus words. 
In alignment with their predictions, compound bilinguals found it easi- 
er than coordinates to correctly respond when the stimulus lists con- 
tained words in more than one language. Within this condition, coordin- 
ates. but not compounds, performed better if the words were grouped ac- 
cording to language and ordered for frequency. 
6 
Other studies, however, have not supported the compound-coordinate 
distinction as it stands. Lambert (1969) himself describes two experi- 
ments where compounds were expected to perform less well than coordin- 
ates but did not. This leads him to concede that "the matter may be 
quite complex" and that his "confidence in the compound-coordinate mat- 
ter is only luke-warm" (p. 41, quoted in Diller 1970: 259). 
Diller (1970) is a little scathing about the simplicity of the com- 
pound-coordinate distinction, commenting that the terms are used "as if 
such phenomena existed in identifiable form" (p. 254). He draws atten- 
tion to the implicit assumptions of a psychological reality for what 
might otherwise be treates as an abstract sociolinguistic model, remar- 
king that: 
the motion seems to be based on the belief that different manners 
of learning second languages will result in radically different 
grammars in the brain. (p. 254) 
He argues against the existence of the two types of bilingual storage 
P1. I 
6. That is, frequency as a response in free-association tests on normal 
monolinguals. 
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on a number of different grounds. 
Firstly, he criticises the inconsistencies between writers (e. g. 
Brooks 1964, Lambert 1966) in their labelling of subjects as compound 
or coordinate. He highlights the problems inherent in Ervin & Osgood's 
(1954) failure to adequately distinguish between the two types of com- 
pound bilingual (as formalised by Weinreich's Models B&C in Figure 4: 
II above). He also questions the relevance to the model of claims made 
on the basis of both the Semantic Differential Test (Ervin & Osgood 
1954: 141; Lambert 1961: 76) and polyglot aphasic studies. He continues: 
If the compound-coordinate distinction has any validity, it should 
be corroborated by translation tests: the compounds should be bet- 
ter translators. However. in four experiments involving transla- 
tion. Lambert found negative results in three. As he has pointed 
out, difficulties in experimental design keep those negative re- 
suits from being conclusive [Lambert 1961: 78]. The same can be 
said for the experiment that had positive results. (p. 259) 
On the theoretical level. Diller has two objections. The first con- 
cerns the validity of the term compound at all, seeing as "no two lan- 
guages are grammatically similar enough to be compoundable" (p. 259). 
Each language, he claims, has to be functionally autonomous to be us- 
able: neither grammatical constructions nor vocabulary hold any signi- 
ficant level of mapping equivalence across languages. His second ob- 
jection lies in the implication that any bilingual's languages "are 
stored so separately in his brain that he cannot speak in one language 
about things he has learnt in the other" (p. 260). (But it may be noted 
that Blom & Gumperz (1986) found evidence of code-switching in Norwegi- 
an students who had left and returned to their home environment; The 
code was determined by the topic under discussion). Diller concludes 
that: 
the terms are empty. Compound and coordinate systems do not exist 
in identifiable form in bilinguals who are proficient in their se- 
cond language. (p. 261) 
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-Despite Diller's many objections, Albert & Obler (1978) still con- 
sider that: 
individual bilinguals do perform differently on many tests. and it 
would be unwise to discard the notions altogether. (p. 227) 
Swain (1972), cited in Genesee, Hamers, Lambert, Mononen, Seitz & 
Starck (1978: 2) suggests that infant bilinguals have a shared syntactic 
system where the rules of L1 and L2 are the same and separate systems 
for language-specific rules. Some experimental evidence, especially 
that gathered by Lambert (e. g. Lambert & Rawlings 1969, Lambert 1969) 
indicates that the bilingual who acquired L2 later is more likely to 
behave in a way consistent with having two segregated linguistic syst- 
ems. besides being more likely to avoid deep semantic processing stra- 
tegies in linguistic tasks like the Stroop Colour Test (Genesee et al 
1978: 2). 
Obler (1984) discusses the possibility that both compound and co- 
ordinate storage operates side by side in one individual. Which system 
is brought into play at any one time will depend on the exact nature of 
the task undertaken. For example, tests of free association to single 
word stimuli might activate coordinate relationships, while list recall 
tasks would tap the compound storage (Obler 1984: 197). She continues: 
Thus, 'compound' is not a label for an individual, but a statement 
of the organization of - or, better, the psycholinguistic approach 
for - specific language tasks. (p. 197; see also Kotik 1984: 237) 
But Kotik (1984) also sees experimental groups as being at a "transi- 
tory intermediate stage between coordinative and mixed bilingualism" 
(p. 237). which suggests a change in the relative importance of compound 
and coordinate organisation in the individual across time (as a func- 
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tion of increasing linguistic proficiency). 
i 
The suggestion that behaviour consistent with a particular type of 
storage might be dependent upon the task being undertaken has been made 
by other researchers too. Segalowitz (1977), for instance, suggests 
the following explanation for the inconsistencies across psycholingui- 
stic and clinical data: 
there is one semantic system in the brain subserving all the lan- 
guages of the multilingual, rather than separate processes for 
each language... The languages of the bilingual become function- 
ally separate at the speech production end of the language pro- 
cess. (p. 131, quoted in Rupp 1980: 27; see also Rupp 1980: 24) 
4: 3.1.2 SWITCH MECHANISM & MONITORING MODELS 
Not unrelated to. the issue of storage, and particularly the rela- 
tionship between an individual's two languages, is the question of how 
the bilingual knows which language to process at any given moment. En- 
tirely different mechanisms are clearly to be invoked according to whe- 
ther we are dealing with production or perception. In the former case, 
y 
. the- 
bilingual makes his own decision, based upon sociolinguistically 
determined factors: who he is speaking to, where and about what, for 
instance. Of more interest to psycholinguists is the bilingual's ap- 
, parent spontaneity 
in identifying and 'switching into' the language he 
is hearing. 
,,, 
A procedure of identification might involve a search of the incom- 
ing data at phonemic and subsequently lexical and structural level (Ob- 
ler 1984: 198f) to isolate features which belong only to one of the two 
languages. There is some evidence to suggest that if such a mechanism 
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exists, however, it is not always fully active, so that the 'scanning, 7 
of incoming information does not occur where a change of language is 
not expected; output may also sometimes be in the inappropriate langu- 
age, for instance under the strain of complexity or confusion. With 
regard to the latter, Gaziel, Obler & Albert (1978) report an experi- 
ment in which Hebrew-English bilinguals were administered the Stroop 
Test. In this test, subjects are required to name the colour of the 
ink in which a stimulus word is written; the stimulus word, however. is 
itself the name of a (different) colour. The bilingual subjects had 
the expected problems in single-language conditions, that is, they 
tended to read the colour name rather than name the colour of the ink. 
When they were required to name in one language the ink colour of words 
written in the other, however: 
they would never read the wordaaloud; rather they pronounced its 
translation equivalent [implying that] once a subject is set to 
speak in a certain language, he will continue in that language. 
(p. 159) 
Monitoring, the checking of one's own output for grammaticality, 
forms the third component of the L2 acquisition model presented by Dul- 
ay, Burt & Krashen (1982; see section 4: 3.2.1). In the first compon- 
ent, information from the language environment is filtered, so that on- 
ly selected parts are subject to the mechanisms of acquisition (p. 46f). 
That information can then be processed by the organiser (p. 54ff) which 
operates to build up systems from the L2 input. The Monitor (p. 58ff) 
----------- 
-- 
7. 'Scanning' is also used in the Focusing Hypothesis as a technical 
term. It is not intended in that sense here, but nevertheless it may 
be seen that the kind of scanning envisaged by the Focusing Hypothesis 
to be part of the holistic processing system (chapter 1: 2) would, if 
it exists, be of value in the assessment of the language of input. It 
might have been clearer, all the same, to have used a separate term. 
However, 'monitoring', the most acceptable alternative, also has a 
technical meaning, as described below with reference to Krashen's work. 
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is a separate information processor, which, unlike the the organiser, 
is 
, 
under the conscious control of the learner. Dulay, Burt & Krashen 
connect the appearance of the Monitor at about puberty with the onset 
of Piaget's formal operations (p. 60), which entails the ability to ab- 
stract. Because this enables the construction of possible external 
perceptions of oneself it often leads to hypersensitivity about one's 
image, and indeed one's importance, in the eyes of others. In the con- 
text of second language learning this will mean that the pupil begins 
to monitor his own production, often to a destructively hypercritical 
extent. The failure of so many individuals learning a second language 
after puberty to achieve the same proficiency. as those learning it be- 
fore puberty is therefore considered to be- the result of an altered 
perception of themselves and their ability to succeed, not of some bio- 
logical alteration affecting the receptivity of the3language centres. 
Dulay, Burt & Krashen (1982) therefore formally distinguish between 
the kind of superficial awareness of language which children have. 
which enables them to enjoy word games and puns, and the metalinguistic 
insight which the Monitor offers. which includes: 
the ability to think abstractly about language, to conceptualize 
linguistic generalizations, to mentally manipulate abstract lingu- 
istic categories, in short to construct or even understand a theo- 
ry of language, a grammar. (p. 61) 
Krashen (1978) suggests that the Monitor is applied optionally. He 
describes how individuals may choose not to employ, in communicational 
production. rules which they clearly know (p. 178) and how. conversely, 
some people may over-use the Monitor so that they find it virtually im- 
possible to say anything in case it is grammatically inaccurate. 
The way in which the concept of the Monitor may relate to the ana- 
lysis of language-focused-language in the Focusing Hypothesis is exa- 
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mined in chapter 5. 
4: 3.2 ACQUISITION 
No language is like the native language that one learned at one's 
mother's knee; no-one is ever perfectly sure in a language after- 
wards acquired. (Bloomfield 1964: 393) 
The central interest in L2 acquisitional processes consists of: 
whether adult second language learners are able to reinvoke the 
right hemisphere processes that appear to be active during some 
stage of child language acquisition. (Carroll 1980: 81) 
He argues that if right hemisphere mechanisms participate in the early 
stages of L1 development (see chapter 4: 2.2.1), 
It would seem unlikely and uneconomical that right hemisphere 
mechanisms existing for first language acquisition would be dis- 
mantled. (p. 81) 
The theories decribed below examine the possible mechanisms of L2 
acquisition in relation to those believed to underlie the remarkably 
uniform acquisitional achievements of L1 learners. 
0 
4.3.2.1 KRASHEN'S 'ACQUISITION' AND 'LEARNING' 
Krashen's formal distinction between 'acquisition' and 'learning'8 
, 
(e. g. Krashen 1976. Dulay, Burt & Krashen 1982) provides the popular 
basis for explanations of the variation in L2 competence and in appar- 
ent patterns of lateralisation (see section 4: 3.2.4.4) as related to 
the' circumstances in which it was acquired. 
,,,,, Children 'acquire' their first language in a way which is uncon- 
scious and natural. claims Krashen. The 'acquisition' proceeds inde- 
pendently of any formal tuition. according to an ordering which is ob- 
-------------- 8. For clarity, the words 'acquisition' and 'learning' will be written 
in'inverted commas when referring to Krashen's definitions; the same 
words without inverted commas are intended in a neutral sense. 
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servable across individuals (Natural Order Hypothesis, e. g. Krashen & 
Terrell 1983: 28). It requires a naturalistic communicational setting 
and a situation in which attention is paid primarily to the content, 
not the form, of-utterances (Vaid & Genesee 1980: 438). Indeed: 
if the child is allowed the necessary input during some critical 
period, complete competence in the target language (first or se- 
cond) appears to be inevitable. (Krashen 1976: 163) 
Krashen claims that this process is still potentially available in ad- 
ulthood (Krashen & Terrell 1983: 26) and that it leads to a linguistic 
competence which is characterised by a 'feel' for the correctness of 
structures rather than any awareness of formal rules. 'Learned' lan- 
guage, usually the product of formal classroom instruction via the me- 
dium of L1, results in "'knowing about' language" (Krashen & Terrell 
1983: 28). This formal 'learning' is: 
characterized by contexts in which there is an emphasis on the 
structure of language through, for example, rule isolation and er- 
ror correction. (Vaid & Genesee 1980: 438) 
One characteristic of the difference between the two types of pro- 
cess . 
is that the level of ultimate success in a 'learned' language is 
-. not uniform and is substantially dependent on the learner's general le- 
vel- of intelligence. Brown (1973a) speaks of qualitative differences 
between L1 and L2 competence, observing that adult Japanese 'learners' 
. of 
English failed to master the correct usage of articles, a phenomenon 
perhaps not unconnected with the fact that these carry only a very low 
semantic functional load (p. 105). English children, however (as oppos- 
ed, to adults), do learn them, he notes, despite the fact that they 
. could clearly get away with getting 
them wrong. judging from the other 
-mistakes which they make without being considered incomprehensible. In 
other words, there is little pressure from communicative requirements 
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to encourage the children to learn the correct forms. Their success, 
contrasted with the failure of adults, leads Brown to presume that 
"children operate on language in a way that adults do not" (p. 105). 
Besides intelligence, motivation is considered to be a crucial va- 
riable in language 'learning' (Affective Filter Hypothesis, e. g. Kra- 
shen & Terrell 1983: 37f). It is impossible to avoid the observation 
that motivation is low in the classroom, where language usage is also 
not primarily communicative. Krashen's Great Paradox of Language 
Teaching states that: 
language is best taught when it is being used to transmit mess- 
ages, not when it is explicitly taught for conscious learning. 
(Krashen & Terrell 1983: 55) 
Indeed, Krashen (1976) goes further, by suggesting that linguistic in- 
formation imparted in a formal way cannot be adopted into the learner's 
language store per se at all. However, it can help adult learners to 
"out-perform [their (usually) imperfectly acquired competence] when 
conditions allow this conscious knowledge to intrude (e. g. when suffi- 
cient processing time is available or when not too distracted" (p. 163). 
Rather, all such information relates only to the Monitor (Krashen & 
Terrell 1983: 30f), which checks and edits linguistic output. Thus, 
adults can 'acquire' language, but in the classroom not only will 'ac- 
quisition' occur only very slowly, but it will occur in spite of the 
formal tuition. He substantiates this claim with the observation that 
an : individual's automatised linguistic system for L2 will increase in 
accordance with a natural ordering (p. 28f). 
4.3.2: 2 CRITICAL AGE IN L2 ACQUISITION 
-The critical age hypothesis as relevant to first language acquisi- 
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tion was discussed in section 4: 2.2, so only a very brief summary will 
be given here for the purpose of contextualising the discussion rela- 
ting to L2 acquisition. Essentially. the critical age hypothesis 
states that natural 'acquisition'9 is possible only during childhood: 
He who learned a language after, say 12 years of age, appears to 
used much more mental energy when speaking that language than he 
who acquired it in early childhood.... Indeed, it looks as if lin- 
guistic habits formed after puberty never reach the same degree of 
automaticity as linguistic habits formed early in life. (Lebrun & 
Paradis 1984b: 216) 
Echeverria (1974) reviews the appropriateness of L2 teaching me- 
thods in the light of the critical age hypothesis, and he proposes that 
puberty effects some irreversible change to the Language Acquisition 
Device. so that it is available as such only until that age. Thus, the 
child handles language by means of a "native speaker coding device" and 
the adult via a "general coding ability" (p. 72). It is because "opti- 
mal grammatical coding is available only to children" (p. 72) that chil- 
dren are more successful in language acquisition. The adult has lost 
the capacity to handle an L2 rule independently of the L1 ones: 
the child is essentially a 'restructurer'. while the adult is bas- 
ically a 'rule-adder'. (p. 72) 
Rosansky (1975) presents the Piagetian interpretation of the criti- 
cal age phenomenon. which points to the cognitive changes associated 
with the Formal Operations stage; the transition from Concrete Opera- 
Lions to Formal Operations is said to occur during the period from 11- 
12 to 14-15 (Rosansky 1975: 95). Rosansky identifies the relevant que- 
stions as: 
What in the nature of Formal Operations might be an inhibiting 
9. The usage of 'acquisition' and 'learning' continues as before. except 
with respect to the direct evaluation of Krashen's hypothesis. where 
the terms are used without inverted commas. as if non-partisan. 
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factor to further language learning? Does something (operation) 
compete with language acquisition operations so that the child is 
no longer able to learn language? Perhaps the problem is not in 
any single operation but rather in the whole nature of cognitive 
development. (p. 96) 
She continues by suggesting that the egocentricity of the child, which 
accompanies L1 acquisition, may not be incidental to the success of 
that acquisition. and that the transition to Formal Operations destroys 
the natural acquisitional ability in involving "progressive decentra- 
tion": 
If decentration is somehow inversely related to the language ac- 
quisition ability... and if awareness of contradictions acts as an 
incentive to decentration, then perhaps what acts as a 'block' to 
language learning is precisely the awareness of differences. This 
new consciousness of differences seems to supplant the child's 
previous limitation of being able to only focus on the underlying 
similarities. (p. 98) 
Within this context it can be seen that the critical age hypothesis 
does not necessarily contradict Krashen's claim that adults can 'ac- 
quire' languages, for it may be that it is simply circumstantial that 
the acquisitional mechanisms are always prevented (if they are) from 
operating in adulthood. 
Ervin-Tripp (1974) on the other hand, does not consider that the 
use of prior knowledge in L2 acquisition renders it formally different 
to L1 acquisition: 
Now it is certainly the case that the second language learner 
makes use of prior knowledge, skills, tactics, but it is also true 
that the first language learner does this. That is, any learning 
builds on what has happened before.... (p. 112) 
However, her evidence is drawn from studies of L2 acquisition in young 
children, not adults; one essential difference between them is the ex- 
tent of their conscious knowledge of L1 forms. This could be expected 
to- be an important type of prior knowledge qualitatively different to 
anything a young child acquiring Li or L2 might invoke. 
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4: 3.2.3 LANGUAGE ACQUISITION AS A ONCE-ONLY EVENT 
Discussion regarding cognitive changes during the course of biolog- 
ical, psychological and social maturation, and their effect on language 
learning, are also central to the theories of several other writers. 
The ideas under discussion in this section. have. in.. common the notion of 
an unavoidable maturational change in cognitive structures, directly 
attributable to language acquisition itself. In other words. acquiring 
language (as distinct from a language) involves a mechanism which can- 
not be reused. This contrasts, then, with the. critical age hypothesis, 
where the change to the Language Acquisition Device is a function of 
age (e. g. Echeverria 1974, see section 4: 3.2.2 above). Thus: 
We propose that learning a language after the- native one, at what- 
ever age, cannot demand a repetition of all the same steps. In 
our argument. learning a language is like learning-to ride -a bicy- 
cle; once one has learned the basic principles of riding a bicycle 
(or using language) one never again has to achieve certain ele- 
ments of knowledge. (Albert & Obler 1978: 230) 
But Albert & Obler's hypothesis does not predict any difference in 
the ability of children and adults to acquire a second language. Ot- 
hers provide a more open-ended account. Lamendella (1977) differenti- 
ates primary language acquisition (PLA). secondary language acquisition 
(SLA) and foreign language learning (FLL): 
FLL is basically an intellectual process involving the relational 
:. induction of TL [Target Language] rules by cognitive problem solv- 
ing systems, as well as conscious hypothesis testing.... The FL 
- learner tends to rely on the NL [Native Language] for actual com- 
prehension and formulation of messages, with the TL serving only 
to mediate between internal NL structures and TL speech schemata. 
(Lamendella 1977: 177f, quoted in Rupp 1980: 26) 
In Lamendella's FLL we see something equivalent to a post-critical 
age language learning device, Krashen's 'learning' and Albert & Obler's 
.,, general 
L2 device. But he provides a means of accounting for the 
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child's superiority over the adult in L2 acquisition. However, as SLA 
is effective between the ages of 6 and. 8"(Rupp "1980: 68). the hypothesis 
achieves little more than a shift of the critical age to 8 and a gratu- 
itous amalgamation of an approach similar to Albert & Obler's with a 
., critical age hypothesis. 
Although Chomsky (1968) believes it may be possible, to use a facul- 
, ty other than the 
language one to tackle a language-acquisition type 
task (p. 691), he speaks of this only in relation to the acquisition of 
a system which contains violations of universal linguistic principles 
(such as constructing a question by reversing the order of the words in 
the declarative sentence). This kind of system, which the learner 
might approach like a puzzle (p. 688), would, then, only be used where 
the language faculty could not cope on account of its strictly limited 
expectation as to the type of structures it will encounter. He does 
not imply that a more general analytical faculty MUST be used after L1 
has been acquired, nor even that it can be successfully used for L2 ac- 
quisition, despite McLaughlin's (1980: 60) claim that he does. 
Any theory which predicts the inevitability of a different method 
of acquisition for L2 (thus also the critical age hypothesis), renders 
, the compound-coordinate 
distinction impossible in its accepted form. 
For the different underlying structures they predict must imply inde- 
pendent storage, so that only subordinative compound storage, not coor- 
dinate or non-subordinative compound storage, could result from adult 
L2 acquisition. 
4: 3.2.4 AGE-STAGE-MANNER HYPOTHESIS 
4.3.2.4.1 GENERAL 
155 
The Age-Stage-Manner hypothesis concerns the amount of right hemi- 
sphere involvement believed to occur in L2 acquisition and processing 
and, for its determining variables, points to the age of that acquisi- 
tion, the manner in which it occurs (particularly whether it consti- 
tutes 'acquisition' or 'learning') and the stage of proficiency reached 
by the time of testing. Vaid (1983) summarises the hypothesis as fol- 
lows: 
[1]. There will be a greater right hemisphere involvement in the 
second as compared to the first language of adult bilinguals if 
the second language is learnt informally. Conversely, there will 
be greater left hemisphere involvement in the second than in the 
first language if the former is learnt formally. 
[2]. Right hemisphere involvement in second language processing 
will be more evident in the initial than in the final stages of 
second language acquisition (Galloway & Krashen 1980; Obler 1977). 
[3]. The pattern of hemispheric asymmetry in bilinguals will more 
closely resemble that of unilinguals the earlier second language 
acquisition occurs and will differ from that of unilinguals the 
later the second language is acquired. (p. 323-9) 
4.3.2.4.2 STAGE 
identified as a possible determiner of right hemisphere participation 
in polyglots appears to have been stage of acquisition. Galloway & 
Krashen (1980) attribute the stage hypothesis to Obler's writings of 
the mid-seventies. In response to experimental data, Galloway & Kra- 
shen, produce their own modified stage hypothesis, which draws a di- 
stinction between formal and informal language acquisition. According 
to the modified stage hypothesis, then, for there to be right hemi- 
sphere involvement in L2 processing: 
First, the performer MUST be at an early stage in second language 
acquisition. Second, the use of the conscious grammar, the Moni- 
tor, needs to be low or non-existent. (p. 78) 
Chronologically speaking, the first of the three factors to be 
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This, they suggest, occurs only in informal acquisition, and probably 
only where the learner is too young to have developed Monitor skills 
(see section 4: 3.1.2). 
The reason for the belief that the right hemisphere is more invol- 
ved in the early stages of L2 is that early-stage learners use strate- 
gies . which are "compatible with the 
demonstrated linguistic capabili- 
ties of the right hemisphere" (Vaid & Genesee 1980: 435). Kotik (1984) 
names these capabilities as: 
dominance of highly contextualized stereotype expressions... using 
more semantic than functional words, leaning upon more prosodic 
than phonemic features, more pragmatic than syntactic information. 
(p. 231; see also Genesee 1982: 318) 
Experimental evidence supports the hypothesis that the right hemi- 
sphere is more involved in the processing of L2 in some subjects. 
Chernigovskaya, Balanov & Deglin (1983: 196) refer to the dichotic list- 
ening tests conducted by Obler, Albert & Gordon (1975) and Silverberg, 
Bentin, Gaziel, Obler & Albert (1979), which showed a far less marked 
right ear advantage when testing the second than the first language. 
Kotik (1984) considers the stage of acquisition to be crucial to the 
t:, e 
understanding of such experimental results; without attention to this: 
it becomes somewhat nonsensical to discuss neuropsychological pro- 
blems of bilinguals and especially the röle of the right hemi- 
sphere. (p. 237) 
But Vaid (1983) observes that studies provide: 
little evidence to suggest that right hemisphere involvement is 
more likely in the beginning than in the advanced stages of second 
language acquisition. (p. 331) 
Further results of similar experiments are described in section 4: 4.1.2 
below). 
4: 3.2.4.3 AGE 
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Much of the justification for age as a determiner of right hemi- 
sphere participation- in L2, processing hinges on the alterations in neu- 
ral structure which may occur in the course of maturation (see section 
4: 2.2 above). Both Vaid & Genesee (1980: 434) and Kotik (1984: 229) a- 
gree that: 
If the two languages are not learned simultaneously, but success- 
ively, it is quite reasonable to expect them to have a different 
neurological organization since every language is acquired at dif- 
ferent stages of brain maturation.... The probability of diver- 
gence grows proportionately to the time lag between the acquisi- 
tion of the different languages. (Kotik 1984: 229; see also Genesee 
1982: 317) 
Thus, different processing strategies for L1 and a later acquired L2 
are a consequence of the natural characteristics of the human's higher 
mental processes. viz.: 
the instability and inconsistency of their cortical localization. 
which changes with-both development due to age and with successive 
stages of practice. (Kotik: 1984: 229) 
Carroll (1980: 85) suggests that it may be only productive skills 
which benefit from study at an early age (perhaps this is due to fac- 
tors relating to social interaction). Nevertheless, he notes that 
young learners do appear to focus on different things to older ones. 
Experimental evidence indicating a greater right ear advantage in 
late than early bilinguals is described in section 4: 4.1.1 below). 
4: 3.2.4.4 MANNER 
The manner hypothesis states that the right hemisphere will be more 
involved the more informally the L2 has been learnt. Lamendella's 
(1977) distinction of two types of non-primary acquisition, i. e. secon- 
dary language acquisition (SLA) and foreign language learning (FLL) 
(see section 4: 3.2.3 above), is motivated by the belief that the manner 
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of acquisition plays a vital role in the determination of linguistic 
storage patterns: 
There is a difference in the nature and internal organization of 
the neuro-functional systems responsible. correlated with drasti- 
cally different types of performance abilities in the target lan- 
guage. (p. 176. quoted by Rupp (1980: 25) 
Part of the justification for the manner hypothesis lies in the 
observation that L1 acquisition proceeds via informal means (Genesee 
1982: 19) whereas L2 'learning' in the classroom involves conscious ana- 
i 
lysis, which is associated with the left hemisphere (Witelson 1977, Ge- 
nesee 1982: 320). Attention is justifiably given to what is missing 
from the formal classroom environment, viz. "interpersonal interaction 
(mime, dialogue, affective color, gestures etc. )" (Kotik 1984: 232). 
These are features of language which many believe to be processed by 
the right hemisphere. 
But also to be considered are the features present in 'learning' 
and absent in 'acquisition'. Vaid & Genesee (1980) observe that adults 
are more analytic than children, so that: 
adults, relative to children, are more likely to use a formal mode 
of processing language reflecting their more advanced stage of 
cognitive development. (p. 440) 
One aspect of this analytical approach may be the increasing use of the 
Monitor (Krashen 1976) and this forms the basis of a prediction by Gal- 
10 way (1981): 
The first language should appear more left lateralised than the 
second language in adults who are acquiring a second language in 
an informal, natural setting and who are not consciously monitor- 
ing their L2 performance with learned L2 grammar rules. (p. 51) 
4: 3.2.4.5 THE INTERACTION OF AGE, STAGE & MANNER 
The strength of these hypotheses as an explanation and prediction 
of experimental and clinical observations lies in their interaction. 
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Together they state that right hemisphere involvement in L2 processing 
is more likely the later and more informally it is acquired and the 
earlier on in acquisition the testing is done (Vaid & Genesee 1980: 
439). It is immediately obvious that the first two conditions (age and 
manner) tend not to coincide in the Western literate nations, where 
even a move to a new linguistic environment will be characterised by 
the opportunity of formal tuition in L2 and the presence of other L1 
speakers who can comment on the relative nature of L1 and L2 rules in a 
formal way. The results of all the psycholinguistic experiments de- 
scribed in section 4: 4 below must necessarily be accounted for in terms 
of all three parts of the hypothesis. 
4: 3.2.5 OTHER FACTORS 
The literature review conducted by Albert & Obler (1978: 64f) high- 
lights other factors which may have some bearing on the determination 
of how much right hemisphere involvement there is in language process- 
ing. These include the possiblity that learning a second language ac- 
tually alters the cerebral organisational patterns of L1. and that af- 
fective and language specific aspects of the languages in question may 
be relevant. 
The affective factors relate to the bilingual's attitude towards 
his two languages. Obler (1984) reports that: 
individuals who are happy where they are and who feel good about 
the language they are learning are most likely to learn it well. 
(p. 199) 
Affective factors also seem important to the recovery of languages in 
aphasia (see section 4: 5.3 below). Self-consciousness might be another 
affective factor, Galloway (1981) suggests. Exploring the value to 
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language acquisition of non-verbal intonational communication, (as in L1 
acquisition)., she suggests that the failure in. this respect of right 
hemisphere capabilities to be fully used by adults acquiring L2 is that 
"it would be socially embarrassing" (p. 21). She cites supportive evi- 
dence that success in adult L2 acquisition can be associated with soli- 
loquizing and intonational imitation. However, the affective factor 
could be less specific here, and simply relate to the presence or. ab- 
sence of enthusiasm and interest in the learning of the new language. 
Language specific factors are of interest because a subset of the 
general processes associated with the right hemisphere appears to be 
more central to. some languages than others. Vaid (1983) names the fol- 
lowing features: the semantic load of vowels as opposed to CV strings, 
the significance of tones, the direction of scan demanded by the 
script, and the closeness of phonemic-graphemic correspondence (p. 318; 
see also Silverberg et al 1979: 185). 
She also highlights the cross-cultural cognitive difference appar- 
ent in comparisons between Amerindian (Navajo and Hopi) and English- 
speaking subjects. The Navajo and Hopi languages reflect (or else 
"give rise to" (Vaid (1983: 319)) an appositional as contrasted with our 
propositional mode of thinking, whereby "the Hopi language creates in- 
volvement with the perceptual field [but] English orients its users a- 
way from the immediate context" (Vaid & Genesee 1980: 432). In addi- 
tion, innumerable other potential bases of variation between individu- 
als or groups might be responsible for the confounding of cross-study 
comparisons (Vaid 1983: 318). It is impossible to itemise all the fea- 
tures of culture, environment, circumstance and maturation which could 
have some bearing on the results of experiments investigating language 
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process sharing between the two hemispheres. The nature of the task 
itself may have an effect (see sections 4: 1.2.1.5.3 and 4: 1.2.5.2 and 
also chapter 5: 2.1.2), and the subject may have more (unintentional) 
control over the results than we realise. The existence of unexpected 
acquisitional phenomena such as Carroll's (1980) discovery that produc- 
tion ability in L2 was actually facilitated by NOT having spend time in 
the L2 environment (p. 85) only serves to remind us how short a distance 
we can safely go in pronouncing on the subject of processing patterns. 
As Kotik (1984) observes: 
The combination of conditions under which a foreign language is 
learned is practically unique for every individual subject. The 
discrepancy in data and opinions may be due to the prevalence of 
monofactorial hypotheses of interpretation when the process is in 
fact multifactorial. (p. 229) 
4: 4 INCONSISTENCIES IN THE DATA FROM STUDIES OF NORMAL POLYGLOTS 
Experiments investigating L2 acquisition and storage are most often 
directed towards the testing of the accounts described above. especial- 
ly aspects of the Age-Stage-Manner hypothesis. Tables A4: iv and v in 
the Appendix indicate the complications which are inherent in the data. 
4: 4.1 THE NATURE OF THE INCONSISTENCIES 
4: 4.1.1 AGE 
The prediction to which experimenters are looking with regard to 
the age variable is that: 
the pattern of hemispheric asymmetry in bilinguals will more 
closely resemble that of unilinguals the earlier second language 
acquisition occurs. and will differ from that of unilinguals the 
later the second language is acquired. (Vaid 1983: 329) 
Literature reviews (e. g. Vaid & Genesee 1980: 435, Vaid 1983: 331. 
Genesee 1982) have considered this prediction largely supported. They 
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cite studies such as Sussman, Franklin & Simon's (1982) finger-tapping 
(verbal-manual . interference) test. 
In this experiment bilinguals who 
had acquired L2 before the age of six indicated left hemisphere domi- 
nance for both languages (displaying interference to tapping with the 
right hand more than with the left during verbal tasks). Bilinguals 
who had acquired L2 after age six, however, displayed greater interfer- 
ence to right hand than left hand tapping only when engaged in L1 ver- 
bal tasks. For L2, both hands were equally affected. This is consi- 
dered to indicate an ambilaterality for L2 processing (Obler 1984: 201). 
Tables A4: iv and v (Appendix), however, indicate that even allowing 
for a separate consideration of early and late acquirers according to 
the manner of their acquisition (see below). there are several studies 
which do not display the pattern of no difference in early informal bi- 
linguals or more right hemisphere for L2 in late informal ones. Snares 
Grosjean's (1981) tachistoscopic experiment found no difference be- 
tween the hemispheres in late bilinguals. Kotik's (1975) experiment 
(see, for instance, Vaid & Genesee 1980: 435) is also cited as counter- 
evidence to the age hypothesis because a greater REA (indicating left 
hemisphere laterality) was found in L2 in late bilinguals. But the 
factor of manner of acquisition interacts here and, referring to this 
and also Gordon's (1980) study, Vaid (1983) suggests that "in certain 
contexts of language acquisition, age related effects may be superce- 
ded"'(p. 330)" 
4: 4.1.2 STAGE 
:: Right hemisphere involvement in second language processing will be 
more evident in the initial than in the final stages of second 
language acquisition. (Vaid 1983: 324) 
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As monolinguals are considered to display little right hemisphere 
involvement this means that the stage hypothesis predicts no difference 
in comparisons of proficient bilinguals with monolinguals, more right 
hemisphere in L2 in comparisons on L1 and L2 in non-proficient bilingu- 
als and more right hemisphere in non-proficient bilinguals when compar- 
ed to proficient bilinguals or monolinguals (Vaid 1983: 324). 
Support for the stage aspect of the Age-Stage-Manner hypothesis is 
rather sparse. Kotik's experiment on the acquisition of Russian in 
Spanish and Vietnamese native speakers provides some limited measure of 
support, insofar as the Spanish group displayed: 
evidence at-the very first stage of learning Russian of signifi- 
cant (p<. Ol) right hemisphere role in the processing of dichotic 
verbal stimuli. (Kotik 1984: 235) 
However, the Vietnamese did not show the same tendency. Bever (1974) 
attributes to non-proficiency his finding in experiments with six and 
seven year old Hispanic subjects: they displayed an REA in Li (Spanish) 
but not in L2 (English) (Walters & Zatorre 1978: 159). By limiting its 
predictions to 'acquisition' (thus drawing on manner as perhaps the 
most important of the factors under examination). Galloway & Krashen 
(1980) consider that all experimental data can be viewed as supportive 
of the modified stage hypothesis. Others, however, think differently. 
Genesee (1978) feels that "the stage hypothesis has been the most ex- 
tensively examined but the least empirically supported" (p. 319). 
Vaid & Genesee (1980) point to evidence from six studies that L1 
and L2 are equally lateralised in non-proficient bilinguals (p. 438; see 
also Vaid 1983: 326)" Carroll's (1980) Experiment 1 revealed a greater 
REA for L2, leading him to believe that adult L2 learners "begin pro- 
cessing the new language in a mode that is highly left lateralized and 
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continue to do so" (p. 82). Rupp (1980) also found a greater REA in L2 
than L1 in his Vietnamese-English bilinguals. However, his subjects, 
with three years of informal and formal exposure to English, may fall 
into a category defined by Galloway & Krashen (1980), of being "well 
beyond the stage where the right hemisphere participates" (p. 77). Al- 
ternatively, Rupp's subjects could have experienced enough formal tea- 
ching for the manner prediction of greater left hemisphere participa- 
tion in formal learning (see below) to apply. Galloway (1981), for ex- 
ample, notes that: 
in contrast to the stage hypothesis, L2 appears to be more left 
lateralized than L1 in adult classroom L2 performers. (p. 4) 
Such a cause for Rupp's results is, however, unlikely, seeing as the 
greater REA for L2 was uniform across all ages of subjects (range: 6-13 
years): it seems implausible that children who first came into contact 
with English by immigration at age 3 and were tested at age 6 could 
have had much exposure to English of any kind at all comparable to the 
instruction generally considered formal and equated with adult class- 
room teaching. 
4: 4.1.3 MANNER 
Iý With reference to Krashen's 'acquisition'-'learning' distinction, 
Vaid (1983) predicts that: 
there will be greater right hemisphere involvement in the second 
as compared to the first language of adult bilinguals if the se- 
cond language is learned formally. (p. 323) 
Elsewhere (P"331) she affirms that the studies in the literature are in 
t. 
keeping, with this prediction. Amongst the experiments supporting the 
manner hypothesis are those of Carroll (1980, Experiment 2) and Kotik 
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(1975, cited in Vaid 1983), both of which found a greater REA for L2 
than L1 associated with formal learning and no difference where L2 was 
acquired informally. 
Genesee (1982), however, notes that while studies do support the 
hypothesis, there is no common definition between them of formal and 
informal learning. - Furthermore: 
they fail to establish whether it was actually learning or simply 
teaching that was informal or formal. In fact, they have tended 
to define manner of learning in terms of the formality/informality 
of the instructional method to which the learner was exposed. 
This in no way means, however. that the learning strategies of the 
learner correspond to the manner of instruction. (p. 320) 
All in all, there appears to be very little counter-evidence to the 
manner hypothesis. 
The explanation for the observed differences in laterality accord- 
ing to the method of instruction focuses either on strategies (see be- 
low) or on the nature of the tasks required in different types of tea- 
ching/acquisition, as these relate to the right hemisphere's abilities. 
Thus, Galloway (1981) says: 
language in the L2 performer with only classroom exposure (empha- 
sizing reading skills and grammar) would not appear more bilater- 
ally represented because the context dependent abilities associat- 
ed with the right hemisphere are not used in L2 performance (let 
alone acquired). (p. 144) 
Similarly, an emphasis on the avoidance of 'formal' methods would allow 
the right hemisphere more involvement in its own capacities: 
Certainly. for some learners it might be possible to achieve con- 
siderable fluency in certain limited situations with effective use 
of the Monitor. However, this system may not involve the same 
processes as those related to primary language acquisition. There 
is some indication that methodology can affect or influence the 
, learner's strategy. The extremely intensive nature of an immer- 
sion program may preclude internal analysis of components and al- 
low or force learners to reactivate earlier language learning 
strategies. (Carroll 1980: 85) 
Gordon's (1980) finding that native English speakers learning He- 
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brew after puberty showed a (non-significant) trend towards less marked 
left hemisphere dominance (p. 261) in comparison to native Hebrew speak- 
ers with L2 English was accounted for in terms of acquisitional differ- 
ences. The native speakers of English learnt Hebrew in intensive 
courses in Israel, and needed to use it in their every day communica- 
tion. The native Hebrew speakers had learnt English in school and used 
it only rarely (p. 266). 
Approaching it from the other end, Hartnett's (1974) work indicates 
that those individuals with a greater measure of left lateralisation 
for language are more successful at deductive (formal) learning in L2, 
whilst those with some measure of right hemisphere involvement in lan- 
guage processing (as determined by observations of eye movement) are 
better at inductive (informal) learning (Obler 1984: 199). This ties in 
with Carroll's (1980: 82) suggestion that the lower level L1 laterality 
in a group who had started L2 learning, as compared to a group of mono- 
linguals, was not due to laterality changes in individuals but rather 
because L2 classes would be particularly difficult for certain indivi- 
duals (the most left lateralised) to cope with and so they would drop 
out, leaving the sample biased. 
4: 4.1.4 SUMMARY 
Although some very bold statements have been made about the blanket 
equality of monolinguals and bilinguals "regardless of when the second 
language was learned, how long it had been used or how well it was 
known" (Soares & Grosjean 1981: 603; see also Gordon 1980: 265f). still 
it seems clear that some kind of difference obtains between groups most 
obviously contrasting in their age, stage and/or manner of acquisition. 
167 
If these factors are responsible for the results obtained in experi- 
mentation, then the inconsistencies may be due to a failure to appreci- 
ate fully the complexity of their interaction. 
4: 4.2 EXPLANATIONS OF THE INCONSISTENCIES 
Potential alternatives to the Age-Stage-Manner hypothesis become 
most apparent as one examines the accounts and insights which result 
from the need to explain the inconsistencies in the evidence, as de- 
scribed above. These accounts can be divided into three categories: 1) 
procedural shortcomings. 2) additions to the current theories and 3) 
new insights into processing theory. 
4: 4.2.1 PROCEDURAL SHORTCOMINGS 
The most usually invoked defects in experimental design involve a 
lack of attention to the kind of detail necessary to assure than a 
group is homogeneous for specific salient variables. The testing pro- 
cedures may be too unreliable. and be subject to confounding influences 
(Vaid 1983). Soares & Grosjean (1981: 600ff) consider that many of the 
studies reported in the literature have inadequately controlled for 
sex, handedness or proficiency in L2. For example, Rupp's (1980) Viet- 
namese subjects ranged in age from 6-13 years old. All had been in the 
U. S. for three years. These three years would have involved very dif- 
ferent linguistic experiences, according to whether the child was old 
enough to spend them in an English speaking school or a Vietnamese 
speaking home. Furthermore, not only their method of L2 acquisition 
might be affected. There might be important differences between the 
confidence with which they used Li and the light in which they saw it, 
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according to their memories of their previous life and indeed their 
pre-immigration proficiency in L1. 
Some experiments have contained inconsistencies in the quality of 
test material administered to different subjects, because the bilingu- 
als are tested in two languages, the monolinguals in only one. This 
may have led to a fatigue factor in Soares & Grosjean's (1981) experi- 
ment, thus accounting for the overall slower reaction times of the bi- 
linguals. Alternatively, as they suggest, it could be that the bilin- 
guals' times reflected the added complexity in their task, namely, that 
they did not know which language the next stimulus would be in. Soares 
& Grosjean appear to have removed this mono-bilingual difference in 
scores by presenting the stimuli in blocks of the same language; this 
indicates that their interpretation is the correct one. 
Another criticism levelled at some studies is that they are evalu- 
ated using misleading or inadequate statistical analyses, or that ana- 
lysis overlooks some important features within the results. Rupp 
(1980) remarks that: 
If a non-linear relationship existed in... studies where the data 
analysis was based on a linear relationship, some developmental 
trends may not have been discovered. (p. 58) 
Harshman & Krashen (1972) have presented a new statistical analysis for 
the dichotic listening test which takes into account changes in accur- 
acy across time; they consider this necessary to gain a correct reflec- 
tion of performance in this test. Galloway (1981) presents a very re- 
vealing graph (reproduced in Figure 4: 111), constructed from her own 
results. She plotted REA scores for her Spanish-English bilinguals 
cumulatively, thus showing the relative REA patterns for the first 7. 
first 14, first 21 etc. subjects tested. It can be seen that the re- 
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lative REA across all subjects (n=39) is not reflected at those points. 
In other words: 
If. for example, only 7 or 14 subjects had been tested, Figure [4: 
III] suggests that the L1 would have seemed more left lateralized 
than the L2, in support of the stage hypothesis. On the other 
hand, group means from 21 to 28 suggest the opposite. (p. 169) 
Clearly, it is not enough to take this as a warning against small sam- 
pies, for it is impossible to predict what the group means would have 
been if the sample size had been 50 or 60. 
RIGHT EAR 
ADVANTAGE 
53.5 - 
53.0 - 
52.5 - 
52.0 - 
51.5 -- 
7 i4 21 28 35 39 
Number of subjects tested (Bilingual Spanish- 
English) 
FIGURE 4: III (from Galloway 1981: 160) 
Finally. some studies may not have provided stimuli which actually 
tested what they claimed to test. Rupp (1980) says of his own experi- 
ment: 
The task may be an artificial use of language. While the results 
of such research give us an indication of how language may be pro- 
cessed. it may be very different in normal discourse and conversa- 
tion. (p. 56) 
.: Galloway 
(1981) admits this to be a potential shortcoming in her 
experiment too, where she used only single words, hardly a good way of 
testing holistic language processing (p. 61). Of Genesee et al's (1978) 
experiment she is equally cautious: 
Bilingual subjects... were required to press one button if they had 
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seen a French word and another button if they had seen an English 
word. One could question to what extent bilingual language compe- 
tence is used to perform this task since a monolingual could also 
perform it easily. (p. 154f) 
4: 4.2.2 ADDITIONS TO CURRENT THEORIES 
Other explanations of results include the suggestion that patterns 
may vary according to the language under examination, the specific task 
demanded from the subject or the nature of the stimulus used. In addi- 
tion, there may be influential differences between individual subjects. 
4: 4.2.2.1 LANGUAGE-SPECIFIC FACTORS 
With regard to language-specific variation, Rupp (1980) found a 
greater REA for L2 English than for L1 Vietnamese. The reason for won- 
dering if this is language-specific as opposed to an indication of dif- 
ferences between Li and L2 in general is that he also found that the 
REA scores increased with age for the Vietnamese but not for the Eng- 
lish language 
J(p. 
54). 
Kotik (1984) also found differences between REAs in Vietnamese and, 
in. her case, Spanish mother tongue speakers, when both groups were 
learning L2 Russian. Only the Spanish group displayed a right hemi- 
sphere role in the initial stages of L2 acquisition (p. 235). One fea- 
ture of Vietnamese which has been associated with differences in later- 
alisation is the role of tone in lexical distinction. Vaid & Genesee 
(1983) mention work which has indicated that native speakers of tone 
languages and of non-tone languages process tone differently in a lin- 
guistic context (REA for Vietnamese speakers but not for English speak- 
ers: Van Lancker & Fromkin 1973. cited in Vaid & Genesee 1983: 434). 
Whether the presence of tone might. conversely, shift language process- 
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ing into a more ambilateral mode, however, is a different matter. 
Tsunoda's (1975) work has led him to claim that Japanese mother 
tongue speakers process vowels in the left hemisphere, while speakers 
of European languages process them in the right hemisphere (see also 
Vaid & Genesee 1983: 433). If this is so, then dichotic listening tests 
might be expected to display language specific differences. 
Apparent language specific differences have also been found between 
Hebrew and English and Yiddish and English (e. g. Caziel et al 1978). 
This language specific difference is considered to relate to a greater 
röle in input processing (even auditory) where the script is read from 
right to left (Vaid & Genesee 1980: 433). 
Silverberg et al's (1979) experiment on Israeli children learning 
English as L2 also invoked script as a factor determining differences 
in apparent laterality patterns. All their subjects displayed an RVFA 
for Hebrew words, but for English words only the most proficient group 
(six years of tuition) showed one, and then not to the same extent as 
in L1. The groups who had had only two or four years of tuition in En- 
glish displayed an LVFA for English words (p. 186). Clearly, this is 
not compatible with the predictions made in connection with the script 
direction (see above). They suggest that the unfamiliarity of the Ro- 
man script may require an increased level of pattern recognition (right 
hemisphere) for English, and indeed.: 
It may be that the verbal nature of the written letters was ob- 
scured by their less familiar appearance, demanding a greater pat- 
tern recognition process relative to the linguistic one. (p. 188) 
4: 4.2.2.2 TASK-RELATED FACTORS 
Hemispheric differences are also determined by the particular lin- 
., guistic requirements of a given task. 
(Vaid 1984: 176) 
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%Kotik's (1981) experiments (see Vaid 1984 for an account of these) 
have suggested that the left hemisphere's superiority is most marked in 
semantic judgements (deciding whether a noun is animate or not; but see 
Vaid's findings described below), and phonetic and syntactic (parts of 
speech) comparisons. Gaziel et al's (1978) experiment shows that pho- 
neme discrimination appears to be "primarily a left hemisphere task" 
(p. 197) even though "parts of the two languages [Hebrew & English], may 
be handled in the right hemisphere" (p. 197). The right hemisphere was 
faster at responding in language recognition tasks in Kotik's (1981) 
experiment (Vaid 1984: 177) and in Vaid's own work: 
a significant LVF superiority was found for orthographically based 
judgements... (but]... no significant visual field differences... for 
semantic comparisons (Vaid 1983: 330). 
Work by Vaid using a tachistoscopic test combined with auditory presen- 
tation revealed that early bilinguals behaved like monolinguals and 
differently to late bilinguals in the discrimination of rhyming and se- 
mantically related pairs (e. g. NOSE-ROSE vs. NOSE-LEGS). Discriminat- 
ing synonymous and non-synonymous pairs (e. g. OBLIGATION-DUTY vs. OBLI- 
GATION-TRADE) it was the late bilinguals whose behaviour matched that 
of the monolinguals. No difference was found between the three groups 
in the discrimination of rhyming and non-rhyming pairs (e. g. LINT-MINT 
vs LINT-PINT) (Vaid 1984: 190). 
Vaid & Genesee (1980; also Vaid 1983) suggest that the LVF prefer- 
ences found in some non-proficient L2 learners may reflect right hemi- 
sphere participation which is limited to reading skills, thus rendering 
Silverberg et al's (1979) results task specific. 
_, -Finally, 
Obler (1984) draws a distinction between tasks involving 
-perception and those involving production. In the latter, bilinguals 
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adopt strategies which maximise the differences between the two langu- 
ages, presenting: 
a relatively dual system... [which]... serves to optimally differen- 
tiate a distinctive feature dichotomy. (p. 207) 
Conversely, in the perception task administered by Obler: 
the bilinguals present a relatively unified system... (which]... 
serves to extend flexibility of interpretation. (p. 207) 
Thus she identifies an adoption by the bilinguals of different strate- 
gies for the task, involving: 
a system that analyzes and exaggerates differences between the two 
languages... (and which]... coincides with that of neither monolin- 
gual group [but rather] incorporates the extremes from analogous 
structures in a way that permits the bilingual to pass as a native 
speaker of each language with greatest functional ease. (p. 206-7) 
Task accomplishment and general linguistic strategy differences between 
monolinguals and bilinguals of different types will be discussed below. 
Another task-related factor is the influence of the overall diffi- 
culty of the experiment. Authors, however, disagree about the direc- 
tion of this influence. Hardyck (1980, cited in Vaid 1983) interpreted 
his finding of greater right hemisphere activity in non-proficient bi- 
linguals' L2 (E. E. G. measurements) as indicative of "right hemisphere 
superiority in tasks requiring perceptual effort" (Vaid 1983: 326). 
Vaid also cites the work of Bentin (1981) as supportive of the notion 
. that: 
the right hemisphere is involved when information, whether in the 
first or second language, is perceptually taxing. (p. 327) 
Rupp (1980), however. considers his results (greater REA in the more 
difficult task) to indicate the opposite: 
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When subjects heard only two stimuli at a time, there was less in- 
formation tö process and store before responding, so that it could 
be done in a holistic, automatic manner. When the task became 
more complex, involving more memory storage and analytical proces- 
sing, the automaticity disappeared and was reflected in the major 
hemisphere processing. (p. 59f) 
4: 4.2.2.3 INDIVIDUAL VARIATION 
The relevance of individual variation in a group is rarely consid- 
ered important, even though it could lead to results unrepresentative 
of, (what is considered to be) the normal population. Hamers & Lambert 
(1977), however, do note that to find three out of 15 subjects display- 
ing LVF preference in a task predicted to produce an RVF preference 
(and doing so in the remaining 12 subjects) casts some doubt on their 
sample: they quote estimates of 6% (Benton 1965) and 4% (Milner 1973) 
for the proportion of right-handers expected not to show left cerebral 
dominance for language, against which their figure "appears very high" 
(p. 61). The same phenomenon invites caution in the interpretation of 
Gordon's (1980) findings. 20-30% of his right-handed subjects had re- 
versed dominance (p. 267). 
- L: 5 THEORIES IN POLYGLOT APHASIA 
The study of polyglotlý aphasia largely centres on two major issues 
The first involves a comparison of the incidence of aphasia in monolin- 
guals and polyglots after lesions localised to different parts of the 
brain and addresses the hypothesis that: 
if the right hemisphere were somehow more involved in language in 
the brain of the bilingual or second language performer, one would 
t, ýexpect to find a 
higher incidence of aphasia due to right-sided 
lesions in bilinguals as opposed to monolinguals. (Galloway & Kra- 
; ;' shen 1980: 75) 
10. See Notes on Terminology for details of the use of this term. 
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The second issue in polyglot aphasic studies is language dissocia- 
tion, that is, differential recovery in the two (or more) languages. 
Exploration of this phenomenon is given first. 
4: 5.1 LANGUAGE DISSOCIATION 
It sometimes happens that an individual who has known more than one 
language experiences more aphasic symptoms in one than the other, ei- 
ther by virtue of one being initially less affected than the other, or 
one recovering to a greater extent than the other. Parallel affliction 
and recovery has been viewed by some as an indication of storage of 
both languages in the same place while dissociation indicates separate 
storage, either within the left hemisphere (e. g. Scoresby-Jackson 1867) 
or in different hemispheres (e. g. Galloway 1978,1981). 
L'Hermitte et al's (1966) cases all corresponded to a pattern of 
parallel loss and recovery, which leads him to say: 
According to an examination given in only one language it is pos- 
sible to predict the type of disorganization in the other langu- 
ages. (L'Hermitte et al 1966: 742-3) 
This statement is paramount to a claim that dissociation does not exist 
at all; otherwise it is a truism, for it will not be possible to decide 
if a given patient has parallel or dissociative aphasia except by ob- 
serving the state of the languages. Their prediction can, therefore. 
only be post hoc. The existence of dissociation as a phenomenon is 
strongly affirmed by others (e. g. Chernigovskaya et al 1983: 195). 
Freud (1891) believed only one type of differential loss and reco- 
very of languages to be possible, viz. L2 more retarded than U. In 
his opinion, all acquired linguistic abilities, including literacy 
skills, shorthand and second languages. were localised to the same 
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place as L1. This contrasts with Scoresby-Jackson (1867) who saw each 
skill as occupying a new section of cortex in the third temporal con- 
volution (p. 704). Thus L2 could be lost and L1 remain, but not vice 
versa: 
It never happens that an organic lesion causes an impairment af- 
fecting the mother tongue and not a later acquired language. If 
in the case of a German who understands French the word sounds of 
the latter language had a different localization from the German 
word sounds, it ought to happen occasionally that following a ce- 
rebral softening such a patient would cease to understand German 
while still understanding French. In fact, the opposite is invar- 
iably the case. and this applies to all functions of speech. (p. 24) 
Some subsequently reported evidence appears to indicate that L1 can 
in fact suffer heavier loss than L2. For example. Bychowski (1919. ci- 
ted in Galloway 1981: 30f) had a patient who recovered productional abi- 
lity in Russian (learnt in adulthood by formal methods) before Polish 
(his mother tongue). His German (informally acquired) never recovered. 
According to Galloway, 
Bychowski suggests that the two most fluent languages, Polish (L1) 
and German (L2) were entrenched in the left hemisphere and there- 
fore most impaired by damage to the left hemisphere and that the 
right hemisphere was used to process L2. (p. 29) 
It may, however, be relevant that the patient recovered in a Russian 
hospital. 
It is cases of this type that make Pitres' rule more convincing 
than Ribot's rule for many writers (both rules are described below). 
What is open to question is whether language dissociation is attribut- 
able to separate storage. Lambert & Fillenbaum (1959) believe it is: 
aphasia would be likely to affect all languages of the compound 
bilingual, but should lead to more selective disturbances for co- 
ordinate bilinguals. (p. 626) 
If different storage or processing areas are invoked for each lan- 
guage, this might relate to whether the script is ideographic or alpha- 
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betic (Vaid & Genesee 1980: 420). Vaid (1983) identifies the likely ar" 
eas of localisation as the parieto-occipital (visual) areas for the 
former and the temporal (auditory) area for the latter (p. 320). Evi- 
dence from studies of deep dyslexia in Japanese patients supports the 
hypothesis that a syllabic script and a logographic script can be dif- 
ferentially affected (see Coltheart, Patterson & Marshall 1980). 
Any explanation of language dissociation invoking language-specific 
factors make predictions which need- to be- investigated; It has been 
suggested that a polyglot loses the ability to read in one language and 
not the other because reading is operated from a different area in 
each, either on account of the type of script each uses or the relative 
closeness of phonemic-graphemic correspondence in each language. For 
example, Luria had a patient who could write Russian but not French af- 
ter an inferior parietal lesion disrupting the "visual analysis and 
synthesis" required for his "non-phonemically" written French (L'Her- 
mitte et a. 1966: 730)). If the location of graphemic representations 
is language specific in this way, then the reading abilities of mono- 
lingual patients ought also to be differently affected after damage to 
a given area, according to the specific characteristics of their L1. 
Nevertheless, L'Hermitte et al (1966) believe that language specific 
factors have only limited explanatory power: 
independently of each particular linguistic system there exists a 
specific character in the disorganization of language [per se]. 
(p"735) 
The association of parallel aphasia with a common storage for L1 
and L2, and of dissociation with separate storage is a little problema- 
tic. For judgements to be reliably made on the basis of loss and reco- 
very patterns, there may not really be any extraneous influences on 
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those patterns. Thus, while affective factors, for example, cannot be 
proved to account for all the characteristics of differential or paral- 
lel recovery, it is a different matter entirely to discount their in- 
fluence altogether. So, if it were to be the case that affective fac- 
tors prevented the entirely parallel recovery of languages with common 
storage and processing mechanisms, the resultant pattern would be judg- 
ed as differential, implying separate storage. 
As a major-concern in polyglot aphasia is the relative accessiblity 
of the two languages, attention must also be given to the patient's 
ability 'to translate. Obler (1984) cites cases reported by Paradis, 
Goldblum & Abidi (1982) where patients could access their L2 only via 
translation strategies from L1 (p. 198). Poetzl (1925) even believed 
that the translation function could be traced to a specific part of the 
left hemisphere-, the inferior parietal region. It was damage to this 
area that led to a preference for one language over the other in apha- 
sia. L'Iermitte et al (1966) do not believe there to be any anatomical 
support for this claim (p. 730). 
Vaid & Genesee (1980: 418) have suggested that a false impression 
may prevail regarding the frequency with which dissociation as opposed 
to parallel loss and recovery occurs. This is because only the most 
interesting cases tend to be reported in the literature. The exact 
purpose of a study seems to be a salient consideration: they contrast 
the high percentage occurrence claimed by Albert & Obler (1978): 58%. 
and, by Paradis: 45%. with the much lower figures found in unselected 
samples, e. g. Charlton (1964): 22%. L'Hermitte et al (1966): 0%. and 
Nair & Virmani (1973): 6% (Vaid & Genesee 1980: 419). Genesee (1982) 
observes that selective studies are more likely to find evidence of se- 
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parate processing areas for each language than are unselected ones 
. 
(P-315f; see also Obler 1984: 195. Charlton 1964: 307-, 310)... ".. ". 
Affective factors have been discussed so far only in relation to 
the ease of acquiring a second language (section 4: 3.2.5). When it 
comes to the recovery of the second or first language after aphasia, 
they may be entirely responsible for non-parallel patterns, or at least 
have some influence. The kind of affective factors which might influ- 
ence recovery are (a) the association of a language with unhappy exper- 
iences, e. g. a difficult childhood, wartime traumas (cf. Galloway 1981: 
32), an unsuccessful relationship etc., or (b) with positive emotions, 
e. g. a case reported by Bychowski (1919), where the language recovered 
first was the one spoken by the nursing staff, which was neither his L1 
nor the language of his speech therapy; (c) the need to recover one 
language more than Zhe rest: Vaid & Genesee (1980) refer -to a"case-de- 
scribed by Halpern' (1949) where a patient recovered the language he 
needed to finish a scholarly treatise he was writing. 
4: 5.2 TWO RULES FOR RECOVERY 
Ribot's and Pitres' rules form a central focus in much of the dis- 
cussion of language dissociation in polyglot aphasia. They make cer- 
tain predictions about the order of recovery of languages and much ef- 
fort has been put into the formulation of plausible accounts for excep- 
tions to Pitres' rule in particular. By virtue of their not invoking 
affective factors as they address dissociation, neither Ribot nor 
Pitres can accommodate the possibility of compound storage (Minkowsky 
1928, cited in Charlton 1964: 307). 
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4: 5.2.1 RIBOT'S RULE 
Ribot's rule dates from 1881 and was not intended to be specific to 
linguistic restitution after polyglot aphasia. It states the follow- 
ing: 
the new dies earlier than the old. (Chernigovskaya et al 1983: 195) 
in cases of overall loss of memory, the loss occurs following a 
pattern of starting with the most recent requisitions and spread- 
ing to the oldest ones. (Veyrac 1931: 333) 
Pick (1921) associated adherence to Ribot's rule with the first langu- 
age being the most automized (p. 162), but believed that the return of 
lucidity to a patient could enable the operation of volition, so that 
some other language could be preferentially nurtured if required 
(p. 157f). Pitres (1895) cited a substantial number of cases which re- 
quire some explanation other than Ribot's rule and which form the basis 
for his own rule (see below). These mostly concern the failure of the 
mother tongue to recover to the same extent as some second language 
which had been much more frequently used by the patient before the 
injury. 
II Such exceptions to Ribot's rule appear to relate to speech recovery 
only. with comprehension in the mother tongue remaining possible (Pick 
1921: 157). 
Not least problematic in the evaluation of Ribot's rule is the pau- 
city of cases suitable to test it. As Vaid & Genesee (1980) point out, 
in almost every polyglot the oldest language (L1) is also the best 
known and the most useful and valuable to him (p. 421). 
4: 5.2.2 PITRES' RULE 
The most familiar language reappears first because it is the one 
that uses the most solidly fixed associations. The patient under- 
stands this language when it is spoken before he is able to speak 
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it because the verbal hearing centre has the earliest and closest 
links to the language function. (Pitres 1895: 47) 
Pitres believed the total aphasia often observed immediately after 
a trauma to be a type of verbal amnesia, temporary in nature. He cited 
a case where a language could be restituted under hypnosis (p. 49. fn. 8). 
Only by invoking a shock-induced "general functional interia" which 
"shatter[s] but do[es] not destroy the cortical language centres" 
(p. 46f) could one account for the gradual restitution of linguistic 
functions. Thus his more detailed accounts of patterns of recovery 
hinge on the disinhibiting of functions previously bound by this 
inertia. He specifies the following steps: 
1) Total loss of the ability to understand and speak any of the 
languages. 
2) Gradual return of the ability to understand the most familiar 
language. 
3) Return of the ability to speak this language. 
4) Return of the ability to understand the other language or 
languages known to the patient. 
5) Return of the ability to speak this or these languages. (p. 35). 
4 
Pitres reported that even when patients were unable to understand w 
the words, they were able to identify which language was being spoken 
(p"43)" 
Table A4: vi (Appendix) presents details of some of the cases refer- 
red to by Pitres (1895); those omitted are the ones where the mother 
tongue is not identifiable. It can be seen that it is mostly, but not 
always, the mother tongue which recovers best; this is predicted by Pi- 
tres' rule, so long as in those cases where a second language fares 
better than L1 it can be genuinely considered the most used language. 
It is hard to ascertain this from the minimal details given by Pitres. 
but in at least one case (Proust's) recovery was most successful in the 
language spoken in the patient's long term place of residence. Pitres 
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indeed names five of the cases reported (Proust, Trousseau, Grasset, 
Bernard and Pitres (Case I)), as examples of the most used (non-mother 
tongue) being the best restored (p. 34f). 
The heptalingual patient reported by Galloway (1978) also adheres 
to Pitres' pattern. The linguistic history of this patient, M. B., is 
particularly interesting. Born in 1926 as a Hungarian Jew, he learnt 
Hungarian as his mother tongue. From age 4-6 he was resident in Po- 
land, becoming fluent in Polish and losing his Hungarian. After again 
living in Hungary from age 6 to 10, from 10-12 he lived in Rumania in a 
multilingual environment of Rumanian, Hungarian, Yiddish and German. 
He spent the years from 12-17 in Hungary, speaking Hungarian and re- 
ceiving formal tuition in English and German. In addition, between the 
ages of 3 and 17 he received regular instruction in biblical Hebrew. 
At 18 he was sent to. an Austrian concentration camp for a year, where 
he spoke German. Then he spent six years in Germany obtaining a uni- 
versity degree. during which time he received some formal instruction 
in German. From 25 till the time of the CVA (at age 47) he lived in 
the United States where he acquired English via newspapers and radio, 
through his work and social interaction. He was married to a Hungarian 
but spoke English with her. He occasionally used German and Yiddish, 
rarely Hebrew. 
The particularly rich linguistic experience of this individual 
makes him unrepresentative of the population at large, but a good test 
case for theories of polyglot storage. However, caution is required in 
any generalisation even within this context, by virtue of his being 
left-handed or ambidextrous. 
At the age of 47 he suffered a massive left-sided cardio-vascular 
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accident, leaving him with a "large cystic space in the left parietal 
lobe" (p. 141). His "severe expressive aphasia with some receptive dis- 
turbances" (p. 141) left him with the following features of linguistic 
dissociation. In production his English was: 
fluent, syntactically complex and marked with some word substitu- 
tions and word finding difficulties. (p. 141) 
The other six languages were "limited to the occasional recall of iso- 
lated words" (p. 141). With regard to comprehension, he had no apparent 
problems with English or German (though replies were in English): he 
said he could understand Hungarian and Yiddish but not Hebrew, Rumanian 
or Polish. Experiments revealed some comprehension in these last 
three, but the relative levels of ability were fairly well in line with 
his own assessment. 
Galloway evaluates the details of this case as largely in line with 
Pitres' rule; slight departures from the predictions of the rule are 
explained in terms of the nature and longevity of contact the patient 
t-, 
had with one language (Yiddish) versus the method of acquisition and 
lack of interactional experience he had in another (Hebrew) (Galloway 
1978: 143f). This case is re-explored in chapter 5: 5.3. 
Despite its substantial explanatory advantages over Ribot's rule, 
Pitres' rule also has its limitations. Both affective and sociolingui- 
stic factors related to usage remain outside of its domain of predic- 
tion. It may be expected that an individual with fluency in more than 
one language does not use the languages interchangeably but rather em- 
ploys a specific language in a specific social environment, e. g. with 
particular interlocutors. If the whole range of linguistic environ- 
ments is not available after the onset of aphasia. then the recovery of 
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languages no longer appropriate for day to day usage may be retarded 
(see Veyrac 1931: 334). 
For some, Pitres' rule has simply not proved valid in the cases 
they report (e. g. L'Hermitte et al 1966: 742). Lambert & Fillenbaum 
(1959, cited in L'Hermitte et al 1966) produced evidence which suggest- 
ed that Pitres' rule did not apply to compound bilinguals. This con- 
curs with Chernigovskaya et al's (1983) own reservations (p. 196). Lam- 
bert & Fillenbaum's work involved the comparison of French-Canadian and 
European bilinguals. Of this study's results L'Hermitte et al say: 
among European aphasics the recovered language is not necessarily 
the first learned language, nor is it the most practised language 
before insult. On the contrary, in Montreal aphasics, Pitres' 
rule was found most often valid. The affective factors which ac- 
cording to Minkowsky (1963) often come into play during recovery 
only occurred in exceptional circumstances in Montreal aphasics. 
(p"729) 
Lambert & Fillenbaum attributed this to early acquisition and compound 
storage in the Montrealers as opposed to late acquisition and coordin- 
ate storage in the Europeans. Furthermore, their motivation for recov- 
ery was different: a European expatriot has a greater communicative 
need for L2, which ought to speed its recovery. The Montrealer can 
survive more easily without L2 because of the widespread bilingualism 
around him (L'Hermitte et al 1966: 729). 
4: 5.3 OTHER PERTINENT FACTORS & COMMENTS 
A number of other observations need mentioning within the context 
of the present discussion. Firstly. it is easy to gain too simplistic 
a picture of the clarity of compatibility between patients. It must 
often be the case that the diagnosis is open to question and is review- 
ed in the light of subsequent developments. Furthermore, a patient may 
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not be known to be a polyglot; another may choose not to use a language 
in which he is still able to communicate (e. g. section 4: 2.2.1, point 
C). 
A second point to be borne in mind relates to the methodology be- 
hind the data collection. Galloway (1981) points out that tests are 
far from uniform and reports are often composed-from evidence which is 
"anecdotal, impressionistic, scantily documented and not infrequently 
based on hearsay" (p. 36). Vaid & Genesee (1980) agree that there is a 
need for standardised tests and longitudinal studies (p. 419). Further- 
more: 
there is almost always no unique explanation for linguistic defi- 
cits in any of the polyglot aphasia cases. Degrees of impairment 
and patterns of recovery may be due to several factors (e. g. age 
of acquisition, frequency of use premorbidly, fluency, social and 
affective value of the languages, literacy, different orthograph- 
ies, language of recovery environment, the language rehabilitiated 
in speech therapy, function of the language, lateralization, 
structural similarities between languages, dead languages vs. ver- 
naculars etc. (p. 36) 
a 
ft . 
Other factors possibly determining recovery patterns are the hand- 
edness and sex of the patients (see section 4: 1.2.4.3). all too often 
not even mentioned in the case studies. Vaid & Genesee (1980) suggest 
that a water-tight analysis of polyglot aphasia after right hemisphere, 
to give one example, should work from a knowledge of the frequency of 
right hemisphere damage initiated aphasia in monolinguals, and systema- 
tically rule out possible alternative explanations to that right hemi- 
sphere processed L2. Such alternatives might be unreported early dam- 
age to the left hemisphere causing a shift of function to the right he- 
misphere in that individual, or the onset of right hemisphere process- 
ing after the lesion (p. 422). 
Observations of polyglot aphasia may have a wider range of rele- 
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vance too, than just the domain of L2 storage. They may indicate po- 
tential chronic symptoms present but undetected in monolinguals. As 
already noted elsewhere, one of Veyrac's (1931) patients recovered L1 
completely but not L2, such that: 
if she had never spoken any other language but French, it could 
have been concluded that the aphasia had completely regressed. 
(p"326) 
I 
ft 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DISCUSSION OF THE CLAIMS AND PREDICTIONS OF THE FOCUSING HYPOTHESIS 
AND ITS EVALUATION IN TERMS OF OTHERS' FINDINGS 
5: 1 EMPIRICAL & NON-EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR COMPONENTS OF THE FOCUSING 
HYPOTHESIS 
. 
5: 1.1 INTRODUCTION 
As chapter 3 has illustrated, the backdrop against which the Focus- 
ing Hypothesis argues for a central right hemisphere röle in language 
processing is one of firm adherence, even in the face of some inconsis- 
tencies in the evidence (chapter 4), to the principle that language is 
-a left 
hemisphere lateralised function. Furthermore, various individu- 
al components of the Focusing Hypothesis are separately challenged. 
For example, the notion of clausal level decoding faces assertions such 
as the following: 
during a clause, listeners accumulate information and hypotheses 
concerning its potential underlying structure(s): the end of the 
clause is the point at which a particular complete underlying 
_`, structure 
is determined. (Bever, Garrett & Hurtig 1973: 278, refer- 
ring to work by Abrams & Bever 1969) 
The justification for clausal processing and its relationship to the 
clausal processing hypothesis is examined in section 5: 1.6 below. 
But it is also possible to draw much support for the Focusing Hypo- 
thesis by noting that many of the features of language processing which 
it combines into one account have been observed or proposed by others. 
5: 1.2 DUAL SYSTEMS 
A number of writers have envisaged a duality in linguistic process- 
ing. Wundt's (1897) account is briefly described in section 5: 1.6 be- 
:.. .... _ low. MacKay (1973) proposes that a short term memory (Ml) deals with 
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all input but that, in addition, a long term memory (M2) operates spe- 
cifically on attended input. Thus he suggests. and substantiates ex- 
perimentally, that: 
The fact that subjects are not fully aware of or cannot recall the 
signal to the unattInded ear is not evidence that the signal was 
not processed. (p. 30) 
A processing account provided by Shiffrin & Schneider (1977, described 
by Tanenhaus, Leiman & Seidenberg 1979) also shares some characterist- 
ics of the Focusing Hypothesis' dual systems model. They envisage two 
levels of processing, referred to as veiled and conscious. Veiled pro- 
cesses: 
are opaque to conscious introspection, faster than conscious con- 
trolled processes, and make fewer demands on limited processing 
resources. (Tanenhaus et al 1979: 436) 
In both these accounts, then, we are offered an unattended, economical 
processor able to at least scan input material (see section 5: 1.6 for a 
parallel account from the Focusing Hypothesis), but not equipped to 
find 'deep structure' relationships between items or structures (MacKay 
. 1973: 36). 
. 
Nor is this support for dual systems limited to abstract accounts 
of , processing models. The characteristics of the two hemispheres are 
considered to underlie not only different approaches to tasks (Levy. 
Trevarthen & Sperry 1972, cited in Ten Houten 1982) but also to be the 
basis of an antagonism which. during the evolutionary history of homo 
, loquens. may have instigated the necessity for an 'armed truce' between 
the -hemispheres, with'a sharing of functions and, consequently, later- 
alisation (Levy 1969). This idea is intimately associated with the no- 
.. 
tion of optimal processing strategies which are preferred because they 
1. For a report of MacKay Is experiments see section 5: 2 below. 
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are . economical but which are also subject to 
deposition because they 
are not programmed in as the only way of operating. The separate and 
distinctive approaches of each hemisphere to tasks have been investiga- 
ted by Calderon (1976, cited in Hecaen & Albert 1978). She played ver- 
bal material into one ear and musical material into the other in a di- 
chotic listening test. Her conclusion was that: 
the two hemispheres may independently process the components of 
complex Jstimuli. selecting that component for which each is domi- 
nant. (Hecaen & Albert 1978: 413). 
,: The example of Calderon's (1976) work above is an exception to the 
general corollary of the Focusing Hypothesis, that dichotic listening 
tests are not a suitable means of observing optimal processing strate- 
gies (see 5: 2 below), because she did not use exclusively verbal stimu- 
li in the test. In section 5: 2 it is suggested that the only way to 
find out how normal processing works is to observe precisely that, and 
not performance in some artificial test situation. If such observation 
is possible, it is predicted to yield indications of differences be- 
tween the strategies operating in proposition- and language-focused 
language. This appears to be precisely what Van Lancker (1972) re- 
ports, with respect to hesitation phenomena, which, she says: 
indicate quite different processing for newly created, proposi- 
., -tional use of 
language as compared with overlearned, read and re- 
peated speech. (p. 23) 
,, 
There is no conflict between this observation and the proposal made in 
-Chapter 2: 2.3.3 that some automatic language is processed in precisely 
the same way as proposition-focused language, because, when it comes to 
hesitation, it is clear that both the cause of it and the relief of it 
will-. be quite differently motivated for the two kinds of production: 
in. -. novel language is it the proposition, not the form which must be 
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consistent to some internal model, while in overlearned. read and re- 
peated speech, the form is sett. 
5: 1.3 OPTIMAL PROCESSING 
Optimal processing has been defined (chapter 1) as the most econo- 
mical use of resources to achieve the desired result. This presupposes 
that conscious analysis, i. e. attention, makes more demands upon those 
resources than holistic processing does. Kintsch & Van Dijk (1978) say 
something rather similar: 
Resources seem to be required only as attention, consciousness, 
decisions and memory become involved; it is here that the well- 
known capacity limitations of the human system seem to be localis- 
ed rather than in the actual processing. (p. 364) 
They use this principle as a basis for their own processing model. 
Guyton (1981) links the notion of a finite capacity for attention to 
the reinforcement. during development. of the more advanced (left hemi- 
sphere) areas by directing the attentional processes into the best de- 
veloped regions, all of which increases the asymmetry (p. 196). 
. 
The Focusing Hypothesis proposes that the strategies most appropri- 
ate to L1 acquisition (unconscious analysis with formula construction 
and application), while remaining part of the strategy option range, do 
not offer the most economical (optimal) processing route in adulthood 
except where new items are encountered or the input is partially masked 
2. Many solo singers have remarked that the potential for a 'hesitation 
phenomenon' associated with performing music from memory issuch that 
it can become impossible to remove one's attention from the level of 
form (i. e. "What is the next word/phrase? "). In order to relieve this 
'focus'. which can seriously interfere with attention to the interpre- 
tation of the song and the communication of ideas to the audience, 
some prefer, where possible, to perform with the score in front of 
them. 
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by extraneous noise (see chapter 1: 8). Rather, a holistic decoding up 
to clausal level, employing the recognition of formulae rather than the 
operation of a rule, is more economical. Vennemann (1974) also sug- 
gests that, with regard to morphophonology at any rate. their decoding 
and encoding may not be generative in nature, except "when new words 
are adapted, constructed and analysed" (p. 346). However, Vennemann 
does not believe that syntax also operates non-generatively. 
5: 1.4 HOLISTIC PROCESSING 
Mitchell & Holmes (1985) review a number of studies which have sup- 
ported a non-generative approach to linguistic processing. Fodor et 
al's (1974) lexical analysis model suggests that: 
readers and listeners use the properties of individual words to 
help them make decisions about the structure. (Mitchell & Holmes 
1985: 543) 
In 'lexical analysis' of this kind, the verb is considered to play the 
central role, because it specifies a finite number of possible struc- 
tures (or, as the Focusing Hypothesis would say, formulae). This leads 
easily to the proposal (see chapter 1: 1.3) that a formula might be a 
skeleton in which the verb is lexicalised, the function words (a closed 
class) are specified and the other slots are filled from a paradigm of 
content words. Others whom Mitchell & Holmes (1985) cite in relation 
_to 'lexical analysis' are Ford, Bresnan & Kaplan (1982) and Riesbeck & 
Schank (1978). The latter have proposed that: 
parsing consists largely of executing routines that are recovered 
from the dictionary. (Mitchell & Holmes 1985: 544) 
5: 1.5 STRATEGIES 
Most support of all for the approach taken in the Focusing Hypothe- 
192 
sis is found in respect of the notion of strategies, which determine 
the amount of each type of processing to be used for accomplishing the 
task. 
The amount of effort a subject makes and the extent to which his 
strategy is specifically verbal, will determine how much the left 
hemisphere is activated, as compared to the right. and thus the 
degree of any asymmetry in processing ability. The relative acti- 
vation of the two hemispheres will vary with task difficulty, mo- 
tivation, cognitive strategy, and more conscious attentional shift 
to compensate for known or inferred shortcomings in processing one 
of the inputs. (Kinsbourne & Hiscock 1977: 182) 
Individual variation in strategy preferences or options is associa- 
ted with cognitive development (Bryden & Allard 1976, cited in O'Leary 
1982: 61) and class, sex and culture (Kinsbourne & Hiscock 1977: 182f) 
not because of some instrinsic differences in brain organisation but 
because of differences in experience, such as familiarity and confi- 
dence in dealing with the sounds or letters used as stimuli (Bryden & 
Allard 1976) and the effects this may have on strategy preferences. 
With reference to Geffner & Hochberg's (1971) failure to find an REA 
for dichotically presented verbal material in children of a low socio- 
economic status, Kinsbourne & Hiscock (1977) suggest that such a child: 
might not be adopting a verbal strategy or any strategy at all 
when the experimenter shoves earphones over his head. (p. 182) 
Code (1983) and Heny (1985) both note how easy it is to deliberate- 
ly -or unintentionally prime subjects into a specific strategy for a 
task by what they are given to do first. Heny considers this to cast 
serious doubt on the reliability of many experiments (p. 170). Code, 
addressing the treatment of Wernicke's aphasia. is acknowledging the 
fact that apparent improvements in performance on standard psycholin- 
guistic tests administered as a type of therapy for the express purpose 
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of training the patient into new strategies for dealing with language, 
may not reveal anything other than an increasing familiarity with the 
test procedures themselves (p. 58). Further support for the effect of 
strategy selection, as determined by precisely what is demanded of the 
individual, comes from Gazzaniga (1977): 
slight variations in the design of classic experiments change the 
previous unequivocal notions concerning the unique organization of 
the human brain and show how dubious interpretations can be perpe- 
tuated in the literature. (p. 421) 
Similarly, Brown (1983) considers that: 
it is not the material but the operation applied to this material 
which determines laterality. (p. 49) 
5: 1.6 CLAUSAL PROCESSING: CHALLENGE AND SUPPORT 
As will become clear in section 5: 2 below. psycholinguistic experi- 
ments which provide evidence of clausal processing are not necessarily 
compatible with the Focusing Hypothesis. While the Focusing Hypothesis 
t 
abstains from detailed comment on the internal workings of the analytic 
system which may, or may not, include the mechanisms required to set up 
(in some people, if needed) a clausal decoding procedure, it certainly 
does not predict systematic access in experimental conditions to the 
holistic clausal processing mechanisms. The strongest case in support 
of the Focusing Hypothesis would be to find that clausal processing ap- 
peared to be operating when normal communicational language was infor- 
mally examined. but that closer, controlled testing failed to observe 
it in any consistent way. 
However, some experimental evidence, e. g. Mackay (1966). Bever et 
al (1973) has indicated that even in test conditions the clause can be 
the pivot about which processing operates (see Garnham 1985: 184ff and 
194 
Bever et al 1973: 277 for reviews). Bever et al's (1973) findings are 
discussed in the context of ambiguity in section 5: 2.4 below. In addi- 
tion, Garnham (1985) raises the following point, which challenges the 
non-experimental aspect of the account given by the Focusing Hypothe- 
sis: 
Many people would claim that introspective evidence refutes the 
idea that syntactic and semantic processing are delayed to clause 
boundaries. In neither reading nor listening does it seem that 
understanding comes only at the end of clauses.... However, intro- 
spection is an unreliable source of information about language 
processing and, as noted above, the feeling of comprehension in 
the middle of the clause may simply come from the recognition of 
familiar words. (p. 185) 
Garnham is right. in one sense, to say that introspection is unreli- 
able, because it cannot be subjected to the same rigorous control as 
experimental testing. If, however, the act of testing itself alters 
the operations under investigation, so that controlled observation is 
monitoring something quite different, then introspection and informal 
observation will be a crucial part of the quest for a full picture of 
the language mechanisms (and techniques can be developed to access 
this, as Conversation Analysis shows3). 
Garnham's point about thinking you understand something because you 
recognise the words is important here. It raises the question: what is 
comprehension? The Focusing Hypothesis has differentiated stages in 
decoding, beginning with the scanning of input to check that only items 
and structures within the capabilities of the holistic system are pre- 
sent (see chapter 1: 2). But it has presented comprehension as the suc- 
cessful evaluation of a proposition in relation to other propositions, 
i. e. it is the result of juxtaposition. This, then, is very different 
3. See Levinson (1983) chapter 6 for an examination of the Conversation 
Analysis approach to linguistic study. 
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to the earier stages of semantic decoding. It could, of course, be ar- 
gued that comprehension occurs when, say, the idea is produced by the 
holistic mechanisms, rather than only when that idea is evaluated. The 
stance taken by the Focusing Hypothesis rests on the assumption that 
there is something qualitatively different about seeing the signifi- 
cance of a proposition and simply decoding a message. This is forcibly 
borne out in the symptoms of right hemisphere damage (see section 5: 
3.2). In other words, it sees comprehension as an active, conscious 
achievement. The questions which arise from this are tantalising4. 
What does it make of that stage where semantic decoding has taken place 
but the propositions have not been (and perhaps will not be) evaluated? 
This may occur in many psycholinguistic tests (see section 5: 2) and, as 
already mentioned, it appears to characterise some localised right he- 
misphere damage (see discussion in section 5: 3.2). This would be a 
stage at which 'comprehension' questions could be successfully answered 
(e. g.. "Was it a man who ate the hamburger? ') because these require only 
recourse to the structure and content of the single sentence ("No, it 
was, a dog that ate the hamburger. "). But questions requiring opinion, 
or the relating of one sentence to others, for a contextual assessment, 
would only be possible after propositional evaluation had been complet- 
ed. Thus it might be that in the routine reading of continuous prose 
that was not particularly interesting. full semantic decoding took 
place, but the propositions were not evaluated. Such reading would be 
characterised by having no retention of the propositional content of 
4. Indeed. in the context of the Focusing Hypothesis, literally sol 
(Tantalus was cast into a pool of water, which receded from him when- 
ever he tried to drink. The fruit tree above him moved out of his 
reach whenever he tried to grasp the fruit). 
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the text and, in the case of reaching a sentence which was evaluated 
propositionally, probably having insufficient information to do so ade- 
quately without re-reading the previous text. In this case, the 'com- 
prehension' that had occurred would be useless and would, as Garnham 
suggests, amount to little more than a recognition of the words and the 
syntactic structures, leading to an assurance that the text 'made 
sense' and, thereby, a feeling of having 'understood' it. even though 
only passively and inconsequentially. This recognition of words and 
structures is very much in keeping with the picture which the Focusing 
Hypothesis paints of the holistic part of language processing, begin- 
ning with scanning, and it draws the divide between decoding and com- 
prehension in exactly the place at which attention is required for the 
successful completion of the comprehension process. 
If the above account is valid, then psycholinguistic experiments 
which required attention to the language itself at some level would not 
result in comprehension in the sense of propositional evaluation. But 
that is self-evident, for most do not require it and so it would be a 
I gratuitous exercise in any case. For further discussion of this, see 
section 5: 2 below. 
The division of 'comprehension' into the successful evaluation of 
propositions on the one hand and the recognition of words and struc- 
tures on the other provides an explanation for the two conflicting sets 
of experimental findings. regarding clausal processing (see Garnham 
1985: 184ff). This is because the Focusing Hypothesis' account. as 
expounded so far. neatly complies with the proposal that it is this 
recognition type of 'comprehension' which can be swapped between the 
two systems, but not the evaluation type. In other words, the holistic 
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system can and will recognise and prepare for evaluation items up to 
the clause level, but the analytic system may cut in at any point and 
take over, with the result that that level becomes the focus of atten- 
tion. Now, in addition, as described above, we have the possibility of 
the analytic system never cutting in, not even at the propositional 
stage, such that only recognition comprehension occurs and proposition- 
al evaluation never does. In this case, the hearer/reader will know. 
that what was decoded made sense. but will have no recollection of it 
or have drawn any conclusions about it which contribute to their pic- 
ture of the world. 
A similar two-level processing scenario to the one just discussed 
was proposed nearly a century ago by Wundt (1897). MacKay (1973) sum- 
marises Wundt's hypothesis as follows: 
The first level of processing provides a preliminary analysis, a 
superficial or 'surface' description of phrases as they appear in 
the sentence. Attention plays no röle in this preliminary or sur- 
face analysis, but is essential for the second level of analysis - 
the level producing perception of the relations among words and 
phrases in the sentences, relations such as 'subject' and 'ob- 
ject'. (p. 22) 
In the remainder of this chapter. an assessment of the Focusing Hy- 
pothesis will be made by examining the predictions it makes with regard 
to psycholinguistic experimentation, brain damage (left and right) and 
other types of hemispheric monitoring in monolinguals and polyglots. 
5: 2 PREDICTION: LANGUAGE FOCUS IN EXPERIMENTS 
THE INTRINSIC NATURE OF EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS WILL INDUCE STRESS AND 
THIS WILL LEAD TO STRATEGY SELECTIONS DIFFERENT TO THOSE OPERATING IN 
NORMAL COMMUNICATION. 
512.1' DISCUSSION 
It is not intended to use the term stress in any technical sense, 
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but only to refer to alterations in the levels of self-monitoring, con- 
centration and self-confidence which may be associated with a new and 
difficult tasks. The level of stress, and indeed, the effect of that 
level of stress. will vary from experiment to experiment and from per- 
son to person. If strategy choice is determined by stress and its ef- 
fects, then, insofar as different strategies involve the two, hemi- 
spheres to different extents, patterns of ear and visual field advan- 
tage will fluctuate across, and even within, subjects, and from study 
to study. 
The range of strategies available for a task will depend on: 
1. The nature of the task 
2. The nature of the stimulus 
3. The test environment 
4. The type of subject 
Of these, it is (1) and (2) that establish the actual range of 
strategies appropriate for achieving the desired result. In the case of 
a metalinguistic task or a stimulus which cannot (or need not) be 
4 
treated as a semantic unit, the holistic processing of information up 
to the focal level may be impossible or disadvantageous6. (3) and (4) 
will cross-sect (1) and (2) to delimit the strategy option range by 
making one point of it more attractive or more efficient than the rest. 
5. I am grateful to Dr. Sidney Gottlieb for pointing out that it is 
legitimate to identify stress as a potential major determiner of stra- 
tegy selection in psycholinguistic experiments. However, his sugges-. 
tion that subjects could be screened for high anxiety levels would, 
even if practical. only serve to reduce the pool from which subjects 
were drawn even more. Furthermore, some might argue that those re- 
maining in it would, by definition, be rather unrepresentative of the 
general population of university students! 
6. For example, Mitchell & Holmes 1985: ".. the segmentation procedure [of 
the task presentation] must have had some effect on the subject's 
overall approach to the task" (p. 551) 
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5: 2.1.1 THE NATURE OF THE TASK 
Tyler & Marslen-Wilson (1977) issued the following instructions to 
subjects: 
First, please continue each sentence fragment with an appropriate 
verb. You should only use verbs which have both singular and plu- 
ral forms and you may use the same verb as often as you wish. Se- 
cond, please rate each sentence fragment for its naturalness, us- 
ing a scale of 1-5, where 1 is very natural and 5 is unnatural. 
(p. 685) 
This specifies the task as linguistic, encouraging attention to the 
language at a level lower than the proposition. In addition, the ter- 
minology is of a nature closely associated with grammatical analysis. 
The tone of the instructions is rather like that of an exam. where 
great concentration and detailed attention is required. 
By instructing subjects to react as fast as possible to stimuli and 
measuring those reaction times (e. g. Tyler & Marslen-Wilson 1982) the 
exercise becomes one of precision, high stress and even implicitly com- 
petitive. because success and failure are determined by concentration 
and quick reactions. 
5: 2.1.2 THE NATURE OF THE STIMULUS 
Instructions may inform subjects that propositional content evalu- 
ation is unnecessary even if it is possible. For example: 
The subjects were told that they would be hearing some words on 
the earphones and that they would be hearing different words in 
each ear at the same time. They were asked to listen very care- 
fully and during the pause of the tape, they were to repeat in any 
order everything they thought they had heard. (Rupp 1980: 39) 
In dichotic listening tests the stimuli are often single words, 
most -often digits (e. g. Inglis & Sykes 1967, Kimura 1963; for a review 
of: many such experiments see Bryden & Allard 1978: 392ff), or else non- 
sense, syllables (e. g. Studdert-Kennedy & Shankweiler 1969, Berlin, 
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Lowe-Bell et al 1973, Haggard & Parkinson 1971). Such stimuli', used in 
a simple discrimination task, have very little in common- with the input 
which the Focusing Hypothesis associates with proposition-focused lin- 
guistic processing7. 
Where continuous prose is used, this is still not for the purposes 
of eliciting propositional evaluations. For example, Tyler & Marslen- 
Wilson (1977), whose experimental instructions are quoted above, re- 
quired the appropriate selection of an item suitable to complete a sen- 
tence fragment. This is still very much a metalinguistic task, despite 
the need for semantic decoding. Similarly, Tyler & Marslen-Wilson 
(1982) required subjects to recognise a prespecified target word when 
it was presented in a sentential (or anomalous or scrambled) context. 
MacKay (1973) required subjects to shadow the stimulus sentences and 
restricted his analysis to those cases where the shadowing latency was 
short. 
Even Sachs (1974), whose experiment disclosed that, in continuous 
prose, semantic (propositional) information was more accurately retain- 
ed than details of the original linguistic form, required subjects to 
pay attention to the stimulus material in preparation for a test (which 
may involve different strategies to those used for reading it/listening 
to it for the sake of sheer interest). 
: 2.1.3 TEST ENVIRONMENT 
7. Where some complication has been added to a dichotic presentation 
(e. g. white noise (Weiss & House 1973), variations in voice pitch 
(Darwin 1971) or speaker (Haggard 1971), all cited in Code 1987: 27), 
- -- REAs have been found for vowels, in contrast to standard d. l. t. s (see 
chapter 3: 4.2). It seems plausible that the strategy selected for vo- 
wel perception might be different where intense concentration (focus) 
is required. 
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Measurements of hemispheric involvement and prowess -in tasks re- 
quire the use -of -equipment (e. g. headphones, tape recorder, timer, ta- 
chistoscope, response buttons or keys, computer display units and key- 
boards) and the establishment of controlled experimental conditions. 
These may contribute to a test 'set', quite different to the frame of 
mind in which linguistic interaction is approached. The stress levels 
induced by the test environment would presumably depend to a large ex- 
tent on the individual subject's experience, attitude and vulnerabili- 
ty. Gur, Gur & Harris (1975) found that lateral eye movement was only 
predictable from the test stimuli when the subject was not facing the 
experimenter: 
We suggest that, when E [Experimenter] is behind S [Subject], the 
problem itself is the most salient stimulus, and S. more nearly 
free to attend exclusively to it, can use that cerebral hemisphere 
that more nearly serves the cognitive strategies needed for solv- 
ing the problem. When E faces S. however,. S is confronted with a 
new set of stimuli, and thereby the problem's saliency is decreas- 
ed. Because the face-to-face situations, being more personal, may 
be more threatening and anxiety-provoking.... S falls back on cha- 
racteristic and preferred modes of response. Thus, when question- 
ed. S tends to rely on the preferred hemisphere even though it 
might be the 'wrong' hemisphere for a particular kind of problem. 
(p. 41) 
5: 2.1.4 TYPE OF SUBJECT 
The subjects used in experiments tend to be of two main types: (i) 
university students, often studying, . linguistics or psychology 
(e. g. 
Foss 1970. Hogaboam & Perfetti 1975. Holmes 1979)8. and (ii) children. 
Results from the latter tend to be inconsistent (see section 5: 2.2 be- 
.. 
low). The former tend to be tested because they are available and wil- 
ling to participate. However, they are rather unrepresentative of the 
8. Mehler et al (1978) expressly state that their subjects "had no parti- 
cular sophistication in experimental psychology or linguistics"(p. 33)" 
Nevertheless. they were university students. 
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general population, and, moreover, in a way which it is rather conveni- 
ent to overlook because it renders them more rather than less efficient 
and predictable performers. They are all members of the small section 
of the population who have been suited to or have adapted to the speci- 
fically analytic requirements of school and of state examinations (see 
chapter 1: 9). It is highly plausible that one feature of their educa- 
tional adeptness is an ability to examine a problem and select the most 
appropriate strategy to tackle it, so that they reach the answer inten- 
ded by the teacher or examiner. The instructions quoted in 5: 2.1.1 
above from Tyler & Marslen-Wilson (1977) exemplify the kind of language 
and task which a university student would be at home with but which 
might be unfamiliar or threatening to other individuals. The psycho- 
linguist who did dare to use other types of subject would face a dilem- 
ma, if he recognised it, when some of his subjects failed to complete 
the test properly. It would be too easy to simply write them off as 
'careless' if they failed to read the instructions properly, or as 'un- 
cooperative' if they gave up before the end, and exclude them from the 
analysis. It would be undermining of many premises inherent in experi- 
mental design to see in this the possible manifestation of different 
strategy choices, whereby what seemed to be an appropriate strategy for 
a successful subject, who has used it to his advantage in 'similar' 
school test conditions, did not seem to be appropriate or easy to 
another subject. who was 'unsuccessful' (see further discussion in 
chapter 1: 9). 
5: 2.1.5 THE SCOPE FOR CONTROLLING FOCUSING IN EXPERIMENTS 
The Focusing Hypothesis ultimately predicts that no amount of con- 
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trol of stimuli, subject type, environment' or administration will reli- 
ably remove . the -tendency to make 
language (or the task itself) focal 
(see chapter 6). The only possibilities which remain would be to alter 
the whole emphasis of the test (see section 5: 4) or to create a genuine 
interactive situation (including spontaneous input and output). The 
latter would be hard to achieve without sacrificing the rigours of ex- 
perimental design which are required for testing across samples, making 
direct measurements of efficiency and controlling extraneous factors. 
Therefore, in tests of hemispheric superiority for language, varia- 
tion in the balance of these variables across and within studies might 
manifest itself in inconsistencies in the side or extent of that super- 
iority; in other psycholinguistic experiments, differences in process- 
ing patterns might be observable. As all four of the variables de- 
scribed in 5: 2.1 could interact, the picture could easily be primarily 
one of confusion. 
5: 2.2 SUBJECT TYPE AS THE PRIMARY VARIABLE 
It was suggested in section 5: 2.1 above that the subject holds the 
key to the range of strategy options and the choice made between them 
in the attempt to complete a task successfully. Chapter 4: 1.2 describ- 
ed experiments where the subject variable can be associated with con- 
trasting results. In the following discussion the decisive features 
differentiating subject groups are examined in the light of the Focus- 
ing Hypothesis' strategy option range account (see chapter 1: 9). How- 
ever, it must first be noted that there are plausible ways of account- 
ing for these inter-group contrasts which do not invoke the increased 
activity of some holistic processing mechanism. These may involve the- 
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ories of strategy, but do not, even in that, necessarily provide any 
direct support for the Focusing Hypothesis. 
In chapter 4: 1.2.2 some observations of Heny (1985) were noted, 
namely, that the same subject may show different patterns of superiori- 
ty when tested twice on the same task (Heny 1985: 169f) and that by prl- 
ming one hemisphere with an initial task, a subsequent task can be bi- 
ased into showing the same (unexpected) pattern of hemispheric superi- 
ority. This leads her to state that: 
obviously, the reliablity of tests like these depends on the abi- 
lity to control such outside factors on choice of processing stra- 
tegy, and that is no simple matter. (p. 170) 
The Focusing Hypothesis proposes that the inventory of strategies 
open to an individual in a given situation and also his flexibility in 
switching between them is governed by a number of environmental fac- 
tors, (and possibly some physiological ones too, related to sex and 
handedness; see Geschwind 1983 and the discussion in chapter 4: 2). Ex- 
perimental findings have indicated general relationships which indir- 
ectly associate subjects of a lower socioeconomic class (Geffner & 
Hochberg 1971). an appositional cognitive viewpoint (Scott et al 1979) 
or who are not Western-acculturated (Hynd et al 1980). under a common 
heading of less left-lateralised for language. Other factors include 
language-specific differences (Tsunoda 1975; Gaziel, Obler & Albert 
1978). which are of a different type and so not discussed here. sex 
differences (e. g. Buffery 1971) and age (see below). These last two 
present a more complex picture. 
As Bryden & Allard (1978) report in their review, an REA can be e- 
licited in children as young as four (e. g. Kimura 1967) but not all ex- 
periments have succeeded in doing so (e. g. Zurif & Carson 1970, Witel- 
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son. 1962). Harris (1978) proposes that sex and age interact to produce 
earlier signs of laterality in females than males but by the time matu- 
ration rates equal out, more extreme ones in males (p. 460; see chapter 
4: 1.2.4.3). 
Ultimately, an account such as the Focusing Hypothesis needs not 
only to simply- cite strategy options as the single, unifying factor 
which produces all these cross-group differences in experiments. but to 
suggest why the patterns should be as they are; that is, why an analy- 
tic strategy in experimental tasks should be preferred by younger 
girls, older boys, middle class children, and educated and Western- 
acculturated subjects. 
Several possible contributors to this may be proposed. Sex. like 
handedness, has been the object of many interesting psychological stu- 
dies (see Harris 1978 for a review) in which differences have been 
found and, in most cases, attributed to physiological rather than en- 
vironmental differences. One exception to this is Berry's (1966) study 
of visuo-spatial skills in the Temne tribe (Sierra Leone) and Eskimos 
(Baffin Island). Here. marked sex differences were found'in the Temne 
but not the Eskimos and the Eskimos also performed much better overall. 
This was attributed to the different demands put upon the two groups by 
their respective environments and the difference in the status afforded 
to women by them. Such findings could indicate that the demands of the 
environment with regard to survival are stronger than any biologically 
(or culturally) instigated sex differences in strategy preferences. As 
Segalowitz & Bryden (1983) point out, if male and female subjects were 
to have different preferred strategies for tasks, it would be hard to 
differentiate this, in the results from the effects predicted for dif- 
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ferent measures of lateralisation (p. 363, cited in Code 1987: 14). 
In regard to age, it could be suggested that the range of strate- 
gies available for a task increases ," decreases or otherwise alters 
during the process of maturation; and any role for maturation will pro- 
vide some specific pointers to expected patterns. One is that girls 
will, in general, display characteristics before. boys , given their. ad- 
vanced maturity. As already noted, Harris (1978) supports this view: 
Girls, because of their earlier linguistic development, may begin 
a course of intellectual development in which, compared with boys, 
language plays the larger role. (p. 474f) 
Another is that changes might be expected to be apparent where samples 
span some traditional maturational watersheds, most notably puberty and 
the age of 7. 
Puberty is the greater of these two dividers. Krashen (e. g. Dulay, 
Burt & Krashen 1982: 61) associates it with the development of self- 
consciousness (an aspect of what Piaget termed Formal Operations) and 
with Monitoring and a new kind of linguistic consciousness. The Formal 
Operations stage is considered, as Krashen suggests, to mark the onset 
of special sensitivity to oneself in relation to not only what one says 
but everything that one does, with an increased sensitivity to how ot- 
hers perceive one (e. g. Piaget 1962a, b, 1964). This, then, would seem 
an obvious. stress-related, factor associable with a tendency to focus 
on performance in any test condition. This change at puberty might ac- 
count for the greater reliablity of adult over child subjects to pro- 
duce a left hemisphere superiority for language in psycholinguistic 
tests. However, it does not account for the still over-riding tendency 
in the same direction of those children. Kinsbourne & Hiscock (1977) 
attribute child-language differences in dichotic listening performance 
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to "an attentional bias to the right when children adopt a verbal set" 
(p. 181). This is less marked in adults, they suggest, because of in- 
creasing sophistication in behavioural control (p. 182). 
The age of seven appears to have its own significance too. In the 
educational methods inspired by Rudolf Steiner seven marks the end of 
the first phase of development and the onset of the second (Harwood 
1940: 100, Edmunds 1975: 38): children are not introduced to literacy 
skills until certain physical milestones associated with that age have 
been passed (notably the "change of teeth" (Harwood 194): 100). because 
they are considered not to be equipped to deal with them9. Piaget 
(e. g. 1972) considered seven to mark the end of the pre-operational 
period. during which "thought processes are perceptually bound and ego- 
centric" (O'Leary 1982: 65). An analytic approach to the world has not 
been fully developed and "the transition to predominantly verbal pro- 
cessing occurs at about age seven" (O'Leary 1982: 65). In chapter 6. 
Experiment 2 attempts to replicate O'Leary's (1982) finding of an al- 
teration at that age in hemispheric superiority from right to left in 
making judgements about tachistoscopically presented pictures. and it 
re-examines his suggestion that this marks the adoption of a verbal la- 
belling strategy. 
Also mentioned and experimentally investigated in chapter 6 is the 
question of educational experience and its possible relationship to the 
tendency to adopt analytic strategies. This is important as a potenti- 
al influencing factor because it has implications beyond just the age 
9. The years from seven to fourteen are termed the "'uncritical' years 
(that is to say, the years before the critical faculty of intellect is 
freed)" (Edmunds 1975: 47). In other words, children of that age are 
still not considered to be able to take a consciously 'analytic' ap- 
proach to life. 
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dimension. If. as seems highly plausible. learning to read, write, do 
arithmetical and mathematical calculations and to. manipulate facts in 
relation to each other in an ordered way develops the analytic capabi- 
lities of the child, then it stands to reason that those most confident 
and most successful in the school environment will either be by defini- 
tion or else become by practice those most able to adopt an analytic 
approach to a task. Furthermore, and importantly. all-rounders, who 
succeed in the widest range of subjects on the curriculum, will be 
those who know when not to be analytic as well. These are, perhaps, a- 
kin to what Krashen terms, in the second- language. acquisition context, 
optimal monitor users (Krashen & Terrell 1983) as opposed to overusers 
or underusers. The latter two could be considered to demonstrate least 
freedom in strategy choice. 
This leads to the the suggestion that subsections of the community 
who are educationally successful and/or favoured in one way or another 
might be most consistent in displaying analytic strategies where they 
are appropriate (and also not displaying them where they are not appro- 
priate). These would be individuals who were able to meet specific 
stress with analytic attention, as in exam conditions. We might pre- 
dict, then, (and this is borne out in the data, as described above and 
in chapter 4) that groups of experimental subjects would display dif- 
ferences along the parameters of class (where this is related to educa- 
tion motivation and attitudes and home support for learning), race 
(where ethnic minorities experience poverty, educational (including 
linguistic) disadvantage. prejudice-related stress and feelings of in- 
feriority). culture (where different emphases are placed on analytic 
approaches to the environment), age (as discussed above) and sex (where 
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females, or males, are treated differently or require different treat- 
ment-- than they receive). The description of field dependency (chapter 
4: 1.2.4.. 2) examines the possible inter-relationship of population sub- 
groups to an analytic cognitive approach and implicitly indicates how, 
in Western society, field independence is considered 'better' than 
field dependence; the latter happens also to be associated with women, 
left-handersl° and some non-Western cultures (Ten Houten 1982: 24). 
In accord with the above we find that Kimura (1969) has suggested 
that males have a greater tendency than females to select the strategy 
most , appropriate to the task (see also Harris 1978: 476 and chapter 4: 
1.2.4.2). Obler (1984). amongst others, proposes that positive atti- 
tudes increase second language learning ability (p. 199; see chapter 4: 
3.2.5); these may be easily associated with reduced stress levels. On 
the.. other -hand, the desire to do well. which is also associated with 
greater attainment. may act to positively harness stress and to enable 
. focusing onto the precise level required 
in the specific exercise, i. e. 
linguistic form in a grammar lesson but propositions in a conversation 
lesson.. 
To summarise, it has been suggested in the above discussion, that 
optimal strategy selection is related to a range of factors, including 
sex, handedness and age differences, but also task-related ones. and 
that, these latter may reinforce and exacerbate the differences initia- 
ted - , 
by the former, or in other circumstances may reduce them to insig- 
nificant levels. 
"10. The issue of 
left handedness raises questions of physiological as 
well as environmental influences; it now also seems more fashionable 
, again, to invoke the same to account for at least some sex differences 
(Geschwind 1983). 
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THE VALUE OF PSYCHOLINGUISTIC DATA IN EVALUATING THE FOCUSING S: 2.3 
HYPOTHESIS 
The above discussion has illustrated how the Focusing Hypothesis 
predicts a confused picture from the psycholinguistic data. Further- 
more, it predicts that experiments which consistently preclude holistic 
ji'nvoivement (e. g. dichotic listening tests or high-stress tasks conduc- 
ted using University students) have little to say about the existence 
of two processing systems, for they tap only one of them. This is, in- 
' evitably, a partisan view, emanating exclusively from internal reason- 
ing. - The general consensus in psycholinguistic research is that even 
the, most artificial experiments (in terms of how closely they resemble 
what happens in normal communication) contribute in a direct way to our 
knowledge about general mechanisms of linguistic processing. Asser- 
tions such as "our research indicates that all speech processing invol- 
ves..; " (Tyler & Marslen-Wilson 1982: 180) bear witness to this. Else- 
where., Tyler & Marslen-Wilson (1982) are even more explicit: 
The aim of the research reported here is to characterize the basic 
properties of human spoken language understanding; of the mental 
events that take place as the listener hears an utterance. The 
1 research is carried out within the framework of the claim that 
-speech understanding is mediated by a set of central on-line pro- 
cesses. and that the primary goal of psychological research into 
speech understanding is to determine the properties of these pro- 
cesses. (p. 169; see also Tyler & Marslen-Wilson 1977: 684 and Mac- 
Kay 1973: 26). 
From their point of view. then, their experimental results are 
clear refutations of the notion of non-analytic (i. e. holistic) approa- 
ches rto 
(at least) input processing. Such initial premises are irre- 
concilable with those of the Focusing Hypothesis, which designates the 
kinds of questions which Tyler and Marslen-Wilson ask (e. g. 1977,1982, 
Tyler 1984), regarding the nature of the processing they initiate ex- 
perimentally. irrelevant to the central issue of the dual systems as- 
pect, -of the Focusing Hypothesis. Indeed, it remains ambivalent to the 
issues raised in this, and many other. areas of linguistic investiga- 
tion, which are. in its terms, concerned with the internal organisation 
of just one, the analytic one, 'of these two systems. 
To test the Focusing Hypothesis in its own terms, then, requires 
investigatory methods which do not by virtue of their intrinsic nature, 
simply debilitate the holistic system and then, in not finding it oper- 
ational, permit the conclusion that it does not exist. 
5: 2.4 TEST CASE: AMBIGUITY 
''This single area of psycholinguistic research has been selected for 
closer examination. It contributes particularly to the discussion be- 
cause it is not as limited as, say, the dichotic listening research, in 
the range of investigatory methods which it can employ. To facilitate 
a full discussion, the aims and findings of research in this area are 
first of all examined in some detail, before they are evaluated in 
terms of the Focusing Hypothesis. 
5.2 4.1 FINDINGS IN AMBIGUITY RESEARCH 
At least two aims may be identified as motivating the research into 
ambiguity. The first concerns whether more than one reading of an am- 
biguous word or expression is available at a given moment during or im- 
mediately after processing. This has been tested by comparing reac- 
tion" times to stimuli containing ambiguous and unambiguous items. Re- 
actions to the former are predicted to be slower if different readings 
0 
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are competing in the interpretation of the stimulus. Amongst the stu- 
dies finding such an effect are MacKay (1966, cited in Bever et al 
1973: 278 and Lackner & Garrett 1972: 360). Mistler-Lachman (1972, cited 
in Hogaboam & Perfetti 1975: 273). Bever et al (1973, experiment II), 
Foss (1970), Foss & Jenkins (1973. cited in Hogaboam & Perfetti 1975: 
273) and Conrad (1974, cited in Hogaboam & Perfetti 1975: 266). For a 
general review of 'ambiguity' see Garnham (1985). 
However, there is a large measure of variation in the experimental 
designs and the exact findings (see Table 5: i in section 5: 2.4.4 be- 
low). MacKay (1966) used a sentence fragment completion task. The 
fragments contained lexical, surface structure or underlying structure 
ambiguities or matched unambiguous controls. (Examples of such con- 
structions can be found in the Appendix. A5: 1). He found ambiguous 
stimuli more slowly reacted to than unambiguous ones in the cases of 
underlying structure only, not in lexical or surface structure ambigu- 
ities. Bever et al (1973) were able. retrospectively, to narrow down 
the scope of this ambiguity effect from all underlying structure sti- 
muli to only those where the fragment left a clause incomplete. There 
was no effect where the fragment ended with a clause boundary. Bever 
et al (1973. Expt. II) replicated this finding. 
Mistler-Lachman's (1972) experiment, on the other hand, found an 
ambiguity effect for stimuli which were all complete sentences. Sub- 
jects had to provide an appropriate sequential sentence. But Bever et 
al (1973) hypothesise that the positive encouragement given to subjects 
to "respond quickly would have led them to start formulating, even ut- 
tering, their response before the sentence was finished. In this case. 
the stimuli would be being treated as fragments which were not clausal- 
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ly, complete. However, Mistler-Lachman's experiment dealt only with 
lexical ambiguity (Hogaboam & Perfetti 1975: 273). which did not show an 
ambiguity effect in the other experiments. 
. Mitchell 
& Holmes (1985) had subjects responding to simple compre- 
hension yes-no questions immediately after sentences carrying an ambi- 
guous or an unambiguous sentence. The verb in the sentence biased for 
one reading, without excluding the other. The sentence was then disam- 
biguated with an indicator segment after the verb. This was predicted 
toy. cause a garden path effect where the verb biased the reader towards 
the inappropriate interpretation. They did indeed find that it took 
longer to react to garden path sentences. They managed to replicate 
, 
these results when. instead of splitting the presentation of the stimu- 
lus,., into segments (Expt. I). they presented it as a single unit (Expt. 
II). However, whether they in fact captured in this the opposition 
which others have observed between sentence fragments and complete sen- 
tences (see above) is open to question: the subjects in the segment- 
presentation condition knew that they would ultimately see the whole 
sentence and they were not required to provide the ending for the sti- 
mulus sentence. 
Other experiments have found no difference between reaction times 
to ambiguous and unambiguous stimuli. Foss. Bever & Silver (1968, ci- 
ted in Foss 1970: 700) required subjects to recognise pictures as com- 
patible with a previous sentence. As a picture could only depict one 
meaning of an ambiguous stimulus, those decisions might be expected to 
take longer than the ones relating to unambiguous stimuli. But no dif- 
ference was found. However, there was a frequency effect. with re- 
sponses to pictures matching the less frequent interpretation taking 
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longer than those matching the more frequent one. Bever et al (1973. 
Expt. I) required the construction of a plausible following sentence to 
sentences which contained a lexical, surface structure or underlying 
structure ambiguity. Not only was no differnce found in general across 
stimulus types, but in the case of underlying structure ambiguities, 
responses were made more quickly to ambiguous than unambiguous stimuli. 
They explained this in terms of the task permitting the choice of ei- 
ther reading, so that in each case the first to be found (probably the 
more frequent, see below) was the one which was computed. Mehler et al 
(1978) found no difference in response times to target phonemes immedi- 
following an ambiguous or unambiguous stimulus, once they had ately 
controlled for word length over the two conditions. Foss (1970). using 
a similar design, but not controlling for word length, had found an am- 
biguity effect. Mitchell & Holmes (1985) also claimed to find no effect 
of garden pathing in their Expt. III. But this is hardly surprising 
since, in their effort to test whether the effect was caused by syntac- 
tic or pragmatic factors. they employed stimuli which were no longer 
able to cause garden pathing. Their conclusions, then. rest on the as- 
sumption that there was no difference in the strategies adopted by the 
subjects involved in this condition and those used in the other experi- 
ments, who were presented with a task requiring complex (and unnatural) 
ambiguity decisions. 
Tanenhaus. Leiman & Seidenberg (1979) suggest that the contradic- 
tory findings regarding whether one or more than one reading is avail- 
able might be dependent upon the time lag between the stimulus and the 
response; unrequi-red readings from a multiply accessed pool might be 
discarded in this time. or, conversely, a singly accessed reading might 
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be, found unsuitable and replaced by another. They attribute the con- 
trast in findings of Conrad (1974) and Oden & Spira (1978) (discussed 
below) to the immediate onset of reponse in the former and the 500msec 
delay in the latter: 
If. for example. multiple access is followed by a rapid selection 
process based on context, then the 500-msec interval may have pro- 
vided enough time for the contextually appropriate reading to be 
accessed. (p. 429) 
They claim support for this stance from Neely (1977) and also from 
their own experimental work. In the latter, presenting a single word 
for naming immediately after the sentence containing the ambiguous word 
resulted in no difference in response times whether the word was seman- 
tically related to the primed or to the unprimed reading of the ambigu- 
ous word. This suggested that. at that specific stage. more than one 
reading was available, regardless of context. But when there was a 200 
msec or 600msec gap before the presentation of the word to be named 
(and therefore before a response could be made) the response time was 
faster only for the primed reading. This suggested that by 200msec 
after the stimulus presentation, all but the chosen appropriate (prim- 
ed) reading had been discarded. 
. The second area of 
interest in ambiguity studies has been the pro- 
cess by which one reading is selected. Experiments have tested hypo- 
theses including (a) multiple access, with parallel processing of all 
possibilities until one can be selected from context and (b) the selec- 
tion of one reading only, with its subsequent abandonment if necessary 
and the search for a second reading (the order hypothesis). For a ge- 
neral review of - studies, see Garnham (1985: 
63ff). Lackner & Garrett 
(1972) conducted an experiment to test the predictions of these two hy- 
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potheses. They used a dichotic listening procedure to present ambigu- 
ous sentences of various kinds to the attended ear and the disambiguat- 
ing-ones, more quietly, to the unattended ear. In each of three groups 
of 15 subjects. seven received the ambiguous (attended) stimulus in the 
right ear and the disambiguating sentence in the left. The remaining 
eight had the reverse presentation. The subjects had to paraphrase the 
attended sentence. A biasing effect for each condition was calculated 
from its frequency of occurrence in the primed condition and in a neu- 
tral, unprimed condition. The effect of priming was significant for 
all - the types of ambiguity, 
despite the fact that no subjects realised 
that the stimulus sentences were ambiguous, nor had any knowledge of 
what had been played to the unattended ear. Lackner & Garrett reason 
that for simultaneous priming to have such an effect, either both read- 
ings must have been simultaneously available through some parallel, pro- 
cessing or else processing must have been delayed until enough context- 
ual information was available. That the subjects were encouraged to 
begin their paraphrase even before the stimulus was finished is one 
fact called in support of the former account, i. e. simultaneous mul- 
tiple access and parallel processing. For a brief review of these hy- 
Ipotheses, see Hogaboam & Perfetti 1975: 265). 
But the frequency hypothesis, which is an elaboration of the order 
hypothesis. receives most attention. This proposes that the accessing 
of readings for ambiguous items & structures proceeds via a fixed or- 
der, determined by frequency. Several studies claim to support this. 
Hogaboam & Perfetti (1975, Expt. I) presented sentences ending with 
an ambiguous or an unambiguous (control) word. The sentence itself bi- 
ased the meaning to either the high or the low frequency reading. The 
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subject had to decide whether the last word in the sentence was ambigu- 
ous or not. They found that decision times on the low frequency read- 
ings were quicker than on the high frequency ones. They explained this 
by 'suggesting that it took longer to find a second, infrequent meaning 
once the frequent meaning had been accessed and found to fit the con- 
text, than it did to find a'frequent meaning after the infrequent one 
had been found to fit. It is hard to see why this should be so: the 
same number of processes ought to be involved either way. Even their 
later attempt to elucidate does not help much: 
the secondary sense... cannot be accessed unless the primary sense 
has been accessed. (p. 272) 
While it would be true that both readings were available by the end of 
the sentence processing itself in the low frequency but not the high 
frequency cases, it ought, presumably, to take less time to complete 
the sentence processing in the high frequency cases, because the first 
reading accessed would have been acceptable. This would leave time in 
hand for the search for a second meaning. However, their account could 
work if the contextual information were of more value in locating a low 
than a high frequency meaning, as might be the case if, as they sug- 
gest, the word in isolation or in a neutral context was attributed, by 
default, the more frequent reading. 
Holmes (1979) proposed another account. The faster reaction times 
for,, low frequency readings might not be because the high frequency 
reading was accessed first, as described above, but rather because con- 
text accesses the correct reading, whether high or low frequency; but 
in the subsequent search for a second reading, the higher frequency 
reading is found faster (p. 576). Holmes (1979) replicated Hogaboam & 
Perfetti's experiment with the same result. In his subsequent experi- 
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ments, subjects made judgements about whether stimulus sentences were 
meaningful or anomalous, without being alerted by the experimenter to 
the presence of ambiguity. The more frequent readings elicited faster 
response times (Expts. II-IV), even with a context clearly restricting 
the ambiguous item to one reading. When a pre-stimulus sentence con- 
textualised (often semantically restating) the stimulus sentence and 
its ambiguous reading (Expt. V) the frequency effect almost completely 
disappeared. This was considered to be because there was sufficient 
contextual information to prevent the irrelevant reading from surfacing 
at all. Support for this interpretation could perhaps be drawn from 
Carey et al (1970, cited in Bever et al 1973: 278). Here, using surface 
structure ambiguity only. subjects were primed for one or other reading 
and then had to decide whether a picture was relevant to the ambiguous 
stimulus. Where the picture related to the reading which had not been 
primed, reactions took longer. so long as the subject had noticed that 
there was ambiguity present. 
Priming (or biasing) has been used in a number of experiments (see 
Table 5: i below) and effects found. MacKay (1973) used a dichotic lis- 
tening presentation similar to Lackner & Garrett's (1972) described a- 
bove. He tested a number of hypotheses relating to a general model en- 
visaging only surface level analysis of unattended material (see earli- 
er discussion). He tested this by requiring subjects to attend to a 
sentence in one ear well enough to shadow it with short latency and 
without error. A single lexical item (or two items) were played into 
the other ear, to which the subjects were instructed not to listen. He 
found that when -that word disambiguated lexical or surface structure 
ambiguity a biasing effect occurred. But there was no effect in the 
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case of underlying structural ambiguity, that is, where the underlying 
structure of the unattended sentence was the same as one of the read- 
ings of the ambiguous sequence. 
5: 2.4.2 THE FOCUSING HYPOTHESIS ON AMBIGUITY 
The Focusing Hypothesis predicts two kinds of conflict in observa- 
tions about language processing. One is variation within the corpus of 
experimental data. The other is contrasts between what happens under 
experimental and non-experimental conditions. Thus. one welcome obser- 
vation from others is that: 
Many sentences could mean more than one thing, but in a normal 
context we usually notice only one meaning. " (Bever et al 1973: 
277) 
It is clear... that many everyday sentences which in (linguistic) 
theory are ambiguous are not taken to be ambiguous by those who 
hear them. " (Foss 1970: 699) 
This observation might be defined as 'informal evidence' because it ad- 
dresses a phenomenon (the oversight of ambiguity in normal language 
processing) which cannot, by definition, be experimentally examined, 
quantified or controlled without altering its 'everyday' nature. It 
has served as a starting point for others to ask. and to seek to find 
out experimentally, why it is that we fail to see ambiguity. However, 
they soon discover that, in test conditions, we can, after all, detect 
ambiguity. more or less rapidly, according to various factors. Yet 
they see little significance in the fact that of the several glaring 
differences in the circumstances in which the two (experimental and in- 
formal) observations are made (see above), one is whether or not the 
subject or informal hearer/reader is looking for ambiguity, either di- 
rectly or indirectly. For the Focusing Hypothesis the difference is 
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paramount, for it is proposed there that entirely different strategies 
are in operation for dealing with the information in each case. which 
may, if those strategies differ in relevant ways, completely alter the 
patterns which are observed. 
There are some who in fact do note this variable but they lack a 
uniform account to contextualise it and to give it significance: 
... reconciling the present results with our everyday experience of 
ambiguity is needed. (Foss 1970: 705) 
Within the context of experimental investigations, the Focusing Hy- 
pothesis predicts conflicting findings because of uncontrolled effects 
on strategy choice from the experimental design. including stimulus 
type. experimental environment and subject type. Any of these might 
play some röle in enabling or disabling a temporary contribution from 
the holistic mechanisms. According to the Focusing Hypothesis, in nor- 
mal processing ambiguity would be overlooked whenever the previous con- 
text or the information contained in any part of the current clause 
clarified the meaning. This is because the whole clause would be de- 
coded at once 
ll. On the other hand it couldýbe argued that at the scan- 
ning stage (see chapter 1: 1.2) there would be a 'multiple access' in 
the sense of the highlighting of more than one formula/lexical area as 
possibly relevant for the later clausal decoding. It has been propos- 
ed, however, that this aspect of the recognition process (see section 
5: 1.6) could not be accessed experimentally, as the attempt of the ex- 
- perimenter to observe it would alter the strategy adopted by the sub- 
----------- - 11. This contrasts with the more common belief that language is processed 
as it is received, e. g.: "it seems safe to assume that the structural 
analysis of a sentence is begun by a listener during its reception" 
(Lackner & Garrett 1972: 236). 
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ject. Where there was not enough contextual information one of two 
things might happen. Firstly, pragmatic knowledge and imagination, us- 
ed to extend the context beyond the explicit, might provide the 'more 
likely' meaning as the only reading. This process would resemble, and 
might be mistaken for, a frequency-based selection procedure (see be- 
low) but would be bound by the dynamic processes of context and common 
sense, not by some immutable internal frequency hierarchy as suggested 
by others12. In this case the ambiguity would be entirely missed when- 
ever the assumptions were correct, but would become apparent if the 
subsequent context indicated a mistake. 
Alternatively, there might be a failure to satisfactorily decode 
the clause, and a 'homing in' (i. e. focus) on the dubious item. In 
this case, as in the case of a selectional mistake being detected (as 
described above), the holistic processing mechanisms would be unable to 
cope with the problems (see chapter 1: 3) and would hand over the pro- 
cessing to the analytic mechanisms. The word in question would become 
temporarily focal and some or all of its various readings accessed. 
The analytic mechanisms would be able to deal with different readings 
and their context by means of juxtaposition, and might adhere to any of 
the patterns of internal organisation which are discussed in the psy- 
cholinguistic literature (but which are there considered to apply to 
normal processing situations as well). 
It is important to note, however, that the analytic mechanisms are 
----------- 12. In the light of Pawley & Syder's (1983) stronger hypothesis (see sec- 
tion 5: 6 below) it could alternatively be postulated that lexically 
stored interpretations would be preferred to novel ones. In this case, 
again, the results would resemble some kind of frequency ordering, but 
in fact the subset of 'natural' lexicalised or part-lexicalised con- 
structs would underlie the preferences. 
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not envisaged to go beyond simply identifying the ambiguity. There 
would, namely, be no value in simply choosing a reading if the context 
had not defined one. In normal communication, only one meaning has 
been intended by the speaker and it is the hearer's job to find out 
which, by seeking clarification from the speaker. He may not usefully 
exercise free choice, unless he deliberately wishes to risk misunder- 
standing the propositions expressed by the speaker. This observation 
seems a fairly obvious one, yet it appears to be ignored by many psy- 
cholinguists. That this is so is evident from the rather different se- 
lectional criteria which are permitted to operate in experimental con- 
ditions (see below). In addition. general comments by experimenters a- 
bout the nature of the processes involved in decoding ambiguity in nor- 
mal' communication fail to acknowledge the point. For example, Lackner 
& Garrett (1972) present three possible scenarios for ambiguity decod- 
ing and then state: 
It is presumed that in all three cases only one reading is finally 
selected. (p. 361) 
lt is contended here that where ambiguity is noticed and the context 
does not disambiguate, the listener holds the two readings side by side 
until clarification is forthcoming, and does not just choose whichever 
reading he likes better. 
S"2 43 CHALLENGES TO THE FOCUSING HYPOTHESIS 
There are some serious challenges to be faced by the Focusing Hypo- 
thesis in respect of some of the ambiguity data. Although there are 
clear indications that stimulus type, at least, does affect experiment- 
al'findings (see below), the Focusing Hypothesis cannot account for the 
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apparently clear-cut nature of the contrasts anything like as succinct- 
ly as some other hypotheses. As exemplified above and also in Table 5: 
ii, some experiments have revealed a delay in processing ambiguous 
words and structures, as compared to unambiguous ones, while other ex- 
`periments have found no such contrast. Bever et al (1973) attribute 
this to whether the stimulus is a sentence (clausel3) fragment or a com. 
'plete one: 
Those experiments which show an effect of ambiguity used tasks 
initiated during the processing of the sentence, while those show- 
ing no effect used tasks initiated after processing of the sen- 
tence was presumably complete. (p. 279) 
This observation is fuel for their argument that all the readings 
of ambiguous words. surface structures or underlying structures are 
potentially available until the clausal boundary and then the inappro- 
priate ones are discarded, so that: 
tasks that occur before such boundaries are complicated by the 
presence of both interpretations of ambiguities. while subsequent 
tasks are not. (p. 279) 
If the pattern is as they describe (this is examined below), then 
the arguments presented so far in this chapter are compromised, though 
the Hypothesis itself is not challenged. The reason for this is as 
follows. 
The Focusing Hypothesis proposes that holistic and analytic mechan- 
isms are both capable of linguistic processing. A consistent contrast 
in subjects' efficiency in processing ambiguous items, according to 
whether they are dealt with before or after the end of the clause could 
be indicative of one of two things: 
----------- 13. Although they speak here in terms of sentences. they are primarily 
concerned with clauses as basic units of processing. So references 
from now on are to the clause. 
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a) Ambiguities processed before the end of the clause involve analytic 
processing, and those processed after it involve holistic processing. 
In other words, the experiments which use clause fragments do not give 
us any insight into the processes by which the single reading of an am- 
biguous item is selected in the experiments which use whole clauses; 
the processing procedures are entirely separated and the former does 
not reflect a stage part-way through the latter. 
This account is unsatisfactory because it makes no allowance for 
the inhibition of the holistic mechanisms as a result of the other va- 
riables outlined in section 5: 2.1. viz. stress levels as a function of 
the experimental environment. subject type etc. 
b) Both the clause-fragment and the whole-clause observations relate to 
stages of analytic processing, just as Bever et al (1973) and others 
suggest. The Focusing Hypothesis' account is then different because it 
holds that neither condition is representative of real language proces- 
sing. which it considers to be holistic. The whole question of ambigu- 
ity is. in this case. only of secondary interest, since it sheds light 
on the operation of the analytic system but does not relate to its re- 
lationship with the holistic system. 
This. account is also unsatisfactory because up until now the possi- 
blity has remained that some experimental designs might permit some li- 
mited and sporadic involvement by the holistic mechanisms. If this is 
denied, so that all psycholinguistic experiments discussed here are 
considered wholly unsuitable for even indirect indications of the ex- 
istence of dual systems, there is an unfortunate consequence. The Fo- 
cusing Hypothesis is forced to fail to predict confusion in the data 
unless it does so with reference to some factors internal to the analy- 
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tic system. It cannot account, then, in terms of strategy options, for 
conflicting evidence in the ambiguity data, nor, more importantly, for 
the inconsistencies in other data, such as those outlined above. 
The Focusing Hypothesis does predict conflict in the data, but it 
must be of a type that would appear. to the experimenter, unprincipled, 
because it will be caused by small fluctuations in numerous variables. 
What we must search for, then, is greater within- and cross-study vari- 
ation than Bever et al (1973) depict in their clear-cut account. As it 
turns out, there is some indication of this when the data is re-examin- 
ed in this light. 
5: 2.4.4 REASSESSMENT OF THE AMBIGUITY DATA 
An examination of the experiments described above, in terms of the 
criteria outlined in section 5: 2.1, reveals variation of precisely the 
kind predicted to lead to conflicting results. And, as already demon- 
strated, they do conflict. Bever et al's (1973) and Lackner & Gar- 
rett's (1972) work supports the multiple access hypothesis, with the 
parallel processing of different readings and the discarding of all but 
one at the clausal boundary. Hogaboam & Perfetti (1975) and Holmes 
(1979) support the frequency order hypothesis, which states that a se- 
cond reading will only be accessed if the first (the more frequent one) 
is found to be unsuitable. 
The Focusing Hypothesis treats both sets of evidence with some cau- 
tion and it considers other parameters more pertinent to the subcate- 
gorisation of experiments. The following oppositions of features are 
observable in the 'experimental designs referred to above: 
a) type of ambiguity: lexical, surface structure or underlying struc- 
ture 
226 
b) stimulus type: isolated item. clause (or sentence) fragment, whole 
' clause (or sentence) 
c) task requirements: direct search for ambiguity, some other lingui- 
stic search, propositional decision without knowledge of implanted 
ambiguity 
d) 'correct answer': subject must select the appropriate reading, sub- 
ject may select any reading 
e) stress-factors: subjects aware of timing or encouraged to react 
quickly etc. 
This list is very similar to the more generalised one in 5: 2.1 above. 
As already described, some of these variables have been acknowledg- 
ed by experimenters as pertinent to their findings. But others have 
not been. Bever et al (1973) perceive a combined effect of (a) and 
(b): the experiments of MacKay (1966) and Bever et al (1973, Expt. II) 
revealed an ambiguity effect only for sentences varying in underlying 
structure but not for the other two types of ambiguity; but this effect 
was only found where the stimulus (a sentence fragment) ended with an 
incomplete clause. 
The Focusing Hypothesis, as it has been presented here, does not 
directly address the question of ambiguity types (a) as a variable, as 
this relates to the internal organisation of a single system, not to 
inter-system differences. However, as already expounded, variable (b) 
is potentially important because sentence completion tasks and tasks 
dealing with stimuli out of a propositional context would be predicted 
to rule out holistic processing; stimuli which were complete sentences 
might enable some (sporadic) holistic involvement, if other variables 
permitted this. Holmes' (1979) comment serves as indirect support for 
this view: 
... entirely 
different processing strategies may be involved depen- 
ding on whether words are presented individually or in sentential 
context. (p. 586) 
Mitchell & Holmes (1985) checked the results which they had obtained 
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using sentences which were displayed in segmental units (Expt. I) by 
presenting the whole sentence at once on the screen (Expt. II). The re- 
suits produced the same patterns but there was clear evidence that: 
the segmentation procedure must have had some effect on the sub- 
ject's overall approach to the task. (p. 551) 
The nature of the task (variable c) is less consistently registered 
as a potential influence on results. Two main observations can be 
made: that most tasks are at variance with our real-life experience of 
language processing procedures, and that some tasks are far more expli- 
citly metalinguistic, than others. 
The first observation also incorporates variable (d). It is clear- 
ly 'unnatural' to require subjects to (repeatedly) encounter unresolved 
ambiguity and make decisions about it (e. g. Mitchell & Holmes 1985). 
Similarly. it is an 'unnatural' question which experimenters are posing 
when they ask "How do people deal with ambiguity when they're listening 
out for the letter 'p'? ' (e. g. Foss 1970, Mehler et al 1978). As de- 
scribed in section 5: 2.4.2 above, in the course of normal communication 
two things may happen in the face of contextually unresolved ambiguity. 
It may go unnoticed and thereby possibly lead to misunderstandings, or 
it may be noticed as ambiguous. What is different here to the test si- 
tuation (e. g. Mitchell & Holmes 1985) is that experimental subjects may 
be required to make decisions about the meaning of sentences despite a 
lack of adequate evidence to lead them to a firm conclusion. This is, 
then, a free choice: either reading is correct. In normal interaction 
there is no choice. The speaker never (except consciously, for effect) 
intends to be ambiguous - it happens by accident. As the hearer is not 
a mind reader, ambiguity is a hazard which must ultimately be overcome 
by the speaker, even if at the hearer's request. In experimental con- 
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ditions. the ambiguity is intentional and it is left to the hearer to 
resolve it, either using contextual information or by, practically 
speaking. guessing. 
The priming of subjects to expect something other than normal lin- 
guistic interaction is inevitable. In some cases instructions are par- 
ticularly explicit. Hogaboam & Perfetti (1975) set up, by means of 
their instructions, an awareness in the subjects that ambiguity was the 
major point of interest, which removes any semblance of normality from 
the task: 
The subjects... were informed that the experiment involved ambigu- 
ous words. defined as words of one spelling and two or more unre- 
lated meanings. The instructions emphasised that the two meanings 
had to be unrelated in order to be considered ambiguous. It was 
pointed out that even though the word plow had two usages, it was 
not to be considered ambiguous because the usages were related. 
They were also told not to consider metaphorical usage, or homo- 
phones that were not homographs. 
The subjects were told that their task was to listen carefully 
to each sentence and decide whether the last word was ambiguous 
.... 
(p. 269) 
Furthermore, the task itself was highly artificial according to the 
criteria of naturalness outlined above. Subjects were required to de- 
cide whether the last word in sentences like (1) & (2) below was ambi- 
guous: 
1) The tired hiker rested his feet. 
2) The building's dimensions were measured in feet. 
Regarding the second observation made above about variables (c) and 
(d), viz. that some tasks require more metalinguistic attention than 
others, this question has not gone entirely unnoticed: 
... the 
difference between the two studies could be due to the dif- 
fering task demands made upon the [subjects]. That is, the kind. 
or depth of comprehension required of a sentence is, perhaps. a 
function of what [subjects] are asked to do. (Foss 1970: 704) 
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Holmes (1979) also notes that results from a task using isolated lexi- 
cal decision do not necessarily tell us much about the procedures in- 
volved in processing words in a "meaningful sentential context" (p. 570; 
Mitchell & Holmes 1985: 544 make a similar observation). The importance 
of this is clearly illustrated in Holmes' (1979) experiments. His 
Expt. I required the detection of ambiguity. The remainder required 
judgements of 'meaningfulness' (i. e. whether a stimulus sentence "des- 
cribes events that are quite possible in our everyday world' or "des- 
crl bes events that cannot really happen in our everyday real-life 
world' (p. 577) and subjects were not told that ambiguous words were in 
use. The results of his Expt. I and Expts. II-IV were contradictory, 
which indicates that the test design variable needs to be seriously 
considered. 
0 
No attention was drawn to the fact that the test sentences would 
contain ambiguous words. (p. 577) 
The experimental tasks employed by Foss & Jenkins (1973, cited in 
Hogaboam & Perfetti 1975: 271) and by Foss (1970) were even more meta- 
linguistic, requiring the detection of a target phoneme. Conrad (1974. 
cited in Tanenhaus et al 1979: 428) conducted a Stroop-like task, where- 
by subjects had to name the colour of a stimulus word presented after a 
sentence containing an ambiguous word which was contextually constrain- 
ed to one reading. The variable was whether the stimulus word was se- 
mantically related to the primed reading or the unprimed one. Conrad 
. 
found that colour naming was slower to stimulus words related to either 
the primed or the unprimed reading. which supports a multiple access 
hypothesis (Tanenhaus et al 1979: 428f). Oden & Spira (1978, cited in 
Tanenhaus et al 1979: 429) conducted a similar, but more tightly con- 
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; trolled, experiment and 
found a priming effect. 
In both the phoneme detection and the colour naming experiments re- 
ferred to above, the subject had to focus on something other than the 
meaning of the sentence (though Foss had three conditions: phoneme de- 
tection, ambiguity detection and both). In the case of Conrad's (1974) 
experiment, it is hard to see how one could control the amount of no- 
tice subjects took of the semantic context at all (though the Stroop 
test itself illustrates that it is hard to ignore the semantic content 
entirely), particularly as, unlike in the Stroop test, the semantic 
context was not related to the colour name. 
So far, we have examined variables (a)-(d). Variable (e). the le- 
vel of stress induced, would inevitably manifest itself to different 
extents-in different experiments. In some cases subjects appear to have 
been aware that reaction times were being measured (e. g. Mehler et al 
1978). In others, the timing was done Afterwards. off tapes (e. g. Be- 
ver et al 1973). In some cases, subjects were encouraged to respond as 
fast as possible (e. g. Mistler-Lachman 1972, cited in Hogaboam & Perfe- 
. tti 
1975: 273, Foss et al 1968, cited in Foss 1970: 700). In others, they 
were permitted to take as long as necessary to set up in their own 
minds the context in which a stimulus was to be seen (e. g. Bever et al 
1973). 
,. 
Amongst the experiments on ambiguity, one design, using dichotical- 
ly presented stimuli, raises some questions of particular relevance to 
the Focusing Hypothesis. Dichotic listening tests have shown that the 
right ear is better at dealing with linguistic stimuli than the left 
(see chapter 3: 4.2) though, as mentioned in section 5: 2.1.2 above, the 
stimuli have usually been single words or nonsense syllables and the 
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right ear advantage has not been consistent across populations (chapter 
4: 1.2). In Lackner & Garrett's (1972) experiment, however. the task 
was not a simple report (i. e. repetition) of what had been heard, but 
to paraphrase the message in one (the attended) ear, which required the 
extraction of the proposition underlying the sentence played to that 
ear. In addition, as Lackner & Garrett report, the proposition con- 
tained in the sentence played to the unattended ear appears to have 
been extracted and utilised too. (MacKay's 1973 experimental design 
was similar, but for clarity it is not discussed here). 
Leaving aside for the moment the effect. discussed above. of exper- 
imental design and environment. and of subject type, all of which might 
preclude anything but analytic processing, it is clear that the simul- 
taneous handling of an attended and an unattended message for the pur- 
poses of extracting propositions would be predicted to operate better 
when the right ear was attended to that when the left one was. In ot- 
her words, to have attention focused upon the ambiguous stimulus 
(though at what level this might be is debatable) would permit, as al- 
ways, successful decoding with, at the same time, unhindered holistic 
handling of the unattended message by the right hemisphere. A proposi- 
tion could then be fed to the analytic mechanisms where it might influ- 
ence the reading given to the ambiguity, perhaps by being juxtaposed 
with some of the smaller semantic units (indeed, being taken to be one 
of them) which the analytic mechanisms routinely juxtaposed as part of 
their decoding procedure. 
But when the attended message was presented to the left ear and the 
unattended one to, the right, the subject ought to find the task more 
difficult. Unfortunately, it is impossible to tell if this was the 
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case. Lackner & Garrett (1972) monitored only the effect of biasing 
for each ear and used different subjects for each side of presentation. 
TIMING SENTEN- CONTEXT- AMBIGUITY(AE)/ 
ASPECT TIAL RELATED FREQ. (FE)/PRIM- 
EXPERIMENTER STRESSED? STIMULI? TASK? ING EFFECT( PE ? 
lex. & ss: No AE 
Bever et al 1973 NO YES YES us: AE: RTs faster 
Ex t. I to AMBIG. stimuli" 
lex. & ss: No AE 
Bever et al 1973 NO NO YES us: AE for incom- 
Ex t. II lete clauses 
Carey et al 1970 ? YES YES ss: RTs faster for 
rimed readings 
Conrad 1974 ? YES NO lex: AE" No PE. 
Foss 1970 YES YES NO lex. & us: AE 
Foss et al 1968 YES YES YES No AE; FE: RTs fas- 
ter for HIGH fre 
Foss & Jenkins ? YES NO lex: AE 
Hogaboam & Perfet- YES YES NO lex: FE: RTs faster 
ti 1975 for LOW fre 
Holmes 1979 YES YES NO lex: FE: RTs faster 
Ex t. I for LOW fre 
Holmes 1979 ? YES YES lex: FE: RTs faster 
(Expts. II-IV)_ for HIGH freq 
Holmes 1 Ex t. V ? YES YES lex: No FE 
Lackner & Garrett lex. ss. us: PE from 
1972 YES YES YES unattended ear 
lex & ss: no AE 
MacKay 1966 NO NO YES us: AE for incom- 
lete clauses 
MacKay 1973 (NO) YES NO lex & ss: PE from 
unattended ear 
lex: No AE in pho- 
Mehler et al 1978 YES YES NO neme detection 
lex: AE with pre- 
Mistler-Lachman'72 YES (YES) YES stimulus contex- 
tualiser only 
Mitchell & Holmes 
1985 I ? NO YES ss: AE 
_ ibid (II) ? YES YES ss: AE 
ibid (III) ? YES YES ss: No AE 
Oden & Spira 1978 ? YES NO various t es: AE 
Tanenhaus et al' ? YES NO lex: PE with delay 
TABLE 5: i KEY 
lex = lexical ambiguity 
ss = surface structure ambiguity fus = underlying Structure ambiguity 
RT = response time 
PE = Priming Effect (previously con- 
text biases choice of reading 
AE = ambiguity effect 
(RTs longer for ambiguous 
than unambigous items) 
FE = frequency effect 
(may operate in either 
direction) 
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They found no differences, but this could simply mean that the two 
groups had to concentrate to a different degree in order to achieve sa- 
tisfactory responses. 
To summarise, many criteria may be at work besides those normally 
highlighted in experimental reports. Table 5: i displays the less than 
uniform picture which results from highlighting certain features of ex- 
perimental design which the Focusing Hypothesis considers important. 
When these studies are roughly rearranged according to the effect 
that the three criteria shown are predicted to have on the findings. 
they fall into three groups (Table 5: ii). 
Group A contains those which are predicted to be most likely to en- 
able some holistic involvement. These have or approach the configura- 
tion NO YES YES. In other words, they involved lower stress in regard 
to the timing aspect of the experiment (e. g. manual control of stimulus 
presentation. screen between them and experimenter with timer etc. ). 
stimuli that were sentential and a task requiring meaningfulness (prag- 
matic) judgements or equivalent. Bever et al (1973, Expt. II) and Mac- 
Kay (1966) have been added to two groups (A & C) because of Bever et 
al's proposal that sentence fragments were treated like sentences when 
they ended in a complete clause. Foss et al (1968) has been added to 
Group A because the level of the subjects' awareness of the timing as- 
pect is difficult to ascertain, and in all other respects this study 
meets the criteria of Group A membership. 
Group B contains the studies predicted to be least likely to permit 
holistic involvement. The configurations are (or approximate) YES NO 
NO and (as this has no members) YES YES NO. 
Group C contains the remainder. with predictions dependent upon the 
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presumed relative strength of the three variables. 
GROUP A 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Bever et al (I) NO YES YES No AE (Ambig. faster in us) 
Carey et al ? YES YES Context aided speed 
Holmes (II-IV) ? YES YES FE: RTs faster for HIGH freq 
Holmes (V) ? YES YES No FE 
Mitchell & Holmes II ? YES YES AE 
it of III ? YES YES No AE(but stimuli NOT ambi- 
guous!! ) 
Bever et al (II) NO (YES) YES No AE (complete clauses) 
MacKay NO (YES) YES No AE (complete clauses) 
Foss et al (YES) YES YES No AE; FE: RTs faster for 
HIGH freq. 
GROUP B 
Foss YES YES NO AE 
Hogaboam & Perfetti YES YES NO FE: RTs faster for LOW freq 
Holmes (I) YES YES NO FE: RTs faster for LOW. freq 
Mehler et al YES YES NO No AE 
Foss & Jenkins ? YES NO AE 
Conrad ? YES NO No AE 
Oden & Spira ? YES NO AE; PE 
Tanenhaus et al ? YES NO PE at 200 & 600msec. not 
Omsec 
GROUP C 
Bever et al (II) NO NO YES AE (incomplete clauses) 
MacKay NO NO YES AE (incomplete clauses) 
Lackner & Garrett YES YES NO PE from unattended ear 
(simultaneous) 
MacKay (NO) YES NO PE from unattended ear 
(simultaneous) 
Mistler-Lachman YES ? YES AE in pre-stimulus context 
only 
Mitchell & Holmes III ? NO YES AE 
TABLE 5: ii (Key as in Table 5: i) 
Although this arrangement incorporates many generalisations over 
what is a complex network of interacting variables, clear patterns can 
be seen. General group characteristics appear to include: 
Group A: no Ambiguity Effect; Frequency Effect: faster for HIGH fre- 
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quency readings. 
Group B: No Ambiguity Effectl4: Frequency Effect: faster for LOW fre- 
quency readings. 
The pattern revealed above is both supportive and undermining of 
the Focusing Hypothesis. The support lies in the indication that some- 
thing may be going on which is related to the parameters which the Fo- 
cusing Hypothesis considers important. But the picture is almost too 
clear. given the claim that numerous uncontrolled variables might well 
be, interacting to confound the findings. So it remains questionable 
whether it is advantageous or not for the Focusing Hypothesis to seek 
and claim support from these studies. or whether it should prefer to 
stand at the sidelines and attribute all the findings to patterns in 
the internal organisation of only one (the analytic) system. 
5.3 PREDICTION: DISRUPTION TO THE MECHANISMS IN LEFT AND RIGHT 
HEMISPHERE DAMAGED PATIENTS 
9: 3.1 LEFT HEMISPHERE DAMAGE 
AS LANGUAGE-FOCUS TRANSFERS ROUTI(V LANGUAGE PROCESSING FROM THE RIGHT 
HEMISPHERE TO THE LEFT HEMISPHERE IT WILL BE FORCED INTO THE DAMAGED 
AREAS OF AN APHASIC IF HE FOCUSES ON HIS OUTPUT. 
In this case, the intact right hemisphere mechanisms would be po- 
tentially capable of handling processing in the normal way, but would 
be deactivated whenever the left hemisphere damaged patient paid atten- 
tion to his processing. 
14. Mehler et al's 1978 study not only contradicts the findings of Foss 
1970 and Foss & Jenkins 1973 but also provides a plausible alterna- 
tive account for their so-called Ambiguity Effect. 
15. A direct connection is assumed here between holistic processing and 
the right hemisphere and between analytic processing and the left; 
cf. chapter 1: 10 
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5: 3.1.1 DISCUSSION 
It is important to begin by noting that alterations in focusing are 
not considered to account for the aphasic symptoms themselves, only for 
circumstantial variations in their severity. Even though left hemi- 
sphere damage is characterised by an awareness of the problems (Ge- 
schwind 1979: 165). to observe that left hemisphere damage is accompani- 
ed by language loss is hardly a source of unique support for the Focus- 
ing Hypothesis! However, another prediction is entailed in the above. 
namely, that language processing should be less affected when the apha- 
sic is not focusing on the language itself but on something elsel6. In 
comprehension, this might occur when the patient was not trying to jux- 
tapose the propositions in the input, as. for example, where he was 
present during a conversation between others. or when the television 
was on. In production. there would have to be a formulation of the 
propositions in preparation for an utterance, followed by a failure. 
for some reason to pay the customary attention to the intelligibility 
of the output. This might occur when the proposition retained the fo- 
cus, e. g. in an emergency or some other emotive situation (see also 
section 5: 3.2.1 below), or when the patient was distracted or caught 
off guard. Linguistic output beyond the characteristic (language- 
focused) post-aphasic capabilities of the patient might be produced. 
but, as the patient would be as surprised as anyone to witness this. 
language focus would immediately ensue, with the consequent loss of 
those temporarily reinstated abilities. 
16. Discussion here is restricted to the symptoms characteristic of 
Broca's aphasia only. The question of accounting for the different 
symptoms of different aphasiac is addressed later in this section. 
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Support for these phenomena tends to be anecdotal, as much of it 
does not reach the literature. Amongst the incidents which have been 
recounted are the following: 
1) In clinical tests of aphasia, a patient may be unable to pick out a 
named object from three placed in front of him. But when the test is 
over, an off-hand request for him to pass that object to the tester so 
thtý"it can be packed away may be successfully understood and responded 
2) Family may insist that a patient understands much more of their con- 
versation and y6 television programmes than symptom diagnosis indicates 
to be possible . 
3) A patient may indicate unexpected levels of comprehension, including 
vehement disagreement, during a conversation between thy speech thera- 
pist and a member of his family who has accompanied him 
9. It is pos- 
sible that some apparent signs of following a conversation (e. g. head- 
nodding & shaking etc. ) a55 not motivated by comprehension but by other 
automatic social cueing . However, signs of strong disagreement, as 
attested, probably could not be motivated in this way. 
4) An aphasic woman. unable to speak. witnessed a conversation between 
her two sons. who were trying to establish some fact about their child- 
hood, but were not acknowledging her in the exchange, even though she 
was the only one who could answer their query. She suddenly uttered 
the key word they needed to know. 2I 
he was amazed to have spoken and 
was immediately unable to do so again 
Two other common symptoms of left hemisphere damage can be inter- 
preted in the light of the Focusing Hypothesis. Firstly, the tendency 
for automatic language (idioms. swearwords, paradigms and memorised se- 
quences) to be better retained. As discussed in chapter 2: 2.2.3. there 
is no reason for disagreeing with Hughlings Jackson's (1874) proposal 
that automatic language is right hemisphere processed; the Focusing Hy- 
pothesis only proposes that other, novel language is also dealt with 
17. Andrew Spencer. Central School of Speech & Drama. London, personal 
communication. 
18. Ruth Vinson, Speech Therapist,. Lincolnshire Health Authority, personal 
communication. 
19. ibid. 
20. Andrew Spencer, personal communication, has suggested this. 
21. Dick Hudson, University College, London, personal communication. 
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there. The familiarity of automatic phrases, their storage in prefa- 
bricated form and the total lack of experience of the left hemisphere 
for constructing them, even in focused situations, might all enable 
them to be more easily accessed. 
Secondly, a symptom of milder forms of aphasia is word-finding dif- 
ficulties. This is a phenomenon also found in normal production from 
time to time and thus it is fitting that the Focusing Hypothesis can 
account for its occurrence in aphasia in terms of the continued func- 
tioning of the normal task-sharing mechanisms. As word-finding diffi- 
culties would be a feature of, or at least exacerbated by, language fo- 
cus, the least productive response to them would be to try harder. 
Word-finding problems in normals are renownedly persistent, despite the 
availability of certain kinds of phonological information while the 
word is on the tip-of-the-tongue. until the search is discontinued; the 
word often becomes available when it is no longer being sought. 
It is plausible that individuals might differ in the frequency of 
these right hemisphere deactivations according to their previous ten- 
dency to focus on language. Apart from differences according to per- 
sonality, which might correspond to the subcategorisations which Kra- 
shen points to with regard to Monitor use in L2 learning (over-users. 
under-users and optimal users, Krashen & Terrell 1983: 
44). cross-cul- 
tural ones might also obtain. These could relate to the status of lan- 
guage in a community, with those valuing rhetorical skills more likely 
to be associated with a relative rarity of reactivation of the right 
hemisphere language centres. Literacy would also be salient, with il- 
literate individuals less analytically aware of their language. and 
therefore less primed for that deactivation. 
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Furthermore. if literacy is one powerful determiner of a tendency 
to, focus on language (see also the discussion in section 5: 5)+ then 
preliterate individuals (i. e. children under. say, five years old) 
would be less likely to deactivate the right hemisphere mechanisms. 
This would mean that, all in all, left hemisphere damage would appear 
to affect their language less severely, or perhaps less uniformly from 
occasion to occasion. As described in chapter 4. there are indications 
that children under five are affected differently to adults by local- 
ised brain damage. But as the development of analytic ability in gen- 
eral, as well as the acquisition of strategies for the easy accomplish- 
ment of many every day tasks is not yet complete in children of that 
age, any further attempt to draw support for the Focusing Hypothesis 
from this particular type of data would be speculative. 
In Japanese brain damaged patients. differences in the ability to 
read the kana and kanji scripts have attracted much attention. Much of 
the discussion centres around the symptoms of deep dyslexia (Coltheart 
et al 1980) which is not an area explored in any depth here22. The in- 
dications from clinical studies (e. g. Sasamuma 1980) and from psycho- 
linguistic ones (e. g. Shimada 1981) are that the processing of the syl- 
labic kana script is more left lateralised than that of the logographic 
kanj! script. Code (1987) cites studies which have found normal sub- 
jects to more accurately report kanji words presented to the left visu- 
al field and kana words presented to the right visual field (p. 55). As 
kanji characters cannot be segmentally analysed for the purpose of 
gaining phonological information, it is generally supposed that they 
are processed holistically and that is why the right hemisphere re- 
22. See the Concluding Remarks. 
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sponds to them so well. As many of the articles in Coltheart et al 
(1980) observe, speakers of languages with a non-logographic script al- 
so appear to process words holistically. rather than by phonological 
segmentalisation; but for them it is a convenient option, not a neces- 
sity. 
The kana-kanji phenomenon provides some valuable support for the 
Focusing Hypothesis, because it illustrates what could be the results 
of the enforced adoption of certain strategies by one literate communi- 
ty, while a wider range of strategies is available in another. Speci- 
fically, to focus on the written form of a word and to analyse it seg- 
mentally would have no value where it was represented by a logogram, so 
the only time such a strategy would be adopted would be when the 
character was first learnt. Conversely, alphabetic or syllabic scripts 
could be read either way, and so the strategy options would remain op- 
en. Furthermore, for Japanese speakers there might be little advantage 
to a holistic approach to kana words, as they tend to be used mostly 
for grammatical 'function words' etc. The preferred strategies in Ja- 
panese would operate by default. Thus, after left hemisphere damage, 
kanji reading would be less affected than kana, because even the ten- 
dency to focus on language as a response to the disabilities would 
mostly fail to force such a shift in processing. Where it did, kanji 
would be disrupted. The Focusing Hypothesis predicts that the left he- 
misphere would only have access to the original mnemonics associated 
with learning the character up to the point where it became automatis- 
ed. However, this might be enough to enable some level of reading abi- 
lity, subject to the disruption initiated by the localised damage. The 
possible effect of right hemisphere damage on Japanese patients is dis- 
241 
cussed in section 5: 3.2.1 below. 
It might seem timely and necessary to examine now the way the Fo- 
cusing Hypothesis accounts for different types of aphasia (e. g. Wer- 
nickels. Broca's, conduction and even dynamic aphasia (as described by 
Luria & Tsvetkova 1970) etc. ). However, no account will be offered 
here for two reasons. Firstly. the symptoms of aphasia which can be 
most reliably observed and quantified relate to production. This is 
not to deny. of course. that comprehension difficulties are also asso- 
ciated with many forms of aphasia. As no attempt has been made here to 
systematically explore the output aspect of the Focusing Hypothesis. it 
would be impossible to contribute in any useful way to the discussion. 
Secondly. aphasia is generally defined. because of its specific associ- 
ation with left hemisphere damage, as a problem exclusively pertaining 
to the left hemisphere and its malfunction; in addition, the Focusing 
Hypothesis holds that in the characteristic language-focus condition of 
the aphasic, there is little or no right hemisphere involvement. 
5: 3.2 RIGHT HEMISPHERE DAMAGE 
IF THERE IS DAMAGE TO THE RIGHT HEMISPHERE LANGUAGE CENTRES, THE LEFT 
HEMISPHERE WILL SIMPLY TAKE OVER, AT THE EXPENSE OF THE JUXTAPOSITION 
OF PROPOSITIONS. 
This prediction addresses the obvious question of why, if the right 
hemisphere is normally involved in language processing, right hemi- 
sphere damage is not usually associated with language disability. The 
answer, then, lies in the recognition that. as the right hemisphere 
does not know anything that the left hemisphere didn't 'teach' it (see 
chapter 1: 8), the left hemisphere is equipped to adopt all processing. 
.... and to exclude 
the right hemisphere from any contribution. But the ad- 
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option by the left hemisphere of this task distracts it from focusing 
on other levels. including the propositional, so that, while language 
processing remains intact. those other levels are disrupted. 
5: 3.2.1 DISCUSSION 
Just as, in normal individuals, left hemisphere low-level lingui- 
stic processing. initiated by language focus, would make it more diffi- 
cult to understand the relation of propositions to each other, and 
therefore to follow and evaluate an argument. so the general adoption 
by the left hemisphere of language processing after right hemisphere 
damage would lead to the same failure in propositional juxtaposition. 
Right hemisphere damage, then, would be characterised by apparently 
normal comprehension and production but a failure to appreciate the re- 
lationship which an utterance had to its context. It could be specula- 
ted, then, that a right hemisphere damaged patient might hear, under- 
stand and be able to repeat and paraphrase a sentence like "its time 
for us to go to the shops no1', but would still not get up and put his 
coat on. Such problems, rather than being associated with language de- 
ficits per se might be considered a sign of absent-mindedness, loss of 
alertness, confusion etc. Gainotti et al 
(1983) make reference to an 
association of "subtle language disturbances", by which they mean pho- 
nological errors in repetition. perseverations in speech and writing, 
some semantic-lexical errors, etc. (p. 150f), and "widespread mental de- 
terioration" in right hemisphere damaged patients (p. 151). 
Support for the prediction is found in Gardner et al (1983), and, 
to a limited extent, in Van Lancker (1987)23. Gardner et al (1983) ex- 
23. See the Appendix. A5: 3 for examples from Van Lancker (1987). 
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amined the abilities of right and left hemisphere damaged patients, 
normals and ageing normals in a series of linguistic tests requiring 
the ability to understand and recount narratives, to recognise context- 
ual incongruities and. for a range of humourous items and foils, to as- 
sess 'funniness'. The results of their study confirmed their hypothe- 
sis, that right hemisphere damaged patients: 
lack a full understanding of the context of an utterance, the pre- 
suppositions entailed, the affective tone, or the point of a con- 
versational exchange... [and] appear to have difficulties in pro- 
cessing abstract sentences, in reasoning logically. and in main- 
taining a coherent stream of thought. (p. 172) 
Their appreciation of stories and jokes appeared to be disrupted be- 
cause "the basic scaffolding... has not been apprehended" so that the 
patients were "unable to judge which details matter and what overarch- 
ing points they yield" (p. 187). In humorous items they could recognise 
types (e. g. puns are funnier than foils (p. 184)) but could not rate how 
funny different items were. 
An obvious explanation for all these observations, and the one 
which Gardner et al (1983) implicitly adhere to. is that the left hemi- 
sphere processes language as it always has done and the deficits indi- 
cate what the right hemisphere would have been doing if it hadn't been 
damaged. They appear to relate their observations to the known charac- 
teristics of right hemisphere processing in two particular ways. 
Firstly, by observing that: 
such patients exhibit clear and recurring difficulties relating to 
the abilities to conceptualize the unit as a whole. (p. 187) 
In this way they seem to make a connection between the appreciation of 
propositions in context and a holistic approach to semantic input. Se- 
condly. they observe side by side the deficits already mentioned and 
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the loss of intonational features (p. 172,178) and of emotional congrui- 
ty '(p. 178f, 185). which right hemisphere damaged patients display in 
dealing with the input presented to them. 
These two assumptions can be challenged. With regard to the first. 
it open to question whether the appreciation of propositions in rela- 
tion to each other and to the real world is a holistic or an analytic 
process. The argument presented in relation to the Focusing Hypothesis 
has been that it is the latter, because it involves the juxtaposition 
of one idea with others. As for the second, there does not appear to 
be any reason to directly associate the two phenomena of a deficit in 
the plausibility metric (Gardner et al 1983: 186) and a loss of the abi- 
lity to produce and interpret intonational contours and emotive force 
in utterances. While. as already discussed. the former would be consi- 
dered. in terms of the Focusing Hypothesis, a result of overloading on 
the left hemisphere, detrimentally affecting an intrinsically left he- 
misphere process, the Focusing Hypothesis would attribute the latter 
directly to the damage to the right hemisphere, that is, as a loss as- 
sociated with the total abandonment of the right hemisphere language 
processing mechanisms. 
If, 
_as 
suggested here, the intonational and emotive parameters of 
an utterance are directly linked to right hemisphere language process- 
ing, three things could be expected to occur. Firstly, focus on langu- 
age by normals would detract from the ability to correctly interpret 
or, in production, incorporate, these cues. This might explain why a 
beginner in reading, when reading aloud, i. e. via non-automated left 
hemisphere mechanisms. is unable to intone naturally. Hand in hand 
with this would be the failure on the part of that beginner to fully 
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: take in and evaluate the propositions' contained in the text, because 
:, language focus distracted him from this., Secondly, in left hemisphere 
damage, unexpected utterances, associated here with a freeing of the 
right hemisphere mechanisms for production (see above). would be asso- 
ciated with the expression of extreme emotions. Thirdly, in right he- 
misphere damage there would not be any mis-functioning, only a failure 
to function, of the intonational and emotional parameters, so that ut- 
terances would be devoid of intonational patterns and colour, not as- 
signed inappropriate patterns of it. as might be expected if the right 
hemisphere areas were permitted to still partially operate. All three 
predictions appear to be generally supported. 
The failure of right hemisphere damaged patients to appreciate hu- 
mour even though they knew it was there (Gardner et al 1983: 184) can be 
explained, by recalling that the activity of the left hemisphere in lan- 
guage decoding would detract not only from propositional evaluation 
(disrupting the comprehension of situational humour and stories) but 
also other levels of potential focus (disrupting the juxtaposition of 
words in their environment to appreciate puns etc. ). 
A Japanese right hemisphere damaged patient, who had been accustom- 
ed to process kanji characters in the right hemisphere only, there be- 
ing no value in focusing onto form (see section 5: 3.1.1 above), would 
be predicted to lose his ability to read kanji24, but only temporarily. 
This is because the left hemisphere is the learner. the innovator. and 
it would be equipped to work out once again the information which the 
------------ 
24. Once again, it is to be noted that this discussion of a reading de- 
ficit is, strictly speaking, beyond the scope of this work, and the 
remarks made here have only very limited value outside of a full dis- 
cussion of the acquired dyslexias. 
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right hemisphere had been operating with, and to use that to recognise 
forms. It would do this in the same way as it was able to focus on the 
word or phrase level in preference to the alphabetic level in other 
languages. 
5: 3.3 OTHER CLINICAL ISSUES 
5: 3.3.1 PREDICTION: THE TOKEN TEST 
IN THE TOKEN TEST, THE CLAUSAL STRUCTURE OF THE TEST ITEMS DETERMINES 
THE PATTERNS OF SUCCESS FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF SUBJECT 
The right hemisphere, working alone. could deal with single clau- 
ses. Commands containing more than one clause could be dealt with only 
by a separate decoding and execution of each part. so that success 
would be more likely where the temporal sequence in the command matched 
that of the required actions (e. g. After picking up the green rectangle 
touch the white circle) than where it did not (e. g. Before touching the 
yellow circle, pick up the red rectangle). It would be unable to deal 
with interacting clauses like if... then or Instead of x do 
5. As co- 
ordinations of the kind used in parts III & IV (e. g. Touch the (small) 
red circle and the (large) blue rectangle; see chapter 4: 1.1.3) have 
only one verb they are counted by the Focusing Hypothesis as single 
clauses (see chapter 2: 3.1.1). However, if they exceeded the general 
or acquired limitations of the short term memory, then they might be 
treated as separate clauses. In this case, success in the second 
clause would depend on the individual's ability to restitute the gapped 
verb. This would be aided by the exclusivity of the one verb 'touch' 
in parts I-IV (see. below) and the reinforcement achieved through physi- 
25. For a list of the commands in part V see A5: 4 in the Appendix. 
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cal response on previous trials. 
26 
The left hemisphere could decode and juxtapose the content of clau- 
ses provided it was not prevented from doing so by damage. Language- 
focus, brought on by stress, might lead to some difficulty with prepo- 
sitions and temporal adverbs, if they were decoded in isolation, as 
such words have a meaning which is directly dependent upon the context 
in which they appear. The limitations on short term memory would de- 
pend on the size of the item stored (cf. the Papcun et al 1974 experi- 
ment, described in chapter 4: 1.2.5.1.2). 
Because of the likelihood of variation in the involvement of the 
right and left hemispheres during language in different kinds of pati- 
ent. it may be seen that slightly different predictions are made for 
each. 
Assuming an increased left hemisphere activity under stress (sec- 
tion 5: 3.1 above), aphasics and commissurotomised patients would be 
most affected by stress with the former employing the damaged mechan- 
isms and the latter, in right hemisphere presentation, perhaps unable 
to respond at all unless via external cueing (assuming that no strategy 
had been learnt for preventing this 'migration' of functions). It is 
predicted that stress would have no effect on performance during a left 
hemisphere presentation to commissurotomised or hemispherectomised pa- 
tients. In children, the lack of an adult-type strategy option range. 
and particularly, a reduced ability to approach tasks analytically, 
might mean that stress had to be greater to have an effect, but that 
that effect would be strong, as the left hemisphere easily became over- 
burdened. As no groups at all would be using what might be termed an 
26. For a description of parts I-IV see chapter 4: 1.1.3. 
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4öptimal processing route, all would be subject to restrictions in the 
short term memory. Of most interest is the observation that some items 
in part V would be easier than those in parts III and IV, but others 
would be very much more difficult. Thus, the average performance on 
part V might be unexpectedly high. 
5: 1.3.1.1 DISCUSSION 
Neither of the studies to be discussed here (Whitaker & Noll 1972 & 
Zaidel 1977) takes any account of a possible change in performance as a 
function of stress. This inevitably means that there is no way of tel- 
ling whether or not the observations made relate to a strategy in which 
the right hemisphere is as active as it could be. All the same, some 
points of interest can be highlighted from the accounts. 
Zaidel (1977) reports that an analysis of error patterns revealed 
"a consistent difference between the structure of the linguistic com- 
petence of 4 year old children and that of the disconnected right hemi- 
sphere27" (p. 8). He takes this as an indication that increased right 
hemisphere language processing is not a feature of child language. The 
Focusing Hypothesis, on the other hand, sees it as a sign of a wider, 
though imperfectly formed, strategy option range in children, who use 
left hemisphere processing with some, though limited. success. 
Zaidel (1977) also found that the right hemisphere of hemispherec- 
tomised and commissurotomised patients was generally less able to cope 
with the test than the combined right hemisphere and damaged left hemi- 
sphere of aphasics. The difference was most marked in parts II and IV, 
where the instructions were longest and the choice of tokens on the ta- 
27, i. e. in comnissurotomised patients. 
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ble was largest. It was less marked in part V (p. 8). This pattern is 
predicted by the Focusing Hypothesis if it is considered to be the case 
that the right hemisphere, encountering sequences of more than a cer- 
tain length, has to break them down into parts and process each part 
separately in sequence. Some items in part V would be easier than ot- 
hers for the right hemisphere (see below), increasing the mean score. 
This is further borne out by Zaidel's observation that the right hemi- 
sphere users scored higher on part V than they did in parts II and IV 
(p. 8). The heterogeneity of the stimuli in part V is noted by Zaidel: 
the right hemisphere and many aphasics may be selectively hampered 
by different linguistic structures in part V. (p. 9) 
One source of difference between the hemispherectomised and commis- 
surotomised patients using only their right hemisphere and those with a 
damaged left hemisphere appeared to be in the difficulty of processing 
grammatical particles. The former group had little problem with verbs 
relative to other parts of speech. some problem with particles, but 
most with colour and shape adjectives. The left hemisphere damaged pa- 
tients made more particle errors than anything else (Zaidel 1977: 10). 
This corresponds to the predictions of the Focusing Hypothesis, whereby 
the right hemisphere would cope with particles because they were stipu- 
lated within a formula, as long as their semantic scope was confined to 
one clause. It would be able to assign formulae by referring to the 
verbs. But colour and shape would be problematic because there was 
choice and no redundancy of information, so that the separate defining 
features of the tokens described in the command would have to be extra- 
cated and assessed relative to the array of tokens on the table. Con- 
versely, the damaged left hemisphere would be able to manage such jux- 
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taposition (assuming that there was no damage specifically to the mech- 
anisms for that function), but in the sequential analysis of the lin- 
guistic structure itself. the particles, strongly bound to their con- 
text, would be found to have limited semantic autonomy. and focusing 
upon them would make them even harder to assign meaning to. 
Particularly interesting is Zaidel's (1977) remark that: 
The right hemisphere [in commissurotomised and hemispherectomised 
patients] is superior to the average aphasic on the syntactic di- 
mensions of the test but inferior with respect to memory. (p. 12) 
It, does not seem unreasonable to rephrase this in the terminology of 
the Focusing Hypothesis. and thus to say that the right hemisphere is 
fine on the decoding of linguistic packaging (formulae) but cannot deal 
with the longer, more complex sequences. 
Whitaker & Noll (1972) pay more direct attention to the linguistic 
4 . structures 
involved in part V. They note both that at that point "for 
' the first time in the Token Test the subject is required to process two 
verbs" (p. 402) and that, on the other hand, "not all [items in part V 
are] more difficult or complex than those of the other parts" (p. 398). 
They list the eight most problematic commands for the children in their 
study: 
3) 43. Touch the blue circle with the red square. (168 errors) 
44. Touch, with the blue circle. the red square. (122) 
45. Touch the blue circle and the red square. (101) 
51. Touch the white circle without using your right hand. (77) 
54. Touch the squares slowly and the circles quickly. (77) 
59. Together with the yellow circle. take the blue circle. (81) 
60. After picking up the green square, touch the white circle. (99) 
62. Before touching the yellow circle, pick up the red square. (121) 
(p"398) 
All of these sentences except (45). discussed below, are complex in 
some way. (44), (51), (59), (60) & (62) are multiclausal; (43) & (62) are 
not sequenced according to the actions required; (54) arguably requires 
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treatment as two clauses because of the restricted scope of each of the 
adverbs. Regarding (45). it is actually no different to a part III 
stimulus and so it is surprising that is should cause particular diffi- 
culty. Whitaker & Noll (1972) address this with the observation that 
their subjects, who were normal children aged 5; 5 to 11; 11. performed 
well on parts I-IV, having no difficulty with the command 'touch' but 
that in part V. it "suddenly [became] difficult to process" (p. 399). 
In part V. 'touch' is one of a selection of verbs appearing in the com- 
mands. For the first time, perhaps, the verb had to be decoded on each 
trial, rather than being taken for granted. They note that 'touch' did 
not appear to have a clear semantic identity for some of the children, 
and this may have made it difficult to understand relative to the other 
verbs ('pick up' and 'take'). They hypothesise that the complexity of 
'touch' might be to do with the implicit. rather than explicit. instru- 
mental and locative entailments that it has (p. 
400). 
The examples given in (3) above are representative of the list ad- 
ministered by Zaidel (1977) even though Whitaker & Noll used the Boller 
& Vignolo (1966) version and Zaidel used De Renzi & Vignolo's (1962) 
and Spreen & Benton's (1969). versions. What is clear from Zaidel's 
full list of part V items (see Appendix, A5: 4) is that not all of the 
unsequenced multiple clauses in the test caused as many errors as the 
ones listed above. But as the subjects used in the two studies were 
different. it makes little sense to compare them beyond this point. 
The quotes from Zaidel (1977) given in chapter 4: 1.1.3 correspond 
well with the predictions of the Focusing Hypothesis, particularly re- 
lating to the apparent inability of the right hemisphere to form 
"stable internal representations... in reponse to sequential bits of se- 
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mantically. unrelated. information" (p. 11). 
5: 3.3.2 THE OBSERVED ABILITIES OF THE RIGHT HEMISPHERE 
The discussion above has dealt implicitly with many of the observa- 
tions which have been made regarding some limited linguistic ability in 
the right hemisphere. Nebes (1978) throws his own light onto the abi- 
lities of commissurotomised patients. Referring to a case reported by 
Gordon (1973). where the patient performed with his left hand an action 
the command for which had been presented to his right ear in a dichotic 
presentation, he says: 
This successful execution of a command took place while the left 
hemisphere was occupied by its own instruction and thus unable to 
obstruct minor hemisphere output. (p. lllf). 
This, then, is support for the Focusing Hypothesis, which sees right 
hemisphere participation as the normaL. consequence of focus elsewhere 
by the left hemisphere. 
One observation which has been made about the right hemisphere in 
regard to language is that language handicap following right hemisphere 
damage is reported to be more common in children under five (10-35%) 
than in adults (less than 1%) (Moscovitch 1977: 22; but see the contra- 
dictory observations of Satz & Bullard-Bates 1981, quoted in Code 1987: 
15f). This could be seen to reflect two aspects of the processing mo- 
del defined by the Focusing Hypothesis. Firstly, that language acqui- 
sition occurs by processing the known structures holistically so that 
the analytic mechanisms are free to deal with the unknown by means of a 
simultaneous employment of unconscious analysis and propositional fo- 
cus. Thus, the right hemisphere is particularly crucial during acqui- 
sition. Once the mechanisms of unconscious analysis are less active, 
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there is more scope. for language-focused decoding to occur without an 
overload of the analytic system. Secondly, the child has not yet 
learnt to be analytic and to operate strategies which select the left 
hemisphere and use it to advantage. 
Moscovitch (1983) is quite explicit in expressing his belief that 
the right hemisphere has substantial, but masked, linguistic ability: 
Whatever the reason, the right hemisphere's inherent abilities are 
not reflected in normal performance, and the functions therefore 
appear to be localised to the left. (p. 64) 
The role of the right hemisphere in reading is explored by Colt- 
heart (1980). Given the various indications that normal reading invol- 
ves the recognition of words as wholes (in parallel to kanji processing 
in Japanese. see section 5: 3.1.1 above). which the right hemisphere is 
better at (Code 1987: 54). and that the left hemisphere's parallel pho- 
nological processing route is slower, the implication is that the right 
hemisphere is largely responsible for routine reading processes. 
Finally, Code (1987) explores the possible role of the right hemi- 
sphere in real-word recurrent utterances (RWRUs) (p. 66f). These are 
short phrases repeated involuntarily by some aphasics. The association 
of these lexicalised strings, produced holistically, with the intact 
right hemisphere is pertinent to the discussion in chapter 2: 2.2 regar- 
ding automatic language and also to the exploration. in section 5: 6 be- 
low. of Pawley & Syder's (1983) output model. 
5.3.4 sUMMARY AND COMMENTS 
There is no shortage of plausible accounts for the effects of left 
and right hemispehre damage upon language and other functions. The Fo- 
cusing Hypothesis is not the simplest. but it has the advantage of in- 
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yoking for-pre- and post-damage linguistic ability the same general me- 
charism. viz. the sharing of functions by the two hemispheres in the 
way most advantageous for, or otherwise preferred by, the individual in 
his specific pre-aphasic situation. 
Two accounts of the symptoms of right hemisphere damage have been 
presented. One is that that the left hemisphere processes language, 
the right hemisphere propositions. The other. provided by the Focusing 
Hypothesis, is that the right hemisphere normally processes language, 
the left hemisphere propositions. and that right hemisphere damage 
leads to a transfer of the former functions to the left hemisphere. at 
the expense of the efficiency with which the latter can operate. Un- 
doubtedly, the first account has the edge in terms of the Occam's Razor 
Principle. On the other hand. that is only the case insofar as no ot- 
her evidence. external to the examination of the symptoms, of right he- 
misphere damage alone, contributes to the complexity of'the picture. 
Previous sections in this chapter and also chapter 4 have indicated 
that they do indeed present data of such a kind that the accounts nor- 
mally provided may fall short in some crucial ways. 
5.4 PREDICTION: NEUROPHYSIOLOCICAL EVIDENCE 
IF THERE WERE SOME WAY OF MEASURING HEMISPHERIC ACTIVITY DURING LAN- 
GUAGE PROCESSING WITHOUT DRAWING THE SUBJECT OR PATIENT'S ATTENTION 
(FOCUS) ONTO THAT LANGUAGE, THEN A GREATER MEASURE OF RIGHT HEMISPHERE 
INVOLVEMENT MIGHT BE DETECTED THAN IS FOUND IN THE PSYCHOL INGUISTIC 
LABORATORY OR IS IMPLIED FROM CLINICAL STUDIES. 
Apart from experiments using the tympanic thermometer, a new means 
of measuring hemispheric bloodflow. but not yet widely used in experi- 
mental linguistics (see chapter 6: 4), the method of examination which 
most closely (but not perfectly) answers this description is the in vi- 
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vo dynamic testing of metabolic exchange or electrical emission, de- 
scribed below. The Focusing Hypothesis predicts that in propositional 
focus the two hemispheres would be found to both be active: the right 
hemisphere would be dealing with the language, the left hemisphere with 
the evaluation of the propositions. It is important to note that a 
greater measure of activity in the right than the left hemisphere is 
not predicted. as the right hemisphere only becomes active (in language 
processing at least) where the left hemisphere is operational as well. 
5: 4.1 INTRODUCTION 
A considerable challenge to the theory of left lateralisation comes 
from medical investigations of brain cell activity in live subjects. 
Much of this research has revealed virtually equal activity in both he- 
mispheres during linguistic processing: v 
[none of our research has] yet found any striking difference in 
cortical activation between right and left hemisphere during com- 
plex behavioural processes which involve speech. Our conclusion 
so far is that in normal brain both hemispheres are highly active. 
(Larsen, Skinhsj & Lassen 1979: 37) 
the most parsimonious interpretation is that both hemispheres are 
involved in some manner in the processing of linguistic informa- 
tion. This is not to say that the processing need be altogether 
similar in the two hemispheres. (Roemer & Teyler 1977: 58) 
These two quotations are from reports referring to two distinct 
methods of measuring cellular activity in the brain during language, 
and neither have found significant differences between the hemispheres 
in this respect. Some of the most common techniques of brain activity 
measurement are briefly described below. along with the results obtain- 
ed from them. Details of some other methods not mentioned here (e. g. 
positron emission tomography) can be found in McAlister (1979). Larsen. 
Skinhoj & Lassen (1978: 193f) and Code (1987: 20). All the experimental 
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procedures described below refer to dynamic studies, not to steady 
state ones. That is, they measure changes in patterns of cell activity 
as the subject performs different tasks, rather than mapping physiolo- 
gical structures (as, for instance. in Fazio. Fieschi, Nardini, Collide 
& Possa 1979). In all these tests subjects tend to be patients who 
have had strokes. tumours or epilepsy (Lassen. Ingvar & Skinhoj 1978: 
53). Controls are neurological outpatients with minor, unrelated dam- 
age. For example, Lassen et al (1978) believe that 
80 or so of their 
500 subjects were representative of the normal population. They were 
individuals who were being examined on account of bad headaches or epi- 
leptic fits which were found not to relate to any (detectable) brain 
damage (p"53; see also Larsen et al 1978: 194f). 
The first two methods described here use computerised imaging to 
provide detailed profile coloured grid representations of the brain 
from the monitored information. The equipment is briefly described by 
Larsen et al (1978: 195). Different concentrations of the detected emi- 
ssions are represented by different colours. The information is gath- 
ered by means of sensors attached to the scalp. In Lassen and Larsen's 
laboratories 254 detectors are used. each covering approximately one 
square centimetre. 
5: 4.2 RADIOACTIVE TRACING 
Dynamic studies require the ability to trace some element intimate- 
ly linked with cellular activity, such that alterations in its distri- 
bution as determined by the rate of metabolic exchange under different 
conditions can be monitored. In the two techniques described here, 
sensors measure relative levels of gamma ray emission after the intra- 
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venous introduction of a radioactive substance. As bloodflow levels 
are a response to the cells' need for oxygen, tracing the amount of 
a 
blood directed to each area of the brain provides a clear picture of 
the cellular activity. 
Images depict only the surface of the brain (but see Fazio et al 
1979 for attempts at tomography). They are constructed by computer 
from a baseline comparison with the brain 'at rest'; this is necessary 
because even at rest there is an unequal distribution of cellular acti- 
vity across the brain (Lassen et al 1978: 53). 
5: 4.2.1 XENON-133 
Xenon-133 is a radioactive isotope which is dissolved in a sterile 
salt solution and injected into the internal carotid artery or the fe- 
moral artery. Alterations in the regional cerebral bloodflow, (rCBF) 
can then be monitored. 
Larsen et al (1978) measured rCBF changes from rest in 18 right- 
handed subjects reciting the days of the week or counting to twenty. 
The most striking finding was that there was no increase in the mean 
hemispheric bloodflow to the left hemisphere (though there was also not 
the 3% decrease associated with a second reading28). But there was a 
10% increase in mean bloodflow to the right hemisphere, despite second 
readings being associated with a 10% decrease. Larsen et al (1978) 
suggest-various reasons for this finding. For instance, the left hemi- 
sphere areas involved in that type of speech function might be activat- 
ed for only a fraction of the 45 seconds across which the measurements 
are pooled, such that no effect would be observable (p. 203). Alterna- 
28. The first reading was the 'at rest' one. 
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tively, they might already be active during rest, in which no change 
would be seen. Whatever the explanation, they are clear that: 
the performance of the rather simple task of spoken speech invol- 
ves activation of both hemispheres (p. 206) 
Lassen et al (1978) report the following results: 
a) Listening to simple words increased the bloodflow to both hemi- 
spheres' auditory and auditory association centres and, in the left he- 
misphere, to Wernicke's area. If the patient's eyes were closed. there 
was some activation of the frontal eye region too. 
b) Listening to complex verbal sequences also revealed asymmetrical ac- 
tivity, this time in Broca's area. 
c) When the patient spoke, activity increased symmetrically. to the au- 
ditory centres, articulatory motor areas. to Broca's area and its right 
hemisphere equivalent. Of this finding Lassen et al say: 
Studies of the effects of brain damage on speech have revealed 
that destruction of Broca's area in the left hemisphere results in 
motor aphasia. that is. the loss of the ability to speak more than 
simple words but not the loss of the ability to understand spoken 
or written language. Destruction of the corresponding area in the 
right hemisphere, however. has no discernible effect on speech. 
We were therefore surprised to observe that this part of the right 
hemisphere was active during vocalization, suggesting that it 
makes some contribution (albeit a nonessential one) to the final 
synthesis and mobilization of speech. (p. 57-8) 
Larsen et al (1978) failed to find any increased activity in Broca's 
area during their automatic speech task. 
Lassen et al (1978) go on to suggest that the right hemisphere may 
play some röle in the construction and articulation of speech. They 
also report an increase in bloodflow to the whole hemisphere (as oppos- 
ed to localised regions) when a complex task was undertaken (p. 58). 
Bloodflow increase has also been associated with anxiety. which "pro- 
yokes a dramatic increase in one's awareness of self and the environ- 
ment" (p. 59). Task demands and stress levels have been named in the 
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course of the discussion of the Focusing Hypothesis as possible influ- 
ences on strategy selection. Just what. if any. relationship these two 
observations may have is not a question that can be tackled here. 
Larsen et al's (1979) results include the following findings. 
Reading aloud and visual naming tasks both led to a mean increase in 
bloodflow of 5% to both hemispheres (p. 6). There was a greater mean 
increase to Broca's area (8%) than to the right hemisphere equivalent 
area (3%). They conclude by noting similar results in other studies, 
viz., that counting aloud and listening to language activate both hemi- 
spheres, so that: 
our results thus confirm that many cortical areas of both hemi- 
spheres are co-operating in performing a complex task. (p. 7) 
U 
Gur, Packer. Reivich et al (1979) found that during a verbal task 
on 36 male right-handed subjects the bloodflow to the left hemisphere 
grey matter increased significantly (p<. 01). Not all of the subjects 
showed any similar increase during a spatial task. but those who did 
also performed better on it. These results support the proposal that 
there is individual difference in the tendency to employ the hemisphere 
which is best suited to a task. This is pertinent to considerations of 
strategy choice in processing (see chapter 1: 9). 
5.4 2.2 18-E-FLUORODEOXYGLUCOSE 
Reivich et al (1979) have used 18-F-2-fluoro-2-deoxyglucose (FDG) 
to monitor the metabolic rate of the brain during different functions. 
The emission sensors detect the concentrations of glucose exchange be- 
tween the blood plasma and the brain cells, and computerised images can 
be constructed (p. 198). Using 17 normal male subjects, they admini- 
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stered visual. tactile and auditory stimuli. The last. using six sub- 
jects only, involved linguistic input: 
The subject listened to connected discourse consisting of a factu- 
al story read by a male talker.... In three subjects the stimulus 
was delivered to the right ear and in the other three to the lef t 
ear. Attentiveness to the story was assessed by testing the sub- 
ject's recall at the end of the study. In all six subjects the 
local cerebral metabolic rate for glucose increased 20-25% in the 
right temporal lobe. The stimulus caused an increase in the meta- 
ý, bolic rate not only of the primary auditory region but of the en- 
tire temporal lobe. (p. 199) 
This finding is highly unexpected in the context of the theory of left 
lateralisation for language. 
543 ELECTRICAL IMPULSE MONITORING 
By attaching electrodes to the scalp it is possible to create elec- 
troencephalograms (EEGs) which trace the natural electrical impulses of 
4 the neurons. 
The emissions are in wave form and four are identifiable, 
according to the wave frequency: alpha 98-13 cycles per second). beta 
(14-15 cps). theta (4-7 cps) and delta (<3.5 cps). The brain states 
associated with each wave type are described by Guyton (1981: 183f). 
4 3.1 ALPHA WAVE MEASUREMENT 
Alpha waves proliferate when an individual is conscious but in a 
state of rest. They are present neither during sleep nor during atten- 
tion-focusing activity. In the latter case they are replaced by beta 
waves. which are higher in frequency but lower in voltage. 
Alpha waves therefore decrease proportionately to an increase in 
mental activity. The emission of alpha waves from a specific area of 
the brain during a given task is an indication of that area's non-part- 
icipation. Alpha wave measurements are valuable because they have: 
the distinctive quality of occurring in well-defined bursts and 
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[standing] out from other activity in high amplitude, rhythmical 
waves. (Marsh 1978: 293) 
Cole & Cummings (1977) measured alpha wave emission in 3-6 year old 
children during the presentation of a sequence of two stories (auditory 
input) and. before the second story, a silent film (visual input). The 
children were encouraged to talk and ask questions during the stories 
but were told to remain silent during the film. 
The results showed a trend towards low alpha wave levels in the 
left hemisphere and high levels in the right hemisphere during the lin- 
guistic task and the reverse during the visual task. Thus the results 
were: 
consistent with the notion that the left hemisphere temporal lobe 
is more involved in ongoing verbal activity than in on-going visu- 
al activity in young children. (p. 43) - 
However, they continue with this comment: 
19 
it is interesting to note that the pattern of results observed in 
the left hemisphere was reflected to a lesser extent in the right 
hemisphere during different tasks. In general there was an in- 
crease in alpha activity from story one to the cartoon ... as found 
in the left hemisphere, but there was no corresponding decrease in 
alpha rhythm during story two. (p. 43f) 
This finding is interesting on three counts. Firstly it does not 
comply with general predictions that during a visual task the right he- 
misphere will be more active than (a) the left hemisphere during the 
same task and (b) the right hemisphere during a linguistic task (e. g. 
Morgan. McDonald & MacDonald 1971. cited in Cole & Cummings 1977: 37). 
Secondly, it may indicate unpredicted right hemisphere participation in 
the functions associated with the processing of story one. Thirdly. it 
indicates some kind of variation in right hemisphere participation from 
story one to story two, which suggests that the brain has more than one 
way of dealing with a linguistic task: one which shows up as left hemi- 
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sphere with right hemisphere. and one which indicates left hemisphere 
only. As the right hemisphere was less involved in the second story. 
one potential explanation is that the children adopted a new strategy 
(using only the left hemisphere) on the basis of their experience in 
the earlier parts of the test. If this were to be the case, then it 
could explain why similar tasks done by adults produce the pattern 
found in the children's second story (cf. Cole & Cummings 1977: 41). In 
other words, adults already know which strategy to adopt for such 
tasks, or else learn more quickly (i. e. near the very beginning of the 
test). 
Scott et al (1979) briefly describe the findings of a study by Ro- 
gers et al (1976) in which EEG ratios were compared for Hopi Indians 
and Anglo-Americans. The finding was of: 
e 
a significant right cerebral hemisphere specialization for langu- 
age processing in Hopi Indian children. (p. 89) 
Psycholinguistic experiments too have found differences between Amerin- 
than and white American children (see chapter 4: 1.2.4.1). 
5.4 32 AUDITORY EVOKED POTENTIALS 
AEP tests also monitor the differences in electrical activity under 
different conditions. Marsh (1978) defines Evoked Potentials as: 
generally of smaller magnitude than the on-going EEG activity. ... 
extracted from the scalp-recorded EEG by summing together several 
short portions (e. g. 500msec. ) of the EEG record following several 
stimulus presentations.... When... the portions of the EEG time- 
locked to the repeated presentation of a stimulus are summed, the 
electrophysiological responses elicited by the stimulus are accu- 
mulated, and the electrical events not tied to the stimulus tend 
to cancel towards zero. (p. 300f) 
In this way a reading is obtained which contrasts the electrical acti- 
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vity elicited by the stimuli (Evoked Potential) with the general back- 
ground electrical activity. 
Roemer & Teyler (197.7) presented normal adults with linguistic sti- 
milli which were ambiguous across lexical categories. e. g. rock (- a 
rock or to rock), fire. blow etc. While the EP patterns were different 
according to a noun or verb interpretation, the two hemispheres were 
equally involved at all times. Thus: 
the observation of similar waveforms in both hemisphere suggests 
caution in the interpretation of the asymmetric role of the hemi- 
spheres in dealing with linguistic information. (p. 58) 
Molfese (1977), on the other hand, found marked AEP asymmetries in 
infants of less than 12 months old. He notes that the degree of asym- 
metry was. indeed, actually greater in the infants than in adults for 
linguistic stimuli. while non-linguistic stimuli elicited a response of 
equal or greater magnitude in the right hemisphere (p. 195). Given the 
young age of these subjects. the stimuli cannot have been being reacted 
to on any complex semantic level, but rather. presumably. more general- 
ly, as human phonetic speech patterns (p. 198). 
Further tests revealed that babies responded with left hemisphere 
activity to both vowels and consonants. This contrasts with other, a- 
dult. studies (e. g. Studdert-Kennedy & Shankweiler 1969). which found a 
contrast between strong left lateralisation for consonant-distinguished 
minimal pairs, but weak or no left lateralisation for vowel-distingui- 
shed ones. 
5: 4.4- SUMMARY 
The following Table (5: iii) affords a general representation of the 
findings of the physiological studies: 
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Ai111TTf1RY CARRCI4 
left & right hemi- Roemer & Teyler'77 Larsen et al'78 
spheres equally Larsen et al'79 
active: Lassen et al'78 
Endo et al '79 
both hemispheres Cole & Cummings'77 
active. but left 
more so: 
right hemisphere Reivich et al '79 
more active: Rogers et al '76 
(Amerindians) 
left hemisphere Lassen et al '78 
active. right (simple words & 
inactive: complex sequences) 
Molfese '77 (babies) 
TABLE 5: iii 
It is clear from the above that there is considerable variation a- 
cross studies. Some of them have found levels of right hemisphere ac- 
tivity entirely unpredicted by the theories of left hemisphere domi- 
nance for language. , 
Of course, the detection of neural activity per se 
does not tell us anything about the brain mechanisms directly responsi- 
ble for language. But, on the other hand, no other method of-measure- 
ment does either, and indeed this one permits considerably more direct 
association between structures and functions than most others. 
5.4.5 DISCUSSION 
The techniques described above have certain limitations. With re- 
gard to the monitoring of electrical activity. Larsen et al (1978) com- 
ment that: 
they afford only a rough localization and one furthermore influen- 
ced by artifacts, especially when recorded from the scalp.... 
(p. 193) 
Larsen et al (1978) and Lassen et al (1978) are equally cognisant of 
the problems with their own technique, however. Firstly, tests are on- 
ly of very short duration, due to the speed with which the tracer is 
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dissipated (Lassen et al 1978: 59). Secondly, only one hemisphere is 
examined in any one patient. This means that the left-right contrasts 
could be due to individual differences in the hemispheric localisation 
of functions (Lassen et al 1978: 204). Thirdly, some areas of interest 
to the general picture of hemispheric activity are not supplied by the 
carotid artery (e. g. the primary visual cortex and the hippocampus, 
which are supplied by the vertebral artery (Lassen et al 1978: 55)). 
These cannot be monitored, as their blood supply does not contain the 
isotope. Fourthly: 
these results mainly reflect events in the superficial layers of 
the cortex and leave out deeper structures. (Lassen et al 1978: 59) 
Equipment is, however. now in existence for taking three-dimensional 
readings (p. 59). 
The level of support which these results offer the Focusing Hypo- 
thesis is not entirely clear, even though there is such strong evidence 
of right hemisphere participation in what have been generally consider- 
ed left hemisphere functions. The reasons for holding reservations are 
as follows. Firstly, some of the measurements are of output; the Fo- 
cusing Hypothesis as expounded here has dealt almost exclusively with 
input. This is probably not a point of any great consequence, however, 
as there is no clear indication that it is only input (as in Larsen et 
al, 1978) that shows signs of right hemisphere participation; the other 
studies described bear this out. Secondly, the nature of the input or 
output is not particularly representative of normal proposition-focused 
language. Larsen et al (1978) explicity restrict the generality of 
their remarks to precisely the kind of automatic language which they 
elicited from their subjects; this was a linguistic activity "not re- 
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quiring any mental effort, verbal commands or emotional involvement" 
(p. 195). It could well be asked just how representative observations 
of such language processing could be expected to be of the operations 
involved in normal language. which certainly does entail mental effort. 
reaction to verbal input and emotional involvement. 
I` Other studies, observing two-way conversation, would be of greater 
value for the evaluation of the Focusing Hypothesis, but though such 
work is mentioned by Larsen et al (1978: 206) they do not reference it. 
On the other hand, as outlined in chapter 2: 2.3.3. automatic language 
need not be set so far apart from the material dealt with in proposi- 
tion-focused processing. The automaticity with which lists and para- 
digms can be produced may simply be a less transient operation than its 
sister procedure of novel language processing, the latter being peculi- 
arly prone to strategy changes initiated by alterations in focus level. 
One issue remains to be addressed: what is different about these 
studies. to set them apart from those which find no evidence of right 
hemisphere involvement in language processing? Lassen et al (1978)'ob- 
serve that: 
the right hemisphere is much more active during speech than the 
tissue-damaged approach has suggested. (p. 50) 
Larsen et al (1978) note that while the patterns of localised CBF 
increase correspond to the ones identified by Penfield & Rasmussen 
(1949) using electrical stimulation to instigate aphasic symptoms in 
specific regions of the cortex. their findings are at odds with Wada 
test results (see chapter 3: 2.2.4). One possible explanation for this 
is that to debilitate one hemisphere leads to compensatory action by 
the other where this is possible. In this way. the left hemisphere 
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might achieve all functions usually shared with the right hemisphere 
during right hemisphere anaesthetisation, while, during left hemisphere 
anaesthetisation, the right hemisphere was unable to reciprocate, if 
only because of a language-focused strategy. The techniques described 
in' this section are unique in not selectively debilitating one hemi- 
sphere or else setting the two hemispheres into some kind of enforced 
competition. This is a major consideration if it is held to be plausi- 
ble that it may be exceedingly easy to upset the balance of some hemi- 
spheric job-sharing which characterises normal processing. In the same 
vein, it is much easier to explain why there are differences in the 
measures of right hemisphere activity evidenced through these and other 
'less direct methods of measurement such as psycholinguistic tests. De- 
spite the measure of unnaturalness which is inevitable where a subject 
is chanting the days of the week at one second intervals, lying flat 
with his eyes covered and ears plugged, surrounded by equipment and 
wired up with 254 sensors on the scalp, nevertheless there is not the 
same pressure to perform well, to concentrate on complex stimuli or to 
get better at speaking and comprehending (as with aphasics), which 
characterise the investigative circumstances of other study methods. 
5: 9 POLYGLOTS 
29 
5: 5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Despite the considerable attention which has been paid in both psy- 
cholinguistic and clinical research to the question of brain function 
in relation to the processing of more than one language (see chapter 
29. The use of 'polyglot' where others would use 'bilingual' rather jars 
-in some places. but it has been retained for the sake of consistency 
(see Notes on Terminology). 
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4),, not very much more can be said about the Focusing Hypothesis in 
this context than has already been expressed elsewhere. Indeed it is 
this very fact that is perhaps the most striking feature of the Focus- 
ing Hypothesis in this area of study. Just as many facets of language 
acquisition and processing in general have been, so to speak, stream- 
lined into one account by, for instance, (1) projecting the operation 
of the same interaction of processing mechanisms into both the formula- 
tion of hypotheses by the child and the tackling of new or problematic 
structures in adulthood (see chapter 1: 9) and (2) accounting for the 
problems associated with aphasia in terms of an extension of processes 
already operational in the pre-aphasic (i. e. normal) condition (section 
5: 3). so here also, the operations of the second language 'acquisi- 
tion', 'learning' and/or processing devices are viewed as precisely the 
same as those which deal with L1, such that the whole field of psycho- 
linguistic and clinical study into L2 is, essentially, demystified 
rather than separately and minutely explained in terms of some special- 
ised and perhaps unprecedented principles. 
The applicability of the Focusing Hypothesis' general account a- 
cross so many different aspects of linguistic investigation is possible 
because of the nature of the processing operations it describes. As 
chapter 4: 3,4: 4 illustrates, there is no shortage of acquisition and 
storage hypotheses in the L2 related literature. However, such speci- 
fic and exclusive language storage arrangements, if they are indeed en- 
vironmentally determined (e. g. by age, stage and manner of acquisi- 
tion), are presumably potentially available to all and thus, in their 
embryonic form, redundant in the monolingual majority. This separation 
of L2-specific mechanisms from general processing ones is shown to be 
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'gratuitous from the perpective of the Focusing Hypothesis. 
The manner and environment in which the second language is acquired 
is ý' considered the central influence upon the strategies preferred for 
operating in it. The contrast of formal and informal acquisition has 
been well explored by others (see chapter 4) but most notably by Kra- 
shen, who envisages a different level of consciousness in informal 'ac- 
quisition' and formal 'learning'. which correspond well with the Focus- 
ing Hypothesis' proposals regarding the role of the analysis of struc- 
tures and focus. 
As Western education is so strongly biased towards analysis, in 
that it encourages a mathematical or scientific approach. characterised 
by the expectation of cause and effect as the salient operators in the 
relationship of items and ideas. it is not surprising that L2 learning 
in the classroom should be presented and received as if it were a code, 
not a language that was being learnt (cf. here also Chomsky 1968). Two 
particular characteristics of L2 'learning' can be particularly consi- 
dered. Firstly. that the L2 is presented as a regular system with se- 
"-parately itemised exceptions (e. g. irregular verbs). This is clearly a 
legitimate way of presenting the information to people who have been 
=taught to formally identify linguistic order. and it does, of course, 
"encapsulate in some way a process which operates automatically in the 
child, viz. the identification of patterns and the forming of hypothe- 
ses which may overgenerate. But this conscious attention to form out 
of its communicational environment is not 'natural', as is witnessed by 
the fact that individuals cannot always easily identify irregularities 
An their language if they have not been taught them. 
Secondly. vocabulary is presented and/or received in equation form. 
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e. g. avion = aeroplane, Blumentopf = flower pot. This ensures that the 
points at which two languages do not overlap will be problematic, whe- 
ther these reflect major cultural differences (e. g. paniir (Hindi) =a 
kind of curd cheese a bit like quark... ) or not (e. g. Wald (German) 
forest and wood (group of trees), Holz = wood (material)). 
It clearly is not impossible to transfer from the strategies asso- 
ciated with analytic processing to ones permitting propositional focus 
and. holistic decoding. This might be characterised by the feeling that 
it- is now possible to 'think' in the language. Just how easily this 
transfer occurred would, however, depend upon the strategy range avail- 
able. If the language has never been used for interaction, then propo- 
sitional focus may not be an option. It would depend too upon the 
flexibility of the individual to choose (or develop) a different stra- 
tegy to the customary one. As the use of a language for fluent commu- 
nication does entail, for the non-native speaker. 'throwing caution to 
the wind' and permitting mistakes in the grammar and pronunciation, the 
personality of the individual would be expected to play an important 
role. This again conforms with Krashen's Monitor model, with the most 
successful polyglots being those who are in control of their Monitor 
use (Krashen & Terrell 1983, Dulay, Burt & Krashen 1982, Krashen 1976, 
1978). 
5.5 2 PSYCHOLINGUISTIC EXPERIMENTS 
Beginning. then, from the standpoint that the systems and processes 
available for LI are the same and the only ones available for L2, the 
assumption will be that polyglot behaviour in the psycholinguistic la- 
boratory will reflect the same limitations and biases as those argued 
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to dominate monolingual studies (see section 5: 2). These will include 
a -high level of inconsistency 
in the findings, caused by the interac- 
tion of mostly uncontrolled variables affecting the range and selection 
, of strategies, and the intrinsic limitations imposed by the nature of 
the tasks, the stimulus presented and the subjects tested (see section 
5: 2). 
-: It is not necessary to invoke some specific rule for storage like 
the compound-coordinate opposition (chapter 4: 3.1.1) in order to ac- 
count for the characteristics of information access in subgroups of po- 
lyglots. Neither is it necessary to highlight features of 'acquisi- 
tion' or 'learning' per se to provide a baseline for behavioural dif- 
: ferences in the laboratory. The contrasts which these accounts are de- 
signed to explain fall neatly out of the Focusing Hypothesis as it 
stands. by simply assuming that when an individual. of any age. tackles 
fa new language. he uses the neurological and psychological resources he 
already both possesses and utilises and, specifically, -that he uses 
, -them 
in the way in which he is accustomed to deal with information of 
the same kind as he is now presented with in his encounter with that 
<. new'language. This is not to deny. for indeed it is fundamental to the 
account. that man is a learning creature. He will develop new strate- 
gies but. crucially, only in response to specific needs. Rather than 
saying, then. that some forms of teaching better equip a language 
learner to translate because they set up some compound as opposed to 
coordinate relationship between the L1 and L2, the question can be ad- 
dressed in a rather more rational and simplistic way; thus it is sug- 
gested that perhaps one L2 speaker can translate better than another 
because he has learnt (or otherwise developed the strategies necessary) 
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to do so. This is not a truism. nor even gratuitous, because the deve- 
lopment of strategies to make up a greater or smaller range of options 
is', central to the account of how people operate their language which 
the Focusing Hypothesis provides. 
Closely on the heels of the proposal that the ability to switch 
from language to language is a direct reflection of how the individual 
has chosen, or been directed, to deal with the relationship between 
them (i. e. that new links are forged as they are required and not ot- 
herwise). comes the idea that all contrasts in L1 and L2 performance in 
psycholinguistic experiments reflect contrasts in the way those two 
languages are regarded and/or employed. Furthermore, individual varia- 
tion in the use of knowledge already acquired could lead to some poly- 
glots transferring strategies learnt in relation to. say, an L2 lingua 
franca used as the medium of literacy. back onto the previously unana- 
lysed L1, while other polyglots did not. 
ýý, Certain specific predictions can be made and tested (to some 
extent) against the reports in the literature: 
a) There may be considerable variation across studies due to a variety 
of strategy determining factors. 
b) Similar patterns of behaviour will obtain where both languages have 
been and are treated in the same way with respect to self-monitoring, 
literacy etc. 
c) Different patterns of behaviour will obtain where the languages are 
used for different purposes (e. g. communication versus formal analysis) 
or where their acquisition has involved the development of different 
strategies in relation to each. 
d) Pertaining to the above. individual differences (but perhaps with 
group tendencies) may exist in the extent to which a strategy is trans- 
ferred from its operation in one language to the other. 
Unfortunately. these individually quite legitimate predictions do, be- 
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tween them, cater for more or less every eventuality. The first predi-' 
ction is borne out by Tables A4: i-ii (Appendix). The references given 
there are, of course, far from exhaustive. but they do illustrate that 
the early-late and formal-informal categorisation of bilinguals' acqui- 
sition is not particularly helpful, at least on its own, as a means of 
predicting relative hemispheric activity in L1 and L2. 
The second prediction, that a similar usage and attitude towards 
the two languages will result in similar behavioural patterns is. of 
course, not dissimilar to the age-stage-manner predictions and observa- 
tions described in chapter 4: 3. It can be plausibly argued that a lan- 
guage learnt or acquired after childhood, perhaps even after early 
childhood, (cf. Sussman et al's 1982 finger tapping experiment, where 
L1 and L2 patterns were the same for subjects who learnt L2 before the 
age of six. but not after six (Obler 1984: 201), see account in chapter 
14: 4.1.1) will be viewed in a different way to the mother tongue. Yet 
this must be qualified with the observation that this depends upon the 
linguistic environment in which the subject is operating. An expatriot 
will surely utilise and view his L2 in a very different way to the 
home-based individual who 'switches on' his L2 only in a particular, 
marked and perhaps rare environment. Carroll (1980) believes that "in 
Ia nonformal setting adults can reinvoke childhood acquisition process- 
es" (p. 84). This he considers to be compatible with the observations 
that adults are most prone to use different, monitoring strategies, 
while "young learners focus on something else entirely" (p. 85), because 
some teaching methods used with adults may be successful in overcoming 
those natural adult tendencies, and "may influence processing strate- 
gies" (p. 84). He believes that: 
the extremely intensive nature of an immersion program may pre- 
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clude internal analysis of components and allow or force learners 
to reactivate earlier learning strategies. (p. 85) 
Despite Carroll's (1980) assertions that an L2 may be learnt in a- 
dulthood via the L1 acquisition mechanisms and. more importantly, de- 
spite the potential for this for which the Focusing Hypothesis argues, 
the examination of prediction b will address only those studies dealing 
with early acquisition. The reason for this is that the operation of 
L1 acquisitional strategies in adulthood is considered unlikely in pop- 
ulations of literate, Western-educated subjects. as the analytic stra- 
tegies developed for other learning will prevent it. However, this is 
not to suggest that informal L2 acquisition in the L2 environment in a- 
dulthood will not bring the L1 and L2 strategies closer together than 
they are when L2 is formally taught. This is explicit in the examina- 
tion of prediction c below. The segregation of early and late acquisi- 
tion is considered necessary only because to overlook it would be to 
ignore the importance of the time and stage at which strategies were 
developed for processing the two languages. To examine prediction b, 
it is important to differentiate, within the early learners, not only 
whether they have been 'acquirers' or 'learners', but also whether they 
are living in an Li or an L2 environment and whether they are equally 
literate in both languages and equally likely to employ their literacy 
skills in each. Restricted to just those studies named in Tables A4: i 
and A4: ii, then, this evaluation will entail consideration of the fol- 
lowing: 
dichotic listening test studies: Rupp 1980, Carroll 1980, Albert & Ob- 
ler 1978, Bever 1974, Gordon 1980. Bellisle 1975, Galloway 1981 and 
Schönle & Breunige'r 1977. 
tachistoscopic tests: Gaziel et al 1978, Hamers & Lambert 1977. Walters 
& Zatorre 1978 and Mishkin & Forgays 1952. 
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These studies are classified below for formal versus informal ac- 
quisition and for whether the subjects were in the L1 or the L2 envi- 
ronment at the time of L2 acquisition and at the time of testing: 
RELATIVE HEMI- 
FORMAL/ ENVIRONMENT OF: SPHERIC INVOLVE- 
STUDY TEST TYPE INFORMAL a )L2 AC Q. b )TEST MENT IN L1 & L230 - Albert & 
' 31 Obler 78 dlt informal L1 L1 more rh in L2 
Rupp '80 dlt informal L2 L2 more lh in L2 
Bever '74 dlt informal L2 L2 more rh in L2 
Galloway 
'81 dlt informal L2 L2 no difference 
Hamers & 
Lambert'77 tachi. informal L2 L2 no difference 
Mishkin &I 
For a s' 2 tachi. informal L2 L2 more rh in L232 
TABLE 5: iv 
Other potential classes are 'formal - L1 - Li' and 'formal - L2 - L2'. 
tl 
There are no studies in those categories amongst the ones under examin- 
ation here. Two studies (Bellisle 1974 & Schönle & Breuniger 1977) 
could not be classified here as they were cited by other authors with- 
out the necessary details about the subjects and testing. The study by 
Gaziel et al (1978) is also excluded as it is too complex to easily 
classify in these terms. 
Table 5: iv does not furnish sufficient variation in subject type to 
enable a satisfactory assessment of the prediction. On the other hand. 
30. 'No difference' means here an equal right ear advantage (REA) or 
right visual field advantage (RVFA) in both languages, unless other- 
wise stated. 
31. These were balanced Hebrew-English bilinguals living in Israel. It 
is not entirely clear which of the languages should be termed Ll and 
which L2. In this context. English has been called L2. 
32. Subjects were 12-14 year olds in the U. S. with some knowledge of Yid- 
dish but limited proficiency. If Yiddish was acquired at home it 
falls between the strict definitions of 'mother tongue' and L2. 
In this context it has been treated as an L2. 
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there is no corresponding uniformity in the experimental results. How- 
ever, in at least three of the four cases where a difference was found 
in-the patterns of hemispheric superiority (Obler's. Rupp's and Mishkin 
& Forgay's). it is difficult to be sure which language should be count- 
ed as L2. To put it another way, as the two languages often vie so 
closely for the status of L1, it is questionable whether differences in 
hemispheric superiority can be due to one being the first language to 
be : learnt and the other the second. It is perhaps more likely that 
differences in the attitudes towards and experience and confidence in 
using each language are responsible. 
The third prediction was that a different use of or attitude to- 
wards the two languages could be reflected in different patterns of he- 
mispheric superiority, because different task strategies may be adopted 
according to those most familiar to the language-specific operations of 
the, individual's experience. Gordon (1980) is supportive with the ob- 
servation that "subjects with different language backgrounds may well 
have different ear asymmetries" (p. 256). Prediction c. then, is exa- 
mined with reference to the studies classified in Tables A4: iv and A4: v 
as 'late! (see text below table 5: v). 
dichotic listening test studies: Kotik 1975. Kotik 1984. Carroll 1980, 
Albert &. Obler 1978. Maitre 1974, Schneiderman & Wesche 1980. Gordon 
1980 and Galloway & Scarcella 1982. 
tachistoscopic tests: Silverberg et al 1979. Walters & Zatorre 1978 and 
Soares & Grosjean 1981. 
Reclassified in the same way as in Table 5: iv. the groupings in 
table 5: v emerge. 
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RELATIVE HEMI- 
STUDY TEST TYPE 
FORMAL/ 
INFORMAL 
ENVIRONMENT OF: 
a )L2 AC Q. b TEST 
SPHERIC INVOLVE- 
MENT IN L1 & L2 
Gordon'80 trend towards 
rou 2 dlt informal L2 L2 more rh in L2 
Galloway & 
Scarcella dlt informal L2 L2 no difference 
'82 
Albert & 
Obler '78 dlt informal L2 L2 more rh in L2 
Soares & 
Grosjean tachi. informal L2 L2 no difference 
'81 
Carroll'80 trend towards 
study dlt informal L1 L1 more rh in L2 
Kotik dlt formal L2? L2? more lh in L2 
high proficiency: 
Kotik '84 dlt formal L2 L2 no difference; 
mid: more lh in L2 
low: more rh in L2 
Carroll'80 no difference: no 
stud 1 dlt formal L2 L2 EA for either 
Walters & 
Zatorre tachi. formal L2? L2 no difference 
'8 rou 2 
words: more rh in 
Maitre'74 dlt formal L1 L1 L2; sentences: no 
difference 
Schneider- 
man & We- dlt formal L1 L1 more rh in L2 
sche '80 
Carroll'8 0 
study 2 dlt formal L1 L1 more lh in L2 
Gordon'80 
xroup 1 dlt formal L1 L1 more lh in L2 
Albert & 
Obler 178 1 dlt formal L1 L1 more lh in L2 
Silverberg high proficiency: 
et al '79 tachi. formal Li L1 no difference; 
low: more rh in L2 
Walters & 
Zatorre tachi. formal L1 L1 no difference 
17_8 rou i 
TABLE :v 
NOTES: 'No difference' means here an equal right ear advantage (REA) or 
right visual filed advantage (RVFA) in both languages. unless otherwise 
stated. 
Regarding Gordon (1980) (1st row). it is not clear whether the 
reduced REA was found in only L2 or in both Li and L2. 
once again, no clear pattern can be seen in Table 5: v, but this, 
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ironically, only provides further support for prediction a. However, a 
stronger REA/RVFA in L2 than L1 is predicted where the tuition was for- 
mal and in the L1 environment. and there is some evidence of that at 
least. 
Finally, prediction d regards individual variation in the extent of 
transfer from one language's strategies into the operations involving 
the other language. It is not easy to see how this could be examined 
and so no attempt will be made. 
To summarise. this discussion has illustrated once again the pro- 
blems inherent in assessing psycholinguistic experiments in terms of 
the predictions of the Focusing Hypothesis. It could be considered 
that the evidence here, as in some other places, provides serious oppo- 
sition to the Focusing Hypothesis, by not displaying the predicted pat- 
terns. It could also be asserted that the Focusing Hypothesis is unac- 
ceptable because it predicts that those very patterns will be obscured 
by the interaction of other variables, thereby covering itself for all 
possible outcomes. This is, at one level. a legitimate criticism. but 
it seems justifiable to argue in return that the problem lies in know- 
ing how to relate the complex (but principled) predictions of the Hypo- 
thesis to the findings of experiments which it in any case condemns as 
flawed and as intrinsically prone to contradictory results. As already 
observed, the actual reasoning behind these predictions is not at all 
dissimilar to that which justifies the age-stage-manner hypothesis, 
which also meets apparent opposition in experimental results but which, 
by virtue of the integral complexity of the three-factor interactions, 
is never lost for a circumstantial explanation. The Focusing Hypothe- 
sis, then, is not faring any worse than that account, and it seems jus- 
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tifiable to lay most emphasis on the reasoning behind the predictions 
and less on the post hoc examination of results from inappropriate ex- 
periments. 
5: 5.3 CLINICAL STUDIES 
Despite the failure to find much support in the examination of psy- 
cholinguistic experiments on polyglot subjects in the previous section, 
the same general criteria will be applied to the projection of expected 
findings in the clinical data pertaining to localised left hemisphere 
damage in polyglots. This is because. as already stated, the princi- 
pies underlying these predictions are still considered to be sound. 
Before this is done, however, a general examination will be made of the 
relationship between the Focusing Hypothesis and Ribot's and Pitres' 
a rules. 
As described in chapter 4: 5.2. Ribot's rule predicts that the ear- 
liest language to be learnt will be least affected by loss. Pitres' 
rule, more specifically aimed at recovery from polyglot aphasia, states 
that the most familiar language will reappear first and recover most 
fully. Discussion in chapter 4 indicated that Pitres' rule is the bet- 
ter supported by findings in polyglot aphasic research. The support 
found for Ribot's rule is, of course, largely explicable in terms of 
Pitres' rule. because most often the earliest language learnt is also 
the best known. The preference for Pitres' rule is based on those ex- 
ceptional cases where this is not so. 
It is not difficult to see that the predictions of the Focusing Hy- 
pothesis also closely align with those of Pitres' rule, for the best 
known language will, in most cases, be one learnt early and informally 
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in its own environment. Where the two views part company is in the si- 
gnificance -placed by the Focusing Hypothesis on the subequent require- 
ments made of each language, which will determine the total range of 
strategies available for dealing with it and. within that, the prefer- 
red ones. Different strategies for different languages will lead to 
more or less tendency for each to inhibit the right hemisphere in apha- 
sia, by focusing on the linguistic level itself. Accomplished poly- 
glots may develop a particular sensitivity to the precise task required 
and become, as Krashen puts it, optimal monitor users (Krashen & Ter- 
rell 1983: 44f), knowing not only how to focus on linguistic form as re- 
quired, but also how not to when the primary aim is communication. 
This technique of operating strategy choices would counteract other 
strategy determining factors such as literacy, and it is this that 
leads to the general prediction that the languages most often used for 
propositional exchange, even if they have been subjected to the analy- 
sis concomitant with literacy, will be most resistant to a blanket ap- 
plication of language-focused strategies. Rather, a number of strate- 
gies may be available and selected in different situations. Their ge- 
neral availability may be greater than in monolinguals (see section 5: 
3) so that polyglots recover Ll better than monolinguals do, because-of 
their heightened ability, as optimal monitor users, to relinquish lin- 
guistic focus when it is not specifically required. On the other hand, 
less well known formally learnt languages would be subject, in aphasia. 
to the double focusing constraint of (a) the longstanding need for 
thoughtful, non-spontaneous production and (b) the expectation of apha- 
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sic symptoms33. However, as ever. one of the greatest problems in as- 
sessing the amount of L2 loss in polyglot aphasia is the lack of cer- 
tain knowledge about how good the language was before. 
Returning now to the predictions made by the Focusing Hypothesis. 
the following can be identified: 
a) The most overwhelming tendency in patients will be to focus on their 
language processing and thus debilitate the undamaged right hemisphere. 
This will lead to serious aphasic problems in any language in which 
such focusing is a customary option. 
b) Similar patterns of language loss will obtain where both languages 
have a similar status with respect to use. including literacy, and at- 
titude. 
c) Different patterns may be observed where the languages have been ac- 
quired or used differently. because this will be reflected in different 
strategy option ranges and preferences. For example, a- little known. 
formally acquired L2 might be more affected then Li because analytic- 
based strategies have dominated the use of that language. Conversely, 
a well known and informally acquired L2 in which literacy has not fi- 
gured. while it has figured in L1, might be less affected. 
d) Individual differences might obtain, relating to the extent to which 
strategies for LI may have been assimilated into L2 (or vice versa). 
0 
The wide range of studies discussed in chapter 4: 5 cannot be exhau- 
stively examined in the light of these predictions because in most cas- 
es too little information has been given in the reports to enable a 
subclassification of the kind required. These studies have, however, 
been evaluated by others (as reviewed in chapter 4) in terms of Ribot's 
and Pitres' rules. and so are implicitly included in the present as- 
sessment by virtue of the close alignment. in some respects, of the Fo- 
cusing Hypothesis' predictions and those of Pitres' rule. as outlined 
33. Dr. Johnson tested his sanity following a stroke by constructing Latin 
verse: "The lines were not very good, but I knew them not to be very 
"good, I made them easily, and concluded myself to be unimpaired in my 
faculties" (quoted in Lott 1981: 31). 
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above. In the light of this, the direct assessment of case histories 
will be restricted to one exceptionally detailed report of an unusual 
patient. namely. the heptalingual aphasic reported by Galloway (1978). 
Table 5: vi classifies the languages of Galloway's (1978) patient 
according to the criteria of type of acquisition, environment of acqui- 
sition and use in adulthood. Details not given here can be found in 
chapter 4: 5. 
LANGUAGE 
AGE OF AC- 
QUISITION 
FORMAL/ 
INFORMAL 
LANG. OF AREA 
OF RESIDENCE? 
ADULT 
USAGE 
ABILITY AFTER APHA- 
SIA & SYMPTOM GROUP 
Eiungari- 
ian MT 
0-4 
6-1034 
informal Yes little c: some; p: isolated 
words"s 
Polish 4-6 informal Yes none c: none: p: isolated 
words"s :4 
Rumanian 10-12 informal Yes none c: none; p: isolated 
words"s "4 
Yiddish 10-12 informal No some c: some; p: isolated 
words"s 
10-12 informal No 
German 12-1 formal No some c: alright 
18-25 informal Yes p: isolated words 
19-25 formal Yes s :2 
12-17 formal No used c: good; p: word sub- 
English 25-47 informal Yes mostly stitutions etc. but 
fluent s :1 
Biblical 
Hebrew 
3-17 formal No little c: none; p: isolated 
words"s .4 
TABLE 5: vi KEY: c= comprehension p= production 
sg = symptom group (based on details given) 
Prediction a leads to a grouping of these languages according to the 
following criteria: (i) formally acquired in the environment of a dif- 
ferent language, (ii) formally acquired in that L2's environment. (iii) 
informally acquired in that L2's environment and (iv) informally ac- 
34. He had to entirely relearn his Hungarian at the age of 6. 
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quired in the environment of another 
Furthermore, the expectation is that group (i) languages will be most 
likely to attract language-focus and group (iv) languages least so. 
The groupings are as follows: 
i) Hebrew (English) (German) 
ii) German 
iii) English (German) Rumanian Polish Hungarian 
iv) Yiddish 
The languages in each of these would be predicted to experience the 
same level of loss in the aphasia. But this is not borne out. How- 
ever, it can be noted that a language which the patient had not used 
much might require special effort in any case, this increasing the 
likelihood of focusing. A regrouping with this consideration taken in- 
to account is hard to set in order, but it would predict a "severity of 
symptoms in something like the following order: 
Hebrew (formal, alien environment. little used in adulthood) 
Rumanian, Polish (informal, own environment. never used in adult- 
hood) 
Yiddish (informal, alien environment. some use in adulthood, low 
proficiency) 
Hungarian (informal, own environment, some use. high proficiency) 
German (informal & formal, alien & own environment. once exclu- 
sively used, then some-use only) 
English (informal & formal, alien & own environment, major lan- 
guage of use till CVA) 
This ordering matches up with the symptom groupings in Table vi (4.4.4. 
3.3.2.1) which supports the notion that criteria of the kind listed 
here may have some bearing on the relative severity of aphasic sym- 
35. The reason for ordering (iii) and (iv) in this way is the same as that 
described in the previous section, namely. that a language learnt 
informally in the environment of a different language is likely to 
be, the language commonly spoken by some subculture in which the in- 
dividually habitually finds himself. This would create an immediate 
L2 environment inside a wider L1 (or L3) one, in comparison to an 
immediate L1 environment inside an L2 one as when a whole family 
moves to a new country. 
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ptoms. The order presented here is also, more or less, that predicted 
by Pitres' rule. 
The evaluations of predictions b and c can be effected in the same 
way. ` Members of groups (v) to (viii) are predicted to align with the 
symptom groups, which, it will be recalled, relate to the severity of 
the symptoms (see table 5: vi), with English in symptom group (sg. )1. 
German in sg. 2. Hungarian & Yiddish in sg. 3 and Polish, Rumanian & He- 
brew in sg. 4.: 
v) used in own environment (in childhood) 
: vi) used in own environment (in adulthood) 
vii) used in alien environment only 
viii) advanced literacy skills 
According to the details given in Gallowy (1978) regarding the pati- 
ent's pre-CVA use of the languages, the memberships are as follows: 
-v) Hungarian (sg: 3) Polish (sg: 
4) Rumanian (sg: 4) Yiddish (sg: 3) 
vi) German (sg: 2) English (sg: l) 
vii) Yiddish (sg: 3) Hebrew (sg: 4) (English sg: 1) (German sg: 2) 
viii) Hungarian (sg: 3) German (sg: 2) English (sg: 1) Hebrew (sg: 4) 
Thus, predictions b and c are supported by subgroups (v) and (vi) 
only. Prediction d. which regards individual variation, cannot be ex- 
amined in this way. 
5.5 4 SUMMARY AND COMMENT 
As already observed, examination of the psycholinguistic research 
data does not lend much direct support to the Focusing Hypothesis, but 
neither does it contradict it. The examination of polyglot aphasia has 
been necessarily cursory and has been unable to shed more than a little 
light on the points of difference between the Focusing Hypothesis and 
the well supported Pitres' rule. It has been proposed, however. that 
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little unambiguous support is to be expected from investigations in 
these areas, and that the key factors upon which the Focusing Hypothe- 
sis''` predictions are built are not any less theoretically justified, 
nor the predictions any worse supported, than those of other accounts. 
5.6" TOWARDS A MODEL FOR OUTPUT 
It is inevitable that any observation-based discussion of language 
processing will rely to a large extent on the OUTPUT of the subjects or 
patients examined. Even if an experiment or clinical assessment is de- 
'signed to ascertain the extent and/or nature of an individual's langu- 
age comprehension, still the signs of that comprehension will mostly be 
mediated by some sort of output, whether consisting of a linguistic or 
a' motor response. Despite the central role of output in the empirical 
side of the exploration of language processing mechanisms, the theore- 
tical model which has been presented as the Focusing Hypothesis has ad- 
dressed only input mechanisms. The justification for this has had to 
rest upon the belief that input and output are sufficiently different 
to prevent the detailed examination of both in a work of this size. but 
similiar enough for the one to be 'taken as read' during the evaluation 
of the other. and for facts about the one not to threaten to undermine 
an`account proposed for the other. 
Were an output aspect of the Focusing Hypothesis to have been fully 
developed here, how would it have differed from the input model? An- 
swering this question requires some appreciation of what makes input 
and output different from each other. The difference which seems most 
'central in the context of the discussion already presented is the fol- 
lowing. In initiating speech, you choose what to say and how to say 
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it. It should, in theory, be possible to stay within your own process- 
ing limitations. In receiving speech you have no such control, for 
anything may be presented to you. This is precisely the observation 
that Hughlings Jackson made (see chapter 2: 2.2) when he said that the 
hearer is the "victim" of the speaker (Hughlings Jackson 1874: 132). It 
is, because the hearer has no control over input that syntactic theory 
has- had to adopt the premise that an ability to deal with every possi- 
ble grammatical sentence (and to disentangle many ungrammatical ones) 
underlies the processing operations of the individual. If only output 
needed to be accounted for, it would never be possible to be quite sure 
that sentences were not drawn, ready-formed, from some, albeit vast, 
inventory of previously constructed (or otherwise adopted) and lexical- 
ly stored grammatical strings. 
The fact that the speaker controls his output in a way he does not 
control his input (but see Krashen's filter component in L2 acquisi- 
tion, e. g. Krashen & Terrell 1983) therefore paves the way for what 
could be much stronger hypotheses to account for the former than the 
latter. In particular, as the formulation of the proposition precedes 
the lexical selection. it is possible, at the non-specific level at 
least, to envisage a lexically-specified sentence selection, whereas 
input processing could not operate in that way without an infinite in- 
ventory of sentences36. The desire to develop an integrated account has 
inevitably tended to draw theoreticians away from a lexically based ac- 
count for output simply because it appears impossible to reconcile it 
----------- 
36. However, care has to be taken to ensure that this is not tantamount to 
saying that a speaker only wants to say what he is able to say. Such 
a danger is avoided if an account also provides for innovation and 
first-time construction, as both the Focusing Hypothesis and the hypo- 
thesis of Pawley & Syder (983). described below, do. 
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with- the necessary characteristics of input processing. But perhaps 
this'has been too radical a move. 
Supposing a model existed in which output processing was lexically 
specified, and input processing was not, what objections would arise? 
The first might be that two such systems would be incompatible within a 
single higher system because they would operate according to entirely 
different principles. This would certainly be true if the input pro- 
cessing model was fundamentally generative in nature. But in the Fo- 
cusing Hypothesis there is a non-generative component too. A second 
objection would be that a non-generative processing account violates 
the Occam's Razor Principle. However, the Principle is only applied to 
decide between two otherwise equally plausible theories. If an account 
can be independently demonstrated to enjoy explanatory advantages over 
some -other less complex ones, then despite its complexity. it is pre- 
ferable. Pawley & Syder (1983), whose output processing hypothesis 
will be discussed in detail below, argue this point, observing that if 
an 'account permits redundancy, but the system it is describing also 
contains it, then "anything else would be incomplete" (p. 217). And 
again, the Focusing Hypothesis, already observed to violate the Occam's 
Razor Principle (see section 5: 3.4 above), will be less at odds with an 
output processing account which also defies this maxim of 
(apparent) 
explanatory economy. 
In the following discussion an examination will be made of an out- 
put processing account by Pawley & Syder (1983) which possesses many 
features in common with the (independently developed) Focusing Hypothe- 
sis, and which differs in the ways predicted to possibly characterise 
the contrast between input and output models. 
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Two questions form the starting point for Pawley & Syder: 
a) Why do native speakers not produce anything approaching the full 
range of constructions which could be generated and would be grammati- 
cal, but rather restrict themselves largely to 'idiomatic' -type famili- 
ar and much-used sentences and constructions? 
b) How do native speakers retain such a remarkable fluency in product- 
ion at the same time as concentrating on so many other aspects of con- 
munication including content and register? 
The first of these questions is based on their own observations of ste- 
reotypy in the sequences occurring in natural conversation. It leads 
them to assert that processing accounts in which all grammatical 
strings are constructed (from scratch) specifically for the proposi- 
tional event. and in which all strings are equally easily processed are 
too strong, for they predict the occurrence of many strings which, al- 
though grammatical and therefore able to occur, normally do not: 
native speakers do not exercise the creative potential of syntac- 
tic rules to anything like their full extent, and... indeed. if 
they did so they would not be accepted as exhibiting nativelike 
control of the language. (p. 193) 
This is very reminiscent of one of the claims that underlies the Focus- 
ing Hypothesis. viz. that "although language has the potential for un- 
predictablility. it is. the majority of the time, predictable within 
certain definable bounds" (chapter 1: 7). Using a fragment of narrative 
and a paraphrase of it. Pawley & Syder (1983) illustrate that certain 
strings are preferred to others which are equally easily generated by 
the hypothetical rules of the grammar: 
4) I had /four /uncles - 
they /all volun/teered to /go a/wav 
and ah /that was /one Christmas - 
th't /I'11 /always re/member... 
289 
5) The brothers of my parents were four 
Their offering to soldier in lands elsewhere in the army of our 
country, had occurred. 
There is not a time when my remembering that Christmas will not 
take place... (p"194) 
Pawley & Syder propose that native speakers customarily employ not 
syntactical rules to generate the sentences they use, but a system of 
retrieval for ready-lexicalised37 sentences or sentence stems. These 
are "unit[s] of clause length or longer whose grammatical form and lex- 
ical. content is wholly or largely fixed" (p. 191). They are automised 
then in the same way as Van Lancker's (1972.1987) automatic language 
(see 2: 2.2). which consisted. for her, of idioms and deliberately me- 
morised sequences. But Pawley & Syder are not referring only to items 
of these types, but also to regular constructions whose meaning is im- 
mediate and literal (cf. the discussion of Code's (1987) examples in 
chapter 2: 2.2). It will be recalled that in chapter 1: 5 the Focusing 
Hypothesis was carefully differentiated from what might be termed sen- 
tence inventory theories in which every sentence is separately stored 
and retrieved. Yet here. it seems, Pawley & Syder are making the 're- 
, 
trograde' step towards the non-generative accounts which, ultimately, 
are forced to countenance a memory store of infinite size. However, it 
may be that the Focusing Hypothesis actually legitimises the approach 
taken by Pawley & Syder, by arguing a rationale for their position (see 
below). 
A major component in the argument presented by Pawley & Syder. 
then, is that of all the possible strings which are grammatical. it is 
only a much restricted subset that would be termed natural for native 
37. 'Lexicalised' is intended to mean 'lexically specified', not 'stored 
in the lexicon'. 
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speakers. There are preferred ways of expressing concepts, and where 
sentence stems are semi-lexicalised (see below) there are strong pre- 
ferences for which items may be paradigmaticaly aligned, with others 
still falling well within the bounds of grammaticality without sounding 
natural. What Pawley & Syder do not do is justify why such a subset 
should be preferred. Also. they cannot formally explain how it could 
be-' that we can generate sentences as well as select them ready-formed, 
though they do invoke a dual system of some kind. They argue indeed 
that such a system is already required for other accounts: 
Insofar as many regular morpheme sequences are known both holisti- 
cally (as lexicalised units) and analytically (as products of syn- 
tactic rules) it is necessary to specify these sequences at least 
twice in the grammar. (p. 192) 
Later they assert that conversational speech consists of three types of 
clause: lexically entirely novel sequences (but grammatically familiar, 
in accordance with the syntactic rules of the language), lexically en- 
tirely familiar sequences, and sequences halfway between the two, "con- 
sisting partly of new collocations of lexical items and partly of me- 
morized lexical and structural material" (p. 205). Between them, these 
three clause types permit a balance between economy in processing and a 
capacity to deal with novelty: 
it is always possible to draw on the fully-productive and semi- 
productive syntactic and semantic rules to provide morphologically 
complex descriptions ... and in due course one or more of the des- 
criptive expressions for a new concept may become its conventional 
designation. i. e. it may be lexicalized. (p. 218) 
This is very reminiscent of the process described in the Focusing Hypo- 
thesis with relation to acquisition. 
The value to the speaker of drawing on lexicalised strings or sen- 
tence stems, from a corpus of some "hundreds of thousands" is that: 
he minimises the amount of clause-internal encoding work to be 
done and frees himself to attend to other tasks in talk exchange 
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including the planning of larger units of discourse. (p. 192) 
In addition, by using set forms for common cultural concepts he enables 
himself and the hearer to access a shortcut to the context (p. 218). 
This' is strikingly similar to the Focusing Hypothesis' justification 
for a non-generative processing of input. However, Pawley & Syder fall 
short of suggesting that the lexicalised sentences could be termed au- 
tomatic or holistic or that there might be some association with the 
right hemisphere. But they do ask: 
Is there something in the language learner's natural capacities, 
in the structure of the human brain. that makes such dual know- 
ledge advantageous, or inevitable? (p. 217) 
The Focusing Hypothesis is based on the belief that there is, viz. the 
very limited capacity of the brain to focus on a number of things at 
once. Furthermore, the examination which has been made of how language 
might be being accommodated within the processing preferences of the 
brain during different types of language use provides some independent 
justification for what is for Pawley & Syder only a theoretical model. 
A Despite the outward appearance of a system which is nongenerative, 
their account is designed to address the economy of idiomatic speech. 
where a phrase will not be used if a single word will suffice, nor a 
complex sentence if a simple one can be used (p. 197). The economy in 
processing comes firstly from employing tactics to reduce the concen- 
tration required to remain fluent and to form novel strings: 
[The speaker] is by no means free to concentrate on the grammati- 
cal content of his productions. (p. 204) 
Secondly it comes from the utilisation of the natural abilities of the 
human brain. viz. its ability to recognise patterns, its limitations in 
performing several mental tasks simultaneously, and its "enormous me- 
mory capacity" (p. 218). 
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Pawley & Syder give examples of lexicalised sentence stems which 
are fundamentally the same as the formulae in the Focusing Hypothesis; 
the latter were proposed to have a lexicalised component. most probably 
the verb (see chapter 1: 1.3). The common stem they envisage for sen- 
tences like (6)-(8) below is (9) and that for (10)-(12) is (13): 
6) I'm sorry to keep you waiting. 
7) I'm so sorry to have kept you waiting. 
8) Mr. X is sorry to keep you waiting all this time. 
9) NP be-TENSE sorry to keep-TENSE you waiting (p. 210) 
10). Tell the truth! 
11) Jo seldom tells the truth. 
12). I wish you had told me the truth. 
38 
13) NP tell-TENSE the truth. (Pawley & Syder 1983: 210f) 
The Focusing Hypothesis had held back from this stronger version of the 
model, in which so much is lexically realised. but, as has been sugges- 
ted, above. such reticence may be more appropriate to an input process- 
ing model than an output processing one. It certainly makes sense in 
general terms to choose an account which indicates the greatest pos- 
sible saving of processing effort. 
Another point of close contact between the two hypotheses is in the 
notion of clausal level processing. Pawley & Syder approach the ques- 
tion of native speaker fluency by observing how much easier it is to 
talk fluently if clauses are 'chained'. 'Clause chaining' involves us- 
ing a succession of (syntactically but not. of course. propositionally) 
independent clauses, as opposed to integrated ones. Chaining, they ar- 
gue,. is substantially more popular (in speech) than integration amongst 
English native speakers (p. 204). Apart from being easier for the spea- 
38. There is no 'slot' in (13) to account for 'me' in (12), but this ap- 
pears to be no more than an oversight on Pawley & Syder's part and it 
it is not detrimental to their general point. 
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ker 'because less processing is required, they also note that clause- 
chaining makes the hearer's job easier because: 
Listeners are tolerant, up to a point, of mid-construction dysflu- 
encies.... But they do not care for more than a little of this at 
`a time. (p. 208) 
As Pawley & Syder do not address input processing they do not present 
any account of w listeners should have such low tolerance to non- 
fluency. The Focusing Hypothesis, however, does: it is because it is 
most economical for them to decode holistically at clausal level, and 
this is hampered by a lack of fluency. to the extent that the analytic 
mechanisms may become involved in an earlier stage of decoding in an 
attempt to pre-empt the ends of clauses (see chapter 1: 
6.2). 
An output processing model in the Focusing Hypothesis might not 
have consisted of all or only the features in Pawley & Syder's model, 
but it seems likely that the general rationale and also many of the de- 
tails would be the same. Neither is tied to one interpretation of the 
specific location of functions in the brain (see chapter 1: 10) and both 
highlight the necessity to examine spoken discourse in preference to 
other forms of language where the processing strategies might be dif- 
ferent (Pawley & Syder 1983: 214). Perhaps the most valuable explana- 
tory advantage that these two accounts possess regards the existence 
and perpetuation of irregularities in languages. As Pawley & Syder 
note. Chomsky (1965) had to allow for separate lexical entries for 
forms which could not be generated (p. 219). Any account which presents 
a primarily regular system with constructions generated as they are 
needed. predicts that it would be easiest for a language to be regular. 
because fewer items would need to be listed separately. In a system 
where lexicalised strings and lexically determined formulae are the 
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preferred medium of expression and comprehension, it is easy to explain 
how irregular items could enter the system and remain there; further- 
more, it is predicted that they would be common in normal interaction, 
which seems to be the case. 
0 
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CHAPTER SIX 
EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS 
6: 1 INTRODUCTION 
. 
In the course of the previous chapters and particularly 5: 2. it has 
been suggested that the psycholinguistic laboratory is not a suitable 
environment for testing the Focusing Hypothesis. This is because cer- 
tain, factors will prevail to prevent optimal processing (chapter 1: 3), 
,,, which is the only condition under which 
the holistic mechanisms would 
be in operation to their full potential. These factors are the nature 
of the stimulus. the nature of the task, the experimental environment 
and the type of subject (see 5: 2). 
Making drastic alterations along all four parameters. however. 
would produce a design which no longer had enough in common with the 
orthodox experiments to enable comparison. In particular. changing the 
test environment and removing those factors which might cause some ab- 
normal level of stress would probably entail not using response-time 
, -tasks, 
which are the most direct means of measuring ear or visual field 
advantage. 
Both the experiments reported in this chapter are of standard psy- 
cholinguistic experimental design. To take the exact stance argued in 
the rest of this thesis would be to conduct psycholinguistic experi- 
ments only in order to demonstrate that they do not test the Focusing 
Hypothesis. This is, of course, unsatisfactory, and. ideally, experi- 
mental designs are required which can overcome the normal limitations 
as,, described above. On the other hand, they need to bear some resem- 
blance to other designs, so that there is some baseline for comparison. 
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This is a difficult brief. Experiment II (section 6: 3) was an attempt 
to, -create a contrast between holistic and analytic processing against 
the odds of operating within a standard listening test set up. In sec- 
tion 6: 4 another design is proposed which might instigate strategy 
choices similar to those considered by the Focusing Hypothesis to be in 
operation in normal communication. 
Experiment I was conducted before the Focusing Hypothesis had been for- 
mulated. But as it was designed to test the effect of educational fac- 
tors on processing strategies, it is highly relevant to the discussion. 
6: 2 EXPERIMENT I" 
INVESTIGATION OF POSSIBLE STRATEGY DIFFERENCES IN RESPONDING TO VISUO- 
SPATIAL STIMULI PRESENTED TA CHISTOSCOPICALLY 
6: 2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In a paper published in 1982. O'Leary reported an experiment com- 
paring visual field advantages for male subjects aged 
6 to 8 inclusive 
when presented with line drawings of 
familiar objects. They had to per- 
form a simple judgement task. to decide whether a stimulus picture, 
flashed momentarily to one visual half-field, was the same as or dif- 
ferent to another picture, which had been presented centrally for a 
longer period immediately prior to that trial. 
Kimura & Durnford (1974) report that across a series of tests pre- 
senting shapes and pictures tachistoscopically, no visual field advan- 
tage (VFA) was observable (p. 35ff). This is less than they might have 
expected, given "the 
known asymmetry of function" (p. 42) favouring the 
-'right hemisphere in visual perception. Nevertheless, it contrasts with 
the 'consistent findings of a RVFA when linguistic stimuli are present- 
-I 
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ed. In O'Leary's experiment. then, the picture identification would be 
predicted to yield no VFA or. if any. then for the left. not the right. 
O'Leary drew from the work of Conrad (1971)1 and Levy (1974) in de- 
signing his experiment. Conrad found that children up to the age of 
five could recall the positions of pictures whose names rhymed as easi- 
ly as those that did not. Over the age of five. however, the rhyme ap- 
peared to lead to muddling in recalling the picture positions. This 
was taken to be evidence of verbal labelling in the older group (O'Lea- 
ry 1982: 66). Therefore, O'Leary used rhyming (e. g. tie-pie) and non- 
rhyming (e. g. tie-sock) pairs of stimuli for the 'different' trials 
(see below). He made a connection between Conrad's (1971) observation 
and the activity of the two hemispheres by noting Levy's (1974) sugges- 
tion that the right hemisphere can decode only semantically and not 
phonologically. Thus he predicted for his task that: 
An increase in reaction time to the pictures whose names rhymed, 
in comparison to pictures whose names did not rhyme, would indi- 
"cate the use of a phonological code which Levy claims is an exclu- 
sively left hemisphere ability. (p. 67) 
But this rhyme-nonrhyme difference should, he predicted, obtain only 
for left hemisphere (i. e. right visual field) presentation (p. 67). 
O'Leary reported a significant left visual field advantage (LVFA) 
in the youngest group (mean age 6; 9), and a non-significant right vi- 
sual field advantage (RVFA) in the two older groups (mean ages 8; 0 and 
8; 10). When 'same' and 'different' responses were separately analysed, 
he found that the change from LVFA to RVFA occurred only in the re- 
sponse times (RTs) to 'different' trials. When he compared the rhyme 
1. This reference is not listed in the bibliography at the end of the 
volume in which O'Leary's article appears. and so far I have not been 
able to trace it. 
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and nonrhyme RTs, however, there was no significant difference and thus 
no support for his hypothesis that the changeover in VFA was the result 
of. the adoption of a verbal strategy in stimulus memorisation. Rather 
:. than abandoning the hypothesis, O'Leary proposed that his device for 
;, 'trapping' the 
label-users had not worked. and that revising the inven- 
tory of stimuli might enable the predicted difference to be found. 
6: 2.2 AIM 
The aim of the experiment reported here was to replicate and extend 
the findings made by O'Leary. - To this end the basic design and purpose 
remained the same but a number of alterations were made to widen the 
scope and to seek the 'rhyme-nonrhyme' differences he predicted between 
the RVFA and LVFA subjects. 
1,4 
6: 2.3 MODIFICATIONS TO O'LEARY'S DESIGN 
6: 2.3.1 SUBJECTS 
6.2.3.1.1 SEX 
O'Leary tested only males; this was extended to include an equal 
number of males and females. 
6: 2.3.1.2 AGE 
O'Leary tested subjects of mean age 6; 9,8; 0 & 8; 10. In the light 
of - Conrad's (1971) watershed at five years of age for rhyme interfer- 
ence, it was decided to extend the age range downwards to four years. 
Therefore, subjects in this study were in five ages groups: 4 (mean age 
4; 7), 5 (mean age = 5; 7), 6 (mean age = 6; 8), 7 (mean age = 7; 7), 8 
(mean -age = 8; 6). Another reason for extending the age range in this 
way was the following. O'Leary found a significant correlation between 
his laterality measure and the mental age of the subjects, the latter 
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being determined by the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test. If the change 
in VFA which O'Leary found was related to educational exposure rather 
than maturation, then it might be predicted to occur one year earlier 
in British children, who begin formal education at age 4-5. not 5-6 as 
in' the United States. If. on the other hand. a changeover were obser- 
ved at the same age in British children, this would be strong support 
for a maturational determination of the task strategy. 
6.2.3.1.3 POOL 
O'Leary's subjects were all pupils at a private Catholic school in 
a middle class area. The subjects in this study lived in the Poppleton 
Road and Acomb areas of York. Most were pupils at Poppleton Road In- 
fant & Junior School and contact was made by means of a letter to par- 
ents, inviting them to volunteer for the study. Additional subjects 
were obtained with the help of the parents of children already taking 
part. These were children who lived in the same geographical area but 
were" within the catchment area of other schools of a similar type. 
There was no reason to suppose that the subjects did not form a rela- 
tively homogeneous sample. Without exception the parents were interes- 
ted and motivated to take part in the experiment; participation was the 
result of returning a form to the school and arranging the visits of 
the' experimenter. 
6.2 1.4 SAMPLE SIZES 
O'Leary tested 18 male subjects. six in each of the three age 
groups. In this study, each of the five age groups consisted of five 
males and five females, making a total of 50 subjects. 
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6: 2.3.1.5 HANDEDNESS 
""'> Handedness is known to be a factor requiring some consideration in 
experimental psycholinguistics (Geschwind 1974,1983). O'Leary tested 
only right-handers. as ascertained by an informal test of handedness 
which involved hand preference in writing, drawing, scissor and tool 
use & throwing, eye preference (telescope) & foot preference 
(kicking). 
Only. individuals who used their right hand, foot2 and eye exclusively 
in, all the relevant tasks were used. In addition, he states that none 
of. the subjects had any left-handed immediate family members. 
-_ It was soon discovered that so strict a set of criteria would be 
impossible to maintain. Although only those subjects whose parents de- 
signated them as right-handed on the reply slip were tested. and al- 
though the results of obvious left-handers and those with no apparent 
hand preference were excluded from the analysis, there cannot have been 
more than one or two children at most 
(out of 50) who displayed the 
kind of 'extreme' right-handedness which O'Leary defines as his base- 
line criterion for inclusion. This is particularly remarkable given 
that his subjects were male: males are known to be more likely to dis- 
play features of ambidexterity & left-handedness 
(Geschwind 1983,1985). 
Even- the females in the current study had at least either a parent or 
sibling who was left-handed or else themselves displayed some measure 
of ambivalence in foot or hand preference. Eye preference was found to 
be particularly variant. 
------------ 2. O'Leary states that one subject did not use his right foot consistent- 
ly for kicking. 
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6: 2.3.1.6 READING-AGE 
O'Leary administered the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test to his 
subjects. Because of the suspected link between literacy and test 
strategies, a reading-age test was used here instead. The (unrevised) 
Schonell reading assessment test (Schonell & Schonell 1960) was used 
for. ease of administration. Although it has been widely criticised 
(Pumfrey 1977: 51, Vincent et al 1983: 40)), it was considered to be ac- 
curate enough for the intersubject comparisons required here. Approxi- 
mately two months later. four of the children were tested at school on 
the.. revised Schonell list3; the scores corresponded closely in three 
cases (11.8. revised: 11.8; 7.2. revised: 7.4; 12.9. revised: 12.6"). The 
fourth differed considerably (6.9, revised: 7.5); this child (age 8; 1) 
was of below average ability. 
6.2.3.2 APPARATUS 
In parallel with O'Leary's experiment. a two-field tachistoscope 
was used to present the stimuli. An electronic timer measured the time 
taken from presentation of the single-field stimulus to the decision. 
The, display of this stimulus was controlled using. a hand-operated but- 
ton. Depression of this button automatically started the timer. The 
timer was interrupted by the depression of a single morse key wired to 
the timer and controlled by the subject. 
Times and the nature of the subject's response ('same' or 'differ- 
ent'. expressed by hitting the key once and twice respectively) were 
----------- - 
3. Editions of Schonell & Schonell from 1972 incorporated revised norms 
drawn from a sample of Salford children by Bookbinder (1970). Shearer 
(1974), however. on the basis of a sample of Cheshire children, chal- 
lenged these revised norms and provided others which were more similar 
to the pre-revision ones (Pumfrey 1976: 100). 
r 
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manually recorded by the experimenter. 
6.2.3.3 STIMULI 
,. 
Six pictures. with which the subject had been familiarised. were 
, the total inventory of stimuli 
(except for the practice trials. see be- 
low). O'Leary's stimuli were as follows: 
III 
tie, pie, moon, spoon, sock, clock 
In this experiment the following were used4: 
mountain, mouse, doll. dog, bel t. bed 
,. 
Different stimuli were used in the practice trials: 
boat. bone. kangaroo, candle. picture. pig 
,,, The reason 
for using different stimuli in the practice trials was to 
, prevent an 
early practice effect. The (apparent) potential for any one 
of twelve pictures rather than merely one of six to appear also made 
the task appear less tedious to the subjects. The three stimulus pairs 
selected for the experiment itself were the ones which made the best 
set, according to the parameters of mutually distinct shape, best cross- 
pair initial phonological similarity matches 
(see below) and most con- 
sistent voluntary naming with the intended label by pilot subjects 
(i. e. dog not puppy, belt not watch or snake). However, inevitably. 
one or two subjects did have initial (occasionally persistent) 'misnam- 
ings'. (e. g. rat for mouse. man for doll) and one or two of the young- 
est-, children had to 'learn' the word mountain, which did not appear to 
be spart of their vocabulary. Misnaming was not a widespread problem 
either across the group or within individual performances, except in 
. the , case 
of one Child whose results were not used. However. it is po- 
4. The pictures used can be found in the Appendix. A6: 1. 
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tentially serious, as the persistent misnaming of a stimulus would 
spoil the intended phonological correspondences. 
The reason for changing the stimuli from O'Leary's was as follows. 
O'Leary- chose rhyming pairs to create confusion for those subjects us- 
ing linguistic-based decision strategies. but he failed to find the 
predicted slower decisions for 'different' trials in RVFA subjects as 
compared to LVFA ones. His hypothesis was that the subjects might be 
making a phonological comparison of the labels; but such a comparison 
could conceivably operate in segmental sequence, in which case the fact 
that the rhyming stimuli were minimal pairs contrasting in initial pho- 
neme might enable their non-identity to be established before the pho- neme 
nologically identical material was encountered. This is consistent 
with the word-cohort theory (Marslen-Wilson & Tyler 1980, Marslen-Wil- 
son & Welsh 1978) as discussed and reinvestigated in Tyler (1984). The 
cohort theory proposes that a word initial cohort is created from some 
minimal sensory input - perhaps equivalent to the first one or two pho- 
nemes of a word, so that: 
the recognition of a spoken word involves the activation of a 
,. large set of word candidates which gradually diminishes in size 
until only a single member remains. (Tyler 1984: 417) 
Therefore. in this experiment the stimuli were paired according to 
initial rhyme5. Specifically, the identical material was the initial 
CV sequence. which corresponded in size to O'Leary's identical final 
sequences which were V(C). 
In line with O'Leary's design. each stimulus word was paired with 
S;: For the sake of'retaining the correspondences with O'Leary's termino- 
logy, " 'rhyme' is used to refer to the initial-rhyme feature. An al- 
ternative term, 'alliteration' is not strictly accurate and is also 
rather more cumbersome. 
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two others: its rhyme partner and a non-rhyme partner. That stimulus 
would only appear with those two partners. Thus: 
2nd presentation Ist presentation 2nd presentation 
ý(nonrhyme) (rhyme) 
belt - mountain - mouse 
1 doll - mouse - mountain 
mouse - doll - dog 
'° bed - dog - doll 
mountain - belt - bed 
dog - bed - belt 
i, 
Each stimulus pair appeared an equal number of times with its rhyme and 
its non-rhyme partner and the total of these two formed the sum of 
'different' stimulus presentations. An equal number of 'different' and 
'same' combinations occurred, for a total of 48 trials (over two vi- 
sits) 
6. Thus every stimulus picture occurred four times with itself 
and twice each with each partner. These occurrences were equally shar- 
ed between side of presentation (i. e. visual field). In each session 
of 24 trials an equal number of right and left presentations was admi- 
nistered. in a semi-random order (screened for consistent patterns and 
more than two consecutive presentations to the same side or of stimulus 
type ('same' and 'different')). 
Stimulus pictures did not exceed 6cm horizontally and 6cm vertical- 
ly, so that they fitted a notional frame of those dimensions. Although 
they were not symmetrical. the pictures selected were not off-centre in 
relation to the frame; that is, the centre of the frame was also (ap- 
proximately) the balanced centre of the image. 
6. O'Leary administered each trial twice, making a corpus of 96 response 
times for each subject. As 24 was the maximum number of trials that 
the York subjects could manage in one session, and as four separate 
sessions for each subject would have been impractical given the size 
of the subject pool, only the 48 trials were administered. 
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Cards used for familiarisation purposes (see below), when the ta- 
chistoscope was not used, had a forward image. All other cards had a 
'reverse' image. Thus, the familiarisation cards depicted the image 
the, same way round as it would appear after mirror reflection in the 
tachistoscope when the stimulus cards were used. The images on the fa- 
miliarisation cards were central to the card; those on the stimulus 
cards were positioned in relation to the centre of the part of the card 
visible on the screen (the left-most four-fifths or so). 
On the cards used for initial (central) presentation on the base 
screen, the centre of the notional frame coincided with the centre of 
the viewing screen. This meant that, given the distance from the view- 
finder to the screen (46cm), the peripheries of the image diverged 
3°44' from the centre, which left the whole image fully within the area 
visible with both eyes. given central gaze. 
On the cards used for second (single visual half-field) presentati- 
on on the rear screen, the inner edge of the notional frame was 5cm (6° 
12') from the centre of the screen and the outer edge 11cm (13°27'). so 
that the image fell entirely within one visual half-field and entirely 
out of the other, given eye fixation on the centre of the screen. 
A single card was used for centring the subjects' vision. This had 
a black saltire cross, filling a frame 3x3cm. The centre of the cross 
coincided with the centre of the screen. This card was kept permanent- 
ly in the base-screen slot and initial presentation cards were slid in 
and, out on top of it. 
6.2.3.4 METHOD 
O'Leary compared responses by the left and right hand. Half the 
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subjects responded 'same' by depressing a button operated by the left 
hand and 'different' with the right. and the other half had the reverse 
instructions. He found significant interactions between this response 
pattern and both rhyme-nonrhyme responses and VFA (p. 69). 
In the present experiment. this variable was removed by instructing 
the- subjects to actively use both hands (one on top of the other) at 
all` times to depress (once or twice. according to their response) a 
single morse key, positioned centrally in front of them7. This was 
reasoned to present a blanket response condition, though it cannot be 
ruled out that only one of the hands was active in making the response. 
O'Leary conducted his experiment in a quiet, dimly lit room in the 
school. This experiment, however, took place in the homes of the chil- 
dren. The disadvantages of this are clear. The child was more relax- 
ed8. being in a home environment. and therefore not so predisposed to 
settle down to the task. Inevitably. the less concentration on the 
part of the child, the longer the session took, making the child more 
tired and (very occasionally! ) bored. Furthermore, in some houses it 
was, not possible to operate in an environment which was quiet or free 
from" distractions, particularly where there were younger siblings in 
the vicinity. 
The reasons for operating in the home were as follows. Firstly, it 
enabled suitable contact to be made with the parents. This was import- 
ant not only for their own peace of mind but because some information 
(e, g, uncorrected sight problems, familial handedness etc. ) was more 
7. In fact the design of the tachistoscope prevented precisely central 
positioning of the key and it was positioned approximately 3cm right 
of centre. 
8. It could be argued, on the other hand. that this reduced the likeli- 
hood of stress. 
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easily and reliably obtained from them than the children themselves. 
Secondly, it seemed unlikely that in dealing with such young children 
it would be easy to conduct an experiment 'from cold' in an alien en- 
vironment. Thirdly, some of the subjects were preschool, so could not 
have easily been tested other than in the home. Fourthly, in many 
cases siblings were tested. It made for a more economical use of time 
to test several subjects on the same occasion. Fifthly, the experimen- 
tal project involved such a large number of individuals that it would 
have required fulltime occupancy of a classroom for a considerable time 
and consistent disruption to classes. In addition, individual sessions 
were so long that they might easily have involved a child's absence 
from a whole taught session, which would not have been popular with 
parents. The school day is also not structured to allow for sequences 
of long sessions. If one session was not interrupted by a playtime, 
then the second could not start until after one, which would involve 
some wastage of time. Individuals varied considerably in the amount of 
time it took to complete a session, which would have made it impossible 
to liase with teachers about the future availability of subsequent sub- 
jects9. It seems inevitable that with the noise levels of a primary 
school and the need to personally fetch subjects from classes rather 
than "sending each child to summon the next one, it would have been far 
from easy to conduct the experiment in the school. 
9. In another experiment, not reported here, secondary school children 
were tested on a much shorter task in the school environment. The 
'quiet' classroom was not quiet during lesson changes, with disruption 
from pupils passing by or lining up outside neighbouring rooms contin- 
uing for a good 15 minutes on some occasions. Despite a high level of 
cooperation from all the teaching staff, it was clearly disruptive for 
them to keep sending pupils out in the middle of class time. 
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6: 2.4 PROCEDURE 
LH 6: 2.4.1 PREPARATION 
All subjects were tested by the author. In advance of the experi- 
mental trials, subjects were familiarised with the equipment and allow- 
ed to 'try it out'. On many occasions a parent was also encouraged to 
do so. 
The subject was then shown twelve flashcards, each of which had on 
it one of the pictures to be used in the practice or experimental tri- 
als., The flashcards used at this stage were specially prepared for 
this purpose, as described in section 6: 2.3.. 3 above, The subject was 
asked to name the picture and in the majority of cases this elicited 
the intended target label. Where this was -not"the case (e. g. dog -> 
puppy., doll -> man). the desired label was suggested to the child and 
usually this was adopted and freely used when the flashcard was re-pre- 
sented. 
When the experimenter was satisfied that the subject was labelling 
the pictures as intended (thus using the intended 'rhyming' pairs), an 
explanation of the task was given. Subjects were told that they would 
be shown a picture on the screen, then they would see a cross and then 
another picture, but only for a very short amount of time. They were 
warned that they would only be able to see the second picture if they 
watched the cross carefully. They were to decide whether the second 
picture was the same as the first or different to it. If it was the 
same, they should "press the button" (morse key) once, and if it was 
different. twice. They were instructed to use both hands (one on top 
of the other) to strike the key. 
Subjects received practice in using the key correctly. first with 
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hand-held cards and then with tachistoscopic presentation. 
All practice trials used the practice pictures, not the experimen- 
Aal pictures (see above). Subjects were given positive reinforcement 
when they responded correctly in the practice trials and they were 
challenged on false responses and shown them again. Practices continu- 
ed until the experimenter was satisfied that the child was able to per- 
form 'the task. Some three or four potential subjects never reached 
this `point and they received a token administration of the test only 
and were excluded from the analysis. New subjects were selected to re- 
place them and testing continued until the desired quota was achieved. 
6: 2.4.2 EXPERIMENTAL TRIALS 
=After a short break, during which the experimenter set out the 
cards (out of sight of the subject) for swift; ordered selectione the 
experimental trials began. The same semi-random order (see section 6: 
2.3.3 above) was used for each subject. 
Before each trial began. the second stimulus card was inserted into 
the rear-screen slot ready for its timed exposure. Then the first pic- 
ture was inserted into the base-screen slot, where it was immediately 
visible, because the base-screen was illuminated by default. The first 
stimulus card for each trial was presented for an exposure time of ap- 
proximately 10 seconds. This was accompanied by the words "Here's the 
first picture. Have a good look at it". (This ten second period was 
used by the experimenter to prepare the stimuli for the next trial). 
Then the stimulus was removed with the words "I'm taking the picture a- 
way now". When the stimulus card was removed it revealed the gaze- 
centring card. with a cross in the centre, which was left permanently 
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in,, the base-screen slot. Exposure to this was approximately seven se- 
conds. during which the experimenter said "Watch the cross. If the 
next-, picture is the same as the first one, press the button once; if 
it's different, press it twice. Watch the cross, here it comes... now": 
In the case of one or two of the four year olds. the word 'twice' was 
replaced by 'two times' if it had been found during the practice trials 
that : this was more easily understood - these were children who did not 
know the word 'twice', as confirmed by a parent. 
-. -Immediately after the word "now". the second stimulus was presented 
for 30 milliseconds. This exposure time was set during the pilot tri- 
als, as producing responses approximately 90% of the time and, within 
that. approximately 80% correct responses. 
: The-remote activation of the rear screen illumination by the expe- 
rimenter also triggered the timer, which measured the time taken from 
presentation to the response of the subject. The subject struck the 
morse key once to communicate the response 'same' and twice for 'dif- 
ferent', but in both cases the initial depression broke the circuit and 
stopped the timer. Although it is feasible that a subject could strike 
the--, key once before making the 'same'-'different' decision, this was 
not- considered to be occurring, for two reasons. Firstly, the second 
depression of the button always occurred immediately after the first, 
except where the subject changed his mind. Secondly, subjects were not 
told that the timer was stopped by an identical process whether they 
struck the key once or twice; they could not see the timer during a 
trial and the circuitry was not explained to them. 
The experimenter always checked the response with the subject to 
ensure that he had not mistakenly pressed or failed to press the key 
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for a second time. A note was kept of both initial and' amended respon- 
ses. but only the amended ones were used in the analysis. as there was 
no indication that the decision itself had been altered, only that the 
wrong response code had been used. 
Subjects were praised equally for all responses and were not given 
any indication of how many correct decisions they had made. Wherever 
possible subjects were not told how many more trials there were to go. 
but in a very small number of cases it was necessary to say "only a few 
more" in order to encourage the subject to continue with the test. 
Responses considered at the time to be grossly outside the charac- 
teristic response-time range for that subject (e. g. over 2.5 seconds 
for a subject characteristically responding in 0.9-1.5 seconds), as 
well as defaulted trials, were readministered at the end of the sessi- 
on10. 
A routine of changing stimulus cards swiftly meant that trials 
could be administered continuously. The subject had time to sit back 
from the tachistoscope, but it was only a matter of seconds before he 
was called upon to begin the next trial. After a set of six trials the 
subject was given a distraction (or 'rest') task to do, which formed 
part of, the handedness or reading-age assessment: The sequence of 
these was as follows: 
Trials 1-6 
Task: draw a circle (2nd session: triangle) and cut it out 
Trials 7-12 
Task: mime using a hammer, eating an apple and brushing teeth; fold 
arms; clasp hands; look through a 'telescope' (cardboard tube) 
Trials 13-18 
Task: catch a ball six times; kick a ball six times 
fr--i-als 19-24 i 
Task: Schonell reading-age assessment 
Retrials as required (maximum 6 before any additional distraction task) 
10.. Because this was done at the time. no information is available regard- 
ing the type of stimulus most often providing such responses. 
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At the end of each of the two sessions of 24 trials (plus retrials) 
the subject received a small chocolate bar. 
After the first session, a parent was asked general questions 
loosely related to handedness (see below). An informal, subjective 
socioeconomic rating was also made by the experimenter, based on type 
and area of residence and father's occupation. This information was 
not used in the analysis as there was only a minimal amount of varia- 
tion; it was observed that the few children from professional families 
who were included in the study tended to have a higher than average 
reading-age in relation to their chronological age. As the influence 
of. reading-age on performance was tested statistically, and as socio- 
economic status was not of immediate interest, this informally observed 
correlation was not subjected to any formal analysis. 
The second session of 24 trials occurred between 3 and 7 days la- 
ter, wherever possible at the same time of day and in the same environ- 
mental conditions. In almost every case, this session took less time 
over all (average c. 40 minutes) than the first (average c. 50 minutes). 
. The -procedure was 
the same, including the picture familiarisation and 
the'practices, but a different stimulus presentation order (semi-random 
& the same for all subjects, as described in section 6: 2.3.3) was used. 
6: 2.5 RESULTS 
6.2.5.1 RESULTS OF THE HANDEDNESS TEST 
The handedness test involved the following exercises: drawing a 
circle or triangle and cutting it out. throwing a ball (six times per 
session). miming eating an apple. hampering a nail and brushing teeth. 
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addition. subjects kicked a ball (six times per session) and used a 
'telescope' to determine foot and eye preference respectively. The 
starting foot was also noted (six times per session) as the child was 
running towards the ball to kick 
it, and also the uppermost arm in arm 
folding and uppermost thumb in hand clasping. Details were gathered of 
familial handedness and, in line with Geschwind's (1983.1985) hypothe- 
sis, also of stuttering, dyslexia, eczema, asthma. 
hayfever and food 
allergies in the subject or immediate family. 
The validity of any in- 
formal scoring on the basis of this wide inventory would be difficult 
to justify, as the relative importance of these different factors is 
not clear. Therefore. the details that had been collected 
in the acti- 
vity part of the assessment were subjected to a scoring procedure modi- 
fied from the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield 1971). This u- 
tilised the following EHI categories: 
2) drawing. 3) throwing. 4) scissors. 5) toothbrush 
i) foot preference, ii) eye preference. 
Two-additional categories were added: 
a) eating, b) hammering. 
Categories (2). (4). (5), (ii). (a) and (b) were scored using one point, 
added either to the left or the right total. 
(3) and (ii) were scored 
as follows: 2-0 for consistent preference; 2-1 for preference but some 
variation; 1-1 for no preference. This was intended to retain the ge- 
neral flavour of the EHI scoring system, even though only eight. rather 
than 12 categories were used. Calculations were the same as for the 
EHI, viz. 100. ((R-L)/(R"L)), but, of course. the figures may only be 
taken as a rough guide because of the alterations made. Scored in the 
above manner, the mean LQ value for the males was +90.00 (decile R. 7). 
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range +57.14-+100; for the females the mean LQ was +94.04 (decile R. 8), 
range +77.78-+100. Like the EHI, this assessment did not take account 
of familial handedness. starting foot or dominant hand and arm in clas- 
ping/folding. All of these manifested considerable variation. Most 
striking was the almost total absence of any subjects who were entirely 
consistent in their use of their right hand, foot and eye and who had 
no sinistral family members. This contrasts with O'Leary's claim to 
have used only boys who were consistent in this respect. 
6: 2.5.2 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
All calculations took into account only those response times (RTs) 
associated with correct identifications of the stimulus type (i. e. cor- 
rect 'same'-'different' judgements). This excluded 3.92% of the re- 
sponses. In addition. the corpus of RTs for each subject was purged of 
outliers by removing times that were more than 
1.5 standard deviations 
from the mean. This removed 13.18% of the remaining data. Thus, just 
over 83% of the total corpus of RT scores was used in the analysis. 
The reason for purging the database of outliers was that there was a 
small , number of 
abnormally slow times attributable to loss of concen- 
tration. As the RT curve was skew, with hardly any abnormally fast 
scores and a low median, the effect of this procedure was to remove on- 
ly the abnormally slow times. as desired. 
Mean reaction times (RTs) are given in Table 6: i. The mean His for 
males and females for left and right presentation are represented in 
Figure 6: 1. As Figure 6: 1 illustrates. the males showed a fairly con- 
sistent, but very small. Right Visual Field Advantage (RVFA); the fe- 
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MALES MEAN AGE COMBINED R L 
4s 4; 08 1.122 1.092 1.153 
5s 5; 06 1.141 1.122 1.161 
6s 6; 08 1.295 1.276 1.313 
7s 7; 08 1.049 1.026 1.073 
8s 8; 04 0.925 0.927 0.923 
FEMALES 
4s 4: 07 1.240 1.277 1.204 
5s 5; 07 1.471 1.471 1.471 
6s 6; 08 1.203 1.205 1.200 
7s 7; 05 1.178 1.168 1.189 
8s 8: 08 0.845 0.854 0.836 
ALL SUBJECTS 
4s 4; 07 1.181 
5s 5; 07 1.306 
6s 6; 08 1.249 
7s 7; 07 1.114 
8s 8; 06 0.885_ 
TABLE 6: i MEAN REACTION TIMES FOR CORRECT RESPONSES (R=RVF presenta- 
tion, L=LVF presentation: N=50.10 in each age group). 
Mean 
RT (secs) 
1.50 
1.40 
1-301, *WA&4R 
1.20 
1.10 
A. G 0. 
1.00, 
- 
0.90 
0.80 
0.70 
45678 
AGE GROUP 
FIGURE 6: 1 MALE AND FEMALE MEAN RTS (SECS) FOR AGEGROUPS 4-8 
RIGHT-AND LEFT VISUAL FIELD PRESENTATIONS 
males did not show a consistent pattern. Figure 6: 11 shows the trend 
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in males towards an RVFA, while the females' VFA appears negligible. 
Mean 
RT (secs) 
1.20 
x. 15 
1.10 
1.05 
1.00 
0.9s , 
0.9c 
FIGURE 6: II OVERALL MEAN RESPONSE TIMES FOR MALES AND FEMALES TO LEFT 
AND RIGHT PRESENTATION (N=50: 25 males, 25 females) 
A repeated measures ANOVA was computed for the two between subjects 
variables sex (male, female) and age (4,5.6,7,8) and the two within sub- 
ject variables side-of-presentation (right, left) and stimulus-type 
(same, different). The apparent sexgroup effect mentioned above was not 
significant, probably due to the large spread of RT scores. However. 
there was a significant age effect F(4.40)=1.10 (p<O. 03). 
The subjects were divided according to two agegroups (age < 7; 6 
and > 7; 6). A two-way interaction of side-of-presentation and stimu- 
lus-type across age and sex approached significance F(1,46)=3.32 (p< 
0.075). Table 6: ii demonstrates the cell values of this interaction. 
STIMULUSTYPE 
SIDE OF SAME DIFFERENT 
PRESEN- RIGHTI 1.138 1.145 
, TATION 
LEFT 1.131 1.173 
TABLE 6: 11 OVERALL MEAN REACTION TIMES FOR COMBINED AGEGROUPS (N=50: 
Each cell value represents a maximum of 12 responses from each child) 
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RIGHT LEFT RIGHT LEFT 
MALES FEMALES 
For the purpose of a third computation the data was redistributed 
according to two reading-age groups: reading-age < 5.5 (7 males and 4 
females) and > 5.5 (18 males and 21 females). A three-way ANOVA (read- 
ing-age group, side-of-presentation and stimulus-type across sex) was 
highly significant, F(1,46)=9.85 (p<O. 003). Figure 6: 111 illustrates 
the interaction of these variables. 
Mean 
RT (secs) 
1.281 
1.23 
1.18 
1.13 
1. O 
FIGURE 6: III SAME AND DIFFERENT FOR LEFT AND RIGHT FOR THE 
READING-AGE GROUPS < 5.5 AND >_ 5.5 
Despite the highly significant interaction. caution is required in 
interpreting the pattern in the graph (Figure 6: 111). This is because 
the cell values used in the calculations from which it is derived are 
not independent, the same subject appearing in all four cells in the 
row. (This was not a problem with the ANOVA calculations, however, be- 
cause a repeated measures test was used). Furthermore, the differences 
are very small: even the greatest one, between the left 'same' scores 
across the two reading-ages is only a matter of 0.158 sec, while the 
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SAME DIFF SAME DIFF SAME DIFF SAME DIFF 
RIGHT LEFT RIGHT LEFT 
READING-AGE < 5.5 READING-AGE > 5.5 
Mean 
RT (secs) 
1-33-- 
1.281.23-- 
1- 131.1F 
1.08 
1.03 
0.98 
FIGURE 6: IV MEAN RTs FOR SAME AND DIFFERENT FOR READING-AGE < 5.5 
Mean 
RT (secs) 
1.33 
1.28 
1.23 
1.18 
1.13 
1. OE 
1.0? 
0.9f 
FIGURE 6: V MEAN RTs FOR SAME AND DIFFERENT FOR READING-AGE > 5.5 
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RIGHT LEFT RIGHT LEFT 
M ALE SFEMALES 
SDSDSDSD 
RIGHT LEFT RIGHT LEFT 
M ALE SFEMALES 
spreads were large; on the other hand, the sample sizes are fairly 
large. Figures 6: IV & 6: V illustrate the same interactions, according 
to sexgroup. 
To see if there was any rhyme-nonrhyme effect in the 'different' 
trials. ANOVA calculations were repeated using only the 'different' re- 
sponses, divided into a 'rhyme' and a 'nonrhyme' group. These calcula- 
tions, which were otherwise the same as those reported above, produced 
no significant main effects and only one significant interaction, for 
rhyme-nonrhyme, sex and age (5 chronological age-groups) across side- 
of-presentation. F(4.40)= 3.44 (p<O. 017); see Figures 6: VI and 6: VII. 
The values relating to these graphs can be found in the Appendix, Table 
A6: i. 
Mean 
RT (secs) 
1.60 
1.50 
i. 4o 
1.30 
1.20 
1.10 MALLS / 
1.001 
0.90 
0.80 
45678 
FIGURE 6: VI NONRHYMES FOR MALES AND FEMALES 
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Mean 
RT (secs) 
1.601 
1.50 
i. 40 
1.30 
1.20 
1.10 
1.00 
0.90 'NZ 
o. 80 
45678 
FIGURE 6: VII RHYMES FOR MALES AND FEMALES 
Finally. subjects were regrouped according to whether or not their 
mean RT was longer for 'different' than 'same' judgements. Figure 6: 
VIII illustrates the mean RTs for these groups. 
Mean 
RT (secs) 
ýý18 
1.17 1.17 
1.16 1.167 
1.15 
F4 
1A4 
1.1? 
FIGURE 6-VIII MEAN RTs ON RHYME AND NONRHYME TRIALS FOR THE 
GROUPS SAME < DIFFERENT AND SAME > DIFFERENT 
321 
RHYME NONRHYME RHYME NONRHYME 
same < different same > different 
}I 
The constrast illustrated in Figure 6: VIII, though striking, is very 
small and was not statistically significant. 
6: 2.5.3 SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
The following results were obtained in the analysis. 
1) There was no statistically significant VFA but there was a nonsig- 
nificant trend in males towards RVFA. 
2) There was a significant age effect, both in calculations involving 
the five agegroups and when subjects were divided into those younger 
than 7; 6 and those 7; 6 or older. 
r ", 
_3) 
The interaction of stimulus-type with side-of-presentation approach- 
ed significance. This was due to a small RVFA in 'different' trials. 
while there was no VFA in 'same' trials. 
4) The interaction of stimulus-type with side-of-presentation and read- 
ing-age group (divided at 5.5) was highly significant. In the lower 
reading-age group, 'different' responses took longer in right presenta- 
tion, 'same's longer in left presentation. In the higher reading-age 
group the opposite was the case. The differences were. however, small. 
5) These patterns were reflected in both sex groups. 
6) Within the 'different' reponse data, there was a significant inter- 
action of rhyme-nonrhyme. sex and age (five groups). 
7) Rhyme reponses took longer than nonrhyme reponses in those subjects 
who also responded faster in 'same' than 'different' trials. Those who 
did not, took longer to respond to nonrhymes than to rhymes. This in- 
teraction was not significant. 
6: 2.6 DISCUSSION 
The lack of any significant VFA corresponds to Kimura & Durnford's 
(1974) findings (see section 6: 2.2 above). It also relates in part to 
Cramer's (1976) results. She found that: 
first graders tend to encode material visually, while fourth grad- 
ers are as likely to encode verbally as visually. (p. 55) 
The equality of RTs was most striking in the females (Figure 6: 11). 
O'Leary found a significant interaction for side-of-presentation and 
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age, reflecting a significant LVFA for his youngest group 
(mean age 
6; 9) and a non-significant RVFA for the older groups (8: 0 and 8; 10). 
No such interaction was observable here; thus, there was no evidence to 
support Cramer's claim regarding first graders (see above). However, 
there was a significant age effect, by virtue of the RTs being shorter 
in the older subjects. In fact. however, the youngest age group was 
not the slowest; female RTs peaked at age 5 and males at age 
6. It is 
possible that this pattern reflects the adoption of a different strate- 
gy at age 5 in the girls and age 6 in the boys. If this were the case. 
the difference in age for the sexes could be attributed to the advanced 
maturational stage of girls relative to boys (cf. Buffery 1971. cited 
in Harris 1978). It is, however, quite possible-that the pattern seen 
in Figure 6: 1 was caused by chance. As each value consists of the mean 
of only five subjects' mean scores, a single 'slow responder' in a 
group could have a considerable influence. 
As in O'Leary's results. a contrast was found in response times for 
'same' and 'different' trials (i. e. for stimulus type) but only his was 
statistically significant. Both experiments elicited more of a VFA in 
the 'different' than in the 'same' trials, but while it was here a con- 
sistent trend towards an RVFA, in O'Leary's results there was a swing 
from LVFA to RVFA in the different responses as a function of increas- 
ing age. O'Leary's prediction was that the presence of rhyming pairs 
would slow the RTs only for RVF presentation; this should have yielded 
an LVFA for 'different' trials. Furthermore. the comparison of rhyme 
with nonrhyme trials should have shown an LVFA for rhymes and no VFA 
for nonrhymes. This was not forthcoming in O'Leary's results. In the 
experiment reported here, although there was a significant interaction 
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of age. sex and rhyme-nonrhyme, this appears to be attributable to the 
faster RTs in males in the youngest age-groups, coupled with the later 
peak in RTs in males than females as described above (see Figures 6: VI 
& 6: VII). Nevertheless, as Figure 6: VIII indicates. there was a non- 
significant tendency for those subjects who took longer to respond to 
'different' than 'same' trials to respond faster to nonrhymes than to 
rhymes, as O'Leary predicted. However, there is a problem in interpre- 
ting this as a 'rhyme effect' because there is no obvious way of ac- 
counting for the opposite trend (i. e. rhymes taking less time) in the 
subjects who responded quicker to 'different' than 'same' trials. This 
question will be raised again presently. 
As there was no changeover in VFA at either age seven (as with 
O'Leary and with Cramer 1976) or age five (as with Conrad 1971). the 
redistribution of subjects according to reading-age was used to search 
for effects relating to educational experience. Underwood (1969) sup- 
ports the view that educational experience may have an effect on the 
perception and memorising of stimuli: 
In a very young child, the associative attributes [of memory] may 
be subordinate to other attributes, particularly the acoustic and 
spatial.... As the child ages, and particularly as he concomitant- 
ly is exposed to successive learning experiences in the school sy- 
stems, the primary attributes developed in learning may change, 
with the associative verbal attributes becoming more and more com- 
mon. (p"571) 
The cut-off point of reading-age - 5.5 was perhaps rather low, consi- 
dering the likely reading-age of the private school children in O'Lea- 
ry's study at age 6; 9. It was selected, however, because it marked the 
general dividing line between pre-school children and school children 
in the York sample. Although it did not offer close correspondence 
with O'Leary's age division, it did enable comparisons with the find- 
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ings of Conrad (1971. cited in O'Leary 1982) and Cramer (1976): 
The... data indicate that visual memory organisation is dominant 
for children just beginning school. but that for fourth graders, 
neither verbal nor visual encoding predominates. (Cramer 1976: 56) 
Furthermore, it roughly separated the pre-peak from the peak and post- 
peak groups (Figure 6: 1). Again, the trends were not significant, but 
a contrast was found (Figure 6: 111). However, this was the opposite to 
what O'Leary predicted: it was the lower reading-age group which showed 
the effect he predicted for the older (supposedly verbal-labelling) 
group, viz. slower 'different' responses during right field presenta- 
tion. 
The 'rhyme effect' thus manifested itself in two puzzling ways. 
Firstly, while rhymes took longer than nonrhymes for those subjects for 
whom 'different' responses also took longer than 'same' responses, they 
took less time in the remaining subjects. Secondly, the 'same'-'dif- 
ferent' effect, attributed by O'Leary to the rhyme variable, was most 
marked in the group with the lowest reading-ages. This would mean that 
the verbal labelling was being carried out by the least educated, in- 
deed virtually- illiterate subjects. Although this is the opposite of 
what O'Leary predicted, it does correspond to the findings of Bach & 
Underwood (1970). who tested second- and sixth-grade children on acou- 
stic and associative attributes in memory. The second graders display- 
ed dominance in the acoustic attribute, the sixth graders in the asso- 
ciative. Although their experiment compared the phonological and se- 
mantic encoding of words, rather than the phonological and visual en- 
coding of pictures, it is of interest that it was the younger group who 
displayed the acoustic dominance. because the results of the experiment 
reported here may be indicating the same thing, i. e. a phonological la- 
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belling. If it were to be the case that this picture memorising was 
approached in the same (general) way as Bach & Underwood's (1970) word 
memorising, then it is possible that the older group were utilising an 
associative rather than a verbal strategy and thus were not affected by 
the rhyme variable. However, this still does not explain the concomi- 
tant findings of the data, namely the slower 'different' responses in 
left field presentation in the higher reading-age group. If Levy's 
(1974) claim that only the left hemisphere can deal with phonological, 
verbal labelling is . to 
be believed (though much discussion has been 
presented regarding this matter: see chapters 3.4 and 5), then the 
'same'-'different' effect cannot be attributed to the rhyme variable-. 
Various general observations can be made regarding the-results re- 
ported above, the design and execution. of the. experiment and the hypo- 
thesis which O'Leary (1982) presented. Firstly, there could be verbal 
labelling which was not phonological but semantic. (This might corres- 
pond in some way to the associative attribute of memory mentioned a- 
bove). In that case. the rhyme variable would have no effect. Howev- 
er, an RVFA might be expected for those subjects employing such a stra- 
tegy and there was none. 
Secondly, a phonological verbal strategy could operate without be- 
ing affected by rhyme. if only the first picture was labelled. The 
same-different judgement could be effected by means of the question 'Is 
that [2nd picture] an x? '. One informal observation supports this. 
The subjects often verbalised their response as ': yes" or "no" rather 
than "same" or "different" during the routine check on their intended 
judgement. On the other hand, the. subjects often proffered gratuitous- 
ly the names of the two pictures they had seen. This would not neces- 
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sarily have been easy for them if they only had the information 'not an 
x'. though it is possible that they retrieved the information from some 
visual trace only after they had made their response. The slower re- 
sponse to 'different' suggests that some extra step was required in the 
decision and this might most obviously be the identification. whether 
by form or verbal label, of the second stimulus. As such an identifi- 
cation was not required for the completion of the task. we may hypothe- 
sise that this step was necessary for the decision because of the par- 
ticular strategy employed. It is equally compatible with the Focus- 
ing Hypothesis that a far more complex pattern of strategies than a 
simple binary opposition would be in operation. The association of 
changes in strategy with sex and reading-age is in keeping with sub- 
ject-type being a decisive variable as discussed in chapter 5: 2. Con- 
versely. if it is argued (as in chapter 5: 2) that educational experi- 
ence plays a major röle in paring down the strategy option range, then 
that range might be wider and the choices less principled in children 
of primary school age than older subjects. In that case, individual 
variation would be so great as to defy the useful grouping of subjects. 
One individual might employ different strategies on different trials, 
and. conversely. a variety of strategies might lie behind the most ap- 
parently systematic of findings, an artifact of the experimental de- 
sign. Equally, wide ranging and erratic patterns of RTs could result 
from alterations in the relative weight of affective factors and in at- 
tention (cf. chapter 4: 1.2). such that the VFAs in studies like this 
were as good as random. This only highlights the inevitable shortcom- 
ings of conducting an experiment on such a young population. It is i- 
ronic, but, of course, fundamental to the very argument presented in 
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this thesis, that the design of response time psycholinguistic experi- 
ments 'is such that probably only analytically trained and highly moti- 
vated adult subjects can be relied upon not to confound the results 
with extraneous variables like attentional fluctuation; this was, seen 
retrospectively, probably the largest single random variable in the ex- 
periment reported here. One observation, then, is clear: there are ex- 
perimental designs which may, by their very nature, preclude their re- 
liable use on all but somewhat unrepresentative subgroups of the popu- 
lation. 
L3 EXPERIMENT II 
INVESTIGATION OF POSSIBLE STRATEGY DIFFERENCES IN COMPLETING A 
PROPOSITIONAL AND A NON-PROPOSITIONAL LINGUISTIC TASK USING MONAURAL 
BLOCK PRESENTATION 
6: 3.1 AIM 
The Focusing Hypothesis draws a distinction between the kind of 
linguistic stimuli commonly used in psycholinguistic experiments and 
the language of normal communicational interaction. It suggests that 
an experimental subject is not usually called upon to exercise the dual 
system for processing which is operational during communicative inter- 
action because (a) the task does not require propositional evaluation, 
(b) the circumstances of the experiment encourage focus on a lower le- 
vel of input and/or output and (c) the subject is probably drawn from 
the small but convenient population of educationally successful indivi- 
duals, i. e. university students. 
The purpose of the following experiment was to compare two types of 
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linguistic task, one of which required only a (spoken) reaction to what 
was heard and the other of which required a response resulting from 
propositional decoding and evaluation. It was hypothesised that, given 
appropriate conditions, which freed the strategy option range suffici- 
ently, different strategies might be selected for each task. The word 
repetition task, which did not require nor, practically speaking, per- 
mit propositional evaluation, was predicted to attract a language-fo- 
cused strategy. -while the one requiring propositional evaluation would 
require a proposition-focused strategy, either with or without holistic 
decoding. 
As noted in the discussion in Chapter 5: 2, however, a contrast be- 
tween two types of linguistic task administered in standard psycholin- 
guistic conditions would only be found if the task variable were stron- 
ger than the Other variables, which might otherwise combine to narrow 
the range of strategy options too much to permit the tasks to be dif- 
ferently approached. Rather than drastically altering the experimental 
conditions, which would preclude satisfactory comparisons with other 
studies, a monotic block presentation was chosen instead of the more 
customary dichotic and random one. Monotic presentation-has a number 
of advantages over dichotic. On the purely practical level it is easi- 
er to prepare the stimulus tapes as there is no need to align onset be- 
tween two channels. The subject is submitted to a rather less stress- 
ful task, as he is not fighting to perceive and deal with two simulta- 
neous contrasting inputs or to actively ignore one in favour of the ot- 
her. Furthermore, as Haydon & Spellacy (1974) point out, work by Bak- 
ker (1967,1968,1969,1970), Murphy & Venables (1970) and Doerhing (1972) 
contradicts Kimura's (1964: 357) assertion that auditory functional a- 
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symmetry can only be found in conditions of stimulus competition 
(flay- 
don& Spellacy 1974: 288; see also Dimond 1972: 156-7). 
When combined with block presentation, the monotic listening test 
appears to have the advantage of commencing at a base-line neutral for 
attentional factors. The intrusion of attention, which may be respons- 
ible for some or all of the characteristic dichotic listening test pat- 
tern of REA for language (Shadden & Peterson 1981) has been suggested 
to be salient by Kinsbourne (1978). He proposed that in a verbal task' 
the expectation of verbal stimuli sets up an attentional bias to the 
right side of space (p. 10). If the experiment reported here had been 
dichotic, the prediction made by the Focusing Hypothesis would have 
been that of the two verbal tasks administered, only. in the non-propo- 
sitional one would an attentional bias to the right have been advanta- 
geous; in the propositional task it would have led to a high load upon 
the analytic mechanisms as they dealt with the linguistic decoding and 
the propositional evaluation. Haydon & Spellacy (1974) found that, in 
the monotic presentation of speech stimuli, an REA obtained only when 
presentation was random with respect to ear. When ear presentation was 
in blocks, the ear advantage disappeared. This was considered to indi- 
cate that attention to the right side of space was less a function of 
the task being verbal than of this being the default state of alert- 
ness. This corresponds to the association made by the Focusing Hypo- 
thesis between the left hemisphere and analysis or. more particularly, 
focus for attention. Shadden & Peterson (1981) compared ear superiori- 
ty patterns in a monotic presentation of verbal stimuli in the two con- 
ditions of random and block presentation. In the random presentation 
there was a non-significant REA; in the expected condition ten of the 
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11 subjects displayed an LEA. This latter correlated negatively with 
the same subjects' ear -advantage pattern in dichotic presentation. 
Shadden & Peterson's two potential explanations for this both hinge on 
the greater simplicity of a monotic over a dichotic task. The first 
account is that in a simple auditory task the ipsilateral pathways play 
an increased role (p. 186). However. this is not in keeping with the 
fact that the ipsilateral pathways are still considered to be inferior 
to the contralateral ones (Gazzaniga 1967); although increased ipsilat- 
eral involvement might reduce the size of an REA, it should not be able 
to reverse it. 
Their second account is that when the left hemisphere is presented 
with a simple task to-do which involves linguistic stimuli. it tends to 
over-react and to subject them to more analysis than is necessary. In 
that case. the right hemisphere woild display an advantage in the task 
because it was not equipped to do such analysis (p. 186-7). The general 
corpus of psycholinguistic evidence regarding the right hemisphere's 
ability to deal with language at some levels (see chapter 3: 5.3) sup- 
ports the notion that the right hemisphere would not at any rate have 
any trouble coping with a straightforward perception of and reaction to 
linguistic stimuli of the standard type. 
By the use of monotic block presentation in this experiment it was 
hoped to remove the effects of a default attentional bias to the right. 
and to come a little closer to measuring the actual efficiency of the 
contralateral (and perhaps ipsilateral) connections of ear and brain. 
6: 3.2 DESIGN 
6: 3.2.1 TASKS 
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In- the propositional task the subject was required to respond to 
statements with a spoken (later written) judgement of TRUE, FALSE or 
DON'T KNOW. The score was the number of incorrect responses as judged 
by the subject himself. In the non-propositional task the subject was 
asked to list, verbally, the last three words of the statement in re- 
verse order. This task was designed as a result of observations made 
with pilot subjects (not included in the analysis); trial tasks admini- 
stered to pilot subjects included naming the initial letter of the fi- 
nal word (too easy). of the final two words (too easy) and of the final 
three words (too difficult). Listing the final two words of the state- 
ment in reverse order was also too easy; three words gave a performance 
level high enough to leave subjects encouraged but low enough to pro- 
vide a suitable number of errors or defaults for the analysis. 
6: 3.2.2 SUBJECTS 
17 male and 20 female students at the University of York acted as 
subjects in the experiment. Most were in the age range 19-24 (14 
males, 13 females). The remainder were in the ranges under 19 (3-fe- 
males), 25-35 (2 males, 2 females) and over 35 (1 male, 2 females). 14 
(2 males and 12 females) were students of linguistics or psychology. 4 
(2 males and 2 females) of social science subjects, education or langu- 
age teaching, 7 (6 males, 1 female) of science. including maths and e- 
conomics, and 12 (7 males and 5 females) of humanities (music, philoso- 
phy, English and history). with the largest group being music students 
(5 males and 2 females). The distribution of the sexes across the sub- 
jects reflects the general trend in the student population at York. 
All subjects were right-handed. scoring over LQ +60 (decile R. 2) on 
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the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield 1971). Mean EHI scores 
were +87.15 (decile - -R. 6) for males (range +61.54 '- +100) and +88.57 
(decile R. 7) for females (range +66.67 - +100). No subjects had any 
known major hearing defect. 
6: 3.2.3 MATERIAL 
80 sentences were constructed on the subject of The University of 
York. 40 constituted statements which were true and 40 that were false 
(see Appendix, A6: 2), to the best knowledge of the experimenter". A 
second set of 80 sentences was similarly constructed; on the subject of 
The City of York. The reason for using subject matter which referred 
to trivial. ' local matters rather than general knowledge was'to avoid 
subjects feeling embarrassed about not knowing some of 
the facts in 
question. 
The statements were tested out on a small number of volunteers 
whose knowledge of the City and/or University was as good, if not bet- 
ter. than that of the subjects. They were invited to comment on the 
truth and clarity of the statements, and a number of amendments were 
made on that basis. The mean number of words in each subject set of 80 
sentences was 8.68 (range 5- 14). Each set was divided in half to 
11. In the course of the weeks during which the experiment was prepared 
and administered. two statements changed their value: City (C) 61 and 
University (U) 66. The latter concerned the closest supermarket to 
the Campus changing its name. Subjects who knew of this appear, with- 
out exception, to have assumed that the experimenter did not, and re- 
acted accordingly. The statement 'The closest supermarket to the Uni- 
versity Campus is Hillards", although literally speaking false, would 
have been, in the pragmatic circumstances of its falsity, meaningless, 
seeing as. with its takeover. there was no supermarket in the whole 
city with that name. The clear and spontaneous response of the sub- 
jects faced with this dilemma was to make allowances for what the 
statement was intended to mean. 
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form Groups A and B. Each Group retained the same mean word length and 
an equal number of 'true'and false statements. 
Groups A and B of each set were then further subdivided into 30 
test items and 10 foils. Only the test items were used in the analy- 
sis. There was no qualitative difference between the sentences used as 
test items and those used as foils. In Group A, which was tobe pre- 
sented first, all 10 foils preceded the test items and acted as prac- 
tice trials. In Group B. presented second and to the other-ear. five 
foils preceded the-test items to allow for subjects becoming accustomed 
to the new ear presentation. The other five followed the test items, 
to reduce the impact of any fatigue or relief effect. 
Foils were balanced for true-false values and word length. In ad- 
dition.. the sentences were balanced with respect to the 'constituent 
structure of the last group of three words. as this was potentially 
pertinent to the difficulty of the non-propositional task. In the City 
of York set, there were 9 incomplete constituents (e. g. (1) below). 
which all appeared in the test items, 5 in Group A and 4 in Group B. 
1)(C42) [The Minster took about two hundred and fifty] years to build. 
2)(U56) [The nearest University town to] York is Hull. 
3)(U48) [Wentworth is the most] recently built college. 
In the' University of York set, there were 19 incomplete constituents 
(e. g. (2)-(3) above), of which 2 appeared in Group A foils, 7 in Group A 
test items, 2 in Group B foils and 8 in Group B test items. The fact 
that there were more incomplete constituents in the University set was 
not considered to be important, as the analysis did not include any 
comparison of the two sets. 
Neither set contained more than 10% of statements considered to be 
334 
likely to evoke a visuo-spatial response (e. g. xis next to y). - but be- 
cause of the other balancing procedures, it was not possible to distri- 
bute these equally across Groups nor, within Groups, across test items 
and foils. 
The sentences were recorded onto ordinary cassette tapes, preceded 
by instructions (see Appendix. A6: 3). The sentences were all spoken at 
a moderate to fast speed by the same female voice. Each sentence was 
immediately followed by a bell, which indicated that it had finished. 
The next sentence began no more than 1 second after the bell marking 
the end of the previous one. Four master tapes were compiled (see Ap- 
pendix. A6: 4), to accommodate both orderings of the tasks and both sets 
of sentences. The ear presentation variable was operated independently 
of the tapes. by means of written instructions. 
The test was administered in a language laboratory in the Depart- 
ment of Language and Linguistic Science, University of York. The la- 
boratory booths did not permit stereo reception, so the monaural pre- 
sentation was effected by inserting suitable padding into one earphone. 
The subjects recorded their responses on a separate track of the tape, 
using the student record- facility. 
6: 3.3 PROCEDURE 
A maximum of four subjects were tested at any one time. They sat 
at non-adjacent individual booths equipped with a cassette player and 
headphones. The headphones had been padded on one side to prevent bin- 
aural (monophonic) output. All subjects first received written instru- 
ctions describing the general nature of the experiment (Appendix. A6: 
3). They were told that the experiment was about listening to how sen- 
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tences -sound while ignoring their meaning. The non-propositional task 
was'referred to as the experimental tes t12. The propositional task was 
mentioned briefly and was defined as a control task. It was referred 
to as the quiz. The reason for introducing the tasks in this precise 
way was to heighten the subject's awareness of the non-propositional 
task as a linguistic test, and suppress a similar perception of the 
propositional task. To aid the latter, the subjects were given the im- 
pression that the quiz was being made as easy as possible. by permit- 
ting them to choose the set of statements on which they felt they could 
perform better. The subjects were also told that there was to be a 
prize for the person who made the most correct responses in the quiz. 
This was hoped to-act as an incentive to concentrate on the proposi- 
tional content of the sentences in that part of the experiment. Last- 
ly, they were told that although it was advantageous for them to score 
as highly as possible on the aural presentation, they would have the 
opportunity to improve their score afterwards. When they did the non- 
propositional task the subjects were told that there would be no oppor- 
tunity to improve on their score, so it was important that they concen- 
trate as hard as possible. Also, they were specifically advised that 
there was no need to pay any attention to the meaning of the sentences 
whose final words they were repeating. 
Subjects selected their preferred theme for the quiz and they were 
assigned an appropriate tape. They had already been allotted to one of 
four groups, varying for both side of initial presentation and task 
order. Subjects in the two 'propositional (quiz) task first' (PTF) 
groups received tape A if they elected to do the quiz on the University 
12. Only the non-propositional task was referred to as a 'test' 
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and tape B if on the City. Subjects doing the non-propositional task 
first (NTF), received tape D for the University quiz of tape C for the 
City quiz (see Appendix, A6: 4). Their group-specific written instruc- 
tions specified which ear to put the working earphone to first and the 
experimenter checked that this instruction had been adhered to. The 
initial instruction sheet also contained general information about the 
operation of the equipment (see Appendix, A6: 3). 
The tape was fitted by the experimenter into the booth machine and 
tested for clarity. The master volume level was set at 7 (of 10) and 
subjects were told that that they could alter it as they wished. The 
purpose of this was to retain some leeway should one ear be weaker than 
the other...... However, as the tape was not particularly-loud, and. the 
tasks were complex.. once the volume was raised to maximum ft tended to 
be kept there. The use of the earphones was explained to the subject. 
because their design was such that the microphone could easily be moved 
from its position near the mouth. 
Then the subject received a new set of instructions (Appendix. A6: 
3) as relevant to the task to be undertaken first. The instructions 
'for the non-propositional task told the subject to repeat the last 
three words of each sentence in reverse order and an example was given. 
There was a warning that halfway through the task they would be in- 
structed on the tape to turn their headphones round. The propositional 
task instructions required the subject to respond to each statement 
with the words TRUE, FALSE or DON'T KNOW. All details not specific to 
one task were identical on both sets of written instructions. 
The subjects commenced the experiment in their own time. The tape 
began with a reminder of the instructions and then, after a short 
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pause. the sentences began. Responses were recorded onto a separate 
track of the tape and the subjects did not. need to take any action to 
effect this after starting the tape. They were not permitted to-replay 
the tape or to switch it off until' they received instructions to that 
effect. s:, 
After 40 sentences they were told to change their earphones round 
and to stop the tape while they did so. Immediately after this 
instru- 
ction were the words "You should now have changed your earphones round 
which acted as a check. In addition, the experimenter watched 
the subjects to ensure that they did so. They were then told that the 
task would continue as before. and the remaining 
40 sentences were pre- 
sented. 
At 'the end of the task they were instructed on the tape to switch 
off the machine and raise their hand. They then received a written 
task to do. The non-propositional task was always followed by a que- 
stionnaire. which enquired about the subject's University and A-level 
study, age and handedness (Edinburgh Handedness Inventory). The pro- 
positional task was followed by a written version of the same quiz that 
they had just heard on tape. The statements were in a different order. 
which was the same for all subjects. The instructions required them to 
fill in the letters T( TRUE), F (FALSE) or DK (DON'T KNOW) after each 
statement. They were told that this exercise was to help them improve 
their quiz score and so they should answer to the best of their abili- 
typ irrespective of whether they had given the same response in the 
taped version. 
When the written task was completed. the experimenter presented the 
written instructions appropriate to the second task and the procedure 
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was repeated for this. 
The whole experiment took 40-45 minutes. The subjects' responses 
were transcribed the same day onto a specially prepared checklist which 
gave the statements in the same order as they appeared on the tape. 
The tape was then ready to be used again, with the new responses over- 
recording the old ones. The student track of the tapes was, neverthe- 
less, periodically cleaned by running the 'record' function with the 
microphone disconnected. 
6: 3.4 RESULTS 
6: 3.4.1 SCORING 
The propositional task was scored by counting up the number of dis- 
agreements between a subject's taped responses and subsequent written 
ones. It was assumed that the latter would most accurately represent 
what the subject really believed to be true and that taped responses 
which were different would reflect limitations on the efficiency of ev- 
aluating propositions at speed. No distinction in scoring was made be- 
tween a change from TRUE to FALSE. FALSE to TRUE or to or from DON'T 
KNOW, because the most obvious reponse to make if a proposition could 
not be suitably evaluated in the tape condition was DON'T KNOW. The 
actual number of correct responses was also calculated, but this was 
only used for the purpose of finding the highest score. The winning 
subject subsequently received a prize. 
The non-propositional task was scored as follows. Only the first 
three words of the subject's response were taken into account except in 
obvious cases of repair. Two points were awarded for a correct word in 
the correct position. One point was awarded for a correct word in the 
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incorrect' position. For example: 
STIMULUS RESPONSE SCORE 
4)(C23)... site of a Roman gateway. gateway, Roman. a 6 
5)(C15)... have a war memorial. memorial, war, not 4 
6)(C73)... ten miles from York. York, from 4 
7)(C61)... is open every Sunday. Woolworths, open, Sunday 2 
If a word such as 'gateway' ((4) above) was treated as two words. this 
was permitted, so that the response 'way, gate, Roman' would also receive 
six points. But. despite the frequency of its occurrence in subjects' 
responses. 'two hundred' was not permitted to count as one word: 
STIMULUS RESPONSE SCORE 
8)(C1)... two hundred years old. old. years, two hundred 4 
This scoring system was not without its problems. Most notably. 
the following configurations attracted scores which seemed misrepresen- 
tative: 
e 
STIMULUS RESPONSE SCORE 
9)(C63) ... became the Roman Emperor. Emperor. became, the 4 
10)(C12) ... due south of York. south, of. York 
4 
11)(C12) ... due south of York. south, York, of 3 
12)(C18) ... the Merchant Adventurers' Hall Adventurers', Merchant, the 2 
However, other scoring systems which were considered (e. g. 1 point per 
word, regardless of position; 1 point per word in correct position) had 
their own shortcomings. In retrospect it might have been better to ap- 
ply the slightly more complex criterion of only awarding position 
points if no extraneous word intervened. Thus. (9) above would have 
been awarded 3 points. not 4. The niceties of the scoring system are 
most relevant to the relationship which responses had to constituent 
structure configurations. Therefore, the system would only have been 
unfair across subjects if different subjects either responded according 
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to differently perceived constituent structure patterns or, and more in 
line with the hypotheses under examination in this chapter, if some 
subjects adopted a strategy which dealt in constituents and others did 
not. It might be argued, then, that the scoring system was potentially 
biased in a crucial way. On the other hand, if such inter-subject dif- 
ferences were of a significant order, then they would. by very virtue 
of appearing as score differences, be highlighted by such a bias; in 
other words, the bias could be advantageous because strategy differen- 
ces are of primary interest to the analysis. However, the bias would 
only be advantageous if those strategy differences were associated with 
specific, recognised subgroups of the subject sample (see below). 
6.3.4.2 ANALYSIS 
As the subjects were permitted to choose which set of statements to 
use for the quiz the groups were not balanced in this respect. 10 males 
and 14 females used the University statements for the propositional 
task (quiz) (tapes A& D) and 7 males and 6 females used the City list. 
9 males and 11 females did the propositional task first and 8 males and 
9 females did it second. 
The potential range of scores on the propositional task was 0-30 
per ear and on the non-propositional task 0-180. The actual ranges 
were 1-19 and 33-180 respectively. The scores on the propositional 
task increased with decreasing accuracy, whereas those on the non-pro- 
positional task increased with increasing accuracy. Therefore, all the 
propositional task scores were given negative values. 
The individual scores are given in Table A6: iii in the Appendix. 
The mean scores were as follows: 
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PROPOSITIONAL TASK NON-PROPOSITIONAL TASK 
RLRL. 
MALES(n=17) -5.76 -6.88 109.65 109.24 
FEMALES (n=20) -4.85 -6.45 122.15 125.60 
TABLE 6: iii TABLE 6: iv 
As Tables 6: iii and 6: iv indicate, the females performed better on both 
tasks. Both males and females displayed an apparent right ear advan- 
tage on the propositional task but no ear advantage on the non-proposi- 
tional task. In a matched pairs t-test (one-tailed) on the right and 
left scores in the propositional task t was not significant for the 
males but it was for the females (p<O. 05). 
Table 6: v shows the number of individuals displaying an REA and an 
LEA in each task and Table 6: iv the distributions of the EA combina- 
tions across the two tasks. 
PROPOSITIONAL TASK NON-PROPOSITIONAL TASK 
REA 99- 
MALES LEA 58 
no EA 30 
REA 12 9 
FEMALES LEA 7 10 
no EA 11 
TABLE 6: v 
MALES 
FEMALES 
RA FOR PROPOSITIONAL(P1 AND NON-PROPROPOSITIONAi. (N1 TASK 
P=REA. N=REA P=REA, N=LEA P=LEA, N=LEA P=LEA N=REA N/A 
4 5 2 3 3 
6 6 4 2 2 
TABLE. -6-. vi 
Table 6: vii redistributes these for task order. 
MALES 
FEMALES 
FA FOR F7RST(1) AMl SFC: ( n(2 TASK 
1=REA. 2=REA 1=REA. 2=LEA 1=LEA. 2=LEA 1=LEA. 2=REA N/A 
4 4 2 4 3 
6" 6 4 2 2 
TABLE 6: vii 
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A chi-squared test on the proportion of subjects with an LEA in the 
propositional task (see table 6: v for these figures) did not reach sig- 
nificance (males: chi-squared = 2.882. d. f. =1; females: chi-squared 
1.8. d. f. =1). 
A four factor analysis of variance (repeated measures) was calcula- 
ted separately for each task, using the within subject factor side-of- 
presentation and the between subject factors sex, task-order-and ear- 
order. For neither task were there any significant interactions. but 
in the within subjects analysis for non-propositional task the interac- 
tion between side-of-presentation and ear-order approached signifi- 
cance, F(1.29)=3.22 (p<O. 083) (see Figures 6: IX and 6: X). 
MEAN 
SCORES 
-3 
-4 
-5 
-6 
-7 - 
-8 
REF = RIGHT EAR FIRST 
LEF = LEFT EAR FIRST 
R= RIGHT EAR SCORE 
L= LEFT EAR SCORE 
FIGURE 6: IX MEAN SCORES FOR RIGHT EAR FIRST (REF) APD LEFT EAR 
FIRST (LEF) FOR THE PROPOSITIONAL TASK1 
13. The purpose of using negative figures displayed in this way is to en- 
able visual comparisons to be made between the results from the two 
tasks. In both cases the highest column represents the best score. 
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RLRL 
REF LEF 
MEAN 
SCORES 
122 
120 
118 
116 
114 
1] 
112 
FIGURE 6: X MEAN SCORES FOR RIGHT EAR FIRST (REF) AND LEFT EAR 
FIRST (LEF) FOR THE NON-PROPOSITIONAL TASK 
Figures 6: IX and 6: X demonstrate that in both tasks the REF and the LEF 
groups had the same mean score for their first ear. In the proposi- 
tional task the second ear performed worse if it was the left and bet- 
ter if it was the right. In the non-propositional task the second ear 
always performed better, whichever it was. 
REF = RIGHT EAR FIRST 
LEF = LEFT EAR FIRST 
R= RIGHT EAR SCORE 
L= LEFT EAR SCORE 
Scores were overall better in the group who received the non-propo- 
sitional task first (Figures 
6: XI and 6: XII). 
-5 
-6 
125 
125.206 
_7 
115 
105 
PTF NTF PTF NTF 
FIGURE 6: XI FIGURE 6: XII 
MEAN SCORES ACROSS SEX AND SIDE OF PRESENTATION FOR THE GROUPS 
PROPOSITIONAL TASK FIRST (PTF) AND NON-PROPOSITIONAL TASK FIRST (NTF) 
IN THE PROPOSITIONAL TASK (FIGURE 6: XI) AND THE NON-PROPOSITIONAL TASK 
(FIGURE 6: XII) 
Order of task presentation had no effect in the females but in the 
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RLRL 
REF LEF 
males the group receiving the propositional task first performed less 
well in both tasks (Figures 6: XIII and 6: XIV). The male-female differ- 
ence (averaged across right and left scores) was not significant in a 
one-tailed t-test for the propositional task but it was significant (p< 
0.025) for the non-propositional task. 
MEAN 
SCORES 
-4 1 
-5 
-6 
-7 
-8 
a 
FIGURE 6: XIII MEAN SCORES IN THE PROPOSITIONAL TASK, ACROSS SIDE OF 
PRESENTATION FOR PROPOSITIONAL TASK FIRST (PTF) AND NON- 
PROPOSITIONAL TASK FIRST (NTF) FOR MALES AND FEMALES 
NON 
SCORES 
130 
120 12E 
110 
100 
9p .1 
FIGURE 6: XIV MEAN SCORES FOR THE NON-PROPOSITIONAL TASK, ACROSS SIDE 
OF PRESENTATION FOR PROPOSITIONAL TASK FIRST (PTF) AND 
NON-PROPOSITIONAL TASK FIRST (NTF) FOR MALES AND FEMALES 
.., 
Finally, the subjects were allocated, according to their A-level 
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PTF NTF PTF NTF 
MALES FEMALES 
PTF NTF PTF NTF 
MALES FEMALES 
subjects. to a sciences or a humanities group. Those with mixed A-lev- 
els (e. g. French, Biology & Geography) were classified according to 
their University studyi4. Only two female subjects fell into the sci- 
ences category, but the males were split equally, with eight in the hu- 
inanities and nine in the sciences group. Because of this distribution. 
analysis was restricted to the male subjects. 
Scores were significantly better for the sciences than the human! - 
ties group in the propositional task, as indicated by a one-tailed t- 
test using scores averaged over right and left presentation (p(0.025). 
The difference was not significant for the non-propositional task. Fi- 
gures 6: XV and 6: XVI illustrate the relationships of side-of-presenta- 
tion, task and A-level group, revealing a greater tendency towards an 
REA for both tasks in the humanities than the sciences group. The sci- 
ences group indeed have a trend towards an LEA on the non-propositional 
task. 
-4 
-5 
-6 
-7 
-8 
-9 
-10 
FIGURE 6: XV RIGHT AND LEFT EAR SCORES FOR HUMANITIES AND SCIENCE 
GROUPS (MALES ONLY, N=17) IN THE PROPOSITIONAL TASK 
14. In this context linguistics was treated as a humanities subject. 
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RLRL 
HUMANITIES SCIENCES 
120 
116 
112 
108 
lo4 
100 
96 
RLRL 
HUMANITIES SCIENCES 
FIGURE 6: XVI RIGHT AND LEFT EAR SCORES FOR HUMANITIES AND SCIENCE 
GROUPS (MALES ONLY. N=17) IN THE NON-PROPOSITIONAL TASK 
As the A-level groups were not balanced for task presentation order 
(humanities: 6 of 8 had PTF; sciences: 3 of 9 had PTF) it is important 
to compare Figure 6: XV with a breakdown of the task-order pattern for 
the propositional task (Figure 6: XIII) for right and left presentation 
(Figure 6: XVII). 
-4 
-5 
-6 
-7 
-8 
-9 RLRL 
PTF NTF 
FIGURE T: XVII RIGHT AND LEFT SCORES FOR THE PROPOSITIONAL TASK FOR THE 
GROUPS PROPOSITIONAL TASK FIRST (PTF) AND NONPROPOSI- 
TIONAL TASK FIRST (NTF) (MALES-ONLY, N=17) 
The similarity of the pattern in Figures 6: XV and 6: XVII indicates that 
probably only one or other of the variables is decisive. 
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Dealing still only with the males' scores, a four factor analysis 
of variance (repeated measures) for the propositional task did not re- 
veal any significant interactions. For the non-propositional task. in 
the between-subjects tests there was a significant main effect for A- 
level group, F(1.9)=5.83 (p<0.039), but there was also a significant 
three-way interaction of A-level group, task-order and ear-order, 
F(1,9)=8.02 (p<0.02). which devalues the former. On the other hand, 
the cells for the three-way interaction contained only between one and 
three values and a complex pattern of inter-relationships could easily 
occur just because of the idiosyncracies of individual scores. 
6: 3.4.3 SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
1) The females scored better than the males on both tasks. 
2) Males and females both displayed an REA on the propositional task 
and this was significant for the females (p<O. 05). 
3) There was no ear advantage for males or females on the non-proposi- 
tionäl task. 
4) Five out of 17 males and seven out of 20 females had an LEA in the 
propositional task. This difference did not reach significance. 
5) There were no significant interactions between right and left 
scores, sex, task-order and ear-order on the propositional task. 
6) On the non-propositional task the interaction between right and lef t 
scores and ear-order approached significance (p(O. 083). 
7) The mean score for the first ear to receive the stimulus was the 
same for both ear order groups. This was true for both tasks. In the 
propositional task, the second ear score was worse if it was the left 
ear, but better if it was the right. In the non-propositional task. 
the second ear was always better. 
8) The males who did the propositional task first performed worse on 
both tasks than those who did it second. This difference between task- 
order groups was significant (p(O. 025) for the non-propositional task. 
9) Amongst the males, those who had specialised in sciences at A-level 
performed better than those who had specialised in humanities. This 
difference was significant (p(O. 025) for the propositional task. 
348 
10) The male humanities group displayed more of a trend towards an REA 
in both tasks than did the male science group. The science group dis- 
played a trend towards an LEA in the non-propositional task. 
11) These A-level groupings largely coincided with the task order grou- 
pings, which displayed the same pattern (males only). 
12) The main effect for A-level group (males only) was significant in 
the non-propositional task (p<0.039) but the interaction between A-lev- 
el group, task-order and ear-order was also significant (p(0.02). 
6: 3.5 DISCUSSION 
As subjects were no* more likely to display an REA for a given task 
than an LEA or no EA (Table 6: v), analysis using means of whole (e. g. 
sex) groups have very limited value. Subgroups, on the other hand. 
might reveal patterns because they separate out salient factors. 
The hypothesis under examination in this experiment was that a pro- 
positional task would be most efficiently done with the combined invol- 
vement of the left and right hemispheres, but a non-propositional task 
with the exclusive operation of the left hemisphere. Two potential 
configurations were predicted. The first was of a strong right ear ad- 
vantage for the non-propositional task and a less strong REA or an LEA 
for the propositional task. The second, based on Shadden & Peterson's 
(1981) work was that the non-propositional task would show no ear su- 
periority, or even perhaps a slight LEA because the simplicity of the 
task was used to advantage only by the right hemisphere. The predic- 
tion for the propositional task depended upon the stance taken regard- 
ing the involvement of the right hemisphere in the decoding of proposi- 
tional utterances; the standard theory of left lateralisation for lan- 
guage would predict an REA, while the Focusing Hypothesis would predict 
no EA or a slight LEA. 
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The Focusing Hypothesis does not, therefore, fare very well. With 
regard to the first predicted configuration, it was the propositional 
task, not the non-propositional one that showed most signs of an REA. 
Shadden & Peterson's predictions, of no EA for the non-propositional 
task and an REA for the propositional task were best borne out by the 
data. 
Balancing for order of presentation is a standard procedure in ex- 
perimental design, but work by Kimura (Kimura & Durnford 1974: 39) 
amongst others has indicated that checks do need to be made to ensure 
that the results are not being biased by differential influences within 
such variables. It is not surprising. in the light of the discussion 
in chapter 1: 9 and 5 regarding the strategy option range to find that 
ear advantage may be affected by subject specific and circumstantial 
factors. The ear-order bias seen here may have had less to do with 
strategy adoption, at least directly, than a simple practice effect; in 
the non-propositional task overall performance was better for the se- 
cond ear of presentation. But this did not hold for the propositional 
task, where the right ear scored better, irrespective of order. Anoth- 
er possible explanation is that there was a selective priming effect. 
. 
The Focusing Hypothesis predicts a certain pattern if the first ear 
of presentation did have some priming effect. In the propositional 
task, two processing routes would be potentially available. one incor- 
porating holistic decoding up to propositional level (right and left 
hemisphere operation) and the other employing only the analytic mechan- 
isms (left hemisphere only). Where left ear presentation was first. 
the most economical operation would be to allow the right hemisphere to 
deal with the linguistic decoding. When the ear presentation changed 
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halfway through the task. this would no longer be the best option, and 
fuli analytic processing would take over. When right ear presentation 
was first, analytic processing would be adopted and, on the changeover 
to left ear presentation, the strategy already adopted would be retain- 
ed, despite the possibility of the other, more economical processing 
route; such would be the effect of analytic priming. This predicts 
that performance in right ear presentation (first or second) would be 
less efficient than left ear presentation (first) but more so than left 
ear presentation (second). Barring other influences. then the follow- 
ing pattern would emerge: 
increasing 
score 
IRLRL 
REF LEF 
REF = right ear first 
LEF = left ear first 
FIGURE 6: XVIII PROJECTION OF EAR PRESENTATION PRIMING EFFECT ON THE 
PROPOSITIONAL TASK 
This pattern is not reflected in the results of this experiment (see 
Figure 6: IX). 
The pattern which the Focusing Hypothesis predicts for the non-pro- 
positional task under the sale influence of an ear presentation priming 
effect differs from the above in that the analytic mechanisms would be 
exclusively active in all conditions15 and there would be no conflict 
for processing space, there being no Propositional level. As the right 
----------- 15. It is, of course. plausible within the terms of the Focusing Hypothe- 
sis to envisage. as Shadden & Peterson (1981) do. that the non-propo- 
sitional task was easy enough for the right hemisphere to deal with in 
any case; in this case, the predictions change. However, it is not 
possible to follow up every argument, and ' 
so this one is here simply 
acknowledged and shelved for some future forum. 
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hemisphere was* never active. the left hemisphere priming effect would 
not alter the pattern. Right ear presentation would show an advantage 
because of the more efficient connections to the left hemisphere: 
increasing 
score 
RLR 
Ht 
REF LEF 
REF = right ear first 
LEF = left ear first 
FIGURE 6: XIX PROJECTION OF EAR PRESENTATION PRIMING EFFECT ON THE 
NON-PROPOSITIONAL TASK 
Again, the results (see Figure 6: X) do not support this prediction. 
There may be reasons for this which do not involve the contradic- 
tion of the Focusing Hypothesis. Firstly. as already mentioned. there 
may have been a practice effect. Secondly. task-order may have inter- 
acted in priming for strategy selection (see below). Thirdly, the sex 
and/or s clence-human! ties variables are not allowed for in the above 
predictions. 
The order in which the tasks were presented appears to have had an 
effect. This is in keeping with results in work by Kimura. reported in 
Kimura & Durnford (1974: 39). She presented letters and geometrical 
forms in blocks. One group received the letter identification task be- 
fore the geometrical form task, the other after it. She found that: 
the direction of the field difference for (geometric] forms is 
affected by whether or not a letter identification task has first 
been presented, but the letter material is uninfluenced by the 
prior task. (P-39) 
For the males, those who did the propositional task first performed 
less well in botý tasks than those who did it second. Apart f rom, pri- 
ming (see below) various explanations for this are possible. The pro- 
positional task perhaps was, or was perceived as, more difficult, so 
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that the subject's confidence levels were different according to wheth- 
er 
ihey did the easy or the difficult task first. This is not support- 
ed by the comments of subjects af terwards; they mostly said - that the 
non-propositional task was much more taxing. Alternatively. this pat- 
tern in the males could reflect the imbalance of task-order presenta- 
tion between the humanities and sciences A-levels groups. Of the sci- 
ence students, who performed better overall, two thirds did the non- 
propositional task first and this could have biased the results. The 
reverse is also possible, of course, i. e. that the science-human ! ties 
contrast was an artifact of the unbalanced distribution of task presen- 
tation order, which was having a priming effect of some sort. 
The priming effect which the Focusing Hypothesis predicts is -that 
the non-propositional task would disadvantageously prime analytic-only 
processing for the propositional task if they were presented in that 
order. The pattern predicted then. with- respect to general performance 
over side-of -presentation is that in Figure 6: XX a&b. 
increasing 
score 
PTF NTF PTF NTF 
(a) (b) 
PTF = propositional task first 
NTF = non-propositional task first 
FIGURE 6: XX PROJECTION OF TASK PRESENTATION PRIMING EFFECT ON THE 
PROPOSITIONAL (a) AND NON-PROPOSITIONAL (b) TASKS 
When compared with the results of the experiment (Figure 6: XI & 6: XII 
there is not a good correspondence. 
Dividing the male subjects according to A-level specialisation re- 
vealed some interesting contrasts. The humanities group scored lower 
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overall (significantly so in the propositional task) and 
displayed a 
greýter (non-significant) trend towards an REA in both tasks. One pos- 
sible explanation for this is that the skills required 
for successful 
creative writing or other prose construction on the one hand and mathe- 
matical manipulations and scientific analysis on the other might be as- 
sociated with different approaches to other tasks. 
The independent 
finding across many studies of sex differences in performance on psy- 
chological tests (see chapter 
4: 1.2.4-3) might then be drawn together 
with the observation that males and females have traditionally gravita- 
ted towards different spheres of academic and creative excellence (for 
whatever reason). such that the same tendency to select different stra- 
tegies might apply to both the sex and the flair variables. -McGlone & 
Davidson (1973) and Harris (1978) have suggested that sex differences 
in some taský; are to do with the adoption of verbal strategies in visu- 
al tasks by females. 
However. this A-level group pattern could be no more than a reflec- 
tion of. or else could itself be reflected in, the male-female differ- 
ences - male humanities students behaved like the female students. all 
but two of whom were humanities students - and/or the task presentation 
order differences - six out of eight male humanities students but only 
three out of nine male sciences students received the PTF presentation 
order. 
There are certain criticisms which can be levelled at the design of 
Experiment II. beyond the general question of whether it actually suc- 
ceeded in testing the hypothesised differences in processing strategies 
during the decoding of standard test material and propos i tion- focusing 
input, or whether the use of laboratory equipment and university stu- 
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dents, or indeed, of monotic rather than dichotic presentation, was de- 
triýental to the accomplishment of that aim. 
Firstly, the subjects were required to respond verbally. Although 
any response, whether spoken or manual, must activate the relevant mo- 
tor areas of the brain, there may be specific asymmetric effects in the 
former case. The left hemisphere motor centres for language appear to 
be quicker to respond than the right hemisphere ones (Guyton 1981) and 
if this is s o, there would be a permanent bias in brain activity which 
could not be balanced in the same way as alternating the hand used for 
hitting a key can for manual response. 
Secondly. the volume level for the tape was not properly controlled 
and subjects with one ear weaker than the other would have been disad- 
vantaged unless they happened to receive presentation to their good. ear 
first, without raising the volume, and then raise it for the weaker 
ear. If they raised it in the first presentation condition. they were 
unlikely to alter it again, whether the second ear was stronger or not. 
6: 3.6 CONCLUSION 
The predicted patterns contrasting ear advantage on the propositi- 
onal and the non-propositional tasks did not obtain in any clear way. 
As so few interactions were significant, it is possible that all the 
patterns which have been observed are due to chance only. One reason 
for such a result might be that Kimura (1964: 357) was correct after 
all, and only dichotic listening tests can access ear superiority ef- 
fects (see 6: 3). at least in respect of this specific experimental de- 
sign. On the othýr hand. a complex interaction of variables would also 
confound any general contrasts and it seems plausible that this is what 
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happened. 
6: 4 COMMENT AND DIRECTIONS. FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Built into the Focusing Hypothesis is the expectation that psycho- 
linguistic experiments will produce a confused picture of hemispheric 
activity during language tasks. This is both its strength and its 
weakness. It is a strength because so many experiments. including the 
two described here, support that prediction. But it is a weakness be- 
cause the failure to find contrasts at a significant level is scant 
support for any hypothesis. not least because there are many ways of 
achieving it. including -pure chance. -Therefore, as has been remarked 
elsewhere (chapter 1: 10) while it is dangerous enough to make direct 
connections between behavioural asymmetries in experimental tests and 
the possible lateralisation of functions. it, is -even more questionable 
whether findings of any experiments, even ones proffering more posi- 
tively identifiable patterns than Experiments I and II above, could 
provide any kind of direct support for the dual systems aspect of the 
Focusing Hypothesis. On the other hand. the potential influences upon 
strategy adoption which the Focusing Hypothesis proposes (see chapter 
5: 2) ar e supported in a more positive way by the complex interactions 
which appear to be occurring during tasks of the kind administered. 
This brings us back to the observation that the psycholinguistic 
laboratory is not the place to test the Focusing Hypothesis. Up to 
now, however, the environment predicted to be most likely to enable the 
direct measurement of hemispheric activity during normal language pro- 
cessing has been the neurological laboratory, where such techniques as 
rCBF and EEG measurements are employed (see chapter 5: 4). Such facili- 
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ties are not only not available to humble research students in lingui- 
stiýs. but also rarely, if ever, to psycholinguists at all; the kind of 
general research on normal behaviour with which they are concerned jus- 
tifiably takes second place to the investigation and diagnosis of 
brain-damaged patients. 
There is a need for a simpler and less expensive means of measuring 
hemispheric activity without compromising the naturalness of the lin- 
guistic input used as a stimulus. The tympanic thermometer (Swift & 
Perlman 1985) shows signs of meeting that need. Swift & Perlman-des- 
cribe how. as the temperature of the ear canal is known to correlate 
with brain temperature, which itself is -determined by blood flow, mea- 
suring the temperature of the tympanum provides a painless and simple 
way of monitoring brain activity. Dabbs (1980), Holt & Brainard (1976) 
and Hancock & Dirkin (1982) have used temperature sensitive earplugs. 
connected to thermometers and recorders, to monitor brain activity in 
this way under different conditions. Swift & Perlman (1985) claim to 
be the first to have applied the technique to psycholinguistic investi- 
gation. They presented 11 male and 11 female high school children with 
two blocks of stimuli. One consisted of noW-words and the' other of hu- 
man faces. The task was to decide whether single items had appeared in 
a previous target set. They did not find a positive relationship be- 
tween left hemisphere bias (i. e. where net left side temperature in- 
crease from rest > net right side increase) and high scores on the ver- 
bal task but there was a significant relationship between right hemi- 
sphere bias (net left side temperature increase < net right hemisphere 
increase) and high scores in the face recognition task. The result for 
the verbal task was not predicted by them and they seek to explain it 
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in terms of the *potential to treat the non-word strings as either ver- 
bal or as visual configurations, leading to a. cancelling out of two op- 
posing hemispheric preferences. 
The Focusing Hypothesis would predict the absence of left hemi- 
sphere superiority in linguistic tasks. but, ironically, not in a non- 
propositional task like Swift & Perlman's. On the other hand, Swift & 
Perlman's scoring method. based on correct and incorrect Judgements ra- 
ther than on response times. is in keeping with the low-stress condi- 
tions which the Focusing Hypothesis favours for the observation of nor- 
mal processing. 
The use of the tympanic thermometer should be of considerable value 
for psycholinguistic research and would do much to enable the evalua- 
tion of the Focusing Hypothesis. The type of opposition of stimuli us- 
ed in Experiment II might be valuable in directly addressing the pre- 
dictions made about relative hemispheric involvement. But even more 
pertinent would be comparisons of left and right tympanic temperatures 
during ordinary conversational exchange on the one hand and standard 
psycholinguistic tests on the other. 
The major limitation of this method must be that it cannot discri- 
minate the source of temperature rises, so that it would not be pos- 
sible to decide from, say. an equal activity of left and right hemi- 
spheres during normal processing, whether the right hemisphere was in- 
volved in the language decoding rather than the Propositional evalua- 
tion (as implied by Gardner et al 1983. see chapter 5: 3.2) or in some- 
thing else entirely. But the organisation of the two hemispheres is 
different in anV case (chapter 1: 10). and even if the localisation of 
the increase in metabolic exchange could be observed by this method. it 
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might not correspond to the traditional expectations built up on the 
basis of 'language centres' in the appropriately arranged left hemi- 
sphere. Most of all. however. it is not as if techniques are not avai- 
lable for the observation of localised brain activity. But up to now 
the rCBF and related studies (see chapter 5: 4) have stood alone in sug- 
gesting that it might even be worth looking at the right hemisphere for 
signs of some involvement in normal linguistic processing. 
But as for using the tympanic temperature measurements in isola- 
tion, care would have to be taken that any number of extraneous fac- 
tors, from uncontrolled visual or auditory input to fluctuations in at- 
tention and wandering thoughts, did not confound the measurements. De- 
spite these limitations. this technique might be the best yet for tes- 
ting the validity of the various models of processing proposed here and 
elsewhere. 4 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A variety of sources of data have been drawn upon in the attempt to 
assess the plausibility of the Focusing Hypothesis. Not all observa- 
tions have been supportive. but very few have provided hard counter- 
evidence either. This is in part due to the nature of the Hypothesis, 
which predicts contradictory findings caused by a range of uncontrolled 
strategy determining factors. However. many positive predictions have 
been supported, in the fields of psycholinguistic. clinical and neuro- 
physiological -research. It may be considered a strength of the Focus- 
ing Hypothesis that it is equipped within one processing model to ac- 
count for features of normal and abnormal language. 
The Hypothesis itself has been developed here without more than 
cursory. reference to output mechanisms (but see chapter 5: 6). and many 
pertinent areas of interest have been omitted. One is the phenomenon 
of deep 
. 
dyslexia (e. g. Coltheart et al 1980). the symptoms of which may 
be predictable from a strategy for normal reading aloud (holistic). 
which bypassed propositional evaluation. This strategy closely resem- 
bles the one described in 5: 1.6 whereby 'comprehension' can occur as a 
function of word and structure recognition without any propositional e- 
valuation. In the breakdown of the bypass system, reading aloud (also 
repeating, writing to dictation and copying, though any or all of these 
could have their own, separate strategies which would lead to a differ- 
ent measure of inability) would have to be mediated by semantic decod- 
ing (analytic) in which lexical identities would be lost and would have 
to be reselectea from lexically non-specific semantic representations 
before output could occur. This account avoids the need to invoke se- 
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veral locations of damage. because it attributes the symptoms of deep 
dyslexia to the utilisation of a route which is part of the normal sys- 
tem, but was previously only used from print into semantic representa- 
tion or from semantic representation out to print, but not bothl6. The 
supposed location in the right and left hemispheres of these processing 
routes for reading may be inferred from the description of the Focusing 
Hypothesis that has been provided, but various questions arise which 
need to be addressed at length. Therefore, no attempt is being made 
here to formally embark upon any such account. 
Other areas of linguistic interest which could have been discussed 
include the case of Genie (Fromkin et al 1974). symptoms of types of a- 
phasia and the apparent hemispheric 'bilaterality' of some individuals, 
particularly left-handers. 
A number of areas which are not directly related to language test- 
ing and teaching have also been mentioned in passing but not examined. 
The foremost is probably the possible effect of education, including 
literacy. on the development of preferred strategies for dealing with a 
wide range of language-related and unrelated activities. The other 
main issue which c6uld have been examined more closely relates to the 
lateralisation of visuo-spatial skills. An important question needs to 
be addressed: why has the right hemisphere been generally considered to 
be dominant for these abilities (Harris 1978). when they can be as much 
the focus of attention as any linguistic skill? This question cannot 
be satisfactorily answered here, except in a superficial way, by propo- 
sing that different strategies are discovered by the learning child to 
16. Max Coltheart (personal communication) has recently been examining the 
possibilities of such a processing route and considers it to have 
some useful explanatory power. 
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be more efficient for each type of task. However. it is worth noting 
Broýnls (1983) comment that with the increasing sophistication of in- 
'vestigative techniques. the right-left differences in visuo-spatial 
skills have become harder to substantiate (p. 45), and that what appear- 
ed to be a right hemisphere superiority for visuo-spatial skills may 
have been an artifact17 of the experimental designs used, which require 
what he terms early processing which is holistic in nature. whereas a 
task requiring -late processing (analytic) would, have shown -a left hemi- 
sphere advantage (p. 49). This early-late dichotomy is part of a speci- 
fic approach to the nature of information processing which Brown (1983) 
proposes. 
The combination of operations which Brown envisages has in common 
with the Focusing Hypothesis model that processing is shared in an ad- 
vantageous way precisely so that both sets of mechanisms can operate 
j 
simultaneously rather than in sequence. The holistic mechanisms in the 
Focusing Hypothesis model do not deal with language Processing because 
they are better at it or specialised for it but because their doing so 
enables the simultaneous operation of higher cognitive levels (e. g. 
propositional evaluation). The overall effect of this is the-same as 
would be obtained by paying full attention to two different levels of 
information at once. Seen in this light, the evolutionary advantage of 
introducing the holistic mechanisms into functions which would other- 
wise involve full attention is immense. for it multiplies the complex- 
ity of possible cognitive interactions. 
----------- 17. Compare, on the other hand, Young & Ratcliff (1983: 23. quoted in Code 
1987: 4): "[There is] no doubt that the case for right hemisphere su- 
periority is not grounded in artifact". 
6 
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The arguments presented here have retained an essentially theore- 
tical stance. seeking to offer a new interpretation and, where appro- 
priate, a challenge, to the experimental and clinical work in the 
fields of neuropsychology and psychol inguis tics. without entirely a- 
ligning itself with either discipline. It sought to raise questions as 
much to suggest answers, and to cut across the grain of some tradition- 
a11 beliefs. The details of the hypothesis are in one way only of se- 
condary importance, for the primary challenge comes from the robus tness 
which such a hypothesis unexpectedly displays. That robustness has two 
forms: empirical and theoretical. It is the latter which, it has been 
argued, is ultimately more important, even though such a view runs con- 
trary to the primary perspective of the experimental discipline it ad- 
dresses. 
The empirical robustness may. in any case, be no more than super- 
f icial. It is not possible to say at this stage, particularly seeing 
as this thesis has devoted only minimal space to accounts of new ex- 
perimental investigations. The robustness emanates f rom the assertion 
that the empirical obstacles are too great to enable testing of the 
type required to measure the salient variables, without the use of 
techniques and equipment beyond the reach of an independent student 
researcher. The hypothesis is not untestable. What is here predicted 
may be elsewhere tested, in an experimental environment of suitable 
sophistication. 
A linguist's attempt to offer any sort of contribution to the 
fields of clinical*and experimental neuropsychology might be considered 
about as valuable as what a student nurse can tell a mother of ten 
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about child rearing. But there are always new things to be seen, and 
the very nalvety which pervades the approach of an outsider may present 
new challenges which avoid -the covert presuppositions. prejudices and 
traditions of the discipline. 
Discussions with a number of experimental psychologists, hýve seen 
one objection repeatedly raised: the scientific way is to provide ex- 
perimental evidence relevant to any proposed account. so that by that 
evidence it may stand or fall. That observation did not fall an deaf 
ears, and the purpose of chapter 5 was to draw on the work of others to 
find support for the Hypothesis and -to -explain -why -a greater number of 
new experiments has not been set up and run tc) test it. Nevertheless. 
this whole account remains at odds with the format which would be re- 
quired from any psychologist working in the field. The intention here 
was to present a model and to examine its explanatory and predictive 
power within a framework which did not attempt to hide its variance 
from a traditional scientific approach, but rather to use that as a le- 
ver to raise the lid on a new range of perspectives. This is not the 
work of a psychologist and it was not intended to be. It is the work 
of a linguist operating at the interface of two disciplines. The 
greatest danger is that it will be acceptable to neither. The deliber- 
ate retention of a primarily theoretical approach has been a positive 
attempt to achieve its acceptance by both. 
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APPENDIX 
[Subclassifications here refer to the chapter to which the information 
applies, e. g. A5: 1 = first appended note for chapter 5; similarly. A5: I 
= first appended Figure. and A5: i = first appended Table]. 
A4 Tables i-vi (Chapter 4: 1.2.1) (NB. The survey of studies 
represented in these tables are not intended to be exhaustive but are. 
hopefully, representative. 41 
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SIGNIFICANT RIGHT 
NCE EAR ADVANTAGE? 
et al 1973 (1) 1 No under 9 
over 
Berlin. Hughes et al 1973 (2) Yes 9 CV pairs_ 
Berlin. Lowe-Bell et al-1973- Yes 5-13 nonsense--syllables 
Bever 1971 (3) Yes 
- 
2.6-5.6 digits 
Rrvden lq70 (1) Yes 7-10 
Chaney & Webster 1966 (4) Yes isolated vowels- 
Darwin 1971 (4) No isolated vowels 
Entus 1977 Yes infants 
- --Phonetic stimuli Ceffner & Hochberg 1971 Yes middle class 
No lower class 
Gilbert & Climan 1974 (1) Yes 2 
Haggard & Parkinson 1971 Yes adult CV contrasting voic e 
& place: LEA for em - 
otional-tone 
Inglis & Sykes 1967 (3) Yes 6&9 3-pair stimulus 
No 5.7-8.10 3-pair stimulus 
No 5-10 1& 2-pair-stimulus 
Kimura 1963 (1) Yes 3-4 most asymmetry in 
Youngest 
Kimura . 1967 
(5)- Yes 4 
Kimura & Folb 1968 (4) Yes backwards speech 
Kinsbourne & Hiscock 1977 Yes children non-signif. increase 
in REA with age 
Ling 1971 (3) Yes 6-15 
Papr, un et al 1974' _Yes- adult - morse code. users 
- - naive S's. sequence 
Yes adult length: short 
No 
- adult 
lone 
Satz et al 1971 (3) Yes 8& 11 
Shankweiler & Studdert-Ken- Yes CVC. contrasting C 
nedy 1967 (2) & (6) No CVC. contrasting V 
Shedletsky 1981 No adult LEA for recognition 
of words from sen- 
tences; explanation: 
lh. 
--Processes 
deene 
Sommers & Taylor 1972 (3) Yes 5-6 normal speech dev. 
No 5-6 late speech dev. 
Studdert-Kennedy & Shankweil- Yes CVC. contrasting C 
er 1969 . No -- 
CVCv contrasting V 
Witelson 1962 (3L No I non-sig trend only I 
Zurif & Carson 1970 (3) 
---- 
I-No 10 non-six trend onIv I 
TABLE A4-i DICHOTIC LISTENING TEST (MONOLINGUAL STUDIES) 
KEY to reference sources: 
1. Ten Houten 1982 4. Haggard & Parkinson 1971 
2. O'Leary 1982 - 5. Moscovitch 1977 
3. Bryden & Allard 1978 6. Code 1987 
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SIGNIFICANT 
RIGHT VISUAL HALF- 
PýPvnv. Nrv IPM. n AnVANTAGF? A r. P. nP. TATT. -q 
I 
Barton et al 1965 (1) Yes letters, words. digits 
in vertical scan 
Bryden 1962 (2) Yes 
No 
according to order 
-of report Bryden 19 70 (3) 
- 
Yes 4-letter non-words 
Crovitz 
(3) 
& Schiffman 1965 No 8 disconnected letters 
Dornbush 
(3) 
- 
& Winnick 1965 Yes 
No 
8-letter words 
8-letter anagrams 
Harcum & Finckel 1963(3) Yes words 
Harcum & Jones 1962 (3) Yes words 
Hirata & Osaka 1967 (3) Yes 
I 
Japanese S's: 2-chara- 
cter words. -vertical Levine & Banich 1982 Yes I adult 10 of 32 S's had LVFA: 
order-of-Dresentation? 
TABLE A4: ii TACHISTOSCOPIC TESTS (MONOLINGUAL SUBJECTS) 
KEY to references: 1. O'Leary 1982 
2. Bryden & Allard 1978 
3. Harcum 1978 
LEFT HEMISPHERE 
REFERENCE TEST SUPERIORITY? AGE DETAILS 
Briggs 1975 (1) bimanual Yes 
tracking 
Buffery 1971 (2) dlt PLUS Yes + No girls: 5+ REA and LVFA 
tachisto. Yes + No 
__ _bOYs: 
7+_ 
_for 
best score! 
Hicks 1975 (1) rod balan- Yes phonetic comp-I 
cing + speech lexity increas- 
-- --ed 
interferenct 
Hicks et al 1975 (1) finger Yes silent & spokei 
movement lap&uaKe 
Hicks et al 1977 (1) finger Yes 
sequencing 
Kinsbourne 1972 eye movement Yes to right for 
words. left foý 
- -victures(*CH) Kinsbourne & Cook rod balan- Yes r-hand better 
1971 cing non-verbal con 
dition. l. hand 
in verbal 
Kinsbourne & Hiscock finger tap- Yes 3-11 rhymes & word 
1977 -, pinic renetition 
Kinsbourne & McMur- Yes 5+ 
ray 1975 
Kreuter et al 1972(l ) Yes adult callosectomien 
TABLE A4: iii OTHER TESTS (MONOLINGUAL SUBJECTS) 
KEY to references: 1. Kinsbourne & Hiscock 1978 2. Harris 1978 
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TYPE OF LEARNER L2 PROCESSING 
9- ArnITT4ZTTTnN ART. ATTVR Tn T. 1 RTYppnATTVV qTllnTVq 
more left hem. Rupp 1980 
more right hem. Albert & Obler 178(ls). Bever'-74(2) 
Early informal no difference Gordon 1980(ls), Bellisle 1975(l) 
Calloway 1981. Schdnle & Breuniger 
1977(4) 
more left hem. Kotik 1979(3). Carroll 1980(study 2TI 
Albert & Obler_l978Cls). Kotfk'84(mp) 
Late formal more right hem. Albert & Obler 1978(ls). Maitre 1974 
I(ssw)(1). Schneiderman & Wesche 1980 
(4). Ko ik 1984Clp) 
no difference Carroll 1980, Gordon 1980(ls). Mai- 
tre l974(sss)C1_)_, Kotik 1984(hp) 
more left hem. 
Late informal more right hem. 
no difference Carroll 1980, Gordon 1980(ls), Gallo- 
Iway 
&-Scarcella 1982 
TABLE A: iv DICHOTIC LISTENING TESTS (POLYGLOT SUBJECTS) 
a) bilingual-type comparisons 
KEY to abbreviations: late z after 11 years old 
ls = language specific hp, = high proficiency 
ssw = stimulus specific: word stimulus only mp, = mid proficiency 
sss = stimulus specific: sentence stimulus only 1P =q low proficiency 
KEY to references: 1. Vaid & Genesee 1980 3. Koti-k 1984 
2. Walters & Zatorre 1978 4. Vaid 1983 
Monolinguals same as Bellisle 1975(l). Stark et al, 1977 (expt. 2) 
bilinguals (Ll & L2) Galloway 1981 
Monolinguals more Ll Starck et al 1977 - 
(expt. 1) 
lh. than bilinguals' L2 Scott. Hynt. H nt & Weed 1979 
Monolinguals more Ll Hynd. Teeter. Stewart 1980 at 
b) monolingual-bilingual comparisons 
KEY to references: 1. Vaid & Cenesee 1980 
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T`qE OF LEARNER 
& ACQUISITION 
Early formal 
Early informal 
Late formal 
Late informal 
L2 PROCESSING 
RELATIVE TO L1 
ff 
no difference Hamers; & Lambert 1977. Gaziel. Obler & 
more left hem. 
Albert 1978. 
more right hem. Mishkin & Forgays 1952(ls)(1), Sil- 
Iverberiz et - al-1979(ls. 
lp) 
no difference lWalters & Zatorre lq78 
more ri¢nt nem. i 
TABLE A4: v TACHISTOSCOPIC TESTS (POLYGLOT SUBJECTS) 
KEY to abbreviations: 
as = age specific 1P = low proficiency 
Is = language specific hp = high(er) proficiency 
ss = stimulus specific late = after 11 years of age 
(for references see table A4: iv) 
----------- 1. Yiddish was a non-proficient but presumably family language, so Ll/L2 
designations are difficult to apply. The increased right hemisphere 
involvement (non-significant LVFA) was in Yiddish. There was a signi- 
ficant RVFA for English. 
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CASE M/F MT L2 Ll L4 FLI FL2 FL3- FL4 
Beaitie(p. 26) m + x 
Lordat(p. 26) m +d xn 
Banks(p. 26) m + x x 
Proust(P-27) F x +r 
Trousseau(p. 27) m x +r 
Bourdin(p. 27) F x + 
Grasset(p. 27) F x +a 
Bastian(p. 27) m + xr 
Ord(p. 27) m +d x 
Rinckenbach(p. 27) m + x 
Bianchi(P-28) m + x x 
Charcot(p. 28) m + x >x 
Bernard(p. 28) F x + x 
Pitres*I(P-28) m xd + 
II(p. 29) m xd + 
III(P-30) F + >+ xd 
IV(P-31) m + + x 
V(P-32) m + xnc xnc xnc xnc xnc 
VI(P-33) m + x x 
VII(P-35) m + > +d + +xx 
TABLE A4: vi 
Cases of polyglot aphasia mentioned in Pitres (1895). showing the 
status of the languages recovered (+) and permanently lost or impaired 
(x) (this refers to production only: comprehension remains where not 
otherwise specified). 
KEY: M= male F= female d= dialect n= national language 
r= language of residence (where not mother tongue) 
MT = mother tongue L= informally acquired language 
FL = formally acquired language (foreign language) 
a= automatic speech only nc = no comprehension 
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A5: I Examples-of lexical. surface structure and underlying-structure 
ambiguities (Chapter 5: 2.3) 
LEXICAL AMBIGUITIES are, in auditory tests, homophones: 
1) Be sure than you take the righ turn. (Bever et al 1973: 279) 
2) The new men started to drill before they were ordered to do so. 
(Foss 1970: 701) 
10) The spy put out the torch as our signal to attack. (Lackner& 
Garrett 1972: 61) 
(3) and (4) are examples of precontexualisation for lexical 
ambiguities: 
3a) The electrician was asked to instal the bulbs. 
b) The gardener was asked to plant the bulbs. (Holmes 1979: 538 
(Expt. IV) 
4a) The manager forced the robber to run out of the building. 
The robber was chased from the bank. 
b) The shooter forced the ducks to fly away from the river. 
The ducks were chased from the bank. (Holmes 1979: 583 (Expt. V) 
SURFACE STRUCTURE AMBIGUITIES relate to alternatives in bracketting: 
5) John looked up the street. 
6) They fed her dog biscuits. (Bever et al 1973: 285) 
7) They are lecturing doctors. (Carey et al 1970. quoted in Bever et 
al 1973: 278) 
11) John left with a dog he found last Saturday. (Lackner & Garrett 
1972: 363) 
UNDERLYING STRUCTURE AMBIGUITIES are caused by "different underlying 
'logical' relationships amongst the words" (Bever et al 1973: 279): 
8) The natives disliked sailing in the harbor. 
9) The duck is ready to eat. 
12) The corrupt policemen can't stop drinking. (Lackner & Garrett 
1972: 363) 
Aci: 2 Extended footnote (Chapter 5: 2.4. 
A possible informal corroboration of this is the response which I re- 
ceived when I tried to explain 'garden path' sentences to my non-lin- 
guist friends. Of the three or four people I gave examples (13) and 
(14) to (individually), all received them with puzzlement. 
13) The horse raced past the barn fell. 
14) The florist sent the flowers was very pleased. 
They all considered that if the sentences were grammatical at all it 
could only be because an 'and' had been deleted (13') and (14'). 
13') The horse raced past the barn and fell. 
W) The florist sent the flowers and was very pleased. 
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When I objected that it was not grammatical to delete 'and' in that po- 
sition, but that there was a reading which was grammatical. they could 
not see it. Nor were they impressed or enlightened when I explained 
the deletion of 'that'/'who'. They didn't disagree, but seemed to see 
no relevance in that particular type of grammaticality game to anything 
that they ever produced or decoded (at least consciously). 
A5: 3 Extended footnote (Chapter 5: 3.2-1) 
Van Lancker (1987) quotes. in the Appendix of her paper (p. 104ff) some 
test responses from right and left hemispherectomy patients. In speech 
sample I (right hemispherectomy) it is clear that the patient's langu- 
age is more or less normal. But one or two curious propositional rela- 
ted mistakes are made: 
I: ... could you tell me three things that a good citizen should 
do? 
P: Vote and obey the law. 
I: That's two. 
P: You wanted three. 
I: Three. Did you think of a third one? Okay. 
I: Look at this picture. and make up a story that has a beginning. 
a middle and an end. 
P: The boy is with his kite, in Mr. Smith's yard. The kite flew 
over the house. He took his dog with him. There was a fire in 
the fireplace. 
12.1: What is the thing to do if you find an envelope in the street 
that is sealed and addressed and has a new stamp? 
P: Try to find out to who it belongs. " 
None of these is striking in isolation. nor even particularly so within 
the context of the rest of the report of that patient. But seen in 
terms of the discussion in this section there is a possible signifi- 
cance to these slightly unusual replies. The mildness of the effect of 
the propositional overloading in the left hemisphere would be expected 
if the patient had had time since the hemispherectomy to allow the left 
hemisphere to learn new strategies for dealing with the load. 
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A5: 4 Part V of the Token Test. taken from Zaidel (1977: 16) AChapter 
5: 3.3-1-1) 
"(Using large rectangles and large circles only) 
1. Put the red circle on the green rectangle. 
2. Put the white rectangle behind the yellow circle. 
Touch the blue circle with the red rectangle. 
Touch with the blue circle the red rectangle. 
Touch the blue circle and the red rectangle. 
Pick up the blue circle or the red rectangle. 
Put the green rectangle away from the yellow rectangle. 
Put the white circle before the blue rectangle. 
If there is a black circle pick up the red rectangle. 
10. Pick up the rectangles except the yellow one. 
11. Omitted. 
12. When I touch the green circle you take the white rectangle. 
%- 13. Put the green rectangle beside the red circle. 
14. Touch the rectangles slowly and the circles quickly. 
15. Put the red circle between the yellow rectangle and the green rec- 
tangle. 
16. Except for the green one touch the circles. 
17. Pick up the red circle - No! - the*white rectangle. 
18. Instead of the white rectangle take the yellow circle. 
19. Together with the yellow circle take the blue circle. 
20. After picking up the green rectangle, touch the white circle. 
21. Put the blue circle under the white rectangle. 
22. Before touching the yellow circle pick up the red rectangle. " 
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A6: 1 Pictures used in Experiment I (reduced size) 
f- -- 3 cm --" 
374 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
I. bý m 5.1 4.09 0.935 0.939 0.937 1.259 1.088 1.055 
n. bu m 5.1 - 
4. og 1.403 1.299 1.413 1.757 1.390 1.545 
S. Wi m 5.1 4.11 1.208 1.320 1.420 1.024 1.232 1.237 
m. ad m 5.0 4-o8 o-891 0.985 0.909 0.787 0.955 0.879 
a-io m 5.0 4. oi o. 863 0.973 1.030 1.012 1.009 0.994 
r. ho m 6.8 5.08 1.029 1.182 1.097 0.978 1.052 1.024 
a. so m 6.4 5.10 1.196 1.136 1.439 1.301 1.558 1.253 
i-co m 5.5 5.02 0.754 0.882 0.780 0.981 0.911 0.963 
j. du m 5.2 5.02 1.393 1.465 1.452 1.402 1.542 1.024 
c. du m 5.9 5.07 1.144 0.933 1.033 1.081 1.156 1.238 
g. bo m 8.2 6.10 0.818 0.813 0.747 0.800 0.984 0.922 
r. bo m 7.8 6.09 0.976 1.149 0.937 0.984 1.186 1.322 
s. le m 5.3 6.07 2.010 1.725 2.036 2.131 1.830 1.980 
n. we m 6.4 6.10 1.318 1.304 1.686 1.254 1.371 1.495 
j. di m 6.2 6.03 1.181 1.295 1.216 1.163 1.26o 1.245 
a. br m 8.9 7.08 0.671 0.721 0.700 0.647 0.765 0.752 
p. br m 9.0 7.08 0.895 0.989 0.956 1.144 1.169 1.101 
m. re m 7.8 7.10 1.171 1.123 1.028 o. 963 1.195 1.071 
k. ma m 7.6 7.07 1.145 i. 14o 1.082 1.001 1.209 1.079 
c. be m 6.2 7.07 1.317 1.012 1.362 1.359 1.605 1.288 
s. wa m 6.9 8.01 1.188 1.162 1.028 1.126 1-107 1.087 
p. as m 11.8 8.02 0.911 0.841 0.823 1.102 0.932 0.933 
d. mi m 9.0 8.10 0.726 0-74o o. 6o4 0.663 0.654 0.708 
P. Po m 12.9 8.01 1.093 1.077 1.113 0.926 1.477 1.184 
P. Co m 12.4 8.08 0.846 MA o. 809 o. 674 0.746 0.647 
k. wa f 6.9 4.11 0.997 0.912 0.833 0.877 0.900 0.777 
I. be f 5.0 4. o4 1.929 2.155 2.002 1.799 1.742 1.884 
h. pa f 5.5 4. io i. o88 1.167 i. 6og 1.127 1.201 1.256 
s. di f 5.0 4. o6 1.127 1.254 1.153 0.924 1.180 0.963 
S-mc f 5.1 4.02 1.056 0.998 1.063 1.193 1.189 1.134 
s. be f 6.1 5.11 1.259 1.402 1.070 1.209 1.152 1.366 
d. ma f 5.6 5.05 1.790 1.808 2.141 1.462 1.666 1.783 
r. as f 5.1 5.03 1.450 1.293 1.431 1-38o 1.336 1.341 
l. ob f 5.7 5.09 1.889 1.629 1.895 1.874 1.961 2.234 
r. fo f 5.9 5.08 0.933 1.157 0.948 1.148 1.101 1.315 
e. ey f 5.5 6. il o. 667 0.571 0.399 o. 654 o. 664 0.508 
h. li f 7.9 6. og 1.006 1.173 1.054 1.040 1-083 1.004 
v. ma f 6.0 6.06 1.067 1.082 1.208 1.263 1.254 1.143 
j. li f 6.2 6. o4 1.688 1.702 1.282 1.469 1.544 1.556 
d. pa f 8.8 6.11 1.750 1.700 1.566 1.568 1.648 1.604 
e. as f 9.4 7.09 1.408 1.187 1.185 1.329 1.090 1.250 
C-mi f 10.1 7.00 0.960 1.266 1.133 0.933 1.224 1.050 
P. So f 7.6 7.08 1.425 l. lo8 1.168 1.388 1.846 1.136 
r. va f 6.8 7.08 1.185 1.103 1.246 1.347 1.212 1.139 
h. co f 9.1 7.02 1.003 o. 943 1.052 0.980 l. o4q 0.832 
I. br f 8.2 8.08 0.884 0.783 0.975 0.803 0.821 0.848 
k. at f 11.2 8.11 0.618 0.684 0.725 0.642 0.750 0.739 
k. bo f lo. 6 8.11 o. 619 o. 697 o. 636 0.631 0.660 o. 652 
c. ey f 7.2 8.01 1.420 1.479 , 1.508 1.335 1.146 1.552 
n. ho f 10.1 8.11 0.588 o. 645 o. 683 0.650 o. 6og 0.818 
A6: i Mean scores-for each subject (Experiment I) (Key overleaf) 
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Key to columns: I. Subject identifier, 2. sex- 3-reading age, 
4. chronological age. 5. Right presentation 'same' trials, 6. Right 
pre; entation 'different, rhyme' trials, 7. Right presentation, 
different. nonrhyme' trials. 8. Left presentation 'same' trials. 9. 
Left presentation 'different. rhyme' trials, 10. Left presentation, 
different. nonrhyme' trials. 
NON-RHYME 
45678 
male 1.119 1.182 1.292 1.093 0.955- 
female_ 1.279 1.491 1.242 1.203 0.827 
RHYME 
male 1.142 1.130 1.359 1.042 0.894 
female* 1.267 1.55 1.132 E119 0.914 
TABLE A6: ii (EY. PT. I) Values for Figures 6: VI and 6: VII 
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A6: 2 Sentences used in Experiment II (In order of presentation on the 
ýtap?. Numbers refer to order of presentation on paper) 
CITY 
LIST A 
FOILS 
33. St. William's College is in King's Manor. F 
10. The only three-cinema complex in York is the Odeon. T 
2. York has a MacDonald's hamburger bar. T 
52. York District Hospital has no casualty department. F 
24. When the Romans arrived in York it was already a Viking settle- 
ment. F 
55. The Theatre Royal doubles as a cinema complex. F 
44. The Public Library backs onto the Museum Gardens. T 
29. The Shambles was once full of butchers' shops. T 
26. It was the North Transept of the Minster that was damaged by fire. F 
62. York Racecourse is in Fulford. F 
MAIN LIST 
47. York was a Royalist stronghold in the Civil War. T 
45. The M57 is York's closest motorway. F 
67. There was formerly a market on Parliament Street. T 
15. York does not have a war memorial. F 
39. A line drawn due southwards from York will pass through Ports- 
mouth. T 
16. St. Leonard's Hospice is in St. Leonard's Place. F 
38. York Sixth Form College is next to the Tech. T 
48. There is a self-service restaurant in St. William's College. T 
22. There are no Chinese restaurants inside the city boundaries. F 
32. The National Railway Museum is by Walmgate Bar. F 
50. The York Story is in the Art Gallery. F 
23. Bootham Bar is the only Bar built on the site of a Roman gateway. T 
46. The market is closed on Sundays. T 
72. St. John's College has premises in Heworth Green. T 
37. St. Margaret Clitherow was executed for sheltering Jesuit priests. T 
76. The Viking Hotel is next to the Jorvik Museum. F 
58. There is no museum in the Museum Gardens. F 
75. The Queen Mother was born less than ten miles from York. F 
19. York does not have any Traffic Wardens. F 
42. The Minster took about two hundred and fifty years to build. T 
59. Marks and Spencers is in Coney Street. F 
11. The Royal Mail sorting office is in Leeman Road. T 
78. The Tourist Information Centre is in the De Grey ROOMS. T 
28. The heads of traitors used to be displayed on Micklegate Bar. T 
51. The Archbishop of York lives next door to the Minster. F 
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1. The Minster is less than two hundred years* old. F 
63. -Constantine the Great was in York when he became the Roman Em- 
peror. T 
68. Sainsbury's is built on the site of a Jewish cemetery. T 
36. Taylor's teashop sells specialist coffees. T 
21. York has no branch of Habitat. F 
LIST B 
FOILS 
27. The Lord Mayor's residence is the Mansion House. T 
64. The Salvation Army Hall is in Coppergate. F 
74. Admission to the Jorvik Museum is free for York residents. F 
18. Tesco's is next door to the Merchant Adventurers' Hall. T 
80. British Telecom has a shop on Coney Street. T 
MAIN LIST 
65. The River Ouse flows under Ouse Bridge before Lendal Bridge. F 
14. There is an admission charge at the Minster. F 
69. The quickest rail journey from York to London is three hours. F 
31. York Station is just outside the City Walls. T 
17. There are roman excavations on show in the Roman Bath pub. T 
9. Betty's teashop is open in the evenings. T 
66. The Treasurer's House is near Presto's. .F 
77. York is closer to London than to Edinburgh. T 
79. The pupils of the York Minster Song Sch6b1 wear green blazers. F 
25. There is no police station inside the city walls. F 
4. Godfrey's bookshop sells typewriter ribl; ons. F 
56. The Arts Centre is in a redundant church. T 
71. There is a car park behind Presto's supermarket. T 
35. Priory Street forms a junction with Bootham. F 
49. It is not possible for organisations to hold public functions in 
the Assembly Rooms. F 
13. There are two branches of the National Westminster Bank in Par- 
liament Street. 
61. Woolworths is open every Sunday. 
F 
53. St. Mary's Abbey was founded by Benedictine monks. 
T 
T 
5. The riverside pub famous for flooding is called the King's Arms. T 
41. There is a cafeteria in the Minster Undercroft. F 
43. The Foss flows into the Ouse by Clif ton Bridge. F 
34. The fire station is in Clifford Street. T 
12. Central Selby is almost exactly due south of York. T 
73. W. P. Brown's is in St. Sampson's Square. T 
7. There is a Lloyds Bank on the comer of Lendal and Museum Street. F 
57. The Duke and Duchess of York are Charles and Diana. F 
54. The Barbican swimming baths is York's only public pool. F 
70. Part of the Castle Museum was a debtors' prison. T 
20. The closest seaside resort to York is Bridlington. T 
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40. York's great Jewish massacre took place in the fourteenth century. F 
FOILS 
6. Guy Fawkes was born in the Dean Court Hotel. F 
3. Gillygate Bakery mills its own flour. T 
30. The York Mystery Plays will next be staged in two years' time. F 
8. Terry's chocolate factory is owned by Rowntree's. F 
60. The Pope visited York during his British tour. T 
UNIVERSITY 
LIST A 
FOILS 
13. St. Lawrence Court has its own squash court. F 
74. Eden's Court only houses male students. F 
2. There is a. computer terminal room in Derwent College. T 
10. It is an offence to walk on the grass. F 
55. Smoking is banned on the bridge between Goodricke and Wentworth. F 
44. Kings Manor is by Exhibition Square. T 
26. Derwent College is -adjacent to the stationery store. T 
71. There is a Politics Department at York University. T 
56. The nearest University town to York is Hull. F 
47. Bleachfield only accommodates undergraduate students. F 
MAIN LIST 
40. The Music Department has its own building. T 
38. Alcuin's dining room is not on the ground f loor. T 
69. Students are permitted to buy meals only in their own college. F 
21. There is a Henry Moore sculpture between Langwith College and the 
lake. F 
25. The University is built on marshland. T 
29. Plastic photocopying cards for the Library cost one pound to buy. T 
63. The Education Department has its own separate building. F 
54. North Yorkshire Student Travel has a sales office in Vanbrugh. T 
11. The University's year has four terms of eight weeks. F 
78. Goodricke bar is next to the Porters' Lodge. F 
6. Food and drink may be consumed on the top floor of the main 
Library. F 
28. The Campus does not have a separate Students' Union building. T 
52. There is a branch of Barclay's Bank in Heslington Village. T 
46. The nearest post office to the Campus is on'the Fulford Road. F 
72. The Psychology Department is based in Wentworth College. T 
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36. The central sorting office for internal mail is in Wentworth 
College. F 
49. U. R. Y. is a student radio station. T 
31. Undergraduates are allowed to borrow library books for up to 
fourteen days. F 
23. The Morrell Library is closed on Sundays. T 
4. Goodricke College has squash courts. T 
75. The Campus Medical Centre is in Alcuin College. F 
18. There is a drinks vending machine in the Morrell Library foyer. F 
20. There are tennis courts next to Heslington Parish Church. F 
70. There is a swimming pool in the Sports Centre. F 
59. The Sports Centre has a sauna bath. T 
42. Only postgraduates may use the computer terminals. F 
7. The University Bookshop is owned by Blackwells. T 
30. Vanbrugh College does not have a 'D' Block. T 
34. Derwent was one of the first two colleges to be officially 
opened. T 
73. The water tower was once a medieval fortress. F 
LIST B 
FOILS 
32. The University of York has a Geography Department. F 
22. University accommodation i s used by conference delegates in the 
vacations. T 
12. The University lake is an artificial construction. T 
16. The Vice-Chancellor lives on Bishopthorpe Road. F 
24. It is an offence to cycle along the covered walkways. T 
MAIN LIST 
27. The University bursar's office is in Heslington Hall. T 
60. Wentworth bar does not sell alcoholic drinks on Thursdays. F 
41. The University of York has a Medical School. F 
66. The closest supermarket to the University Campus is Hillards. T 
35. Catherine House is situated on the Hull Road. F 
67. The University year begins in November. F 
45. The Sports Centre runs aerobics sessions. T 
8. Different M. P. s serve the University and the City. T 
39. The University Bookshop sells birthday cards. T 
15. Heslington Church is shared by clergy of three denominations* T 
33. Langwith College library is in Derwent. F 
64. Students resident on the Campus have to wash their own bed linen. F 
48. Wentworth is the most recently built college. T 
68. It is illegal to smoke marijuana on the Campus. T 
1. The Vice-Chancellor's name is Professor Laurie Taylor. F 
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57. -It is possible to have your hair cut in Vanbrugh College. T 
62. It is not possible to study philosoph y at undergraduate level. F 
51. The Library Snackbar opens at nine o' clock on Tuesday mornings. F 
3. The name 'Sir Jack Lyons' is affixed to the side of the Biology 
Department. F 
53. Alcuin College is named after an 8th century scholar. T 
14. Central Hall is the largest auditorium on the Campus. T 
50. The University porters wear uniforms. T 
61. The University Book Mart can be found in Wentworth College. T 
19. Students resident on the Campus may not keep cats. T 
37. The Library plastic photocopying cards are revalued using 50 
pence pieces. F 
77. Smoking is permitted on the first floor of the Morrell Library. F 
43. The English Department is located in Derwent College. F 
9. The Department of Electronics is based in Heslington Village. F 
80. The bridge between Vanbrugh and Goodricke has no roof. F 
79. The building- work opposite Derwent is an extension to the Chem- 
istry Department. F 
FOILS 
65. The current Students' Union president is a woman. T 
76. Undergraduate students may not use the University car parking 
facilities. F 
58. The Gilbert & Sullivan Society shows take place in Central [fall .T 
17. A footpedal operates the Morrell Library exit turnstile. T 
5. Alcuin has an 'E' Block. F 
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A6: 3 Instructions for experiment Il 
bENERAL INSTRUCTIONS (WRITTEN) 
This experiment is to find out- how good you are at 'concentrating on 
how sentences SOUND while ignoring their MEANING. 
In a moment you will hear some sentences on tape and you will be 
asked to list , 
in reverse order the last three words in each one. For 
example. in the sentence "The cat sat on the mat" you would say "MAT 
THE ON" because you have to identify the last three words ("on the 
mat") and list them. beginning with the last one and working backwards. 
To make the test harder. the recording is quite quiet and you'll 
only hear it in one ear at a time. 
There are two tasks on the tape: the one I have just decribed and a 
Quiz. The quiz functions as a 'control condition' and gives me a base- 
line against which to compare your performance in the experimental 
test. 
I have prepared two sets of statements suitable for the quiz. One 
set is about the University and the other is about the City of York. 
You may choose which set to use for the quiz (choose the subject you 
know more about). The other set will be used for the experimental 
test, where you just listen for the sounds occurring in the statements. 
Please raise your hand and tell me which subject you would like to 
do the quiz on: the University or the City. 
*** 
Ensure that the microphone is always 
responses are picked up when you record. 
When-you are ready to begin. press the 
one). This will enable you to hear the 
your responses. 
Please speak 
others around you: 
things to do. 
You are being 
first and the Quiz 
near your mouth, so that your 
SPEAK button (not the LISTEN 
pre-recorded tape AND record 
up clearly and confidently. Do not be distracted by 
different people have been given slightly different 
asked t2 do the experimental (word 
. 
listing) test 
afterwards . 
b) INSTRUCTIONS FOR NONPROPOSITIONAL TASK (WRITTEN) 
On the tape is a set of statements about the University of York/ 
City of York (whichever you did not choose for the quiz). All of them 
are either true or false. However, you are not required to judge this. 
Instead. you must listen to the words and when the statement has fini- 
shed, list IN REVERSE ORDER the last three words. For example. in the 
statement "Cardiff' is the capital of Great Britain", your response will 
be "Britain Great of" because the last three words are "of Great Bri- 
tain" and you have to name them beginning with the last and working 
backwards. 
You can tell when a statement has finished because you will hear a 
bell. 
The statements will be presented quite fast, so you will need to 
----------- 
2. Reversed for half the subjects. 
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respond quickly if you are to avoid masking the next statement with 
your answer to the previous one. 
If you realise that you have responded incorrectly. do not let this 
distract you from the remainder of the task. However, there will NOT 
be any opportunity to improve your score afterwards. so the response 
you give must be as accurate as possible. 
Halfway through the test you will be asked to stop the tape and 
change your headphones round. You should do this without undue delay 
and then switch the tape back on by pressing SPEAK as before. 
Please put the 3 working earpiece 
(i. e. with the microphone attached 
to it) on your LEFT ear. 
You may begin (press SPEAK). 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE NONPROPOSITIONAL TASK 
-(SPOKENI 
This task requires you to list, in reverse order, the last three 
words in each statement. You may adjust the volume as you wish. En- 
sure that you have depressed th SPEAK button and not the LISTEN button. 
Please speak confidently and clearly at all times. Answer these preli- 
minary questions by speaking into the microphone. What is your name? 
What is the reference number at the top of your instruction sheet? The 
task now follows. Do not stop the tape until you are instructed to do 
SO. Give the last word first, then the one which preceded it and then 
the one before that. 
[LIST A (40 sentences)] 
Now you must change your headphones round so that the sound enters the 
other ear. Stop the tape now. You should now have changed your head- 
phones round. The sound should now be entering the other ear. Adjust 
the volume if you need to. The task now continues exactly as before. 
[LIST B (40 sentences)] 
Please stop the tape and raise your hand. 
d) INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE PROPOSITIONAL TASK (WRITTEN) 
On the tape is a set of statements about the University of York/ 
City of York (you have chosen which). All of them are either true or 
f alse. When you have heard each statement respond by saying the word 
TRUE, FALSE or DON'T KNOW into the microphone as appropriate. 
You can tell when a statement has finished because you will hear a 
bell. I have tried to avoid any ambiguous or complicated statements. 
The statements will be presented quite fast, so you will need to 
respond quickly if you are to avoid masking the next statement with 
your answer to the previous one. You are not permitted to stop the 
tape until you are instructed to. There is a prize for the highest 
number of points scored. Try not to guess randomly. A "don't know" is 
worth more than a wrong answer. But a right answer is worth most. 
If you realise that you have responded incorrectly, do not let this 
distract you from the remainder of the task. There will be an opportu- 
nity to improve your score afterwards, though a correct answer first 
time through is worth more points. 
Halfway throuih the test you will be asked to stop the tape and 
change your headphones round. You should do this without undue delay 
and then switch the tape back an by pressing SPEAK as before. 
----------- 
3. RIGHT for half the subjects. 
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Please put the 4 working earpiece 
(i. e. with the microphone attached 
to it) on your LEFT ear. 
You may begin (press SPEAK). 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR' THE PROPOSITIONAL TASK (SPOKENJ 
This task requires the answers TRUE. FALSE and DON'T KNOW. You may 
adjust the volume as you wish. Ensure that you have depressed th SPEAK 
button and not the LISTEN button. Please speak confidently and. clearly 
at all times. Answer these preliminary questions by speaking into the 
microphone. What is your name? What is the reference number at the 
top of your instruction sheet? The task now follows. Do not stop the 
tape until you are instructed to do so. Answer with the words TRUE. 
FALSE and DON'T KNOW. 
[LIST A (40 sentences)] 
Now you must change your headphones round so that the sound enters the 
other ear. Stop the tape now. You should now have changed your head- 
phones round. The sound should now be entering the other ear. Adjust 
the volume if you need to. The task now continues exactly as before. 
(LIST B (40 sentences)) 
Please stop the tape and raise your hand. 
A6: 4 Contents of tapes A- 
TAPE A: Instructions for propositional task 
University of York Group A 
Interim instructions 
University of York Group B 
Final instructions 
Gap 
Instructions for non-propositional task 
City of York Group A 
Interim instructions 
City of York Group B 
Final instructions 
TAPE B: Instructions for propositional task 
City of York Group A 
Interim instructions 
City of York Group B 
Final instructions 
Cap 
Instructions for non-propositional task 
University of York Group A 
Interim instructions 
University of York Group B 
Final instructions 
----------- 4. RIGHT for half the subjects. 
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TAPE C: Instructions for non-propositional task 
University of York Group A 
Interim instructions 
University of York Group B 
Final instructions 
Gap 
Instructions for propositional task 
City of York Group A 
Interim instructions 
City of York Group B 
Final instructions 
TAPE D: Instructions for non-propositional task 
City of York Group A 
Interim instructions 
City of York Group B 
Final instructions 
Gap 
Instructions for propositional task 
University of York Group A 
Interim instructions 
University of York Group B 
Final instructions 
a 
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A6: Table iii 
1.2346789 10 
8 gp m prtb 
9 dra m nrtc 
12 cp m nltc 
13 al m qlta 
14 mm m nrtc 
17 ts m prtb 
22 pb m pl ta 
28 aw m nrtd 
29 sg m plta 
30 cw m nltc 
32 rb m prta 
36 gg m nl tc 
37 rm m plta 
39 ks m pl ta 
40 bs m nrtd 
41 jgm prta 
43 dc m nltd 
1 hd f prtb 
2 fc f nl td 
3sff pl ta 
4ctf plta 
6 ic f nl tc 
7 jd f prta 
10 ab f nrtd 
11 sp f prta 
15 cb f nltc 
16 hb f plta 
19 ss f prta 
20 ns f nrtd 
21 bw f nl td 
24 lb f prta 
25 jk f prta 
26 gp f pltb 
27 cr f nltd 
31 sh f pltb 
38 cj f nltd 
42 gl f nrtc 
76.47 
80.00 
84.62 
95-00 
86.67 
100.00 
92-31 
90.00 
76.47 
92.86 
84.62 
92-31 
100.00 
95.45 
78-57 
61-54 
94-74 
66.67 
100.00 
90.00 
94.44 
90.91 
88.24 
100.00 
87-50 
83-33 
80.00 
84.62 
92-31 
88.24 
92-31 
76.47 
88.89 
80.00 
100.00 
93-33 
94.12 
15 19 
37 
11 
52 
12 8 
19 
10 10 
q4 
34 
5 10 
74 
67 
5 12 
46 
22 
86 
26 
58 
54 
42 
56 
84 
34 
46 
12 
77 
45 
9 14 
11 9 
2 13 
85 
4 lo 
32 
36 
5 15 
14 
53 
132 125 1 
180 174 2 
93 88 2 
109 98 2 
141 153 2 
95 123 1 
131 121 1 
101 85 1 
98 107 2 
126 138 1 
33 70 2 
145 133 2 
97 42 1 
46 54 1 
121 129 2 
110 104 1 
io6 113 2 
56 63 1 
138 A8 I 
144 142 1 
170 164 1 
90 101 1 
112 145 1 
145 142 2 
133 125 1 
124 92 1 
126 133 1 
144 154 1 
67 74 1 
169 166 1 
116 113 1 
A3 154 1 
127 127 1 
157 150 1 
56 77 2 
105 101 1 
121 141 1 
A6: iii (EXPT. 2) Total scares for each subject 
Key to columns: l. Subject number (order of testing). 2-subject 
identifier. 3. sex, 4. presentation order group: n/p first task 
(nonpropositional/propositional). r/1 first ear (right/left). 
ta/tb/tc/td = tape a/b/c/d). 5. handedness score. 6. propositional 
task, right ear score (= no. of mistakes), 7- propositional task. left 
ear score, 8. nonpropositional task, right ear score (= no. of words & 
positions correct), 9. nonpropositional task. left ear score. 10. 
A-level subjects groups (1 = humanities. 2= sciences) 
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